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     Executive summary
Recent budgetary developments 
and prospects
In 2005, the budgetary position in the euro area and the
EU improved significantly. In the euro area, the govern-
ment deficit fell by 0.4 percentage point and reached
2.4 percent of GDP. The deficit of the entire EU also
improved by 0.3 percentage points and reached 2.3 per-
cent of GDP in 2005. The deficit reduction in the euro
area and in the EU reflects better than expected eco-
nomic growth, better than expected revenues, as well as
structural budgetary adjustment. It was particularly
important in the countries currently subject to an exces-
sive deficit procedure (EDP). According to the spring
2006 forecasts of the Commission services, the euro area
and EU deficits would remain roughly stable in 2006 and
2007, based on the assumption of unchanged policy.
After increasing in 2005 for a second consecutive year,
the debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU would fall from
63.4 percent in 2005 to 62.9 percent in 2006. 
Since Spring 2005, the Commission and the Council
took action on six Member States currently subject to an
EDP. The Commission and the Council considered that
the Netherlands had corrected its excessive deficit and
the Council decided to abrogate the EDP for this country
in June 2005. In June 2005 the Council also adopted a
decision that an excessive deficit exists in Italy and set
fiscal efforts and deadlines for its correction in a recom-
mendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty. The same
actions were taken in September 2005 for Portugal and
in January 2006 for the UK. In light of the fiscal notifi-
cations of Spring 2006, the Council decided in March
2006 to address a notice in accordance with Article
104(9) to Germany, which has to correct its excessive
deficit in 2007. Finally, the Commission and the Council
considered that Hungary has not respected the recom-
mendations formulated in the 104(7) recommendation.
Since January 2006, twelve EU countries are subject to
an excessive deficit procedure: five euro area Member
States, the UK and six new Member States.
In the context of budgetary surveillance, the Commission
also assessed the 2005 updates of the stability and conver-
gence programmes submitted by Member States and pro-
posed Council Opinions on these documents. In these pro-
grammes, the nominal deficit in the EU and in the euro
area is projected to be reduced from 2.5 percent of GDP in
2005, to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2008. The improvement
relies notably on the large budgetary consolidation pro-
jected in the Member States in EDP. According to the cal-
culations of the Commission based on the figures of the
programmes, the cyclically-adjusted budget balance
(CAB) would improve in the euro area and in the EU from
-2.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to -1.0 percent of GDP in
2008. In 2006 is planned only a minor improvement in the
CAB, while significant structural efforts are envisaged for
2007 and 2008. Most Member States revised their debt
level upwards but project a gradual improvement over the
programme period. 
The EU faces a major budgetary challenge in view of
ageing populations over the coming decades. The assess-
ment of this round of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes suggests that the increased focus on the long-
term sustainability of public finances in the EU – rein-
forced by Ministers in the context of the reform of the
Stability and Growth Pact – has contributed to incorpo-
rate longer-term concerns in the policy-making proc-
esses. The analysis of the 2005/06 updates of the stabil-
ity and convergence programmes reveals that six
Member States (the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus,
Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia), face a high risk with
regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances
in view of the budgetary impact of ageing populations.
Ten Member States (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and
the UK) are at medium risk and the remaining nine coun-
tries (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria,
Poland, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) are at low risk.
For a large majority of countries, achieving the planned
budgetary consolidation over the medium-term would
contribute substantially to reduce the sustainability chal-13
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   lenge. However, for a number of countries structural
reforms in particular in the field of pensions need to
complement the budgetary efforts to ensure a sustainable
fiscal position in the long term.
The EU fiscal framework one year after 
the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
One year ago, the EU heads of State or Government
endorsed the March 2005 Ecofin Council report
containing the main directions for reforming the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. Since then, the revised SGP has
been codified in regulations. Where necessary, further
clarifications on how to interpret the new text of the
regulations were included in a revised Code of Conduct
for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.
This is the case for several provisions regarding the pre-
ventive arm of the SGP, notably the modalities for the
determination of the medium-term budgetary objectives
(MTOs) and the criteria for the assessment of the adjust-
ment path towards the MTOs. Section II of the report
summarises the result of one year of work to codify and
make operational the revised SGP. It also provides a first
review of the implementation of the revised SGP.
The 2005 SGP reform introduced new concepts, defini-
tions and principles in the preventive arm of the SGP. In
order to ensure a consistent application of the rules, a
number of elements were specified since spring 2005.
Notably, the methodology for setting the country-spe-
cific medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) was
clarified and, in parallel, the Commission has started
work on how implicit liabilities could in future be taken
into account in their determination. A number of issues
related to the definition of the adjustment path towards
the MTOs were also clarified, including the conditions
for taking into account structural reforms in the preven-
tive arm of the SGP. 
The Commission assessment of the functioning of the
preventive arm of the pact is mixed. On the positive side,
differentiated medium-term budgetary objectives
reflecting country-specific economic fundamentals were
set in the context of the 2005 updated Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes. In addition, Member States lived
up to their commitment to base their budgetary projec-
tions on realistic macroeconomic assumptions, and the
recourse to one-off measures has clearly declined. The
Commission assessment of the 2005 updated stability
and Convergence Programmes also pointed to some
deviations from the agreed principles. Notably, the struc-
tural fiscal adjustment planned for 2006 by Member
States not yet at their MTO falls short of the 0.5 percent
benchmark agreed at the moment of the reform. This
provides evidence that the benign economic environ-
ment is not being exploited to progress towards the
MTO. In addition, in some Member States, the projected
adjustment is back-loaded and not underpinned by con-
crete measures. 
The experience with the implementation of the excessive
deficit procedure is positive. The Commission reports ini-
tiating the excessive deficit procedure gave consideration
to all elements that appeared relevant for an evaluation of
the situation when deciding on the existence of an exces-
sive deficit and when setting the deadline for its correc-
tion. The increased room for judgement has notably been
applied to set realistic deadlines for Member States to cor-
rect their excessive deficits, while ensuring that signifi-
cant fiscal efforts are made. The application of the provi-
sions related to ‘other relevant factors’ in the steps leading
to a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit con-
firmed that the SGP remains a rules-based framework:
since the reform, all deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP
have been considered excessive. Finally, the SGP reform
stimulated a constructive and transparent policy dialogue
on the individual country cases at EU level, which contrib-
uted to a smooth and efficient operation of the Pact. 
By moving the emphasis from a single indicator to a
more reasoned analysis of budgetary positions, the
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact has reinforced
the need to strengthen the knowledge and understanding
of budgetary developments in each Member State. In the
past twelve months, progress was notably made on
issues related to the measurement of budgetary positions
and policies. The concept of one-off and temporary
measures was specified and clear principles have been
agreed for taking into account such measures in the con-
text of budgetary surveillance. Progress was also made
on the cyclical adjustment of budget deficits: budget sen-
sitivities to the cycle were updated for all Member States
which allowed estimating a new set of values for the
country-specific minimal benchmarks. Over the last
months, several developments have contributed to
improving the quality of budgetary statistics: the Council
amended the regulation governing the transmission of
fiscal data by Member States in order to increase the
operational capacity of Eurostat in assessing the quality
of government statistics and to improve transparency in
the data compilation and notification procedure. Follow-
ing discussions on standards for the institutional set-up14
 E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y
       of national and Community statistical authorities, on
25 May 2005 the Commission recommended that Mem-
ber States recognise the European Statistics Code of
Practice as a common set of standards for statistical
authorities in the EU.
The quantification of the implications for government
finances of population ageing has been improved. Long-
term budgetary projections were updated on the basis of
commonly agreed assumptions and methods for a wide
range of budgetary items (pensions, health-care, long-
term care, education and unemployment benefits). With
regard to the analysis of public finance sustainability in
the context of the assessment of the annual updates of
stability and convergence programmes, some improve-
ments were introduced in the latest assessment round. A
decomposition of the sustainability indicators has been
introduced, which examines whether risks to public
finance sustainability mainly come from the short-term
or long-term budgetary developments. Second, a new
sensitivity test has been introduced, which shows the
additional budgetary cost that arises from a delayed
adjustment. 
Analytical sections
The role of national budgetary rules and institutions 
in promoting sound public finances
The debate on the ways to improve fiscal policies has
recently focused on the need to rebalance the incentives
of policy-makers or impose constraints on the conduct of
fiscal policy via the introduction of adequate fiscal rules
and institutions at national level. At EU level, the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
impose budgetary obligations on Member States. In
order to ensure the respect of objectives, both of them
also stress the importance of national institutions for budg-
etary discipline. In particular, the report on the SGP reform
endorsed by the European Council on 22 March 2005
states that ‘national budgetary rules should be comple-
mentary to the Member States’ commitments under the
Stability and Growth Pact’ and that ‘national institutions
could play a more prominent role in budgetary surveil-
lance’. Section III of the report focuses on national
numerical fiscal rules and independent institutions
which may influence fiscal policy making. It exploits the
results of surveys which review the rules and institutions
in force in the 25 EU Member States in the period 1990-
2005 and assesses whether these arrangements have an
effect on budgetary outcomes. 
It comes out from the analysis of the survey on numerical
fiscal rules that the number of rules in force in EU Mem-
ber States has increased continuously over the past
twenty years. The characteristics of the numerical fiscal
rules in place vary depending on the sub-sector to which
they apply. While most of the rules applied to regional
and local governments are enshrined in a legal text, rules
applying to the whole of the general government sector
are more frequently based on political agreements and
commitments. Similarly, while rules for regional and
local governments seem to have relatively strong
enforcement procedures, rules applying to general and
central governments generally do not envisage ex ante
defined actions in case of non compliance. Statistical and
econometric exercises suggest the existence of a link
between numerical rules and budgetary outcomes. The
analysis takes into account the coverage and characteris-
tics of fiscal rules and controls for various factors that
may affect government budget balance and develop-
ments in primary expenditure. It appears that an increase
in the share of government finances covered by numeri-
cal fiscal rules leads, ceteris paribus, to lower deficits. In
the case of expenditure rules, it appears that an increase
in the coverage of government finances by expenditure
rules leads to a reduction in the primary expenditure-to-
GDP ratio. The analysis also suggests that the character-
istics of fiscal rules matter for their influence on budget-
ary outcomes. Strong rules, enshrined in law or constitu-
tion and foreseeing automatic enforcement mechanisms,
seem to have a larger influence on budgetary outcomes.
The survey on national fiscal institutions shows that, con-
trasting with the conclusion reached for fiscal rules, there
is no visible tendency towards the development of ‘fiscal
councils’ in the EU Member States. There is a large vari-
ety in the type of institutions in place. Two major catego-
ries are distinguished: (i) institutions in charge of provid-
ing forecasts or/and conducting positive analyses on fiscal
policy issues; and (ii) institutions issuing normative state-
ments and recommendations on the conduct of fiscal pol-
icy. Assessing the influence of the institutions covered by
the study on fiscal policy is by nature difficult. However,
combining descriptive analysis, the result of existing stud-
ies on the subject and the answers from the questionnaires,
a number of tentative conclusions on the contribution of
such institutions to fiscal discipline are drawn in the
report. First, delegation of the forecasting activity seems
to be an efficient way to address possible optimistic biases
in macroeconomic projections. Second, the institutions in
place seem to have a considerable impact on the public
debate and the recommendations formulated are generally15
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     followed by governments. Finally, there is a general per-
ception that independent fiscal institutions have contrib-
uted to fiscal discipline.
Fiscal policy in good times
In spite of the unanimous view among economists and
policy -makers that pro-cyclical fiscal policies should be
avoided, counter-cyclical fiscal policies are far from
being the norm in most countries. What is most surpris-
ing is that the available evidence seems to indicate that
in most advanced countries pro-cyclicality is an issue
that mostly arises in good times, when the economic
activity is above potential or when growth is above
trend. This is somehow puzzling, since while in bad
times a trade-off could emerge between the objective of
output stabilisation and that of budgetary discipline, the
two objectives go hand in hand in good times. The direct
consequence of a pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy
is an unnecessary amplification of GDP fluctuations.
Furthermore, the prevalence of pro-cyclical behaviour in
good times is responsible for a considerable share of debt
growth in EU countries. 
The analysis carried out in this years’ Report reveals that
episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy were frequent in
euro-area countries in the past decades. The picture,
however, is quite different depending on the period con-
sidered. While during the run-up to EMU pro-cyclicality
took place mostly during bad times, after the completion
of EMU budgetary corrections in bad times became less
common, but there was a greater incidence of pro-cycli-
cal policies in good times. The separate analysis of gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures reveals that the pro-
cyclical bias is mainly related with the behaviour of
expenditures, which appear to grow faster in periods of
positive output gap. An explanation could be identifica-
tion and implementation lags. Strong pressures to spend
budgetary windfalls accruing in good times would be an
aggravating factor. The analysis also shows that,
although revisions in output gap estimates can be quite
considerable, errors in measuring the cycle in real time
can explain to some extent pro-cyclicality in bad times,
but the same does not hold for pro-cyclical behaviour in
good times. 
A possible response to the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal pol-
icy is setting up national-level rules and institutions that
permit governments to credibly commit not to surrender
to the pressures to increase spending or cut taxes in good
times. Expenditure frameworks aimed at capping the
growth of expenditure over a medium-term framework
can address the tendency for expenditure to grow faster
in good times. Revenue rules that determine ex ante
which share of revenue windfalls will be saved or the
establishment of rainy-day funds can strengthen the
commitment of governments not to spend or give away
via tax cuts better than expected budgetary outcomes
materialising in good times. ‘Fiscal councils’ providing
technical inputs in fiscal policy-making, including via
high-quality independent macroeconomic forecasts and
a thorough estimation of the budgetary impact of policy
measures could permit a better working of the rules
aimed at addressing the pro-cyclical bias. The analysis in
the report supports the view that expenditure rules could
be an effective instrument to curb the pro-cyclical bias.
It is shown that the countries endowed with effective
expenditure frameworks have been less inclined to run
pro-cyclical expenditure policies in good times.
An institutional framework for budgetary policy at
national level that strengthens the ability of governments
to keep budgets under control in strong phases of the
cycle would be consistent with the reformed Stability
and Growth Pact, which puts enhanced emphasis on the
need for countries to step up adjustment efforts in good
times to achieve their medium-term budgetary objec-
tives. Efforts to make progress on this front should not be
delayed. There is mounting evidence that good times are
going to be there again. Growth in the euro area is recov-
ering and output may return above potential in a majority
of countries in the near future. Member States need to
avoid the mistakes of the past and be ready to make the
best use of such an opportunity to combine an appropri-
ate use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool with
progresses towards achieving their medium-term budg-
etary objectives.16
  Part I
Current developments and prospects

  Summary
In 2005, the budgetary position in the euro area and the
EU improved quite significantly. In the euro area, the
nominal deficit fell by 0.4 percentage points and reached
2.4 percent of GDP. The aggregate nominal deficit of the
entire EU also improved by 0.3 percentage points and
reached 2.3 percent of GDP in 2005. Such a relatively
good budgetary performance is due to better than
expected growth performance, higher than expected rev-
enues, as well as structural budgetary adjustment. In
cyclically-adjusted terms, relative to 2004, the deficit in
the euro area was reduced substantially to 1.9 percent of
GDP, an improvement of 0.7 percentage points. The
improvement in the budgetary position was particularly
important in the countries currently subject to an exces-
sive deficit procedure. Germany, Greece and France sub-
stantially reduced their deficits. However, fiscal imbal-
ances increased in Italy and Portugal. Outside the euro
area, apart from Hungary and the UK, all the EDP coun-
tries improved their budget balances, with Cyprus and
Poland bringing their budget deficits below the reference
value.
According to the Spring 2006 forecasts of the Commis-
sion services, the euro area and EU deficits would
remain roughly stable in 2006 and 2007, based on the
assumption of unchanged policy. Projected develop-
ments in the EU and euro area deficits result from
diverse budgetary performances across Member States.
In 2006, the deficit is projected to reach 3 percent of
GDP in France, Poland and the UK, while in Germany
and the Czech Republic it is expected to be just above the
reference value. The deficit would be brought below
3 percent in 2006 in Malta and Slovakia is expected to
further consolidate it below this value. On the other
hand, deficits in Italy, Portugal and Hungary are
expected to remain significant. Among the euro-area
countries with high cyclically-adjusted deficits, struc-
tural improvements over the entire projection period are
expected only in Germany and Portugal. Outside the
euro area, most of the countries are foreseen to see a
worsening or no changes in the cyclically adjusted defi-
cit. The most significant worsening are expected in Hun-
gary, Czech Republic and Poland. The only countries for
which improvements over the forecast period are fore-
seen are Cyprus, Latvia, Slovakia and the UK. Larger
efforts to improve the structural budget positions would
be expected as recent indicators confirm the improve-
ment in economic conditions. This would allow to
ensure sufficient room for the automatic stabilisers to
operate when necessary.
The debt-GDP ratio in the euro area and the EU has
increased for the second consecutive year in 2005. How-
ever, as a consequence of the positive performance of the
underlying fiscal position, the dynamics in the debt-to-
GDP ratio are projected to improve. The euro area debt
ratio is projected to fall from 71.7 percent in 2005 to
70.5 percent in 2006 and 70.1 percent in 2007. In the EU,
the debt-to-GDP ratio would fall from 63.4 percent in
2005 to 63.2 percent in 2006. The debt ratio would
remain particularly high in Belgium, Greece, and in
Italy. In the latter, the debt ratio would continue increas-
ing over the projection period. The debt ratio is also pro-
jected to increase over the next two years from a rela-
tively high level in Germany, France and Portugal.
Since spring 2005, the Commission and the Council took
action on six Member States currently subject to an
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The Commission
and the Council considered that the Netherlands had cor-
rected its excessive deficit and the Council decided to
abrogate the excessive deficit procedure for this country
in June 2005. In June 2005 the Council also adopted a
decision that an excessive deficit exists in Italy and set
fiscal efforts and deadlines for the correction of the
excessive deficit in a recommendation under Article
104(7) of the Treaty. The same decisions and recommen-
dations were adopted in September 2005 for Portugal
and in January 2006 for the UK. In light of the fiscal
notifications of Spring 2006, the Council decided in
March 2006 to address a notice in accordance with Arti-
cle 104(9) to Germany, which has to correct its excessive
deficit in 2007. Finally, the Commission and the Council19
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 considered that Hungary has not respected the recom-
mendations formulated in the 104(7) recommendation.
Since January 2006, twelve EU countries are subject to
an excessive deficit procedure: five euro-area Member
States, the UK and six new Member States.
In the context of budgetary surveillance, the Commission
also assessed the 2005 updates of the stability and conver-
gence programmes submitted by all the Member States
and proposed Council opinions on these documents. The
macroeconomic assumptions underlying the medium-
term budgetary projections have on average been consid-
ered realistic, which is a major progress compared to pre-
vious updates. Regarding budgetary plans, the nominal
deficit in the EU and in the euro area is projected to be
reduced from 2.5 percent of GDP in 2005, to 1.4 percent
of GDP in 2008. The improvement relies notably on the
large budgetary consolidation projected in the Member
States in EDP. According to the calculations of the Com-
mission based on the figures of the programmes, the cycli-
cally-adjusted budget balance (CAB) would improve in
the euro area and in the EU from -2.1 percent of GDP in
2005 to -1.0 percent of GDP in 2008. In 2006 is planned
only a minor improvement in the CAB, while significant
structural efforts are backloaded to 2007 and 2008, but
policy measures are often unspecified. Most Member
States revised their debt level upwards but project a grad-
ual improvement in the debt ratio over the programme
period. Apart from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia and the UK, all non-euro-area Member States are
expected to have lower debt levels in 2008 than in 2005.
By the end of the programme period, only in Malta gov-
ernment debt is expected to stay above the 60 percent of
GDP reference value.
The EU faces a major budgetary challenge in view of
ageing populations over the coming decades. The assess-
ment of this round of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes suggests that the increased focus on the long-
term sustainability of public finances in the EU – rein-
forced by Ministers in the context of the reform of the
Stability and Growth Pact – has contributed to incorpo-
rate longer-term concerns in the policy-making proc-
esses. The analysis of the 2005/06 updates of the stabil-
ity and convergence programmes reveals that six
Member States (the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus,
Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia), face a high risk with
regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances
in view of the budgetary impact of ageing populations.
Ten Member States (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and
the UK) are at medium risk and the remaining nine coun-
tries (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria,
Poland, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) are at low risk.
For a large majority of countries, achieving the planned
budgetary consolidation over the medium-term as envis-
aged in the programmes would contribute substantially to
reduce the sustainability challenge. However, for a number
of countries structural reforms in particular in the field of
pensions need to complement the budgetary efforts to
ensure a sustainable fiscal position in the long term.20
   1. Budgetary developments in the euro area 
and EU Member States
1.1. Short-term developments 
and prospects for the budget balance 
and public debt
In 2005, the budgetary position in the euro area
improved significantly after a slight improvement in
2004 following deterioration in period 2001-2003 (see
Table I.1). Compared to 2004, the nominal deficit fell by
0.4 percentage point and reached 2.4 percent of GDP.
The aggregate nominal deficit of the entire EU also
improved by 0.3 percentage points and reached 2.3 per-
cent of GDP in 2005 (see Table I.2).
The aggregate outcome for the euro area as a whole
results from diverse budgetary performances across
Member States. In the case of Germany, France, Greece,
Italy and Portugal the budgetary positions in 2005
remained weak with nominal deficits ranging from
2.9 percent of GDP in France to 6 percent of GDP in Por-
tugal. It is, however, important to stress substantial
improvement in budget balances of Greece (of 2.4 per-
centage points), France (0.8 percentage points) and Ger-
many (0.4 percentage points). On the other hand budget-
ary situation worsened in Italy and Portugal by
respectively 0.7 and 2.8 percentage points. Among the
countries mentioned above, only France succeeded in
bringing its deficit below the 3 percent of GDP reference
value in 2005. In 2005 the nominal deficit has signifi-
cantly improved in Spain and the Netherlands, respec-
tively, by 1.2 and 1.6 percentage points Given the
improved growth conditions in 2005, the Netherlands
joined the group of countries that had nominal budget
positions in balance or in surplus in 2004 (in 2005 – Bel-
gium, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands and Finland; in
2004, only Belgium, Ireland and Finland and Spain).
Overall, the nominal budget balances in 2005 worsened
compared to the previous year only in the case of Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal.
Certainly, the budgetary performance also differed
across the Member States outside the euro area. Relative
to 2004, the budget position remained roughly
unchanged or improved in a large majority of Member
States with exception of Hungary and the UK, where
deficits widened further. Nominal budget balances in
2005 varied from a deficit of 6.1 percent of GDP in Hun-
gary to a surplus of 4.9 percent of GDP in Denmark.
Only in the case of Hungary, Malta and the UK, the nom-
inal deficit in 2005 was above the reference value of
3 percent of GDP while a number of countries reached a
surplus budgetary position (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia
and Sweden). The improvement was particularly impor-
tant in Denmark, Cyprus, Malta and Poland.
Looking ahead to 2006 and 2007, the Commission
Spring 2006 forecasts project that economic growth in
the euro area as a whole will hover around 2 percent
reaching 2.1 percent in 2006 and decline temporarily to
1.8 percent in 2007. The nominal budget balance is
expected to stay at 2.4 percent of GDP in 2006 and
improve slightly in 2007 (2.3 percent of GDP). Despite
the improving economic situation, given the difficulties
in pursuing budgetary consolidation, the aggregate nom-
inal deficit for the entire EU is foreseen to hold stable at
2.3 percent of GDP in 2006 and decline only slightly to
2.2 percent of GDP in 2007.
At the Member State level, the surplus budgetary posi-
tion in the case of Belgium is expected to deteriorate into
a deficit position in 2006, while the surplus in Ireland is
expected to be significantly reduced. Under a no-policy-
change assumption, the deficits in both countries would
continue to worsen in 2007. In contrast, Spain and Fin-
land are expected to maintain their budgetary positions
in surplus throughout the forecast period. Among the
Member States outside the euro area, this is also the case
of Denmark, Estonia and Sweden.21
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 On the basis of current policies, the Commission forecast
projects that the nominal deficits in Germany, Italy and
Portugal will be exceeding the 3 percent of GDP refer-
ence value in 2006 while Greece is expected to reach the
3 percent of GDP reference value. While the German
deficit will improve and be just above the 3 percent ref-
erence value and an improvement is expected also for the
Portuguese deficit (which remains however at 5 percent
of GDP), no improvement is expected for the Italian def-
icit. According to the Commission forecast, the budget-
ary situation is expected to slightly worsen in France as
a deficit of 3 percent of GDP is projected. In 2007, apart
from Germany all the abovementioned countries are
expected to stay above the 3 percent of GDP reference
value or to breach it again. In Germany, the nominal def-
icit is projected to remain above 3 percent of GDP in
2006 and move below the reference value in 2007. In
Greece, the nominal deficit is expected to be at 3 percent
of GDP in 2006 and worsen again in 2007. Although the
excessive deficit procedure for Portugal was abrogated
in 2004, the nominal deficit is foreseen to exceed 3 per-
cent of GDP again in both 2005 and 2006. In Italy,
although the nominal deficit is projected beyond the
threshold in 2005 and will deteriorate further in 2006.
The nominal deficit is projected to stay above the refer-
ence value also in some other Member States. Despite an
already very high deficit, budgetary situation in Hungary
is projected to worsen in 2006 and 2007, when it is
expected to reach 7 percent of GDP. Following good
budgetary performance in 2005, deficit in the Czech
Republic is expected to be above the reference value
throughout the forecast period, while for Poland, it is
expected to stay at 3 percent of GDP. In Malta, after a
solid consolidation below the reference value expected for
2006, the deficit is expected to be above 3 percent of GDP
again in 2007. In the UK, it is foreseen to be at 3 percent
of GDP in 2006 and decline below the deficit reference
value in 2007. In 2006, most of the new Member States
expect the nominal deficit increase slightly or to remain
unchanged. In the case of Latvia, a significant deteriora-
tion is projected for 2006, while the surplus in Estonia is
expected to be reduced over the forecast period.
In cyclically-adjusted terms, relative to 2004, the deficit
in the euro area was reduced substantially to 1.9 percent
of GDP, an improvement of 0.7 percentage points.
According to the Commission Spring 2006 forecasts, the
cyclically adjusted budget balance is projected to
increase slightly in 2006 and improve again slightly in
2007. Among the euro-area countries with higher cycli-
cally-adjusted deficits, improvements over the entire
projection period are expected only in Germany and Por-
tugal. In Greece a significant improvement is expected in
2006, however for 2007, the cyclically-adjusted deficit
should be higher again. In Italy, no improvement is fore-
seen in 2006 and for 2007, a widening of the cyclically-
adjusted deficit is projected. No change over the forecast
period is foreseen for France, the cyclically-adjusted
deficit is expected to stay at 2.5 percent of GDP.
Outside the euro area, most of the countries are foreseen
to see a worsening or no changes in the cyclically adjusted
deficit. The most significant deteriorations are expected in
Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, where the deficits
are foreseen to reach respectively 7.1 percent, 4 percent
and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2007. The only countries for
which improvements over the forecast period are foreseen
are Cyprus, Latvia, Slovakia and the UK.   
The euro area government debt-to-GDP ratio increased to
70.8 percent in 2005 (see Table I.3). According to the
Commission Spring 2006 forecasts, the debt ratio is pro-
jected to decline slightly in 2006, which would be for the
first time since 2002, to 70.5 percent of GDP and again in
2007 reaching 70.1 percent of GDP. Over the period
2005-2007, it is expected that the primary surplus coupled
with the stock flow adjustment would more than offset the
negative contribution to the change in debt ratio from
interest expenditure. The aggregate debt ratio in the EU at
63.4 percent of GDP in 2005 is lower in comparison to the
euro area. The EU debt ratio is projected to fall over the
forecast period and to reach 62.9 percent of GDP in 2007.
As it was the case with the euro area, the overall positive
contribution from the primary balance and stock flow
adjustment will more than offset the negative contribution
from interest expenditure/growth.
Aggregate figures tend to hide different pictures across
countries. In 2005, Greece and Italy continued to have
debt ratios above 100 percent of GDP, and this is
expected to still be the case also in 2007. Belgium man-
aged to reduce its debt below this level already in 2003
and its debt ratio is expected to be reduced further in the
future. In addition to these three countries, seven EU
Member States are projected to have debt ratios above
60 percent of GDP in 2007. This includes Hungary,
which is expected to breach the 60 percent of GDP ref-
erence value in 2007. Despite an overall bright picture at
the euro area and EU levels the combined effect of poor
growth performance and interest expenditure is never-
theless expected to significantly affect the budgetary22
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                     situation in Italy, Portugal and Poland, where in addition
primary deficits are projected over the forecast period.     
1.2. Government revenue and expenditure
The developments in the EU and euro-area budgetary
positions are derived from changes in expenditure and
revenue ratios. On the spending side, the euro area
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in 2005 stayed at the same
level as in 2004, both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted
terms (see Table I.4). The reductions in interest and sub-
sidies offset the increases in social benefits. According
to the Commission Spring 2006 forecasts, the expendi-
ture ratio is projected to decline further during the fore-
cast period with additional reduction of collective con-
sumption and social transfers other than in kind, while
other items are foreseen to remain broadly unchanged.
On the revenue side, the revenue-to-GDP ratio increased
in 2005, both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms
and it is expected to decline in the coming years.
At the Member State level, the patterns are generally
similar (see Table I.5.). Only in Spain, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and the Netherlands and outside the euro area in
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and UK expenditure
ratios are projected to increase over the 2005-07 period.
In contrast, over the same period, large decreases are
expected in Germany, Greece, Austria, Denmark,
Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slove-
nia. Revenue ratios are set to increase pronouncedly over
2005-07 in the case of the Netherlands and Portugal and
outside the euro area, in the UK, whereas important
reductions are foreseen in Belgium, Austria, Finland,
Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania and Malta.
In the euro-area, the projected decrease in tax revenues
on income and wealth, social contributions and other
resources is being offset by an expected decline in
expenditure on collective consumption, social benefits
other than in kind and interests. Such a development
reflects lessons from the past showing that tax measures
resulting in a decline of tax revenues should be accom-
panied by expenditure cuts to avoid the worsening of the
general government balances.
Nevertheless, the composition of expenditure adjust-
ment should not constrain growth enhancing spending
items such as public investment, education and R & D.
This doesn’t seem to be the case as expenditure on gross
fixed capital formation is broadly stable at around
2.5 percent of GDP at annual level. The reduction in
interest expenditure that has particularly contributed to a
better allocation of available resources in past years will
slowly continue.
Table I.1
General government budgetary position — Euro area, 2001-2006 (% of GDP)
2002(1) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total revenue (1) 45.1 45.1 44.7 45.1 45.0 44.8
Total expenditure (2) 47.6 48.1 47.5 47.5 47.4 47.1
Actual balance (3)  = (1) — (2) – 2.5 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.3
Interest (4) 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Primary balance (5)  = (3) + (4) 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
UTMS proceeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyclically-adjusted balance (6) – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 1.9
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance  = (6) + (4) 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.1
Change in actual balance – 0.7 – 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0
Due to:  — Cycle – 0.5 – 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.1
  — UMTS 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  — Interest 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
  — Cyclically-adjusted primary balance – 0.5 – 0.1 0.0 0.6 – 0.1 0.1
NB: differences are due to rounding.
(1) Including UMTS receipts. UMTS receipts as a percent of GDP would be equal in 2002 to 0.2 for IE and 0 for the euro area and EU-15.
Source: Commission Spring 2006 forecasts.23
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                                                                    1.2.1. The fiscal stance and policy mix 
in the euro area
An appropriate policy mix can be defined as a combina-
tion of monetary and fiscal policies that ensures price
stability and keeps economic activity close to its poten-
tial level. In the euro area, given that monetary policy is
centralised and fiscal policies decentralised, it is of a par-
ticular importance to assess both the aggregate fiscal
stance at the euro area level and national fiscal stances.
Namely, the aggregate fiscal stance affects the policy
mix at the euro area level and is, therefore, one of the ele-
ments to be considered by the ECB when setting the
monetary policy.
Graph I.1 examines the fiscal stance (approximated by
the changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance,
CAPB) in relation to cyclical conditions (approximated
by the size of the output gap) (1). In this graph, fiscal
behaviour in accordance with the SGP would be repre-
sented by movements along the horizontal axis. In other
words, countries would achieve and maintain broadly
Table I.2
Budget balances in EU Member States, 2004-2007 (% of GDP) 
Budget balance Cyclically-adjusted budget balance
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance
2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 0.0 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.1 – 0.3 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.6
DE – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.5 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 2.3 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.5
EL – 6.9 – 4.5 – 3.0 – 3.6 – 7.7 – 5.3 – 3.8 – 4.4 – 2.3 – 0.3 1.1 0.6
ES – 0.1 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 2.0 3.1 3.0 2.5
FR – 3.7 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.1 – 3.6 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
IE 1.5 1.0 0.1 – 0.4 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.8 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.0
IT – 3.4 – 4.1 – 4.1 – 4.5 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 3.4 – 3.8 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9
LU – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 1.1 – 0.9
NL – 1.9 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.9 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.2 1.7 3.5 2.1 2.1
AT – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.7 – 1.2 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.4
PT – 3.2 – 6.0 – 5.0 – 4.9 – 2.7 – 5.1 – 4.0 – 3.8 0.0 – 2.4 – 1.1 – 0.7
FI 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.0 2.7 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.1
EUR-12 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 1.9 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.1
CZ – 2.9 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 3.6 – 4.0 – 0.8 – 1.4 – 2.2 – 2.6
DK 2.7 4.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 5.4 3.9 4.0 6.1 7.3 5.7 5.5
EE 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.5 2.0 1.7 1.3 0.7
CY – 4.1 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 2.1 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.0
LV – 0.9 0.2 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.2 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.1 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.2
LH – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3
HU – 5.4 – 6.1 – 6.7 – 7.0 – 5.2 – 5.8 – 6.6 – 7.1 – 1.1 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.5
MT – 5.1 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 3.2 – 3.9 – 2.4 – 2.2 – 2.6 0.1 1.5 1.6 1.1
PL – 3.9 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.0 – 4.2 – 2.6 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 1.6 – 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.9
SI – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.7 0.0 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3
SK – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.4
SE 1.8 2.9 2.2 2.3 1.9 3.0 2.1 2.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 3.9
UK – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.5
EU-25 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.9 – 1.8 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.9
NB:  Cyclically-adjusted ﬁgures are computed with the Production Function method.
Source: Commission Spring 2006 forecasts.
¥1∂ In line with the Council agreement, the output gap in this section is com-
puted with the Production Function method. It should be noted, however,
that changes in the output gap are equally relevant for the judgment of the
stance in relation to cyclical conditions. The changes in the gap can be
inferred in Graph I.1 by looking at the horizontal distance between years.24
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                                              balanced budgets over the economic cycle. Thus,
changes in the output gap would not imply movements
in the CAPB. However, as long as a Member State has
not yet reached the medium-term target of the SGP, a
restrictive fiscal stance – that is a positive change in
CAPB – would be needed.
According to the Commission Spring 2006 forecasts, the
euro area fiscal stance in 2005 was slightly on the side of
pro-cyclical fiscal tightening. Looking ahead to 2006
and 2007, the euro area fiscal stance is projected to
become again broadly neutral. Lessons from the past
show that efforts to improve the underlying budget posi-
tions should be made as economic conditions improve in
order to ensure sufficient room for the automatic stabilis-
ers to operate in the next downturn.
Graph I.2 illustrates the euro area policy-mix, by plotting
the fiscal stance on the vertical axis and the monetary
stance (approximated by the change in the short-term
real interest rates) on the horizontal axis. Against the
background of a protracted slowdown in economic activ-
ity, the monetary stance tightened somewhat and became
more neutral in 2004, after three consecutive years of
loosening. In 2005, it remained broadly neutral, while
the euro area fiscal stance was being tightened.    
Table I.3
Composition of changes in government debt ratio in EU Member States, 2004-2007 (% of GDP)
Gross debt
Change in 
gross debt 
2005-07
Change in 2005-07 due to:
2004 2005 2006 2007 Primary balance
Interest & 
growth 
contribution
Stock flow 
adjustment
BE 94.7 93.3 89.8 87.0 – 6.3 – 6.9 0.6 – 0.1
DE 65.5 67.7 68.9 69.2 1.5 0.0 2.8 – 1.2
EL 108.5 107.5 105.0 102.1 – 5.4 – 3.3 – 3.2 1.1
ES 46.4 43.2 40.0 37.9 – 5.2 – 4.5 – 2.2 1.5
FR 64.4 66.8 66.9 67.0 0.3 0.9 0.5 – 1.1
IE 29.4 27.6 27.2 27.0 – 0.6 – 2.1 – 1.7 3.2
IT 103.8 106.4 107.4 107.7 1.3 – 0.7 2.3 – 0.3
LU 6.6 6.2 7.9 8.2 2.0 3.0 – 0.7 – 0.3
NL 52.6 52.9 51.2 50.3 – 2.6 – 2.8 0.7 – 0.5
AT 63.6 62.9 62.4 61.6 – 1.4 – 2.0 0.2 0.4
PT 58.7 63.9 68.4 70.6 6.8 3.9 1.7 1.1
FI 44.3 41.1 39.7 38.3 – 2.8 – 8.1 – 0.4 5.7
EUR-12 69.8 70.8 70.5 70.1 – 0.7 – 1.2 0.7 – 0.2
CZ 30.6 30.5 31.5 32.4 1.9 3.9 – 0.9 – 1.1
DK 42.6 35.8 30.0 26.5 – 9.3 – 11.2 – 0.2 2.2
EE 5.4 4.8 3.6 3.0 – 1.7 – 2.6 – 0.6 1.4
CY 71.7 70.3 69.1 67.8 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 2.0 1.5
LV 14.6 11.9 11.3 10.9 – 1.1 0.9 – 2.0 0.0
LT 19.5 18.7 18.9 19.7 1.0 0.1 – 2.1 3.0
HU 57.1 58.4 59.9 62.0 3.6 6.3 – 0.4 – 2.3
MT 76.2 74.7 74.0 74.0 – 0.7 – 1.3 0.3 0.3
PL 41.9 42.5 45.5 46.7 4.2 0.9 0.4 2.8
SI 29.5 29.1 29.9 29.7 0.6 0.6 – 0.7 0.7
SK 41.6 34.5 34.3 34.7 0.2 1.3 – 2.6 1.7
SE 50.5 50.3 47.6 44.8 – 5.5 – 8.1 – 1.1 3.7
UK 40.8 42.8 44.1 44.7 1.9 1.7 0.1 0.2
EU-25 62.4 63.4 63.2 62.9 – 0.5 – 0.9 0.5 – 0.1
Source: Commission Spring 2006 Economic Forecasts.25
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2 0 0 61.2.2. The fiscal stance and policy mix 
at the national level
The aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area results from
a variety of diverse fiscal stances across Member States
despite fairly similar cyclical developments, Graph I.3
shows that most EU-25 countries recorded a negative
output gap in 2005 with the exception of Greece, Poland
and the Baltic States.
In 2005, several EU countries ran moderately broadly
neutral fiscal policies in a context of negative output gaps.
Policies were, however, clearly countercyclical in the case
of Portugal, Hungary, Italy and Luxemburg. It is worth
mentioning that the nominal budget balances in these
countries markedly worsened in the course of 2005.
The Netherlands, Cyprus and Malta ran pro-cyclical pol-
icy in 2005, reflecting consolidation efforts in order to
improve the budgetary position. At the same time France
also tightened its fiscal stance in order to bring the deficit
below the 3 percent of GDP reference value.
As pointed out above, the overall policy-mix in the euro
area in 2005 was characterised by a neutral monetary
stance and tightened fiscal policy stance with most
Member States experiencing an adjustment of the fiscal
stance (see Graph I.4).
The real interest rate for the euro area (i.e. the short-term
interest rate corrected by private consumption inflation)
amounted to below 0.3 percent in 2005. However, this
aggregate figure for the euro area conceals significant
differences across Member States due to disparities in
inflation rates across countries. The highest real interest
rates were in France, Finland and Germany (1 percent,
0.9 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively), whereas in a
number of countries (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy and
Portugal) the real interest rates were negative.
Regarding 2006, the overall fiscal stance of the euro area
is expected to be broadly neutral (see Graph I.5),
although some pro-cyclical fiscal easing is expected,
particularly in the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Finland
and Belgium. Greece and Portugal are projected to con-
siderably tighten their fiscal stances. Outside the euro
area, Denmark, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Latvia
are projected to substantially ease their fiscal stance,
while the UK is expected to tighten it.    
Table I.4
Euro area government revenue and expenditure, 2003-2007 (% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total revenue 45.1 44.7 45.1 45.0 44.8
 — Cyclically-adjusted 45.3 44.9 45.5 45.4 45.2
Taxes on imports and production 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.8
Current taxes on income and wealth 11.5 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.4
Social contributions 15.8 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.3
 of which actual social contributions 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.2
Other revenue 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3
Total expenditure 48.1 47.5 47.5 47.4 47.1
 — Cyclically-adjusted 48.1 47.4 47.4 47.3 47.1
Collective consumption 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9
Social benefits in kind 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.3 12.3
Social benefits other than in kind 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.7 16.5
Interest 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9
Subsidies 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
Other expenditures 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.8
NB:  Including UMTS receipts. See footnote to Table I.1.
NB:  Data from the Commission October 2005 forecasts for Italy have been used in order to estimate the aggregate value for ‘Collective consumptions’ and for ‘Social
beneﬁts in kind’.
Source: Commission Spring 2006 forecasts.26
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Total revenue and expenditure in EU Member States, 2004-2007 (% of GDP)
Revenue Expenditure
2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 49.4 50.1 49.3 48.5 49.5 50.1 49.7 49.5
DE 43.2 43.4 43.1 43.0 46.8 46.7 46.1 45.5
EL 42.0 41.8 41.9 41.3 48.8 46.2 44.8 44.9
ES 38.7 39.3 39.3 38.8 38.8 38.2 38.3 38.5
FR 49.6 51.0 51.0 50.7 53.2 53.9 54.1 53.8
IE 35.2 35.5 35.1 34.7 33.7 34.5 34.9 35.1
IT 44.3 44.0 44.0 43.8 47.8 48.2 48.1 48.4
LU 42.1 42.4 42.2 42.3 43.2 44.3 44.0 43.8
NL 44.5 45.4 46.5 46.4 46.6 45.7 47.7 47.1
AT 48.8 48.0 46.6 46.8 50.0 49.6 48.7 48.3
PT 43.2 41.8 43.0 43.1 46.4 47.8 48.0 48.0
FI 52.4 53.1 52.7 52.1 50.3 50.7 50.1 49.8
EUR-12 44.7 45.1 45.0 44.8 47.5 47.5 47.4 47.1
CZ 41.4 41.1 40.8 40.4 44.3 43.7 44.1 43.9
DK 57.2 57.4 54.7 53.8 54.6 52.7 50.9 50.0
EE 37.9 37.5 37.3 36.8 36.4 35.9 35.8 35.9
CY 39.7 42.3 41.8 41.8 43.8 44.7 43.9 43.8
LV 34.9 36.4 36.1 36.1 35.9 36.2 37.1 37.1
LH 31.9 33.1 32.0 30.7 33.4 33.7 32.6 31.7
HU 44.1 44.5 43.1 42.2 49.5 50.6 49.8 49.2
MT 43.4 44.2 42.4 40.2 48.5 47.5 45.3 43.4
PL 38.6 40.8 41.6 40.7 42.5 43.3 44.6 43.7
SI 45.3 45.5 45.5 45.3 47.6 47.3 47.3 47.0
SK 35.9 33.9 33.0 32.5 38.9 36.8 35.7 34.6
SE 58.3 59.1 58.2 57.7 56.7 56.4 56.1 55.6
UK 39.9 41.3 42.2 42.7 43.2 44.8 45.2 45.5
EU-25 44.3 44.9 44.9 44.7 47.0 47.2 47.1 46.9
p.m. EU-15 44.5 45.1 45.1 45.0 47.2 47.4 47.3 47.2
p.m. EU-10 39.9 40.8 40.7 39.9 43.5 43.7 43.9 43.2
NB:  Including UMTS receipts. see footnote to Table I.1.
Source: Commission Spring 2005 forecasts.27
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Graph I.2:  Euro-area policy-mix, 2001-2005
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Graph I.4:  Policy-mix in the euro-area Member States, 2005
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2. Implementing the Stability 
and Growth Pact
2.1. Introduction
The fiscal framework of EMU aims at ensuring budget-
ary discipline through two main requirements. These are
the Treaty requirements to avoid excessive deficit posi-
tions, measured against reference values for deficits and
debt of 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP respectively,
and the requirement for Member States to achieve and
maintain their medium-term budgetary objective
(MTO). Compliance with the MTO secures fiscal disci-
pline and the sustainability of public finances, and thus
contributes to maintaining an economic environment in
which monetary policy can effectively pursue price sta-
bility. It also provides the necessary room for manoeuvre
to allow the automatic stabilisers to play freely without
breaching the 3 percent reference value of the Treaty.
The rules-based framework of the Treaty and SGP con-
sists of both preventive and dissuasive elements, both of
which are backed up with enforcement procedures.
Box I.1 makes a description of these procedures. During
2005 and the early part of 2006, the Commission and
Council applied the various enforcement mechanisms of
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) against several Mem-
ber States. This section reviews the implementation of
these mechanisms since spring 2005 in the EU countries.
2.2. The excessive deficit procedure 
since spring 2005
Since spring 2005, the Commission and the Council took
action concerning six Member States in EDP. The Com-
mission and the Council considered that the Netherlands
had corrected its excessive deficit and the Council
decided to abrogate the excessive deficit procedure for
this country on 7 June 2005. The Council decided to
address a notice in accordance with Article 104(9) to
Germany, which has to correct its excessive deficit in
2007. The Council decided that Portugal, the UK and
Italy were in excessive deficit and set fiscal efforts and
deadlines for their correction in 104(7) recommenda-
tions. Finally, the Commission and the Council consid-
ered that Hungary has not respected the recommenda-
tions formulated in the 104(7) recommendation. Since
January 2006, twelve EU countries are subject to an
excessive deficit procedure: five euro-area Member
States, the UK and six new Member States (1).
2.2.1. The surveillance mechanisms in the euro-area 
countries
Germany and France
Summary of past events
Following evidence of government deficits above 3 per-
cent of GDP in 2002, the Council decided in spring 2003
that excessive deficits existed in Germany and in France
and adopted recommendations under Article 104(7) with
a view to bringing this situation to an end by 2004. In
autumn 2003, the Commission considered that the
actions implemented were inadequate and recommended
the Council to adopt decisions giving notice to these two
countries to correct the excessive deficit by 2005.
On 25 November 2003, the Council voted on the recom-
mended decisions but did not achieve the required major-
ity. Instead the Council adopted conclusions addressing
recommendations to Germany and France for the correc-
tion of the excessive deficit by 2005 and stating that the
excessive deficit procedure was held in abeyance. The
Commission brought the case before the Court of Justice
of the European Communities. On 13 July 2004, the Court
annulled the Council conclusions in so far as they aimed
¥1∂ For documents concerning these procedures, see the section on fiscal sur-
veillance on the website of the DG ECFIN: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm.31
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existing recommendations.
On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted a Com-
munication clarifying the situation of Germany and
France in relation to the excessive deficit procedure. The
Commission recognised that the actions of the two
Member States concerned taken in the aftermath of the
Council conclusions of 25 November 2003 and up to
their annulment by the Court on 13 July 2004 were based
on the notion that the deadline for the correction of the
deficit had been effectively moved to 2005. The Com-
mission considered that the assessment of the actions
taken to correct the excessive deficit situation should
refer to 2005 as the relevant deadline. In the Communi-
cation, the Commission stated that the actions taken by
the German and French authorities were broadly consist-
ent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2005 and
that no further steps were necessary under the excessive
deficit procedure. The Council agreed with this position.
Germany
The German statistics office announced on 22 February
2006 that the public deficit in 2005 was 3.3 percent of
GDP, down from 3.7 percent in 2004 but above the
3.0 percent reference value set in the Treaty. In addition,
the deficit is expected by the German authorities to remain
above the 3 percent of GDP threshold in 2006. The Com-
mission recommended to the Council to give notice to
Germany, according to Article 104(9) of the Treaty, to
correct its excessive deficit by 2007. Such a notice was
adopted by the Council on 14 March 2006. In this notice,
the Council acknowledged that the German government
that took office in November 2005 has adopted a compre-
hensive budgetary consolidation strategy in a context of
still fragile economic recovery to bring the deficit below
the 3 percent reference value by 2007.
The Commission and the Council considered that, on the
basis of currently available information, the fiscal effort
implied in the strategy until 2007 would be in line with the
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, the
Commission and the Council also considered that the
adoption process of this strategy was well advanced, which
reduces uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the con-
solidation. The Council recommended in the notice that
Germany corrects the excessive deficit by 2007 at the latest
and ensures that the budget balance in structural terms (i.e.
disregarding cyclical effects and one-off and temporary
measures) improves by at least one percentage point cumu-
latively in 2006 and 2007. Germany shall submit to the
Commission, by 14 July 2006 at the latest, a report outlin-
ing the measures taken to comply with the notice. Other
reports should be submitted by 1 October 2006,
1 April 2007, 1 October 2007 and 1 April 2008, examin-
ing the progress made. The latest Commission forecast
shows a deficit just above the reference value in 2006 and
well below it in 2007.
France
The French deficit was reduced to just below the reference
value in 2005. The deficit reduction notably reflects large
Graph I.6:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Germany
– 5
– 4
– 3
– 2
– 1
0
1
2
3
4
2003
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
D
P
2004 Stab. Prog. 2005 Stab. Prog. Com. forec. Spring 2006
Reference value
Budget balance
GDP growth
20092008200720062005200432
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sone-off revenues and statistical revisions. For 2006, the
Commission projects a deficit at the reference value
(including one-off revenues amounting to 0.2 percent of
GDP). The no-policy change projection for 2007 shows a
deficit slightly above 3 percent of GDP. Taking into
account the uncertainties surrounding the deficit forecasts
for 2006 and 2007, the Commission will continue in the
coming months its monitoring of the budgetary develop-
ments in France and assess whether the correction of the
excessive deficit is firmly established.
Portugal
The update of the stability programme submitted on
9 June 2005 by the Portuguese authorities revealed the
plans for a general government deficit in excess of the
3 percent of GDP reference value of the Treaty for the
years from 2005 to 2007. More specifically, after a
reported deficit outturn of 2.9 percent in 2004, Portugal
planned to record a government deficit of 6.2 percent of
GDP for 2005, 4.8 percent in 2006, 3.9 percent in 2007
and 2.8 percent of GDP in 2008. Over the same years, the
debt-to-GDP ratio was projected to increase from
61.9 percent in 2004 to a peak of 67.8 percent of GDP in
2007. On this basis, the Council decided on 20 Septem-
ber 2005 that Portugal has an excessive deficit.
On the same date, the Council addressed a recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive
deficit had to be corrected by 2008. Specifically, Portu-
gal was recommended to limit the deterioration of the
fiscal position in 2005 and to ensure a correction of the
structural deficit of some 1.5 percent of GDP in 2006
from 2005, followed by a further decrease of, at least,
ã percent of GDP in each of the two subsequent years.
At the same time, Portugal was invited to rapidly imple-
ment reforms to contain and reduce expenditure and to
stand ready to adopt the additional measures which may
be necessary to achieve the correction of the excessive
deficit by 2008. In addition, the Portuguese authorities
were recommended to ensure that the government gross
debt ratio is brought onto a downward path also by
avoiding debt-increasing financial transactions, and by
considering carefully the possible impact on debt of
major public investment projects.
The Council established the deadline of 19 March 2006
for the Portuguese government to take effective action in
order to achieve the 2006 deficit target. The Commission
will carry out an assessment of the efforts made by the
Portuguese authorities in the coming weeks. This assess-
ment will take into account the results of the spring 2006
Commission forecast that shows a 2006 deficit some-
what higher than recommended.
Greece
On 4 May 2004, the Greek authorities submitted a
revised EDP notification showing a 2003 deficit of
3.2 percent of GDP. The Council, also taking into
account developments in the debt ratio, decided that an
excessive deficit exists in Greece and addressed on
Graph I.7:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in France
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view to bringing the excessive deficit situation to an end
by 2005. The Council established the deadline of
5 November 2004 for Greece to take appropriate meas-
ures to this end.
Based on its autumn 2004 forecast incorporating the data
revisions of the September 2004 notification and project-
ing the 2005 deficit at 3.6 percent of GDP, on 22 Decem-
ber 2004 the Commission recommended to the Council
to decide under Article 104(8) that no effective action
had been taken in response to its 104(7) recommendation.
The Council decided accordingly on 18 January 2005.
On 9 February 2005, the Commission recommended to
the Council to give notice to Greece, in accordance with
Article 104(9) of the Treaty, to take the necessary meas-
ures to remedy its excessive deficit situation. The Com-
mission recommended extending the deadline for bring-
ing the deficit below the 3.0 percent reference value by
one year to 2006. When taking this decision, the Com-
mission took into account the fact that the 2004 deficit
would likely be substantially higher than expected, due
to statistical revisions and to expenditure overruns asso-
ciated notably with the organisation of the Olympic
games. In addition, the Commission considered that
GDP growth prospects for 2005 and 2006 had become
less favourable, making the reduction of the deficit more
difficult.
On 17 February 2005, the Council adopted a decision
giving notice to Greece, in accordance with Article
104(9) of the Treaty, to take measures to remedy the sit-
uation of excessive deficit as rapidly as possible and at
the latest by 2006 through (i) a rigorous implementation
of the 2005 budget as approved by the Parliament;
(ii) implementing in 2006 adjustment measures of a per-
manent nature leading to a correction in the deficit of at
least 0.6 percentage point of GDP (1). The Council
decided that Greece had to submit, by 21 March 2005 at
the latest, a report outlining the decisions to respect these
recommendations.
In March 2005, Greece submitted a report, which was
assessed in the Commission Communication of 6 April.
The Commission concluded that the Greek government
had taken effective action so that no further steps under
the EDP were needed at that stage. Greece submitted
other reports in October 2005 and April 2006. Another
report examining progress made in respecting the recom-
mendations of the notice issued under 104(9) shall be
submitted by 31 October 2006. For Greece, the Spring
2006 Commission forecast shows a structural improve-
ment in 2005 and 2006 that is in line with the Council
notice under Article 104(9) but, given the upward revi-
sions of past deficits, the deficit is at the reference value
in 2006 only because of significant one-offs (0.6 percent
of GDP).
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¥1∂ The Council also recommended Greece to further pursue the efforts to
identify and control factors other than net borrowing, which contribute to
the change in debt levels, with a view to ensuring that the government
gross debt ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the reference value
at a satisfactory pace in line with the correction of the excessive deficit.34
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In light of a reported general government deficit of
3.2 percent of GDP in 2003 and considering the risk that
the deficit might remain above 3 percent of GDP in
2004, the Council placed the Netherlands in excessive
deficit on 2 June 2004 and at the same time issued an Art.
104(7) recommendation for its correction. The Dutch
government was recommended to put an end by 2005 at
the latest to the excessive deficit. To that end, it was rec-
ommended to take action regarding corrective measures
in 2005 amounting to at least half a percentage point of
GDP by the deadline of 2 October 2004.
Following this recommendation, the Dutch authorities
implemented an additional savings package for 2004
equivalent to 0.6 percentage point of GDP on top of the
savings measures that had already been included in the
2004 budget. The corrective measures were for the larg-
est part of a structural nature, thus having a deficit-reduc-
ing impact also in subsequent years. On 6 October 2004,
the Commission considered that the Netherlands had
taken effective action to correct the excessive deficit by
2005. The Council concurred to this analysis in its con-
clusions of 21 October 2004.
Based on data reported by the Netherlands of a deficit of
2.3 percent of GDP in 2004 and the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2005 economic forecast of a deficit at
2.0 percent in 2005, the Commission recommended on
18 May to the Council to abrogate its decisions under
Article (6) and (7) of paragraph 104 of the Treaty. On
7 June 2005, the Council abrogated its decision on the
existence of an excessive deficit in the Netherlands.
Italy
On 23 May 2005, Eurostat released revised figures on Ital-
ian government data, showing a general government defi-
cit of 3.1 percent of GDP in both 2003 and 2004. Over the
same two years, the debt-to-GDP ratio was reported to
have remained broadly stable at around 106-107 percent
of GDP. On 24 May the Italian institute of statistics
(ISTAT) released new public finances data for the period
2000-2004. The deficit was reported at 3.2 percent of
GDP in 2003 and 2004. Considering that the deficit ratio
had been above but close to 3 percent of GDP in 2003 and
2004 and that the breach of the reference value could not
be considered temporary because the deficit was projected
by the Commission to exceed 3 percent in 2005 and 2006,
and taking into account developments in the debt ratio, the
Council decided that Italy has an excessive deficit. At the
same time, the Council addressed a recommendation
under Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive deficit
had to be corrected by 2007.
In particular, Italy was recommended to implement with
rigour the 2005 budget; reduce the structural deficit by a
minimum 1.6 percent of GDP by 2007 relative to its
level in 2005, with at least half of this correction taking
place in 2006; and ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio
diminishes and approaches the reference value at a satis-
factory pace.
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2 0 0 6On 22 February, the Commission adopted a communica-
tion concluding that the actions taken by Italy, if fully
implemented and effective, would be consistent with the
Council recommendation. The Commission Communi-
cation highlighted that implementation uncertainties
persist, which will require continuous monitoring. The
Council agreed with this analysis. The spring 2006 Com-
mission forecast shows that the deficit would remain
unchanged at just above 4 percent of GDP in 2006 and
rise further in 2007 on a no-policy change basis. This
confirms the significant uncertainties surrounding the
correction of the excessive deficit by 2007 that were
highlighted in the Commission communication on the
action taken in response to the Council recommendation.
2.2.2. The surveillance mechanisms in the non-euro 
area Member States
United Kingdom
According to the data notified by the United Kingdom
in August 2005, the general government deficit
amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP in the 2004/05 finan-
Graph I.10:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the Netherlands
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ence value was not exceptional. In particular, it did not
result from an unusual event outside the control of the
United Kingdom authorities, nor was it the result of a
severe economic downturn. The excess over the 3 per-
cent of GDP reference value was also considered not
temporary, based on the Commission services’ autumn
2005 forecasts. Assuming that United Kingdom fiscal
policy remained as announced, the deficit in these fore-
casts was expected to widen to just below 3â percent
of GDP in 2005/06 and to remain over 3 percent of
GDP in 2006/07. Based on these projections, the excess
over the reference value could not be considered excep-
tional or temporary within the meaning of the Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact although the deficit
is close to the reference value.
After the Commission services’ autumn forecasts had
been published, the United Kingdom announced policy
decisions in the Pre-Budget Report presented to Parlia-
ment on 5 December. In net terms, these measures repre-
sented an easing of policy by 0.1 percent of GDP in the
2005/06 financial year and a tightening of policy by
0.1 percent of GDP in 2006/07. Compared to an
unchanged policy scenario, the Pre-Budget Report fore-
saw a tightening of 0.2 percent of GDP in 2007/08. Tak-
ing into consideration these measures, the Commission’s
assessment remained that the deficit in 2006/07, at
around 3.1 percent of GDP, was expected to exceed
3 percent of GDP. On this basis, the Council decided on
24 January 2006 that the UK had an excessive deficit.
On 24 January 2006, the Council considered that, in the
case of the United Kingdom, the consideration of rele-
vant factors did not warrant a departure from the stand-
ard deadline for correcting the excessive deficit. There-
fore the Council decided that the United Kingdom
authorities should put an end to the excessive deficit sit-
uation as soon as possible and by the financial year 2006/
07 at the latest. To this end, the UK authorities should
bring the general government deficit below 3 percent of
GDP in a credible and sustainable manner and to this end
ensure an improvement of the structural balance by at
least 0.5 percentage points of GDP between the 2005/06
and 2006/07 financial years.
For the United Kingdom, the spring 2006 Commission
forecast shows the deficit at the reference value in finan-
cial year 2006/07 and dropping below it in 2007/08.
Hungary
On 5 July 2004, the Council issued a 104(7) recommenda-
tion to the Hungarian authorities to implement the meas-
ures envisaged in the May 2004 convergence programme
aiming at a correction of the excessive deficit by 2008.
The Hungarian authorities were recommended to stand
ready to introduce additional measures, if necessary, with
a view to achieving the deficit targets for 2004 and 2005.
On 18 January 2005, the Council considered that Hun-
gary had not taken effective action in response to its
recommendation. Having joined the Community on
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2 0 0 61 May 2004, Hungary is a Member State with a deroga-
tion, which means that it is to avoid excessive deficits
but that Articles 104(9) and Article 104(11) of the Treaty
do not apply to it. The Council therefore issued on
8 March 2005 another recommendation based on Article
104(7), taking into account the information of Hungary’s
convergence programme update submitted in December
2004. The Council recommended the Hungarian author-
ities to ‘take effective action by 8 July 2005 regarding
additional measures, as far as possible of a structural
nature, in order to achieve the deficit target for 2005 as
set in the updated convergence programme’.
On 13 July 2005, the Commission adopted a Communica-
tion stating that, based on the information available at the
time that the Hungarian authorities had taken effective
action regarding the 2005 budget deficit within the 4-
month deadline set by the Council in its new 104(7) rec-
ommendations of 8 March 2005. The assessment under-
lined that the achievement of the 2005 deficit target of
3.6 percent of GDP might require further action later in
the year and that important adjustments and decisive
action would be needed to achieve the target of
2.9 percent of GDP in 2006 of the authorities. However, in
light of a substantial deterioration of the budgetary out-
look in Hungary, based on a Commission recommenda-
tion of 2 October 2005 incorporating the new information,
the Council decided on 8 November 2005 that Hungary
did not comply with the new 104(7) recommendations.
Czech Republic
On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that the Czech
Republic had an excessive deficit. At the same time, the
Council addressed a recommendation under Article
104(7) specifying that the excessive deficit had to be cor-
rected by 2008 in a credible and sustainable manner. In
particular, the Czech Republic was recommended to take
effective action regarding the measures envisaged to
achieve the 2005 deficit target by the deadline of
5 November 2004 and to implement with vigour the
measures envisaged in the May 2004 convergence pro-
gramme, in particular to cut the wage bill of central gov-
ernment and to reduce spending of individual ministries.
Furthermore, the Czech Republic was invited to allocate
higher-than-budgeted revenues to deficit reduction, to
introduce fiscal targeting based on medium-term
expenditure ceilings, to design effective rules to reduce
the risk of increasing indebtedness of regions and munic-
ipalities, to undertake the reform of the pension and
healthcare systems so as to improve the long-term sus-
tainability of the public finances and to minimise the
negative budgetary impact of the operations of the Czech
Consolidation Agency.
On 22 December 2004, the Commission concluded that
the Czech government had taken effective action regard-
ing the measures envisaged to achieve the 2005 deficit
target in response to the Council recommendation, and
that no further steps were necessary under the excessive
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casts confirmed that the Czech Republic seems to be on
track to correct the excessive deficit by 2008.
Cyprus
On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that an excessive def-
icit existed in Cyprus. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation to Cyprus under Article
104(7), requesting Cyprus to take effective action by
5 November 2004 in order to bring the deficit below 3 per-
cent of GDP by 2005 in a credible and sustainable manner
and to implement with vigour the measures envisaged in
the May 2004 programme. Cyprus was also recom-
mended, inter alia, to pursue the reform process in the
pension and healthcare system in order to reduce the sus-
tainability risks associated with the future evolution of
age-related expenditures, together with the planned and
necessary budgetary consolidation in the medium term.
A Commission communication of 22 December 2004
concluded that, on then available information and on the
basis of the measures detailed in the 2005 budget, it
appeared that the Cypriot government had taken effective
action to achieve the 2005 deficit target, in compliance
with the Council recommendation under Article 104(7).
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that no further
steps were necessary at that point under the excessive def-
icit procedure. The spring 2006 forecast of Commission
services shows a deficit clearly below the reference value
in 2005 (albeit thanks to a significant one-off) and
expected to fall further by 2007 on a no-policy change
basis (including small one-offs in 2006 and 2007).
Malta
On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that Malta had an
excessive deficit. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation under Article 104(7) spec-
ifying that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by
2006. Malta was recommended to implement with vig-
our measures, particularly those of a structural nature,
aimed at rationalising and reducing expenditure. The
Council also recommended that the rise in the debt ratio
is brought to a halt in 2005 and reversed thereafter.
The Commission Communication to the Council of
22 December 2004 concluded that, on the basis of the
measures contained in the 2005 budget, Malta appeared
to have taken effective action regarding the measures to
achieve the deficit targets for 2005 in response to the
Council Recommendation. According to the spring 2006
forecast of Commission services, Malta seems to be on
track to correct the excessive deficit by 2006.
Poland
On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that Poland had an
excessive deficit. At the same time, the Council addressed
a recommendation under Article 104(7) specifying that
the excessive deficit had to be corrected by 2007. In par-
Graph I.14:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Czech Republic
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2 0 0 6ticular, Poland was recommended to implement with vig-
our the measures envisaged in the convergence pro-
gramme, in particular those contained in the so-called
Hausner plan. This plan was proposed in 2003 and aimed
at reducing public expenditure on social protection, public
administration and State aid. The Polish authorities were
recommended to take effective action by 5 November
2004 regarding the measures envisaged to achieve the
2005 deficit target. In addition, the Council invited the
Polish authorities to allocate possible extra revenues to
decrease the general government deficit.
On 22 December 2004, the Commission stated, in its
communication to the Council, that the Polish govern-
ment had taken effective action regarding the measures
envisaged to achieve the 2005 deficit target in response
to the Council recommendation. Accordingly, the Com-
mission concluded that no further steps were necessary
at that point under the excessive deficit procedure.
The spring 2006 Commission forecast for Poland shows
nominal deficits – on current definitions – at the refer-
ence value for 2006-07. After the implementation (by
Graph I.15:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Cyprus
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classification of funded pension schemes, the deficit fig-
ures will be revised upwards by close to 2 percent of
GDP. Although the projection for 2006 is in line with the
Council recommendation under Article 104(7), the
budgetary target for 2007 in the most recent update of the
convergence programme is not consistent with the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit by 2007.
Slovakia
On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that an excessive
deficit existed in Slovakia. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation under Article 104(7) spec-
ifying that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by
2007. In particular, Slovakia was recommended to take
effective action by 5 November 2004 to achieve the 2005
deficit target, to implement with vigour the measures
envisaged in the May 2004 programme, and to accelerate
the fiscal adjustment if the implemented structural
reforms result in higher growth than expected in the pro-
gramme, in particular by dedicating any higher-than-
budgeted revenues primarily to faster deficit reduction.
The Commission communication of 22 December 2004
concluded that, based on current information and the
measures detailed in the 2005 budget, it appeared that the
Slovak government had taken effective action to achieve
the 2005 deficit target, by the deadline of 5 November,
in response to the Council recommendation under Arti-
cle 104(7) to correct the excessive deficit by 2007 at the
latest. The communication concluded that no further
steps were necessary at that point under the excessive
deficit procedure.
The spring 2006 Commission forecast for Slovakia
shows nominal deficits – on current definition – falling
below the reference value in 2006-07. After the imple-
mentation (by spring 2007) of the March 2004 Eurostat
decision on the classification of funded pension
schemes, however, deficit figures will be revised
upwards by some 1ä percent of GDP. The projection for
2006 is in line with the Council recommendation under
Article 104(7), while the no-policy change forecast for
2007 stands at 3â percent of GDP including the impact
of the Eurostat decision.         
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This section provides a description of the enforcement mechanisms at the disposal of the Commission and the Council to
ensure budgetary discipline in the EU. It first explains the different steps of the excessive deficit procedure, which is codi-
fied in Article 104 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and when these steps need to be activated. In
a second step, a short description of the mechanism of early warning is provided. This mechanism is codified in Article
99(4) of the Treaty and Articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.
The excessive deficit procedure
Article 104 of the Treaty states that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. In particular Member States
shall comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria: a deficit ratio and a debt ratio not exceeding reference
values of respectively 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP. Article 104 also sets out the procedure to be followed to identify
and correct situations of excessive deficit, and voting modalities in the course of the procedure. The Regulation 1467/97
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) clarifies the procedure.
The first four steps of the procedure, corresponding to provisions of paragraphs 3 to 6 of Article 104, concern the identification
of situations of excessive deficit. The excessive deficit procedure is triggered if the deficit of a Member State exceeds 3 percent
of GDP (1). In such a situation, the Commission adopts a report, in accordance with Article 104(3), reviewing in detail the eco-
nomic and budgetary situation the Member State considered. As foreseen in Article 104(4) and Regulation 1467/97, the Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee formulates an opinion on this report within two weeks. The Commission takes this opinion
into account and, if it considers that an excessive deficit exists, addresses an opinion under Article 104(5) to the Council.
On the basis of the Commission opinion, the Council decides on the existence of an excessive deficit under Article 104(6).
The subsequent steps of the procedure are dedicated to the correction of excessive deficits. When it decides that an exces-
sive deficit exists, the Council addresses a recommendation to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article
¥1∂ Article 104(2) of the Treaty states that a deficit in excess of the 3 percent reference value that is only exceptional and temporary may not be considered
excessive in case the deficit remains close to the reference value. A deficit above 3 percent of GDP may also not be considered excessive if it has
declined substantially and reached a level that comes close to the reference value. The same Article provides an exception for countries having a debt
ratio above 60 percent, if this ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the value of 60 percent of GDP at a satisfactory pace.42
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104(7). In this recommendation, the Council sets a deadline for the Member State to correct the excessive deficit and a
fiscal effort to be achieved by the Member States concerned to this end (at least 0.5 percent of GDP as a benchmark). Regu-
lation 1467(97) specifies that the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit shall be set taking into account an over-
all assessment of the factors mentioned in the Article 104(3) of the Treaty.
In case action by the Member State concerned leads to the correction of the excessive deficit, the Council shall decide, in
accordance with Article 104(12), to abrogate its decisions under the excessive deficit procedure. In other words, the pro-
cedure is closed. In the event the Council considers that no effective action has been taken, it may decide, as stated in Arti-
cle 104(8) of the Treaty, to make public its recommendation according to 104(7). In case effective action has been taken
but events outside the control of the government with large adverse consequences on the budget prevent the correction of
the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists to revise the deadline for the correction
of the excessive deficit in a new 104(7) recommendation.
The steps described above apply to all EU countries. The further steps of the procedure depend on whether the Member
State is a euro area Member State.
The excessive deficit procedure applies in full to euro-area Member States. For these countries, Article 104(9) stipulates
that, provided the Council adopts a decision under article 104(8), it may decide to give notice to the Member State con-
cerned to take the necessary measures to reduce the deficit. The recommendations under Article 104(9) of the Treaty shall
include a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and a fiscal effort to be achieved by the Member States con-
cerned to this end (at least 0.5 percent of GDP as a benchmark).
This step constitutes a move towards even closer surveillance, and is the ultimate step before the possible imposition of
sanctions. If the Member State fails to comply with the recommendations, the Council may decide to impose sanctions no
later than two months after notice has been given. In case of compliance with the recommendations formulated in the notice
under article 104(9), the decisions taken under articles 104(6) to 104(9) are abrogated with a Council decision in accord-
ance with article 104(12), and the procedure is closed. In case effective action has been taken but events outside the control
of the government with large adverse consequences on the budget prevent the correction of the excessive deficit within the
time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists to revise the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in a
new 104(9) notice.
As already mentioned, non-euro area Member States are not exempt from the obligation to avoid excessive deficits, but the later
steps of the EDP do not apply for them. When a Member States outside the euro area in a situation of an excessive deficit fails
to respect the recommendations addressed under Article 104(7), it cannot be submitted to the last two steps of the excessive
deficit procedure, namely notice foreseen in Article 104(9) and the imposition of sanctions foreseen in Article 104(11) (1). Non-
compliance with a recommendation under 104(7) may lead to a renewed recommendation according to Article 104(7). 
The UK, Sweden, Denmark and the RAMS are in such a situation. The specific situation of the RAMS, which have the
status of ‘Member States with a derogation’, in the sense of Article 122 of the Treaty, was detailed in the 2004 edition of
this report. This report also underlined that, in addition to Council recommendations, other channels may act as comple-
mentary discipline mechanisms for these countries.
The early warning mechanism
In complement to the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Treaty foresees in its Article 99(4) the possibility for the Council
to make recommendations to Member States in case their economic policies ‘are not consistent with the broad guidelines
or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU’. Based on this Article, Regulation 1466/97, which codifies the pre-
ventive arm of the SGP, provides the Council with the possibility to issue ‘early warnings’ to Member States in order to
prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit.
Early warnings are issued by the Council, upon recommendation of the Commission, in the event that the Council identifies
significant divergence of the budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, or the adjustment path
towards it.
¥1∂ These Member States have no voting right on decisions provided for under the two paragraphs.43
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Overview of ongoing excessive deficit procedures
DE FR EL IT PT UK
Commission adopts EDP-report (Art. 104.3)  = start of 
the procedure
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 
(Art. 104.4)
Commission adopts: 
• opinion on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.5)
• recommendation for Council decision on existence 
of excessive deficit (Art.104.6)
• recommendation for Council recommendation to 
end this situation (Art. 104.7)
19.11.2002
29.11.2002
8.1.2003
2.4.2003
13.4.2003
7.5.2003
19.5.2004
2.6.2004
24.6.2004
7.6.2005
20.6.2005
29.6.2005
22.6.2005
4.7.2005
20.7.2005
21.9.2005
30.9.2005
11.1.2006
Council adopts:
• decision on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.6)
• recommendation to end this situation (Art. 104.7)
• deadline for taking effective action
• deadline for correction of excessive deficit
21.1.2003
21.5.2003
2004
3.6.2003
3.10.2003
2004
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2005
28.7.20051
12.1.2006
2007
20.9.20052
19.3.2006
2008
24.1.2006
24.7.2006
financial year 
2006/07
Follow-up of the 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts recommendations for:
Council decision establishing no effective action 
(Art. 104.8)
Council decision to give notice (Art. 104.9)
18.11.2003
8.10.2003
21.10.2003
22.12.2004
9.2.2005
Council adopts conclusions (instead of Commission 
recommendations for 104.8 & 104.9)
• new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
(NB: conclusions annulled by European Court of 
Justice on 13.7.2004)
25.11.2003
2005
25.11.2003
2005
Commission adopts communication on budgetary 
situation
Council adopts conclusions thereon
14.12.2004
18.1.2005
14.12.2004
18.1.2005
Council adopts:
• decision establishing no effective action (Art. 104.8)
• decision to give notice (Art. 104.9)
• deadline for first report to be submitted
• new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
18.1.2005
17.2.2005
21.3.2005
2006
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.2.2006
Council adopts conclusions thereon
Commission adopts NEW recommendation for:
• Council decision to give notice (Art. 104.9)
Council adopts:
• decision to give notice (Art. 104.9)
• deadline for first report to be submitted
• new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
Follow-up of the 104.9 Council notice
Commission adopts communication on action taken 
(cf. first report)
Council adopts conclusions thereon
1.3.2006
14.3.2006
14.7.2006
2007
6.4.2005
12.4.2005
14.3.2006
(1) Date of political agreement: 12 July (ECOFIN). Actual adoption on 28 July (written procedure).
(2) Date of political agreement: 9/10 September (informal ECOFIN). Actual adoption on 20 September (AGRI/FISH Council).44
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Overview EDP – steps to date
CZ CY HU MT PL SK
Commission adopts EDP-report (Art. 104.3) 
= start of the procedure
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 
(Art. 104.4)
Commission adopts:
• opinion on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.5)
• recommendation for Council decision on existence 
of excessive deficit
• recommendation for Council recommendation to 
end this situation
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
12.5.2004
24.5.2004
24.6.2004
Council adopts:
• decision on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.6)
• recommendation to end this situation (Art. 104.7)
• deadline for taking effective action
• deadline for correction of excessive deficit
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2008
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2005
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2008
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2006
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2007
5.7.2004
5.11.2004
2007
Follow-up of the 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004
Council adopts conclusions thereon 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for Council 
decision establishing no effective action (Art. 104.8)
22.12.2004 To be 
decided (1)
Council adopts decision establishing no effective 
action (Art. 104.8)
18.1.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for new 
Council recommendation to end excessive deficit 
situation
(Art. 104.7)
16.2.2005
Council adopts new recommendation to end 
excessive deficit situation (Art. 104.7)
• deadline for taking effective action
• deadline for correction of excessive deficit
8.3.2005
8.7.2005
2008
Follow-up of the NEW 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.7.2005
Council adopts conclusions thereon -
Commission adopts recommendation for Council 
decision establishing inadequate action (Art. 104.8)
20.10.2005
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate 
action (Art. 104.8)
8.11.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for new 
Council recommendation to end excessive deficit 
situation (Art. 104.7)
To be decided
(1) As indicated in the Council opinion of 14 March 2006 on the updated convergence programme, the Commission intends to recommend further steps under the
excessive deﬁcit procedure as required by the Stability and Growth Pact.45
3. Overview of the 2005 updates of the 
stability and convergence programmes
3.1. Introduction
The 2005-06 assessment round of Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes was the second one including all the
25 Member States of the enlarged EU and the first one
implementing the reformed Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP).
While the new principles of the revised Pact were gener-
ally well followed-up, the assessment process was ham-
pered by the non-respect of the 1 December deadline set
in the ‘Code of Conduct’ for the submission of stability
and convergence programmes. Eighteen countries sub-
mitted their programme after the deadline, sometimes
several weeks so. The late submission of the pro-
grammes gave the Commission little time to prepare a
thorough assessment. 
The 2005 SGP reform introduced a number of changes
to the preventive arm which had an impact both on the
format and content of the Stability and Convergence
Programmes and on the way the Commission assessment
was made. For the first time, EU Member States indi-
cated their medium-term objectives (MTO) in their Sta-
bility and Convergence Programmes. The Commission,
in assessing the adjustment path towards the medium-
term objective, as a result of the SGP reform, took into
account, inter alia, whether the improvement in cycli-
cally adjusted budget balances net of one-offs was in line
with the agreed benchmark after the SGP reform,
whether adjustment efforts were stronger in good times,
whether structural reforms justified deviations from the
adjustment path. All these matters relating to the way the
Commission assessed the Programmes are discussed in
Part II.2 of the report. In the present section the focus in
instead on the content of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes.
3.2. Medium-term objectives indicated 
in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes
In March 2005 the Council agreed that, until criteria and
modalities for taking into account implicit liabilities are
established, the country-specific MTOs are set taking
into account the following three elements: (i) the govern-
ment debt ratio; (ii) potential growth; (iii) the need to
ensure a safety margin with respect to the reference
value of 3 percent of GDP. Moreover, the new Pact states
that the MTO for euroa-area coutries and ERMII coun-
tries shall not be below -1 percent of GDP.
As foreseen by the reformed SGP, Member States pre-
sented their MTOs in their Stability or Convergence Pro-
gramme updates taking into account the results of dis-
cussions following the 2005 reform agreement and
further defining modalities regarding the computation.
In some cases the MTOs were not directly specified but
could be inferred from the programmes. In the case of
the UK, a quantitative medium-term objective was not
specified, while the programme referred to fiscal objec-
tives under domestic rules (1). The table below presents
the country-specific MTOs that the EU Member States
set in their programmes.
As shown in the table above, some countries set MTOs
that are more ambitious than the minimum required in
light of the new texts of the SGP. In most cases, this
reflected national strategies to ensure the sustainability
of government finances through a rapid decline in the
debt to GDP ratio.
¥1∂ This implies a medium-term path for the cyclically-adjusted deficit, con-
sistent with stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio at a low level and with keep-
ing the current budget in balance or surplus on average over the economic
cycle.46
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The examination of the 2005 round of updates of stabil-
ity and convergence programmes, covering the period up
to 2009, was completed by March 2006 (1).
In order to make an assessment of the budgetary targets set
by Member States in the 2005 updates of the programmes,
it is necessary to examine the growth assumptions upon
which the budgetary commitments are made. The 2005
programme updates project economic growth to recover
gradually over the coming years (see Table I.8). The aver-
age GDP growth in the EU-25 is expected to pick up from
1.7 percent in 2005 to 2.3 percent in 2006, 2.4 percent in
2007 and 2.6 percent in 2008. Favourable growth pros-
pects are expected to continue in the new Member States.
Growth assumptions concerning euro-area countries can
be considered cautious, with growth expected to average
2.1 percent over the period 2006-2008.
In comparison with the 2004 updates of the programmes,
growth projections have been revised downwards for all
the years covered by the programmes (see also Part II.2
of this report on this point). The revision is particularly
large concerning 2005, when growth is estimated to have
reached 1.7 percent instead of 2.6 expected. For the years
2006-2008, growth projections were revised slightly
downwards, and are marginally more favourable than
the Commission autumn 2005 forecast. This was the
case for the previous updates as well.
Contrary to previous updates of the stability pro-
grammes, growth projections for the programme period
seem to be based mainly on cautious or plausible
macroeconomic assumptions. This constitutes an
improvement compared to the experience of the last few
years, which provided evidence of an optimistic bias in
the macroeconomic forecasts associated with budgetary
plans. As a consequence, the growth projections for the
euro area in 2006 as derived from the stability pro-
grammes is very similar to the one projected in the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast.
3.4. Budgetary plans
Based on these growth assumptions, the nominal deficit
in the EU-25 and in the euro area is projected to be
reduced to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2005. The improve-
ment relies notably on the large budgetary consolidation
projected in the Member States in EDP, such as
Germany (1.3 percentage points over the period 2005-
2008), France (1.1 percentage points over the same
period) and Italy (2.2 percentage points over the same
period). Significant consolidation is also expected in
Greece (2.6 percentage points over the same period) and
Portugal (3.4 percentage points over the same period).
In contrast, the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast projects no change in the nominal budget deficit for
the euro area in 2006, which is thus expected to remain
at 2.4 percent of GDP. On the basis of unchanged poli-
cies, the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast puts
it at 2.3 percent of GDP. To some extent the difference
between the programme targets and the spring forecast
reflects the small gap between both for 2006. More sig-
nificantly however, the 2007 figures in the programme
Table I.7
Country-specific MTOs
Country MTO
AT 0 % of GDP
BE 0.5 % of GDP
CY – â % of GDP
CZ Around – 1 % of GDP
DE 0 % of GDP
DK Between 1â and 2â % of GDP
EE 0 % of GDP
EL 0 % of GDP
ES 0 % of GDP
FI Around 1â % of GDP
FR 0 % of GDP
HU Between – 0.5 and – 1 % of GDP
IE Close to balance
IT 0 % of GDP
LT – 1 % of GDP or below
LU – 0.8 % of GDP
LV Around – 1 % of GDP
MT 0 % of GDP
NL Between – 0.5 % and  1 % of GDP
PL – 1 % of GDP
PT At least – 0.5 % of GDP
SE 2 % of GDP
SI – 1 % of GDP
SK – 0.9 % of GDP
UK Fiscal objectives under the domestic rules
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ See Table I.13 of the 2005 updates of the stability and convergence pro-
grammes.47
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budgetary measures, while the Commission services’
forecast extrapolates revenue and expenditure trends and
only includes measures that are known in sufficient
detail at the time of completion of the forecast (no-
policy-change assumption). The differences are the larg-
est in the cases of Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal.
Outside the euro area, substantial consolidation of public
finances is foreseen in new Member States with exces-
sive budgetary deficits. Among these, particularly strong
reductions are expected in the countries with initially
high deficits, such as Malta (2.7 percentage points over
the next three years), Slovakia (2.8 percentage points
over the same period) and Hungary (4.2 percentage
points over the next four years).
According to the 2005 updates of the stability pro-
grammes the excessive deficits in Germany is expected
to be corrected in 2007, while in France additional budg-
etary consolidation over the programme period is
expected to result in a deficit of 1.9 percent of GDP in
2008. In Greece, the expected deficit is projected to be
corrected this year, in Italy, next year, while in Portugal
the correction is foreseen to take place in 2008, in line
with their respective Council recommendations.
Outside the euro area, sizeable budgetary improvements
are expected in all six Member States under the exces-
sive deficit procedure, of which the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Poland and Slovakia have brought the deficit
below the 3 percent of GDP reference value in 2005.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
Table I.8
Projections of real growth in the 2005 updates (% change from the previous year)
2004 (1) 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.3
CZ 4.4 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.3
DK 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.1 1.6
DE 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.8
EE 7.8 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.3
EL 4.7 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0
ES 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
FR 2.3 (1) 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.3
IE 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.0 4.8
IT 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.7
CY 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2
LV 8.5 8.4 7.5 7.0 7.0
LT 7.0 7.0 6.0 5.3 6.8
LU 4.4 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.9
HU 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1
MT 0.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 2.0
NL 1.7 0.8 2.5 2.5 2.3
AT 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5
PL 5.3 3.3 4.3 4.6 5.0
PT 1.2 0.5 1.1 1.8 2.4
SI 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8
SK 5.5 5.1 5.4 6.1 5.6
FI 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.6 2.3
SE 3.6 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.3
UK (2) 3.3 1.8 2.0 2.8 2.8
EU-12 2.1 1.4 2.1 2.0 2.3
EU-25 2.5 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.6
(1) COM Autumn 2005 Economic Forecast. In the calculation of the euro-area and the EU averages for the year 2004, data from the Commission Autumn 2005 fore-
cast were used for France.
(2) Financial years ending in following March.
Source: Commission services.48
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expected to record deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP
again in 2006. According to their latest convergence pro-
gramme updates, Malta and the UK will have deficits
below the reference value in 2006, although according to
the Commission services’ latest forecast this may not be
the case for the latter. According to the convergence pro-
gramme updates, the Czech Republic and Hungary in
2008 are expected to correct their respective excessive
deficits in 2008.
Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Finland and Estonia are the
only Member States that project a budgetary deteriora-
tion between 2005 and the end of the programme period,
albeit from a surplus budgetary position. Updates are
still more optimistic about budgetary developments in
2006 and 2007 than the Commission Spring 2006 fore-
casts, in particular those of Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Hungary.
3.5. Composition of the budgetary 
adjustment
The updates of the programmes show that both revenue
and expenditure ratios are expected to decline over the
programme period (see Table I.10). In the euro area total
receipts are expected to fall by 0.6 percentage point
between 2005 and 2008, to below 45 percent of GDP by
the end of the programme period. This is more than com-
pensated by reductions in the expenditure ratio which,
over the same period, are expected to amount to approx-
imately 1.6 percentage point of GDP. Revenue ratios are
projected to decline in all Member States with the excep-
tion of Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, where they
are expected to increase. Contrary to this, outside the
euro area, total receipts are foreseen to decrease in all
countries except for Latvia and the UK, where they are
set to rise. Particularly strong reductions in revenue are
projected in Estonia, Hungary, Malta and Denmark.
Almost all Member States are set to decrease the expend-
iture ratio, with the exception of Ireland, Latvia, the
Netherlands and the UK. Particularly strong reductions
are planned by the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia,
Hungary, Malta and Slovakia.
Graph I.20 presents the contribution to the change in the
budget balances from four budget components, namely
primary current expenditures, interest expenditure, gross
fixed capital formation and total revenues. A number of
remarks can be made.
Firstly, Member States that have been under the exces-
sive deficit procedure (EDP) project to improve budget
balances substantially via cuts in primary current expen-
ditures. However, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and
UK foresee to increase reveneus. In the case of France,
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia,
the budgetary adjustment involves a decline in public
investments.           
Graph I.19:  Nominal budget balances in the euro area: evolution in projections from the 2000 — 2005 
updates of the stability programmes (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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budgetary adjustment arising from this item is coming to
an end, particularly given their substantial investment
needs to improve the infrastructure. Among countries in
EDP, a significant fall in interest expenditure over the
programme period is expected to contribute to an
improvement in budget balance in Greece, France, Italy,
Malta and Poland.
Secondly, Czech Republic, Italy, Poland and UK plan to
increase the expenditure ratio (notably public invest-
ments). In the UK case this is financed by an increase in
the revenue ratio, which should help reducing the deficit
to closer to balance.
Thirdly, several Member States with budget close-to-
balance or in surplus in 2005 (Belgium, Denmark,
Estonia, Ireland, Finland and Sweden) foresee cuts in
primary current expenditures as well as in taxes,
thereby reducing the size of the public sector while
maintaining sound budgetary positions. Finally, deteri-
oration in the budget balance over the period is
expected in Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Ireland and Fin-
land, albeit from a position of budgetary surpluses. In
Estonia and Finland the reduction in revenues is par-
tially compensated by cuts in primary current expendi-
tures, and in public investments.
Table I.9
Nominal budget balances in the 2005 updates and the Commission Autumn 2005 forecasts
2005 updates of the stability and convergence 
programmes
Commission Autumn 2005 
forecasts (1)
Commission Spring 2006 
forecasts (1)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
BE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.5 0,1 – 0.3 – 0.9
CZ – 3.0 – 4.8 – 3.8 – 3.3 – 2.7 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 3.4
DK 2.0 2.7 2.1 2.2 1.7 3.7 3.0 2.7 4.9 3.9 4.0
DE – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.5
EE 1.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.4 0.8
EL – 6.6 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.7 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.8 – 4.5 – 3.0 – 3.6
ES – 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 – 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.4
FR – 3.7 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.1
IE 1.4 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.1 1.0 0.1 – 0.4
IT – 3.2 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 4.3 – 4.2 – 4.6 – 4.1 – 4.1 – 4.0
CY – 4.1 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.0
LV – 1.0 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 1.5 – 1.5 0.2 – 1.0 – 1.0
LT – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.9
LU – 1.2 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.2 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.5
HU – 5.4 – 6.1 – 4.7 – 3.3 – 1.9 – 6.1 – 6.7 – 6.9 – 6.1 – 6.7 – 7.0
MT – 5.1 – 3.9 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 1.2 – 4.2 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 3.2
NL 2.1 – 1.2 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.7
AT – 1.0 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.0 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 1.4
PL – 3.8 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 3.6 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.0
PT – 3.0 – 6.0 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 6.0 – 5.0 – 4.8 – 6.0 – 5.0 – 4.9
SI – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 1.7 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.6
SK – 3.2 – 4.1 – 2.9 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 4.1 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2,.
FI 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.8 2.5
SE 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.4 0.8 1.1 2.9 2.2 2.3
UK (1) – 3.3 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 3.4 – 3.3 – 3.0 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 2.8
EU-12 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 2.4 – 2.3
EU-25 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 22
(1) Financial years ending in following March, excluding the UMTS receipts.
Source: Commission services.50
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The gross debt to GDP ratio in the euro area is expected
to have increased to 71.0 percent of GDP in 2005 (see
Table I.12). As it was the case in the previous vintages of
updates, most Member States revised their debt level
upwards but project a gradual improvement in the debt
ratio over the programme period. However, the adjust-
ment path is slower and the debt ratio for 2007 is pro-
jected to be 2.1 percentage point higher than the figure
projected in the 2004 updates (see Graph I-21 and even
higher compared to the previous updates. This is mainly
due to smaller primary surpluses, although the contribu-
tion from the nominal GDP growth is expected to
slightly increase given the positive growth outlook.
Table I.11 also shows that the estimated stock-flow com-
ponent on average increases the debt ratio up to 2006,
while from 2007 to 2008 their contribute is negative.
This could stem from plans to build up financial assets
(for example public pension reserve funds which are
invested in non-governmental assets).
Table I.12 shows that although all seven euro area Mem-
ber States with debt levels currently above the 60 percent
of GDP ceiling that (Belgium, Germany, Greece, France,
Italy and Austria), plan to reduce their debt levels over
the programme period, only Austria expects it to be
below the debt reference value by the end of it. Portugal,
however, is expecting a rise in debt ratio over the same
period. On the other hand, by the end of the programme
Table I.10
Revenue and expenditure ratios in the 2005 updates
Total revenues Total expenditures
2005 2008 2005-08 2005 2008 2005-08
BE 49.7 48.8 – 0.9 49.7 48.3 – 1.4
CZ 41.1 40.9 – 0.2 45.9 43.6 – 2.3
DK 55.0 52.2 – 2.8 52.3 50.5 – 1.8
DE 43.4 42.5 – 0.9 46.7 44.0 – 2.7
EE 41.2 37.2 – 4.0 40.9 37.2 – 3.7
EL 41.1 41.9 0.8 45.4 n.a. n.a.
ES 39.4 38.9 – 0.5 38.4 38.3 – 0.1
FR 50.8 50.2 – 0.6 53.8 52.1 – 1.7
IE 35.3 34.4 – 0.9 33.2 33.3 0.1
IT 44.9 44.2 – 0.7 49.2 47.5 – 1.7
CY 41.2 39.6 – 1.6 43.8 40.8 – 3.0
LV 35.3 37.4 2.1 36.8 38.7 1.9
LT 33.5 33.0 – 0.5 35.1 34.0 – 1.1
LU 44.7 44.3 – 0.4 47.0 44.5 – 2.5
HU 45.1 41.7 – 3.4 51.2 43.6 – 7.6
MT 45.7 40.9 – 4.8 49.6 42.1 – 7.5
NL 46.0 47.0 1.0 47.2 48.1 0.9
AT 47.6 46.7 – 0.9 49.5 46.7 – 2.8
PL 42.0 40.5 – 1.5 44.9 42.4 – 2.5
PT 41.4 42.5 1.1 47.4 n.a. n.a.
SL 44.9 43.1 – 1.8 46.7 44.2 – 2.5
SK 37.8 37.2 – 0.6 41.9 38.5 – 3.4
FI 53.2 52.0 – 1.2 51.4 50.5 – 0.9
SE 58.9 57.7 – 1.2 57.3 56.0 – 1.3
UK* 38.7 40.2 1.5 41.9 42.2 0.3
EU-12 45.3 44.7 – 0.6 47.8 46.2 – 1.6
EU-25 44.5 44.2 – 0.4 47.0 45.6 – 1.4
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsistencies in the data provided in the programmes. Therefore, the net lending implied by this
table may be different from the one in table 8.
(1) Financial years ending in following March. Concerns total current revenue.
Source: Commission services.51
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their debt levels above 30 percent of GDP.
In the Member States outside the euro area, government
debt is on the average significantly lower. Overall, apart
from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
and the UK, all non-euro area Member States are
expected to have lower debt levels in 2008 than in 2005.
By the end of the programme period only in Malta, gov-
ernment debt is expected to stay above the 60 percent of
GDP reference value. Finally, in five countries, namely,
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, debt
levels are expected to be below 30 percent of GDP at the
end of the programme period.        
Graph I.20:  Contributions to change in budgetary position 2005-2008 (in percentage points)
Source: 2005 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.  A positive value indicates a positive contribution to the change in budgetary position. 
A positive value in total variation of budgetary position (value is presented on top of columns) implies an improvement of the balance.
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Table I.11
Euro area – Gross debt level and changes 
in the 2005 updates
2005 2006 2007 2008
Gross debt level 71.0 70.8 69.6 64.7
Change in gross debt 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.3
Previous updates of the programmes 70.0 69.4 68.4 67.6
Difference 1.0 1.4 1.2 – 2.9
Contributions to change in gross debt 
Primary balance – 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.6
Interest expenditure 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9
Nominal GDP growth – 2.0 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.6
Other factors influencing the debt 
ratio *
0.3 0.2 – 1.0 – 1.2
NB: Commission calculations. Discrepancies are due to rounding or inconsisten-
cies in the data provided in the programmes. * The programmes do not
always contain enough information to identify directly the contribution from
different factors to the development of the euro-area debt ratio. Therefore, it
has been necessary in some cases to ‘identify’ the contribution from nomi-
nal GDP growth (GDP deﬂator plus real GDP growth multiplied by the debt
ratio). In this way, the stock-ﬂow adjustment is derived as a residual.
Source: Commission services.52
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C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sGraph I.21:  Debt to GDP ratio in the euro area: evolution in projections from the 2000 updates 
to the 2005 updates of the stability programmes (% of GDP)
Table I.12
Debt levels in the 2005 updates (as % of GDP)
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 94.7 94.3 90.7 87.0 83.0
CZ 36.8 37.4 37.1 37.9 37.8
DK 42.3 35.6 31.7 28.9 26.5
DE 65.7 (1) 67.5 69.0 68.5 68.0
EE 5.4 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.0
EL 109.3 107.9 104.8 101.1 96.8
ES 46.6 43.1 40.3 38.0 36.0
FR 63.2(1) 65.8 66.0 65.6 64.6
IE 29.4 28.0 28.0 28.2 28.3
IT 106.5 108.5 108.0 106.1 104.4
CY 71.3 70.5 67.0 64.0 56.9
LV 13.1 14.9 13.6 13.7 14.7
LT 19.5 19.2 19.9 19.8 18.9
LU 6.6 6.4 9.6 9.9 10.2
HU 57.2 57.7 58.4 57.9 56.2
MT 76.7 76.7 70.8 68.9 67.3
NL 53.1 54.4 54.5 53.9 53.1
AT 63.6 63.4 63.1 61.6 59.5
PL 41.9 42.5 45.0 45.3 45.4
PT 59.4 65.5 68.7 69.3 68.4
SL 29.5 29.0 29.6 29.8 29.4
SK 42.6 33.7 35.5 35.2 36.2
FI 44.9 42.7 41.7 41.1 40.6
SE 51.1 50.9 49.4 47.8 46.0
UK (1) 40.5 42.7 44.1 44.7 44.7
EU-12 70.1 71.0 70.8 69.6 64.7
EU-25 62.8 63.6 63.6 62.6 61.5
(1) Financial years ending in following March.
Source: Commission services.
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P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sBox I.2: Making the SGP reform take root: an increasing role for national institutions, 
including parliament
Slippages of budgetary results compared with plans from SCPs were among the reasons leading to the revision of
the preventive arm of the Pact in 2005. Member States’ commitment to the Pact diminishing over time was partly related
to insufficient involvement of national institutions, including national parliaments in the preparation and discussion of
SCPs or in the discussion of EDP procedures. This conclusion was reflected in the ECOFIN report of March 2005 (Council,
2005a), which states that ‘the Council invites Member States’ governments to present Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes and the Council opinions thereon to their national parliaments. National parliaments may wish to discuss the fol-
low-up to recommendations in the context of the early warning and the excessive deficit procedures’. Recent academic
work has emphasised the importance of national institutions in this domain, particularly the idea that stronger national
‘ownership’ can potentially increase the effectiveness of EU rules and mechanisms (see, e.g., discussion in Buti et al.
(2005), Hallerberg et al. (2001) and European Commission (2005)).
Some specific recommendations are embedded in the revised Code of Conduct endorsed by the ECOFIN Council
in October 2005 (Council, 2005b). The Code includes provisions that ‘Each programme mentions its status in the con-
text of national procedures, notably with respect to the national parliament. The programme also indicates whether the
Council opinion on the previous programme has been presented to the national parliament’.
So far the involvement of national Parliaments with EU budgetary surveillance remains limited. The table below
indicates in summary form the extent of national parliamentary involvement in EU budgetary surveillance processes, dis-
tinguishing practice in terms of the instruments involved: national Stability or Convergence Programmes, Council Opin-
ions on these programmes and Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs). Two of the indicators concerning national Stability
and Convergence Programmes are purely passive, those recording whether the programmes are formally submitted to Par-
liament (only a bare majority are) and the recording in the Programmes themselves of whether Council Opinions on the
previous programme were presented to parliament (the vast majority of programmes submitted in the 2005-06 round omit-
ted this mention, despite it being recommended in the Code of Conduct for their preparation). Among the more active indi-
cators, no country makes its national programme as such subject to explicit parliamentary approval, although substantial
content could be said to be subject to such approval in the cases of Austria and the United Kingdom.
The situation regarding parliamentary involvement between oversight of Council Opinions and EDP procedures is very
similar. Only in about a quarter of Member States is there some parliamentary scrutiny, and among these about half are con-
cerned only with the procedures related to the same Member State, with the other half of this group scrutinising procedures for
all Member States. In the great majority of Member States, parliaments have not so far involved themselves in these processes
on any regular footing.
Table I.14
Parliamentary oversight of EU budgetary surveillance in the 25 Member States (number of cases)
National stability/convergence programme 
Formally submitted to Parliament? No:12 Yes:13
Subject to explicit approval of Parliament? No: 25 Yes: 0
Indicates whether Opinion on previous programme has been presented to Parliament (1)? No:23 Yes: 2
Council Opinions on Member State programmes 
Formally scrutinised by Parliament? No:18 Yes:7
If so, for all Opinions or just for own country? All:3
Own:4
Council EDP surveillance instruments 
Formally scrutinised by Parliament? No:19 Yes:6
If so, for all Member States or just for own country? All:3
Own:3
(1) Guideline in code of conduct57
4. The long-term sustainability of public 
finances based on the 2005/06 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes
4.1. Introduction
The projected demographic changes, with the old-age
dependency ratio doubling over the coming decades in
the EU, have led to growing concerns regarding the long-
term sustainability of public finances. Since the launch
of the euro in 1999, the Commission has sought to inte-
grate an examination of the sustainability of public
finances into the existing EU framework for the surveil-
lance of Member States’ economic and budgetary poli-
cies, in line with the conclusions of the Stockholm
(March 2001) and Barcelona (March 2002) European
Council meetings and the March 2003 Ecofin Council.
More recently and importantly, the 22-23 March 2005
European Council put increased emphasis on long-term
sustainability issues in the context of the reform of the
Stability and Growth Pact.
The Commission is therefore regularly producing
assessments of long-term sustainability of public
finances in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.
This note presents the overview of the assessment of the
long-term sustainability of the public finances based on
the 2005/06 updates of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes (SCPs).
The assessment of long-term sustainability of public
finances is a multifaceted issue and there is not a unique
indicator that provides a clear response to what extent a
country’s public finances are sustainable in the long run.
The Commission and the Council therefore assesses long
term sustainability of public finances by using both
quantitative indicators and qualitative information (1).
The main quantitative indicators of public finance sus-
tainability risks are the sustainability gaps that measure
the difference between the current and planned budget-
ary positions and that ensure sustainable public finances.
Greater attention has been devoted to systematically take
account of qualitative features when making the assess-
ment, which is key in enriching the interpretation of the
quantitative results obtained. The main qualitative fea-
tures considered in the assessment are: the current level
of the debt ratio, the impact of structural reforms, the
reliability of the projections and the current level of the
tax burden.
4.2. The approach used to assess the long-
term sustainability of public finances
There is not a unique definition of long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances. In the absence of an agreed defini-
tion in the literature, a pragmatic definition of what con-
stitutes a sustainable public finance position is used in
the assessment by the Commission and the Council,
namely whether on the basis of current policies and pro-
jected budgetary trends Member States will: (i) meet the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint so that the
discounted value of future revenues matches the dis-
counted value of future government expenditures and the
level of outstanding debt; and, (ii) continue to comply
with the budgetary requirements of EMU, and in partic-
ular, the Treaty requirement to keep debt levels below
the 60 percent of GDP reference value.
¥1∂ The EU approach to assessing sustainability is described in detail in Annex
11 of ‘The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-
25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and
unemployment transfers (2004-2050)’, European Economy, Special
Reports No 1, 2006. 58
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issue and there is not a unique indicator allowing to give
a clear response on the extent of sustainability chal-
lenges a country is facing in the long run. The Commis-
sion approach, as agreed by the EPC, takes into account
several factors to complement the available information
on future quantitative budgetary trends.
The Commission and the Council assessed long-term
sustainability of public finances using both quantitative
indicators and qualitative information in order to arrive
at an overall assessment of the budgetary challenge
posed by ageing populations.
A complete description of the method used to assess
long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU
framework is given in the Annex of ‘EPC and EC’
(2006) (henceforth the ‘Ageing report’) (1) and in the
European Commission (2005). The main improvements
compared to last year’s assessment, are as follows:
• A decomposition of the indicators has been intro-
duced. It now separates the pure impact of ageing
(i.e. the impact of the rise in age-related expenditure
on the indicators) and the impact of the initial budg-
etary position (mainly the distance between the
actual structural primary balance from the long-term
debt-stabilizing primary balance) (2). It therefore
enables to analyse separately the source of the risks
to long-term sustainability of public finances.
• A new sensitivity test on the cost of a delay, which
calculates the supplementary budgetary cost that
arises if a budgetary adjustment equal to the size of
the sustainability gap is made at a later stage.
4.3. The assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances based 
on the 2005/06 updates
4.3.1. The data used in the analysis
In agreement with the view of the EPC, the Commission
used the commonly agreed underlying assumptions —
which were finalised in November 2005 — as a reference
when evaluating the projections in the programmes in the
assessment of public finance sustainability (3). Table 1
summarises the macroeconomic assumptions underlying
the long-term budgetary projections in the 2005/2006
updated stability and convergence programmes. In addi-
tion, the macroeconomic assumptions used in the com-
mon long-term projection exercise are given.
Overall, the underlying assumptions in the updates were
close to the commonly agreed ones. There are however
some differences that may be noted; for some countries
(CY, HU and to some extent UK), labour productivity
growth and real GDP growth are assumed to be higher in
the SCPs than in the Ageing Report (AR), suggesting
that the projections are based on more optimistic under-
lying assumptions.
Table I.16 presents projected budgetary changes between
the last year of the programme period (usually 2008) and
2050 provided in the Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes. In addition, the common long-term budgetary
projections conducted by the EPC and the Commission
are provided. Since the results of the common projections
exercise were not available in time for the submission of
the SCPs, the national projections were used in the assess-
ment of public finance sustainability. This approach was
agreed by the EPC in Autumn 2005.
Overall, the budgetary projections in the Stability and
Convergence Programmes were close to the commonly
agreed ones. As expected in view of the rising proportion
of older persons in the EU over the coming decades, age-
related expenditures are projected to rise significantly in
the years to 2050. Especially pension but also healthcare
and long-term care expenditures are of the highest con-
cern for the long-term sustainability of public finances.
In turn, other age-related expenditures — unemployment
and education — are projected to decline as a result of
demographic changes in the vast majority of countries,
although insufficiently to offset the increase in pension and
healthcare expenditures. There are large divergences
between countries with regard to pension expenditure,
reflecting very diverse arrangements for public pensions.
Differences in the other age-related expenditure items pro-
jections are smaller. Future pension expenditures therefore¥1∂ The Annex to the ageing report is available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
economy_finance/epc/documents/2006/ageingannex_en.pdf.
¥2∂ In the case of S1, the decomposition also separates the impact of the debt
position (60 percent of GDP in 2050). In particular, if the current debt/
GDP ratio is below 60 percent of GDP debt is allowed to rise and this com-
ponent reduces the sustainability gap as measured by the S1 indicator, and
vice versa.
¥3∂ See ‘The 2005 EPC projections of age-related expenditure (2004-2050) for
the EU-25 Member States: underlying assumptions and projection meth-
odologies’, European Economy, Special Reports No 4, 2005.59
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budgetary challenges that ageing populations represent in
the Member States.
Looking at the 2005/06 SCPs, very high increases in
age-related expenditures are projected in SI, PT, IE, CY
and CZ, of 8 percent of GDP or more (1). Relatively high
increases in age-related expenditures are also projected
in ES, LU, FI, NL, BE, SE, all rising by between 5 and
8 percent of GDP, while in FR, UK, SK, DK, LT the rise
is projected to be between 2 percent and 5 percent of
GDP. Low increases in age-related expenditures are pro-
jected in LV, AT, HU and IT; all with a total rise of less
than below 2 percent of GDP and some countries actu-
ally project a fall (PL, EE, MT).
The reasons for this large divergence across countries
are primarily due to the design of the pension system in
different countries, often linked to whether the pension
system has been reformed in recent years or not.
For example, Sweden, France, Germany, Slovakia and
Lithuania have introduced pension reforms that limit the
increase in pension expenditure and the impact of
reforms are even more noticeable for Poland, Estonia,
Latvia, Italy and Austria.  (2) By contrast, the increase in
Table I.15
Macro-economic assumptions according the national SCPs and the EPC projections
Real GDP growth Labour productivity growth
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
SCP AR SCP AR SCP AR SCP AR SCP AR SCP AR
BE 2.2 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7
CZ 3.6 3.6 1.9 1.9 0.8 0.8 3.4 3.4 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
DK 2.1 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
DE 2.3 2.3 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
EE 5.8 5.6 2.3 2.3 0.6 0.6 5.3 5.1 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
EL : 2.2 : 1.0 : 1.1 : 1.3 : 1.7 : 1.7
ES 2.8 2.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
FR 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
IE 5.2 5.2 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 3.8 3.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
IT 1.9 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
CY 4.0 4.5 3.0 2.8 3.0 1.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 3.0 1.7
LV 7.4 7.4 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.4 6.5 6.5 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
LT 6.4 6.1 1.9 1.9 0.4 0.4 5.3 5.1 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
LU 4.3 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
HU 4.2 3.3 3.2 2.1 2.5 1.1 3.3 3.1 3.5 2.7 3.5 1.7
MT 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.1 1.7 1.7 0.9 0.8 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
NL 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7
AT 1.5 2.6 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
PL 5.0 5.0 2.2 2.2 0.4 0.4 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
PT 2.4 2.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
SI 3.7 3.6 2.0 2.0 1.1 1.1 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
SK 5.3 5.3 2.0 2.0 0.3 0.3 4.2 4.2 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.7
FI 2.2 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
SE 2.4 2.9 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
UK 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.7
Source: Commission services, 2005/06 updated stability and convergence programmes, 2006 Ageing report.
¥1∂ It should be noted that Greece did not include any long-term projections in
their update programme and that the projected increases from last year’s
assessment was used for Greece, showing a very high rise of more than
11 percent of GDP in the period to 2050.
¥2∂ Even though pension reforms limit the increase in pension expenditure, the
increase in age-related expenditures in SE, FR, DE, SK is higher than
2 percent of GDP up to 2050.60
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sion reforms have been limited (e.g. Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia and the Czech Republic).
The results of the common long-term budgetary projec-
tions exercise were released in February 2006, in the
middle of the 2005/06 assessment round of the stability
and convergence programmes. Overall, they confirm the
information from the SCPs, showing a considerable rise
in public spending over the coming decades as the effect
of ageing takes hold. The common budgetary projections
will be used in the report on the long-term sustainability
of public finances that the Commission envisaged pre-
paring for the Autumn 2006.
Table I.16
Change in the age-related budgetary items (between last year of the programme and 2050)
Pensions Health care Long-term 
care
Education Unemployment benefits
Total age- 
related
 
Revenues
Other 
expend.
SCPs AR SCPs AR SCPs AR SCPs AR SCPs AR SCPs AR SCPs SCPs
BE 4.2 5.1 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.3 6.0 6.5 : – 0.4
CZ 5.4 5.8 2.6 1.7 0.3 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.0 8.0 7.5 : :
DK 0.4 2.7 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 : 0.0 2.2 (1) 4.5 1.0 0.2
DE 2.5 2.4 1.1 1.0 : 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.3 2.9 (1) 3.7 1.6 :
EE – 2.6 – 2.9 – 0.3 0.8 : : 0.0 – 0.4 0.0 0.0 – 2.9 (1) – 2.4 1.3 :
EL 10.3 : 1.5 1.6 : : 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.1 11.6 (1) 1.3 : :
ES 6.9 6.8 : 2.1 : 0.3 : – 0.2 : – 0.3 6.9 (1) 8.7 : :
FR 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.5 : : : – 0.2 : – 0.2 4.3 (1) 2.9 : :
IE 6.1 6.1 2.7 1.8 1.0 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.5 0.0 0.0 9.4 8.0 : – 0.1
IT 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.4 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 1.3 2.1 : :
CY 7.7 12.1 1.9 1.0 : : – 0.1 – 1.3 : 0.1 9.5 (1) 11.8 – 0.5 :
LV 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.8 – 0.7 :
LT 2.3 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.3 – 1.2 – 1.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.9 : :
LU 6.5 7.7 : 1.1 : 0.6 : – 0.8 : – 0.1 6.5 (1) 8.4 : :
HU 1.7 5.9 : 0.9 : : : – 0.3 : 0.0 1.7 (1) 6.5 – 2.4 :
MT – 1.4 – 1.2 0.5 1.7 : 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 1.8 (1) – 0.2 – 3.6 :
NL 3.1 3.7 3.2 1.2 : 0.6 : – 0.1 : 0.0 6.3 (1) 5.4 3.1 :
AT – 0.8 – 0.9 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 – 0.3 :
PL – 4.3 – 4.4 : 1.2 : 0.1 – 1.2 – 1.2 : – 0.3 – 5.5 (1) – 4.6 0.4 :
PT 8.6 8.9 1.1 0.4 0.6 : 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 10.4 9.4 : – 0.3
SI 7.3 7.2 2.9 1.4 1.0 1.1 : 0.0 : 0.0 11.2 (1) 9.8 0.6 :
SK 2.1 2.1 1.4 1.7 : 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.2 2.5 (1) 3.4 : – 0.1
FI 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.3 2.4 1.6 – 0.4 – 0.4 : – 0.1 6.5 (1) 5.1 4.1 :
SE 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 2.9 1.8 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.0 5.3 3.6 0.5 – 1.7
UK 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.7 0.6 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.3 : 0.0 3.7 (1) 4.2 2.2 – 0.1
NB: Projections on unemployment beneﬁts were provided after the submission of the programmes by the Irish, Portuguese and Estonian authorities. For Cyprus, data
under a no-reform scenario were not included in the programme but was provided after the submission of the programme by the Cypriot Ministry of Finance. For
Belgium, projections for the period 2030-2050 were provided by the Bureau Fédéral du Plan after the submission of the programme. For Greece, the projections
from last year’s assessment were used and are given in the ‘SCP’ columns. Moreover, it should be noted that the total age-related expenditures according to the
Ageing report does not include pension expenditure projections in the case of Greece. For Austria, the projections for healthcare, long-term care, education and
unemployment beneﬁts from last year’s assessment were used and are given in the ‘SCP’ columns. The changes in revenues and other expenditures as a share of
GDP are given for information and are taken from the SCPs for the period 2010-2050, except for the UK, where the period is 2014/15-2054/55.
The difference between the projected changes in expenditure on healthcare and long-term care are in some cases large when comparing the projections in the SCPs
with those in the AR. This can be due to the differences in the assumptions made or method used. It underlines the importance of basing the analysis on comparable
information in terms of underlying assumptions and methodology used.
(1) One or several expenditure items were not available in the updated stability and convergence programmes. If the projected change in expenditure on healthcare or
long-term care is missing, the increase in age-related expenditures is underestimated. If the projected change in expenditure on education or unemployment beneﬁts
is missing, the increase in age-related expenditures is in general overestimated. The change in total age-related expenditure as a share of GDP is therefore not fully
comparable across the Member States.
Source: Commission services, 2005/06 updated stability and convergence programmes, 2006 Ageing Report (AR).61
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kept constant at the underlying level (net off the cyclical
components and one-off measures) reached in the last
year of the programme period for all countries. How-
ever, as Table I.16 reveals, a number of countries include
projections of changes in the revenue/GDP ratio, in some
cases the projected changes are substantial.
Some countries also included other long-term expendi-
ture projections than those covered by the common
budgetary projections exercise. The changes up to 2050
in those additional projections were in general quite
small when compared to the five expenditure items cov-
ered by the common projections.  (1)
4.3.2. The quantitative indicators
The quantitative indicators provide estimates of the size
of budgetary adjustment that is necessary to achieve sus-
¥1∂ Such additional projections were given in the SCPs and their impact on the
sustainability indicators, as calculated by the Commission services, were
given in the respective technical assessments. 
Table I.17
Results of the sustainability gap calculations
S1 indicator, of which: S2 indicator, of which:
Initial 
budgetary 
position
Debt position 
in 2050 (1)
Long-term 
change 
in budgetary 
position
Overall
Initial 
budgetary 
position
Long-term 
change 
in budgetary 
position
Overall
2005 eop 2005 eop 2005 eop 2005 eop 2005 eop
BE – 3.3 – 3.3 0.3 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.1 – 3.3 – 3.2 4.7 1.5 1.5
CZ 2.5 1.9 – 0.3 – 0.4 2.2 4.3 3.7 2.7 2.1 4.7 7.4 6.8
DK – 4.5 – 2.8 – 0.9 – 0.7 1.7 – 3.6 – 1.8 – 4.5 – 2.8 2.0 – 2.5 – 0.8
DE 1.2 – 0.8 0.2 0.1 1.2 2.6 0.5 1.2 – 0.8 2.0 3.3 1.3
EE – 0.6 – 0.1 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 2.7
EL 0.8 – 0.8 0.6 0.6 4.8 6.2 4.6 1.2 – 0.5 7.8 8.9 7.3
ES – 2.6 – 1.8 – 0.4 – 0.4 2.7 – 0.3 0.5 – 2.5 – 1.7 4.6 2.1 2.9
FR 1.4 – 1.3 0.1 0.0 2.3 3.8 1.0 1.4 – 1.3 3.5 4.9 2.2
IE – 2.3 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.8 3.9 0.6 1.8 – 2.2 – 1.2 7.2 5.0 6.0
IT 1.0 – 1.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 2.4 – 0.5 1.0 – 1.8 1.0 2.0 – 0.8
CY – 0.1 – 1.8 0.1 – 0.2 5.1 5.1 3.1 0.0 – 1.7 9.4 9.4 7.7
LV 1.0 0.3 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.9 1.2 0.5 – 0.1 1.1 0.4
LT 1.6 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.7 0.4 1.3 0.2 1.8 0.6 1.0 2.8 1.7
LU 1.3 – 0.3 – 1.8 – 1.9 2.8 2.4 0.6 1.3 – 0.4 6.5 7.8 6.1
HU 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.5 4.5 1.4 4.1 1.2 1.5 5.6 2.7
MT 0.0 – 3.8 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 – 3.6 0.4 – 3.4 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 4.5
NL – 2.0 – 1.4 – 0.2 – 0.1 4.4 2.1 2.9 – 2.0 – 1.3 5.5 3.5 4.2
AT – 0.5 – 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 – 1.4 – 0.5 – 2.0 0.6 0.1 – 1.5
PL 2.2 1.6 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 4.0 – 1.9 – 2.5 2.7 2.1 – 4.6 – 1.9 – 2.5
PT 3.1 – 1.1 0.2 0.1 4.4 7.7 3.4 3.3 – 0.9 7.2 10.5 6.3
SI – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5 4.9 4.0 4.3 – 0.2 0.1 8.0 7.9 8.1
SK 2.0 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.5 2.1 1.3 2.3 1.5 1.3 3.6 2.8
FI – 4.0 – 3.2 – 1.4 – 1.1 4.1 – 1.3 – 0.3 – 4.0 – 3.2 5.4 1.4 2.2
SE – 3.1 – 3.4 – 0.9 – 0.7 3.2 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 3.1 – 3.4 4.6 1.5 1.2
UK 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 1.6 2.6 1.1 1.3 – 0.3 3.1 4.4 2.8
NB:  ‘eop’ indicates the end of the programme period.
(1) In the case of S1, the decomposition also separates the impact of the debt position (60 % of GDP in 2050). In particular, if the current debt/GDP ratio is below 60 %
of GDP debt is allowed to rise and this component reduces the sustainability gap as measured by the S1 indicator, and vice versa.
Source: Commission services.62
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lysis reveals that there are large sustainability gaps in a
majority of EU Member States according to the S2 indi-
cator when considering the budgetary situation in 2005,
the ‘2005’ scenario. Assuming that the medium-term
budgetary plans set out in the stability and convergence
programmes are fully implemented, the ‘programme’
scenario, the size of the sustainability gap is usually sig-
nificantly reduced. Consolidating public finances
towards the MTO appears to contribute substantially to
cope with the age-related budgetary challenges.
However, large sustainability gaps remains for a majority
of Member States even under this assumption, suggesting
that more needs to be done in most Member States.
The decomposition of the sustainability indicators intro-
duced in the 2005/06 round of sustainability assessments
provides an interesting description of where the sustain-
ability gap mainly stem from. This decomposition distin-
guishes between the impact on the sustainability indica-
tors (S1 and S2) from: (i) the initial budgetary position –
i.e. mainly the distance between the actual structural pri-
mary balance and the long-term debt-stabilizing primary
balance; and, (ii) the long-term change in the budgetary
position – i.e. the impact of the rise in age-related
expenditure on the indicators. The findings from the cal-
culations can be summarised as follows:
• The initial budgetary position (the current structural
primary balance and the current level of debt) is not
sufficiently strong in 2005 – the ‘2005’ scenario —
to avoid unsustainable public finances even before
considering the budgetary impact of ageing popula-
tions in about half of the Member States according
to the S1 and S2 sustainability indicators.
• Assuming that the public finances evolve as envis-
aged over the period covered by the programme –
the ‘programme’ scenario — (which usually
involves a fiscal consolidation), the initial budget-
ary position at the end of the programme period
would still be too weak, implying that the public
finances are on an unsustainable path in about a
quarter of the countries even before considering the
budgetary impact of ageing populations according
to both sustainability indicators.
• Ageing populations will result in higher public
expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming dec-
¥1∂ The sustainability indicators were calculated on the basis of the projected
changes in the expenditure items included in the 2005/06 updates of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes reported in Table I.16. (pensions,
healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment benefits). For
details, see the notes to Table I.16. In addition, they were calculated, were
applicable, according to the adjusted gross debt.
Table I.18
The structural primary balance and the required 
primary balance
Structural primary balance Required 
primary balance2005 End of prog.
BE 4.3 4.3 5.6
CZ – 2.1 – 1.5 5.7
DK 4.7 3.1 1.8
DE 0.0 1.9 3.4
EE 0.6 0.1 – 2.2
EL 0.4 2.0 9.2
ES 3.0 2.3 5.0
FR – 0.6 2.0 4.1
IE 2.3 1.4 6.9
IT 0.8 3.5 2.9
CY 0.0 1.7 8.8
LV – 1.0 – 0.3 1.0
LT – 1.5 – 0.4 1.6
LU – 1.3 0.4 6.6
HU – 3.9 – 1.0 1.9
MT 0.3 4.0 – 0.9
NL 2.6 2.0 5.5
AT 1.4 2.9 1.6
PL – 2.0 – 1.4 – 2.4
PT – 2.2 1.9 7.8
SI 0.5 0.3 8.1
SK – 1.8 – 1.0 2.3
FI 3.8 3.2 4.5
SE 3.2 3.6 4.7
UK – 0.8 0.7 3.4
NB:  The structural primary balance equals the cyclically-adjusted primary bal-
ance net of possible one-offs and temporary measures relative to GDP.
Moreover, in the case of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the long-term pro-
jections of public pension expenditures as a share of GDP considered in the
sustainability analysis assessment included 1st pillar pensions and excluded
2nd pillar funded deﬁned-contribution pension schemes, the latter will be
classiﬁed outside government from March 2007 onwards in accordance with
Eurostat’s decision of 2 March 2004. An adjustment (reduction) of govern-
ment revenue as a share of GDP of the part that is attributed to the 2nd pillar
funded deﬁned-contribution schemes is therefore necessary for consistency.
The updates of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia provide estimates of this reve-
nue-reducing impact. Reducing current revenue and long-term expenditure
(both related to 2nd pillar pension contributions) should be neutral or posi-
tive in terms of sustainability. The structural primary balances given in this
table may therefore differ from the structural primary balance in the SCPs.
Source: Commission services, 2005/06 updated stability and convergence pro-
grammes.63
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increase will largely depend on the projected change
in pension expenditure. Indeed, there is a large dis-
persion across the countries in terms of the long-
term change in the budgetary position, with a very
large rise of 6 percent of GDP or more in CY, PT, SI,
EL and LU according to the S2 indicator.
• The budgetary challenge posed by ageing popula-
tions can be reduced by improving and sustaining
sound public finances. In a large majority – about
three-quarters – of the Member States, the sustaina-
bility gap is lower in the ‘programme scenario’ com-
pared with the ‘2005 scenario’, reflecting the
planned consolidation of the public finances for
most countries over the programme period. How-
ever, even assuming the full implementation of the
‘programme scenario’, an additional adjustment of
2 percent of GDP or more would still be required in
14 countries according to the S2 indicator.
• In general, the size of the overall sustainability gap
corresponds to the size of the long-term change in the
budgetary position, notably for the countries with a
relatively high and low sustainability gap. This is also
the case with regard to the relation between the initial
budgetary position and the overall sustainability gap,
though it displays more variation.
As noted above, one way to cope with the budgetary
implications of ageing is to run and maintain sound pub-
lic finances. The size of the required budgetary position
can be illustrated by the required primary balance (RPB)
over the medium-term that would ensure sustainability
Table I.19
Gross government debt (% of GDP)
2005
Programme scenario 2005 Scenario
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 94.3 75.3 36.1 63.5 73.4 33.6 60.2
CZ 37.4 39.6 79.0 280.2 43.2 95.7 320.3
DK 36.8 21.5 – 15.1 – 37.3 14.4 – 61.2 – 135.5
DE 67.3 65.6 57.9 99.4 73.6 116.2 232.4
EE 4.6 2.5 – 28.2 – 93.2 0.9 – 39.3 – 117.0
EL 107.9 91.0 122.0 346.0 96.9 165.2 451.3
ES 43.1 31.5 9.6 95.8 25.7 – 13.5 42.6
FR 65.8 61.1 64.2 121.2 69.2 132.8 269.9
IE 28.0 24.6 36.7 156.2 13.6 7.9 100.4
IT 108.5 99.1 51.4 30.7 108.9 127.6 208.9
CY 70.5 51.5 70.6 189.5 64.3 116.3 269.9
LV 13.1 11.7 – 0.4 11.1 13.0 14.9 49.6
LT 19.2 18.0 19.9 69.8 22.4 46.7 135.7
LU 6.4 8.9 20.9 109.7 11.5 56.1 179.1
HU 57.7 62.5 76.0 119.3 76.1 143.6 247.6
MT 76.7 60.6 – 1.8 – 106.3 80.2 92.9 79.6
NL 54.4 50.0 88.6 218.1 44.2 67.8 177.7
AT 63.4 54.9 15.0 – 21.2 58.9 54.9 67.5
PL 42.5 51.3 6.2 – 76.3 53.2 20.0 – 42.5
PT 65.5 64.4 89.2 262.5 76.3 195.4 517.4
SI 29.0 28.4 76.3 302.7 25.1 68.5 287.2
SK 33.7 35.9 48.1 130.4 38.7 66.8 176.9
FI 42.7 37.3 38.8 117.3 23.7 7.9 61.6
SE 50.9 39.0 9.6 52.0 30.3 8.0 58.8
UK 43.3 44.4 54.0 110.3 47.0 90.1 186.7
Source: Commission services, 2005/06 updated stability and convergence programmes.64
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the ‘2005’ scenario). In addition, the structural primary
balances in 2005 as well as at the end of the programme
period are also given.
The debt/GDP ratio is projected to remain above 60 per-
cent of GDP in the ‘2005’ scenario over the coming dec-
ades for the EU as a whole and around 2015 it is pro-
jected to start rising considerably, revealing that the
public finances are on an unsustainable path. If the
medium-term budgetary plans in the programmes are
implemented, the debt/GDP ratio will instead decline
over the next 20 years. This trend would, however, start
to reverse once the budgetary impact of ageing starts to
take hold and the debt/GDP ratio will again start rising
(see Graph I.22 for the EU aggregate).
This points to the importance of consolidating the public
finances so as to reduce current and future debt levels.
The debt/GDP ratio is above the Treaty reference value
of 60 percent of GDP in 10 countries, which makes debt
reduction a matter of urgency in these cases (see
Table I.19). Indeed, high-debt countries need to keep
large primary surpluses for an extended period of time,
which may be hard to achieve in practice in view of com-
peting budgetary pressures. They are also more vulnera-
ble to negative interest rate and GDP growth shocks. For
countries with a government debt level well above
100 percent of GDP (EL, IT) public finance consolida-
tion is therefore of utmost importance.
4.3.3. The qualitative considerations
In order to interpret the quantitative indicators, it is nec-
essary to take into account other factors so as to identify
the main reasons behind the sustainability risks in the
formulation of an overall assessment of the long-term
sustainability of public finances.
The current level of the debt/GDP ratio is an important
item in terms of risks to public finance sustainability.
High-debt countries may have to sustain high primary
surpluses, which might be difficult to maintain over
time. Moreover, high-debt countries are more vulnerable
to negative growth rate/interest rate shocks. Since the
current level of gross debt has a rather limited impact on
the sustainability indicators, it requires special attention
in the assessment (1). Those arguments notably applied
to high-debt countries like Belgium and Italy, which dis-
play relatively low sustainability gaps as measured by
the indicators. They also apply symmetrically to Luxem-
bourg, being a low-debt country.
When relevant, structural reforms are also taken into
account. Some of them have a positive impact on the
long-term budgetary trends and/or the economic varia-
bles underlying such trend but their impact is uncertain
and/or have not been quantified in the programmes and
are therefore not incorporated in the quantitative indica-
tors. This is particularly the case for recent pension
reforms which have not yet been quantified and would
be included in the calculations in next rounds.
For example, in the Netherlands a recent reform of disa-
bility schemes will reduce expenditure in the long-term.
The impact of this reform is not considered in the figures
provided in the Dutch stability programme because pen-
sion expenditure in the programme does not include dis-
ability schemes. It is however included in the pension
projections in the Ageing report.
The reliability of projections may play a role, particu-
larly when long-term assumptions/projections are con-
siderably different from the common budgetary projec-
tions in the Ageing report, suggesting that the indicators
may be over/under estimated. Some countries relied on
more optimistic underlying assumptions than the com-
monly agreed ones (CY, HU, UK). This plays a role
notably when projections displayed very different out-
comes from the (at that time) forthcoming EPC results
(notably Hungary). Missing projections were also men-
tioned in a number of cases (DK, DE, EL, FR, ES, LU,
HU, MT, NL, PL, SK), which, when omitted, generally
underestimates the budgetary impact of ageing.
The tax ratio could also play a role. Indeed, it may be
more difficult for high tax-ratio countries to increase tax
further limiting the possibilities to deal with the budget-
ary impact of ageing population. This could be the case
for high-tax countries as Sweden and Denmark, should
the need arise.
Other long-term budgetary changes in non-age-related
expenditure and/or revenue may be taken into account in
the qualitative assessment. Indeed, to ensure full compa-
rability across countries, indicators are calculated on the
set of items decided at EPC level. But when changes of
other items are clearly explained and if the size of their
¥1∂ The contribution of the debt to the S2 sustainability indicator for a country
with a debt/GDP ratio of 100 percent and an interest/growth rate differen-
tial of 1.5 percent is in fact 1.5 percent of GDP (debt times the interest/
growth rate differential).65
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account in the overall assessment.
4.4. Main public finance sustainability 
challenges in Member States
The budgetary impact of ageing populations is a concern
for all EU Member States. There is however a large var-
iation in the degree of risks that they are facing and
where they mainly come from. Overall, six countries
were assessed to be at high risk, ten at medium risk and
nine at low risk in the Council Opinions.
The assessments in the Council Opinion’s were in line
with the view of the Commission, with the exception of
Slovakia (where the Commission’s assessment of
‘medium’ risk was changed to ‘low’ risk) and the Neth-
erlands (where the Commission’s assessment of ‘low’
risk was changed by the Council to ‘medium’ risk).
The reasons for the challenges to public finance sustain-
ability are different across the Member States. This
reflects a huge variety in terms of both the current and
planned budgetary position over the medium-term and
the projected budgetary impact of ageing over the long-
term. As shown in section 1 above, it is possible to
decompose the sustainability indicators (S1, S2) so that
the impact of the current budgetary position and the
future change (deterioration) is separated.
High-risk countries
Nearly all high-risk countries exhibit a strong increase in
age-related expenditures up to 2050. The notable excep-
tion is Hungary, who projects a relatively small increase
in their convergence programme. However, as shown in
Table I.16 above, pension expenditure is projected to
rise considerably more according to the projection in the
Ageing report, pointing to a significantly higher increase
in age-related expenditure than envisaged in the Hungar-
ian convergence programme.
In addition, only Slovenia has relatively sound public
finances with a level of debt slightly under 30 percent of
GDP and a relatively limited structural public deficit (-1.2
percent of GDP in 2005). Indeed, three countries (EL, CY,
PT) have a debt above 60 percent of GDP with structural
Graph I.22:  Debt development in EU
Source: Commission services.
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Table I.20
Overall classification of risks to sustainability
Risk category Country
Low DK, EE, LV, LT, AT, PL, SK, FI, SE
Medium BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, 
UK
High CZ, EL, CY, HU, PT, SI
Source: Commission services.66
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of the level of debt appears therefore as a priority for those
countries. Hungary’s debt/GDP ratio is close to the Treaty
threshold but its current structural deficit is very large,
which implies large sustainability risks for the Hungarian
public finances, even without taking account of the impact
of ageing on public finances. Finally, the Czech Republic
has a level of debt under 40 percent of GDP but the current
structural deficit is large.
Medium-risk countries
The intermediate category consists of countries with very
different characteristics. Germany and France have
reformed their pension schemes so that the overall increase
in public expenditure is usually limited. However their level
of debt is still above the Treaty threshold and their current
level of deficit, if not corrected, would result in an explosive
debt before taking into account the impact of ageing.
Four countries (ES, IE, NL, and LU) should experience
a relatively large increase in pension expenditure but
have currently rather sound public finances. Spain and
Ireland are in surplus and have a low level of debt. Lux-
embourg experiences a deficit but has a very low level of
debt and substantial assets in the public pension fund.
The Netherlands have improved their budget balance
considerably in recent years.
Belgium and Italy still have high debt/GDP ratios. Yet
the situation is quite different in the two countries. Bel-
gium has been very efficient in maintaining surpluses for
a number of years, which has enabled a steady reduction
of its debt level; by about 14 percentage points of GDP
since 2000. However, under current legislation a large
rise in public expenditure is projected in Belgium.
On the other hand, Italy has considerably reformed its
pension schemes, resulting in very little increase in pub-
lic expenditure over the long term.
However, the current budgetary situation is not suffi-
ciently strong to ensure a steady reduction of the consist-
ently high debt level. Indeed, the debt/GDP ratio has
been reduced by some 3 percentage points of GDP since
2000, reflecting the relatively weak budgetary position
in recent years in Italy.
Although public expenditures are projected to show little
change over the long-term, the pension system in Malta is
currently being reviewed and reforms are envisaged, with
a view to improve its financial sustainability and adequacy
over the long term. Moreover, the currently high structural
deficit, if not corrected, will prevent the necessary reduc-
tion of the debt/GDP ratio, currently above the 60 percent
reference value. Despite a low level of debt, the UK faces
a challenge in terms of public finance sustainability. Pub-
lic expenditure as a share of GDP could rise faster than
envisaged in the UK convergence programme, as there is
possibility of insufficient provision of private pensions
which could imply higher costs. In addition, the projec-
tions in the UK convergence programmes rely on more
optimistic underlying assumptions than the commonly
agreed ones, which results in a lower projected rise in age-
related expenditure. Moreover, their current level of defi-
cit, if not corrected, would result in an explosive debt ratio
before taking into account the impact of ageing.
Low-risk countries
Low-risk countries in general have a comprehensive
strategy to deal with ageing which implies a strong budg-
Table I.21
Are the overall policy conclusions different compared with last year’s assessment?
This year’s assessment
Low risk Medium risk High risk
Last year’s assessment
Favourable position DK, EE, FI LU
Relatively favourable position AT, LT, LV, SE,SK IE, ES, UK, NL
At some risks PL BE, FR, IT, DE MT CY, SI, HU
At risks PT, EL, CZ
NB: the colour of the cell indicates if there is a change in the overall assessment of the Council Opinion. A white cell means that the assessment is unchanged. A dark
grey cell means that the overall assessment has changed.
Source: Commission services.67
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accumulating assets) and/or a comprehensive pension
reform, sometimes including a shift towards private pen-
sion schemes or both. However countries can also show
very different patterns. Some countries (FI, DK, SE) are
running large surpluses and are reducing debt and/or
accumulating assets, which will enable them to face part
of the rise in pension expenditure. Others have reformed
their pension schemes and face a limited increase in pen-
sion expenditure (EE, LV, LT, AT, PL, SK, and SE).
This does not mean that these countries have no risk at
all regarding long-term sustainability of the public
finances. For example, the current level of debt is above
60 percent of GDP in Austria. Some countries also need
further budgetary consolidation or reforms, although to a
lesser degree than medium and high risk countries.
Changes compared with last year’s assessment 
were limited
As regards sustainability of public finances, countries
were divided last year in the Council Opinion’s in four
categories: favourable position, relatively favourable
position, at some risks, at (serious) risks. This year, in
the draft Council Opinion on the stability and conver-
gence programmes, they have been classified in three
categories: low risk / medium risk / high risk.
This risk categorisation involves:
• recognising that ageing population represents a
budgetary challenge for all countries, albeit to vary-
ing degrees;
• providing a clear distinction between the different
degrees of risks to public finance sustainability
countries are facing.
For most countries (see Table I.21), the main conclu-
sions are the same as last year and changes in the overall
assessment are due to the change of the categorisation
and not a change in the assessment. However, there were
some changes for several countries mainly related to
new information on long-term projections or sometimes
to a worsening of the budgetary position.
The changes were mainly driven by new long-term pro-
jections. In particular, Poland provided budgetary pro-
jections up to 2050, which reveals that there are limited
risks to public finance sustainability under current poli-
cies. For Luxembourg the increase in expenditure were
revised upwards reflecting improved projections.
The projected rise in public expenditure over the long-
term was revised upwards also for Ireland, Spain, the
UK, Cyprus and Slovenia. In the case of Hungary, long-
term projections of pension expenditure may be underes-
timated in their convergence programme, as evident
when compared to the results of the common long-term
projections.
Table I.22 provides the conclusions reached by the
Ecofin Council in its Opinions on the stability and
convergence programmes on the basis of the Commis-
sion’s assessments.68
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Policy conclusions by the Council on the sustainability of public finances
Are public finances sustainable? What are the main issues? Have policy conclusions 
changed?
BE Belgium appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations and considering the need 
to sustain high primary surpluses for a 
prolonged period of time.
The current level of gross debt, while declining, 
remains well above the reference value and the steady 
reduction of the debt ratio foreseen in the update is 
necessary. The Belgian strategy of putting longer-term 
concerns at the heart of fiscal policy, including by 
reducing debt, will undoubtedly alleviate sustainability 
risks and the ‘ageing fund law’ reinforces the political 
commitment by setting legally binding budgetary 
targets. Furthermore, recent measures aimed at 
increasing the effective retirement age and the 
employment ratio should contribute positively to 
sustainability. However, the current budgetary position 
may not be sufficient to cover fully the substantial 
increase in expenditure due to ageing populations, 
underlining the importance of maintaining large 
primary surpluses in the coming years.
No 
CZ The Czech Republic appears to be at high risk 
on grounds of the projected budgetary costs 
of ageing populations.
While the debt ratio is currently relatively low in an EU 
perspective, the high deficit contributes to a rising debt 
ratio in the long-term projections until 2050, which 
increases the risk to debt sustainability. At the same 
time, the projected high increases of pension 
expenditure over the projection period are expected to 
put a significant burden on the public finances. A 
rigorous implementation of the planned consolidation 
of public finances over the medium term and a further 
strengthening of the budgetary position together with 
additional structural reforms to contain the increase in 
age-related expenditures, in particular on pensions and 
healthcare, appear to be of key importance in order to 
mitigate the risks to public finance sustainability.
No 
DK Denmark appears to be at low risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population, due to its solid public finances and 
provided that the assumed employment 
increases and low government consumption 
growth are achieved, which requires further 
labour market reforms and spending restraint. 
The strategy of putting sustainability concerns at the 
heart of fiscal policy-making, including containing 
pension expenditure and involving accumulation of 
assets, contributes positively to the long-term outlook 
for public finances. The currently favourable budgetary 
position contributes to the financing of the projected 
budgetary impact of an ageing population and the 
medium-term budgetary plans are consistent with 
sustainable public finances
No  
DE Germany appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
The structural reforms carried out in previous years, 
and in particular the pension reform, have helped to 
contain future rises in public expenditure. In view of 
the current level of government gross debt exceeding 
the Treaty reference value of 60 % of GDP and the 
currently high structural deficit, implementing 
rigorously a strong budgetary consolidation over the 
programme period is necessary so as to reduce the risks 
to long-term sustainability.
No 
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EE Estonia appears to be at low risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The level of gross debt is currently very low and is 
projected to remain below the 60 % reference value 
throughout the projection period. Estonia’s strategy of 
putting sustainability concerns at the heart of fiscal 
policy-making, including the pension system reform 
which involves the accumulation of assets, contributes 
positively to the outlook for the public finances. The 
current budgetary position in surplus contributes 
towards limiting the projected budgetary impact of an 
ageing population, and the medium-term budgetary 
plan of maintaining balanced budgets is consistent 
with low risks to public finance sustainability.
No 
EL Greece appears to be at high risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The debt ratio is currently the highest in the EU, and is 
projected to remain at very high levels throughout the 
projection period up to 2050. It is therefore necessary 
to implement rigorously the planned consolidation of 
public finances over the medium-term and to further 
strengthen the budgetary position in order to reduce 
risks to public finance sustainability. At the same time, 
the projected increase of government expenditure, 
notably on pensions, over the projection period is 
expected to put a high burden on public finances. To 
this end, resolutely implementing measures enacted 
and designing and carrying out additional structural 
reforms, notably on pensions, are necessary so as to 
reduce the risks to public finance sustainability.
No 
ES Spain appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
The currently favourable budgetary position, including 
the debt position and accumulation of assets in the 
Social Security Reserve Fund, contribute to absorb 
somewhat the projected increase of pension 
expenditures. However, the significant increase in these 
expenditures over the projection period suggests that 
the implementation of the measures within the 
announced social welfare reform aimed at containing 
the budgetary impact of ageing, notably concerning 
pensions could be an important element in reducing 
risks to the sustainability of public finances.
The updated long-term 
projections reveal a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term.
FR France appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
Recent reforms, notably the 2003 pension reform, have 
substantially helped to contain future rise in public 
expenditure and their full implementation will be 
crucial to ensure the expected results. The current level 
of government gross debt is above the Treaty value of 
60 % of GDP, and the currently high structural deficit, if 
unchanged, will prevent the necessary reduction of 
debt in view of the future cost of ageing. Therefore, in 
the absence of additional reforms, strong budgetary 
consolidation is needed in order to reduce the risks to 
long-term sustainability. 
No  
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IE Ireland appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
an ageing population. 
The currently sound budgetary position, in conjunction 
with the low debt level and the accumulation of assets 
in the National Pension Reserve Fund, helps partly to 
offset the significant rise in age-related government 
expenditure, notably on pensions, projected over the 
long term. Ireland has also recently enacted reforms to 
the pension system for public servants, and the 
authorities envisage further measures that should 
contribute to a more sustainable basis for the provision 
of public service pensions. The commitment to 
monitoring the adequacy of contribution rates through 
regular actuarial reviews is helpful. Implementing 
additional measures aimed at easing the budgetary 
impact of an ageing population over the long term 
would be nevertheless an important element in 
reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
The updated long-term 
projections reveal a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term. 
IT Italy appears to be at medium risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of an ageing 
population. 
Past reforms have helped to contain future rises in 
public expenditure and their full implementation, 
notably of the 2004 pension reform, will be crucial to 
obtain the expected results. The currently high level of 
gross debt and the weak budgetary position indicate 
the necessity for strong consolidation of public finances 
over the medium-term to reduce risks to public finance 
sustainability
No  
CY Cyprus appears to be at high risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
Implementing rigorously the planned consolidation of 
public finances over the medium term will alleviate the 
risks to long-term sustainability and, as recognized in 
the programme, substantial pension and healthcare 
reform measures will also be necessary to contain the 
projected high increase in age-related expenditure in 
the period up to 2050 and to reduce the risk to long-
term sustainability.
The updated long-term 
projections reveal a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term.
LV Latvia appears to be at low risk on grounds of 
the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The currently very low level of gross debt is projected 
to remain below the 60 % reference value throughout 
the 2005-2050 projection period. Latvia is 
implementing a pension reform launched in 1996 
which contributes significantly to contain the 
budgetary impact of ageing populations.
No  
LT Lithuania appears to be at low risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The level of gross debt is currently very low and is 
projected to remain below the 60 % of GDP reference 
value throughout most the projection period and a 
contained government deficit is planned over the 
programme period. Lithuania has enacted a pension 
reform which contributes significantly to contain the 
budgetary impact of ageing populations. Further 
changes to the pension system are envisaged by the 
Lithuanian authorities, aiming at increasing the 
replacement rates for pensioners and at the same time 
gradually raising the retirement age. The 
implementation of the latter measure would be key in 
ensuring the financial sustainability of the public 
pension system.
No  
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LU Luxembourg appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
The current level of debt is certainly very low and the 
planned consolidation over the medium term should 
contribute to partly alleviating the risk to public 
finance sustainability. However, Luxembourg has 
experienced, over the last two decades, a period of 
exceptionally strong employment growth which will 
progressively translate into a similar increase in the 
number of pensioners and into a large increase in 
pension expenditure. While it contributes significantly 
to public finance sustainability, the current size of 
pension fund assets will not be sufficient and, as 
recognised by the programme, some changes in the 
pension schemes will prove necessary at some point to 
contain future increase in public expenditure and 
reduce the risk to long-term sustainability.
Yes. The updated 
projection of the rise in 
age-related expenditures 
point to a significant 
challenge with regard to 
public finance 
sustainability.
HU Hungary appears to be at high risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The gross debt-to-GDP ratio is currently close to the 
reference value and is projected to increase in the 
period up to 2050. Hungary reformed its pension 
system in the late 1990s, aimed at contained future 
rises in expenditure on pensions, which helped to 
reduce the budgetary impact of ageing. However, 
increases in government expenditure on pensions 
could be higher than projected in the update, 
suggesting that a close monitoring of factors that are 
assumed to offset such higher expenditures as well as 
developments in pension and other age-related 
expenditures is important. Moreover, the currently 
high structural deficit contributes to increase 
sustainability risks. It is therefore necessary to carry out 
a large consolidation of public finances over the 
medium-term and to further strengthen the budgetary 
position in order to reduce risks to public finance 
sustainability.
The new common 
projections show a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections 
and those included in the 
Hungarian 2005 update, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term.
MT Malta appears to be at medium risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
The level of gross debt is currently above the 60 % 
reference value and the currently high structural 
deficit, if unchanged, will prevent the necessary 
reduction of the gross debt ratio from falling below 
the Treaty reference value over the long term. 
Implementing rigorously the planned budgetary 
consolidation over the programme period would 
therefore contribute to reducing debt below the 
reference value, with positive consequences for risks to 
public finance sustainability. Changes to the pension 
system are envisaged by the Maltese authorities, 
aiming at ensuring adequacy and sustainability of the 
pension system. The implementation of the reform 
would be key in ensuring the financial sustainability of 
the public pension system.
No  
NL The Netherlands appears to be at medium risk 
on grounds of the projected budgetary costs 
of ageing populations. 
The current level of debt is under the Treaty value of 
60 % of GDP and the recent improvement of the 
budgetary situation in the Netherlands has helped 
alleviate risks to long-term sustainability. The 
implementation of recent reforms of the disability 
scheme will also contribute to curb long-term public 
spending. However, even fully taken into account, the 
projected future rise in revenue, notably due to 
delayed taxation of pension is not sufficient to 
compensate the rise in public expenditure over the 
long-term. Further budgetary consolidation may 
therefore be necessary to fully offset the impact of 
ageing.
No  
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AT Austria appears to be at low risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The level of debt, currently above 60 % of GDP, is 
projected to fall and remain below the reference value 
up to 2050 on the assumption that the planned 
budgetary consolidation is implemented. Austria’s 
recent pension reform should contribute significantly 
to the containment of future increases in public 
expenditure. However, the structural deficit in the 
government finances, if not corrected, could pose a risk 
to public finance sustainability. Implementing the 
planned consolidation of public finances over the 
medium term is therefore instrumental for reducing 
the risks to public finance sustainability.
No  
PL Poland appears to be at low risk on grounds of 
the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The level of debt is currently under the 60 % reference 
value and should remain so under the assumption that 
savings related to the implementation of the 1999 
pension reform will materialise. The reform is 
ambitious and contributes to the solving of the ageing 
problem, but measures recently adopted by the 
government to exclude particular employment groups 
from the reformed pension scheme could weaken the 
reform’s long-term outcome, particularly if further 
exemptions from the pension schemes were granted. 
The realisation of contingent liabilities as well as the 
currently high structural deficit may increase the debt/
GDP ratio faster than planned over the medium term. 
Implementing rigorously the planned consolidation of 
public finances over the medium-term would reduce 
risks to long-term sustainability.
Yes. The updated 
projection of the change 
in age-related 
expenditures up to 2050 
reveals limited risks to 
public finance 
sustainability under 
current policies.
PT Portugal appears to be at high risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The currently high level of gross debt and the weak 
budgetary position indicate the necessity for 
implementing rigorously the planned consolidation of 
public finances over the medium-term and to ensure 
the attainment of the budgetary targets in order to 
reduce risks to public finance sustainability. However, 
the projected increases in pension and healthcare 
expenditures over the projection period clearly indicate 
the necessity of a comprehensive strategy in dealing 
with the challenge posed by ageing populations that 
goes beyond improving the currently weak budgetary 
position. The ongoing introduction of changes to the 
pension and healthcare systems should go some way in 
making these systems more sustainable. However, 
further reforms are required to curb the projected 
growth of age-related expenditures.
No 
SI Slovenia appears to be at high risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The relatively low debt ratio will contribute to limit the 
budgetary impact of ageing. However, Slovenia will 
still face a very large increase in government 
expenditure. Even though the 1999 pension reform has 
significantly alleviated future increase in expenditure, 
its effects have been partly offset by the modification 
of the indexation rule. Further changes in the pension 
schemes, as recognised by the programme, will prove 
necessary at some point to contain future increase in 
government expenditure and reduce the risk to long-
term sustainability. If no further measures are taken to 
relieve the pressures of age-related expenditure, the 
long-term sustainability of public finances will be 
undermined. A careful planning and timely adoption 
of measures are key in this regard.
The updated long-term 
projections reveal a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term.
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SK With regard to the sustainability of public 
finances, Slovakia appears to be at low risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations, subject to the sustained 
fiscal consolidation also beyond the 
programme period and the full 
implementation of enacted reforms, as well as 
other reforms of a structural nature (including 
a reduction of unemployment). 
The level of debt is significantly under the 60 % 
reference value and should remain so under the 
assumption of unchanged policies for the coming two 
decades. However, the continuation of the currently 
high structural deficit will prevent the reduction of the 
debt/GDP ratio, which increases the risk to long-term 
sustainability. Implementing rigorously the planned 
consolidation of public finances over the medium-term 
is necessary in order to reduce risks to long-term 
sustainability.
No  
FI Finland appears to be at low risk on grounds 
of the projected budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. 
The gross debt ratio is currently below the 60 % of GDP 
reference value, and is projected to remain below this 
value throughout most of the projection period which 
extends until 2050. The significant assets of social 
security and the currently favourable budgetary 
position contribute to limit the budgetary impact of 
ageing populations. However, in the long run, a risk to 
public finance sustainability could emerge, reflecting 
rising pension expenditure. Containing age-related 
expenditure over the long term, including the 
successful implementation of recent reform measures 
aimed at rising the effective retirement age, while 
maintaining sound budgetary positions would be key 
components in reducing risks to public finance 
sustainability.
No  
SE With regard to the sustainability of public 
finances, Sweden appears to be at low risk on 
grounds of the projected budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. 
The level of gross debt is currently comfortably below 
the 60 % reference value and is projected to remain 
below the reference value throughout most of the 
programme period. The Swedish strategy of putting 
sustainability concerns at the heart of fiscal policy-
making, including the pension system reform which 
contains pension expenditure and involves 
accumulation of assets, contributes positively to the 
outlook for the public finances. The currently 
favourable budgetary position contributes to limiting 
the projected budgetary impact of ageing populations 
while the planned consolidation towards the 2 % MTO 
at the end of the programme period contributes to 
improve sustainability.
No  
UK With regard to the sustainability of public 
finances, in combination with an increase in 
the cost of ageing, the possibility of 
insufficient provision of private pensions 
increasing fiscal costs would put the United 
Kingdom at medium risk, unless changes are 
made to improve fiscal sustainability. 
Over the period until 2050, a contained rise in public 
pension expenditure is projected. However, higher age-
related expenditure pressures cannot be excluded as 
there is a possibility of insufficient provision of private 
pensions. Pension policy is currently under review and 
the government’s response to the November 2005 
Pensions Commission report is expected in spring this 
year. The currently favourable debt position 
contributes to limit somewhat the budgetary impact of 
ageing populations; however, gross debt is projected to 
go above the 60 % of GDP reference value during the 
projection period to 2050 if, compared to the structural 
budgetary position in 2005/06, no further budgetary 
consolidation takes place during the programme 
period. Improving the structural balance of 
government finances over the medium term would 
contribute to reducing risks to public finance 
sustainability.
The updated long-term 
projections reveal a higher 
increase compared with 
the previous projections, 
pointing to higher risks 
for public finance 
sustainability over the 
long-term.
Source: Council Opinions on the 2005/06 updated stability and convergence programmes on the basis of the Commission’s assessment.74
Part II
Evolving budgetary surveillance

Summary
One year has passed since the EU heads of State or Gov-
ernment endorsed the March 2005 Ecofin Council report
containing the main directions for reforming the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. Since then, the revised SGP has
been codified in regulations. Where necessary, further
clarifications on how to interpret the new text of the Reg-
ulations were included in a revised Code of Conduct for
the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.
The Member States, the Commission, the Council had
all to learn ‘how to live with new rules’. Following the
SGP reform, the information provided in Stability and
Convergence Programmes by Member States needed to
be enriched. New values for Member States’ medium-
term budgetary objectives were indicated in Stability and
Convergence Programmes according to the principles
spelled out in the amended SGP regulations. The imple-
mentation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure had to con-
form to the revised Regulations.
This part of the report summarises the result of one year
of work to codify, make operational and implement the
revised SGP. It also provides a first assessment on how
well Member States and EU institutions adapted to the
revised SGP and on how the revised SGP translated into
different outcomes for what concerns the application of
the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Codification of the agreement on the SGP reform
On 20 March 2005, the EU Finance Ministers agreed on
a revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, after months
of intense discussions. The agreement was then endorsed
by the European Council and codified in Regulations.
The Commission adopted Proposals for amending Reg-
ulations 1466/97 and 1467/97 underpinning the Stability
and Growth Pact on 20 April 2006. These proposals
were submitted to the Council and simultaneously to the
European Parliament. The amending Regulations for-
mally entered into force on 27 July 2005. They include
all the essential elements of the SGP reform.
In parallel, the Council prepared, on the basis of a pro-
posal by the Commission services, a revised Code of
Conduct which includes provisions contributing to a
consistent application of the reform. This document
mainly consists in definitions of concepts, clarification
of procedures and provisions on some elements of the
agreement reached in the Council, in particular those
which were not codified in the amending Regulations. It
also includes detailed provisions on the content and for-
mat of Stability and Convergence Programmes. It was
endorsed by the Council on 11 October 2005.
Main developments in budgetary surveillance 
in the preventive arm of the SGP
The revised SGP introduced some new or revised con-
cepts, definitions and principles in the preventive arm of
the SGP. In order to ensure a coherent and consistent
application of the rules, the Commission and the Mem-
ber States have, in the past twelve months, further spec-
ified certain elements.
• The methodology for setting the country-specific
medium-term budgetary objectives was clarified. In
the revised SGP, countries are no longer required to
aim for the uniform position of ‘close-to-balance or
in surplus’ in the medium term. Rather, medium-
term objectives are set taking into account country-
specific economic and budgetary circumstances.
The Council Report of 20 March 2005 says that,
until criteria and modalities for taking into account
implicit liabilities are appropriately established,
MTOs are differentiated on the basis of the debt
ratio and potential growth, while preserving suffi-
cient margin below the reference value of 3 percent
of GDP. Following a discussion with Member States
on the basis of a document prepared by the Commis-
sion services, Member States agreed to stick to sim-
ple principles leaving sufficient leeway for setting
the MTOs.77
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how implicit liabilities could be taken into account
in the determination of MTOs. As foreseen by the
SGP reform agreement, the Commission will report,
by the end of 2006, on the progress made on this
issue. A number of preliminary considerations are
made in this report, aiming at illustrating the ration-
ale for considering implicit liabilities relating to age-
ing in the determination of MTOs and presenting
alternative broad approaches.
• Following the past failure to reach the medium-term
budgetary objective of ‘close to balance or in sur-
plus’, the SGP reform introduced principles for the
conduct of fiscal policy in the period of convergence
towards the medium-term budgetary targets. In par-
ticular, it was agreed that Member States would take
active steps to reach the MTO (0.5 percent bench-
mark adjustment for euro area and ERM II coun-
tries) and make larger structural efforts in good
times. Under certain conditions, Member States
implementing structural reforms may deviate tem-
porarily from the MTO or the adjustment path
towards it. The Commission and Member States
clarified a number of issues related to the definition
of the adjustment path towards the MTOs and spec-
ified the conditions for taking into account structural
reforms.
• The Commission assessment of the 2005 updates of
Stability and Convergence Programmes suggests
that Member States have, to a large extent, followed
the revised rules, but also reveals some deviations
from the agreement of 20 March 2005. On the posi-
tive side, differentiated MTOs were set for Member
States that reflect country-specific fundamentals and
ensure a sufficient safety margin against the 3 per-
cent limit. Other positive elements are that the
0.5 percent benchmark adjustment is, on average
over the period covered by the programmes,
respected in most countries not yet at their MTO,
and that the projected reduction in the deficit is gen-
erally based on realistic macroeconomic forecasts.
As regards concerns, the adjustment planned by
Member States which have not yet reached their
medium-term budgetary objective (but not in EDP)
falls short of the 0.5 percent adjustment in the year
2006. The benign economic environment with
growth close or above potential is not being
exploited to progress towards the MTO. In addition,
there is, in some Member States, an unfortunate
combination of a back-loaded fiscal adjustment with
a lack of specification of measures underlying the
(backloaded) projected consolidation. Finally,
according to the information in the programmes, the
0.5 percent benchmark is, on average, not achieved
in countries with a positive output gap (the same is
true for countries with a positive change in the out-
put gap).
Main developments in budgetary surveillance 
in the corrective arm of the SGP
One year after the reform, the experience with the imple-
mentation of the excessive deficit procedure is overall
positive. The following elements are particularly rele-
vant.
• The Commission reports in accordance with Treaty
Article 104(3) adopted since the reform contained a
comprehensive assessment of ‘other relevant fac-
tors’. The consideration of a wide range of factors in
the initiating step of the excessive deficit procedure
ensured that decisions and recommendations
reflected a comprehensive assessment of the budget-
ary developments in the context of the economic
conditions prevailing in the country concerned. The
specific factors put forward by Member States were
assessed in an objective and balanced way by the
Commission. Since the SGP reform, all deficits in
excess of 3 percent of GDP have been considered
excessive. In all cases, deficits could not be consid-
ered close to the reference value or the excess could
not be considered temporary. The application of the
provisions related to ‘other relevant factors’ in the
steps leading to a decision on the existence of an
excessive deficit has confirmed that the SGP
remains a rules-based framework.
• The revised SGP foresees that deadlines for the cor-
rection of excessive deficits should be set taking into
account an overall and balanced assessment of rele-
vant factors. Since the agreement on the revised
SGP, recommendations in accordance with Article
104(7) of the Treaty were issued for three EU Mem-
ber States. In all three cases, the room for judgment
in the excessive deficit procedure has been applied
to set realistic deadlines for Member States to cor-
rect their excessive deficits, while ensuring that sig-
nificant fiscal efforts are made. The Council
recommendations and notices issued since the
reform always specified the required structural fiscal
effort, which excludes one-off and temporary effects78
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room for economic judgment in the fiscal surveil-
lance process, the SGP reform stimulated a con-
structive and transparent policy dialogue on the
individual country cases between the Commission,
the Council and Member States. This contributed to
a smooth and efficient operation of the Pact.
• A focus is made in the report on a change introduced
by the reform which deserves particular attention
and careful implementation: the assessment of effec-
tive action in the excessive deficit procedure. Provi-
sions related to effective action play a central role in
the revised SGP, since the new rules foresee the pos-
sibility of repeating steps in the EDP in case a Mem-
ber State has acted in compliance with the previous
recommendations of the Council. Simple and trans-
parent principles for the implementation of the con-
cept of effective action are presented, with the view
to stimulate discussion on this issue.
Progress in the measurement of budgetary positions 
and policies
By moving the emphasis from a single indicator to a
more reasoned analysis of the budgetary position of
Member States, the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact has reinforced the need to strengthen the knowl-
edge and understanding of budgetary developments in
each Member State. In the past twelve months, progress
was made on a number of issues related to the measure-
ment of budgetary positions and policies.
• The first issue concerns the identification of tempo-
rary influences, other than those stemming from the
cycle, on budgetary statistics. All documents of the
revised SGP refer to fiscal adjustments in cyclically-
adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary meas-
ures. The concept of one-off and temporary meas-
ures was specified. Common features of one-off and
temporary measures were identified and there were
discussions on an open and indicative list of meas-
ures to be considered in the context of the SGP. A
number of clear principles have been agreed for tak-
ing into account such measures in the context of
budgetary surveillance, which reduce incentives to
pursue fiscal consolidation on the basis of one-off
measures and, in turn, stimulate the implementation
of sound consolidation measures with a sustained
effect on government finances.
• Secondly, progress was made on the cyclical adjust-
ment of budget deficits. Budget elasticities and sen-
sitivities to the cycle were updated for the former
EU-15 Member States and calculated for the first
time for the new Member States. This allowed esti-
mating a new set of values for minimal benchmarks
(threshold value which ensures the respect of the
3 percent reference value under normal cyclical
fluctuations) for the 25 EU Member States. 
Enhanced quality of budgetary statistics
The implementation of the SGP and budgetary surveil-
lance in broader terms has shown that the effectiveness
of fiscal rules also depends on the quality of the underly-
ing government finance statistics, and that these depend
to a great extent on their governance. Over the last
months, several developments have contributed to
improving the quality of budgetary statistics: notably the
reinforcement of the Eurostat powers and responsibility
in checking the quality of fiscal data reported by Mem-
ber States, the publication of budgetary statistics with an
infra annual frequency, as well the establishment of min-
imum standards for the institutional set up of national
and European statistical authorities.
New long-term budgetary projections and 
improvements of the analysis of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances
The revised SGP put greater emphasis on the sustainabil-
ity of government finances. Progress was made in the
past year in the quantification of the implications for
government finances of population ageing. Long-term
budgetary projections were updated on the basis of com-
monly agreed assumptions and methods for a wide range
of budgetary items (pensions, healthcare, long-term care,
education and unemployment benefits). With regard to
the analysis of public finance sustainability in the con-
text of the assessment of the annual updates of stability
and convergence programmes, some improvements
were introduced in the latest assessment round. First, a
decomposition of the sustainability indicators has been
introduced, which examines whether risks to public
finance sustainability mainly come from the short-term
or long-term budgetary developments. Second, a new
sensitivity test has been introduced. It shows the supple-
mentary budgetary cost that arises if an adjustment that
ensures sustainable public finances is made in the future
rather than today. In other words, it illustrates the ‘cost
of consolidation delay’.79
1. Codification of the agreement 
on the SGP reform
1.1. Introduction
On 20 March 2005, the Ecofin Council reached a politi-
cal agreement on a revision of the Stability and Growth
Pact. The substance of the agreement is laid down in a
report on ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact” (1). In this report, the Council gave
consideration to enhancing the governance and the
national ownership of the fiscal framework; to strength-
ening the economic underpinnings and the effectiveness
of the SGP, both in its preventive and corrective arms; to
safeguarding the sustainability of public finances in the
long run; and to promoting growth. The 2005 edition of
the report ‘Public Finances in EMU’ provided a detailed
presentation of the main elements of the agreement.
Table II.1 below summarises the main changes intro-
duced by the reform.
On 22 March 2005, the European Council endorsed the
Ecofin report, stating that it updates and complements
the Stability and Growth Pact and invited the Commis-
sion to bring forward proposals for amending the Coun-
cil Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and No 1467/97,
which underpin the SGP, in accordance with the Council
report. The Commission adopted Proposals for amend-
ing the Regulations on 20 April 2005.  (2) These propos-
als were submitted to the Council and simultaneously to
the European Parliament. The amending Regulations
were finally adopted by the Council on 27 June 2005,
published in the Official Journal of the European Union
on 7 July 2005 (3). They entered into force 20 days later.
In parallel, the Council prepared, on the basis of a
contribution of the Commission services, a revised
Code of Conduct including specifications on the imple-
mentation of the Stability and Growth Pact. This docu-
ment includes provisions ensuring clarity and consist-
ent application of the reform. This mainly consists in
definitions of concepts, clarification of procedures and
provisions on some elements of the agreement reached
in the Council, in particular those which were not cod-
ified in the amending Regulations. The revised Code of
Conduct also includes detailed updated provisions on
the content and format of Stability and Convergence
Programmes. It was endorsed by the Ecofin Council on
11 October 2005 (4). This section reviews the main
changes introduced to the SGP Regulations and to the
Code of Conduct.
1.1.1. The legislative changes to the SGP
One month after the Council agreement on the SGP
reform, the Commission adopted legislative proposals
for an amendment of Council Regulations 1466/97 and
1467/97 which underpin the SGP. In line with the pref-
erence expressed by the Council, the Commission pro-
posed to limit the legislative changes to a minimum,
while ensuring consistency and clarity of the legal pro-
visions.
The Commission also decided to seize the opportunity
created by the SGP reform to propose some additional
amendments of a technical nature in order to smooth the
process of the examination of Stability and Convergence
Programmes and the application of the excessive deficit
procedure. These changes essentially reflect a codifica-
¥1∂ The report can be downloaded at the following address: http://register.con-
silium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st07/st07423.en05.pdf.
¥2∂ The Commission Proposals for the amending Regulations can be down-
loaded at the following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_
finance/publications/sgp_en.htm.
¥3∂ It can be downloaded at the following address:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/johtml.do?uri=oj:l:2005:174:som:en:html.
¥4∂ The full title of the document is ‘Specifications on the implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of
Stability and Convergence Programmes’. It can be downloaded at the
following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/
activities/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf.80
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(Continued on the next page)
Council Regulation (EC) Nos 1466/97 and 1467/97 are based on different Treaty articles. Regulation 1466/97 is based on
Article 99(5) of the Treaty (EC) and 1467/97 on Article 104(14). As a consequence, different procedures applied for the
revision of the two Regulations.
Council Regulation 1466/97
With Article 99(5) being the relevant legal basis, changes to CR 1466/97 followed the ‘cooperation procedure’ as laid down in Article
252 of the Treaty. The cooperation procedure foresees two readings in the European Parliament. The following steps were followed for
the adoption of the amending Regulation.
In a first step, the Commission submitted its Proposal for the amending Regulation to the Council and the European Par-
liament on 20 April 2005. On 3 May, the Commission Proposal was sent to the European Central Bank (ECB) for com-
ments. On 3 June 2005, the European Central Bank reported that it does not see the need to express an opinion on the
specific provisions of the revised Regulation, but endorsed the aim of improving the surveillance and coordination of eco-
nomic policies so as to achieve and maintain medium-term objectives that ensure the sustainability of public finances. The
ECB also considered that a rigorous and consistent implementation of the surveillance procedures would be conducive to
prudent fiscal policies.
At a first reading, on 9 June 2005, the European Parliament delivered an Opinion on the Commission proposal. The Opinion
was prepared by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. It included amendments underlying the importance of reli-
able fiscal statistics (including proposals allowing the possibility for the Commission to undertake audit missions and to com-
pare data provided by Member States with those provided by the national Central Banks and the European Central Bank). The
amendments also aimed at reinforcing the monitoring of the achievement of the medium-term budgetary objectives, and giv-
ing more emphasis on government debt dynamics in the assessment of Stability and Convergence Programmes.
Then, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, adopted a Common Position, taking into account the European Parliament’s
Opinion. The Council decided not to include provisions reflecting the amendments adopted by the European Parliament. How-
ever, the changes adopted by the Council with respect to the Commission Proposal went in the direction of further clarifying
the implementation of the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and were therefore in line with the overall
thrust of the amendments tabled by the European Parliament. The changes envisaged by Parliament concerning the statistical
field have been considered by the Council in the finalisation of the legal acts more directly linked to public finance statistics.
On 17 June 2005, the Commission issued a Communication on the Common Position prepared by the Council. The Commis-
sion considered that the Common Position of the Council included all the essential elements of its original proposal and
reflected an overall balanced compromise. It could therefore accept all the changes made by the Council to its Proposal. On
23 June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution approving the Council’s Common Position. The amending Regulation
was finally adopted by the Council on 27 June 2005, published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 7 July 2005,
and entered into force 20 days later. All official documents concerning the adoption of Regulation 1055/05 amending Regu-
lation 1466/97 can be found at the following web address: http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=5245412.
Council Regulation 1467/97
Legislative changes to Council Regulation 1467/97 were submitted to the so-called ‘consultation procedure’. Only one
reading by the European Parliament is foreseen in this procedure.
In a first step, the Commission submitted its Proposal to the Council, which consulted the European Parliament and the
ECB. On 3 June 2005, the ECB issued a report stating that it did not see a need to express an opinion on the specific pro-
visions of the proposed regulation. In its report, the ECB reiterated that the EDP needs to be both credible and effective as
a safeguard against unsustainable public finances, maintaining a strict time frame. Against this background, the ECB
favoured an amendment of Council Regulation 1467/97/EC that is as limited as possible.
On 9 June 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the amending Regulation. It notably considered that there
should be a clear, agreed list of which factors might be judged relevant in assessing deficits, and that the maximum deadline for
correction of an excessive deficit should not exceed three years after its occurrence. The Parliament also considered that the Com-
mission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit, should compare the figures
submitted to the Commission by the Member States with the reports submitted by the national central banks to the ECB. 81
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proposed by the Commission were limited in size and
scope and reflected the compromise agreement reached
in the Council.
In the weeks following the adoption by the Commission
of draft amending Regulations, the European Parliament
and the Council discussed and amended the legislative
proposals (the main steps of the adoption process are
described in Box II.1). The final versions of the amend-
ing Regulations adopted by the Council include all the
essential elements of the Commission Proposal and
reflect an overall balanced compromise. The main
changes introduced to the legislative framework of the
SGP are described below.
Legislative changes concerning the preventive arm 
of the SGP
The following changes were introduced in Regulation
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordina-
tion of economic policies:
i. Principles for the definition and revision of country-
specific medium-term budgetary objectives. The
agreement on the SGP reform foresees that medium-
term budgetary objectives (MTOs) should be differ-
entiated across countries. This principle was intro-
duced in Article 2a of the amended Council
Regulation 1466/97. This Article specifies that
medium-term budgetary objectives may diverge
from the requirement of a close-to-balance or in sur-
plus position. It also says that MTOs should provide
a safety margin with respect to the 3 percent of GDP
reference value, ensure rapid progress towards
sustainability and allow room for budgetary
manoeuvre. The same Article of the Regulation
specifies that medium-term budgetary objectives
can be revised when a major structural reform is
implemented and in any case every four years.
ii. The range for the MTOs of euro area and ERM II
Member States. The Council decided to insert legal
provisions stating that, for euro-area and ERM II
Member States, the country-specific MTOs should
be specified between –1 percent of GDP and balance
or surplus, in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-
off and other temporary measures. 
iii. 0.5 percent of GDP benchmark adjustment for euro-
area and ERM II Member States. The obligation for
Member States of the euro area and participating to
ERM II which have not achieved their MTO to pur-
sue an annual improvement of their structural bal-
ance (cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and
temporary measures) by 0.5 percent of GDP as a
benchmark was introduced in the Articles 5 and 9 of
amended Regulation 1466/97.
iv. Larger efforts in good times. Articles 5 and 9 of the
amended Regulation specify that the Council, when
assessing the adjustment path towards the MTO,
should take into account whether a higher adjustment
effort is made in economic good times, whereas the
effort may be more limited in economic bad times.
v. Content of Stability and Convergence Programmes.
Article 3 of the revised Regulation foresees that Sta-
bility and Convergence Programmes should present
a detailed and quantitative assessment of the budget-
ary and other economic policy measures being taken
and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the pro-
gramme, comprising a detailed cost-benefit analysis
of major structural reforms which have direct long-
term cost-saving effects, including by raising poten-
tial growth.
Box II.1 (continued)
The European Parliament also considered that it should be informed regularly about the existence of an excessive deficit and the
monitoring process.
The amending Regulation was adopted by the Council on 27 June 2005, published in the Official Journal of the European
Union on 7 July 2005, and entered into force on 27 July 2005. All official documents concerning the adoption of the Reg-
ulation 1056/05 amending Regulation 1467/97 can be found at the following web address: http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/
file.jsp?id=5245392.
¥1∂ For instance, in its proposal to amend Council Regulation 1466/97 on the
strengthening of the surveillance budgetary positions and the surveillance
and coordination of economic policies, the Commission proposed to
extend the deadline for the Council assessment of the Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes, previously of two months after their submission, to
three months. In its proposal to amend Council Regulation 1467/97 on
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit pro-
cedure, the Commission proposed to clarify the concept of abeyance in the
excessive deficit procedure.82
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foresees that structural reforms should be taken into
account when defining the adjustment path towards
the medium-term budgetary objective. Articles 5
and 9 of the Regulation specify the conditions under
which the implementation of structural reforms
could allow a temporary deviation from the adjust-
ment path towards the medium-term budgetary
objective or from this objective.
vii. The specific role of pension reforms introducing a
multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully
funded pillar. The Council introduced provisions
specifying that Member States implementing such
reforms should be allowed to deviate from the
adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary
objective or from the objective itself, with the devi-
ation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the pub-
licly managed pillar, under the condition that the
deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate
safety margin with respect to the deficit reference
value is preserved.
Legislative changes concerning the corrective arm 
of the SGP
The following changes were introduced in Regulation
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementa-
tion of the excessive deficit procedure:
i. Definition of a ‘severe economic downturn’ in the
EDP. Regulation 1467/97 was amended to reflect
the change of the definition of a ‘severe economic
downturn’ in the excessive deficit procedure (1). In
the revised SGP, an economic downturn may be
considered ‘severe’ in case of a negative growth rate
or accumulated loss of output during a protracted
period of very low growth relative to potential
growth.
ii. Specification of the nature of ‘other relevant fac-
tors’ in the EDP. When reforming the SGP, the
Council specified the nature of the ‘other relevant
factors’ mentioned in Article 104(3) of the Treaty.
These factors should be taken into account in the
Commission reports which launch the excessive
deficit procedure. Article 2(3) of amended Regula-
tion 1467/97 provides the list of ‘other relevant fac-
tors’ to be considered. The same article creates the
possibility for a Member State to put forward to the
Commission and the Council any factor that it con-
siders relevant.
iii. Role of ‘other relevant factors’ in the EDP. Article
2(4) of the amended Regulation specifies that only if
the general government deficit remains close to the
reference value and its excess over the reference
value is temporary, other relevant factors should be
taken into account in the steps leading to the deci-
sion on the existence of an excessive deficit. Article
2(6) specifies that other relevant factors should be
taken into account in the subsequent procedural
steps of Article 104 of the Treaty, with the exception
of decisions under Article 104 (12) of the Treaty on
the abrogation of the excessive deficit procedure. In
particular, other relevant factors are taken into
account when setting the deadlines for the correction
of the excessive deficit in the context of Council rec-
ommendations and notices in accordance with Arti-
cles 104(7) and 104(9) of the Treaty.
iv. Systemic pension reforms. The Council introduced
legal provisions concerning the special treatment of
systemic pension reforms in the excessive deficit
procedure. Article 2(5) of amended Regulation
1467/97 specifies that the Commission and the
Council should give due consideration to the imple-
mentation of pension reforms introducing a multi-
pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded
pillar in all budgetary assessments in the framework
of the excessive deficit procedure. Article 2(7) spec-
ifies that, in case the deficit exceeds the reference
value, while remaining close to it, and where this
excess reflects the implementation of such a pension
reform, the Commission and the Council should also
consider the cost of the reform to the publicly man-
aged pillar when assessing budgetary developments
(see box 2 below for details on this issue).
v. Extension of deadlines for taking action in the context
of the EDP. With a view to allowing for an appropri-
ate assessment of all aspects, the SGP reform
extended delays for the adoption of decisions and rec-
¥1∂ According to Article 104 (2a) of the Treaty (and the Protocol on the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure) a government deficit above 3 percent of GDP is
considered to be excessive unless the excess over the 3 percent is only
exceptional and temporary and the government deficit ratio remains close
to the reference value. The Council Regulation 1467/97 specifies in Art. 2
that the excess over 3 percent can be considered exceptional if it results (a)
from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State (e.g. a natu-
ral disaster) or (b) from a severe economic downturn. In the original ver-
sion of the regulation, a ‘severe economic downturn’ was defined as an
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent (Article 2(2)).83
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and for Member States to take effective action follow-
ing Council recommendations and notices (see Table
II.1. Main changes to the Stability and Growth Pact
following the Council agreement of 20 March 2005).
As a result, the overall maximum period of 10 months
within which the Council is obliged to take a decision
to impose sanctions in case a Member State partici-
pating to the euro area fails to comply with the succes-
sive decisions of the Council was effectively
expanded to 16 months. These changes are codified in
various Articles of amended Regulation 1467/97.
vi. Allowing repetition of steps in the EDP. A major
innovation introduced by the 2005 SGP reform is
that, in case an unexpected adverse economic event
with a considerable negative impact on the budget
hits a country in the course of correcting its excessive
deficit, the deadline for the correction of the excessive
deficit initially set by the Council following Art.
104(7) or Art. 107(9) can be revised and extended. A
repetition of these steps can only be invoked under the
provision that effective action has been taken by the
country concerned in compliance with the initial rec-
ommendation (104(7)) or notice (104(9)). Provisions
allowing repetition of steps in the EDP are inserted in
Articles 3(5) and 5(2) of the Regulation.
vii. 0.5 % of GDP structural adjustment. The amended
Regulation 1467/97 specifies that the Council should
always recommend an annual structural adjustment
of at least 0.5 percent of GDP as a benchmark to
ensure the correction of the excessive deficit.
What was not codified in the Regulations
The agreement on the SGP reform contains a number of
complementary elements designed to improve fiscal and
statistical governance, both at the level of the EU and in
Member States. These aspects were not subject of any
amendments in the two regulations considered in this sec-
tion. However, as stated by the European Council on 22
March 2005, the 2005 Ecofin report is an integral part of
the Stability and Growth Pact. This report contains a
number of elements designed to increase the ownership of
the SGP provision, clarify the respective roles and respon-
sibilities of the various actors involved as well as meas-
ures to improve the quality and timeliness of statistical
data, both at the national and the EU level. It also states
that, in order to solidly re-establish the credibility of the
SGP and to strengthen the enforcement of budgetary dis-
cipline, it is important that complementary measures are
taken at national level to enhance the institutional settings
for fiscal and statistical governance. The choice of the top-
ics of the analytical chapters of the present report, which
provide evidence of the influence of national fiscal rules
and institutions on budgetary outcomes, should be seen in
the context of the follow-up to the 2005 SGP reform.
1.1.2. The revised Code of Conduct
In the weeks following the 20 March 2005 Council
agreement on the SGP reform, the Commission services
prepared a contribution for a revised Code of Conduct
for the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact,
which would substitute and extend the scope of the pre-
vious Code of Conduct. The final version of this docu-
ment was endorsed by the Council on 11 October 2005,
following discussions with the Member States.
At this occasion, the Council confirmed that ‘the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact is an essential part of the macroeco-
nomic framework of the Economic and Monetary
Union’. The Council also considered that ‘the revised
Code of Conduct contains the guidelines for a consistent
and even-handed implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact and for the content and format of the stabil-
ity and convergence programmes’.
The revised Code of Conduct includes provisions on two
types of issues:
(a) Provisions ensuring clarity and consistent applica-
tion of the reform. This mainly consists in defini-
tions of concepts, clarification of procedures and
provisions on some elements of the agreement
reached in the Council, in particular those which
were not codified in the amending Regulations.
(b) An update of the existing provisions on the content
and format of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes. This is a code of good practice and check-
list to be used by Member States in preparing
stability or convergence programmes. Compared to
the existing Code of Conduct, a number of addi-
tional data requirements were included.
Provisions ensuring clarity and consistent application 
of the SGP reform
Compared to the Council report of 20 March 2005 and
the amending Regulations, the revised Code of Conduct84
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the provisions inserted in Regulations. In particular, it
brings important new elements on the following aspects:
i. Specification of concepts and methods. The Code of
Conduct specifies that the reference method for the
estimation of potential output is the one adopted by
the Council on 12 July 2002. Assessments of the
cyclical developments, as well as those of the under-
lying fiscal position and efforts in the context of the
Stability and Growth Pact, should be based on this
method.
ii. The procedure for setting the country-specific
medium-term objectives. A consistent differentia-
tion of MTOs across countries can only be achieved
if precise modalities for setting the MTOs are dis-
cussed in the context of a common procedure. To
this aim, the Code of Conduct specifies that the pres-
entation by each Member State of its MTO in the
Stability or Convergence Programme should follow
a discussion in the Economic and Financial Com-
mittee. In their assessment and opinion on the pro-
grammes, the Commission and the Council would
assess whether the MTOs presented by Member
States are appropriate.
iii. Definition of economic good times. The Code of
Conduct specifies the definition of good times. It
states that economic ‘good times’ should be identi-
fied as periods where output exceeds its potential
level, taking into account tax elasticities. It specifies
that the change in the output gap will also play a role
in the identification of good times, especially when
the output gap is estimated to be close to zero.
Finally, the Code specifies that the identification of
periods of economic ‘good times’ should be made
after an overall economic assessment.
iv. Deviations from the adjustment path towards the
MTO or from the MTO itself only for adopted struc-
tural reforms. The Code clarifies the conditions
under which the implementation of a structural
reform may lead to a temporary deviation from the
adjustment path towards the MTO or from the MTO
itself. It notably specifies that only adopted reforms
should be considered when assessing whether a
structural reform can allow a deviation from the
MTO or the adjustment path toward it. It also states
that, in case a deviation is allowed, this should be
mentioned in the Council Opinion on the Stability or
Convergence Programme.
v. Specifications for the preparation of a Commission
report under Article 104(3). The revised Code of
Conduct specifies that the indicator for assessing an
‘accumulated loss of output’ in the excessive deficit
procedure is the output gap. It also specifies that
Member States should put forward to the Council
and the Commission specific ‘other relevant factors’
(as a rule) within one month of the reporting dates
established in Article 4 (2) and (3) of Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93.
vi. Clarifying the conditions for a repetition of steps in the
EDP. The Code of Conduct contains clear provisions
on the conditions for a repetition of steps in the EDP.
In particular, it states that a decision to repeat a recom-
mendation or notice has to be taken before taking into
account the other relevant factors. This decision
should then be based on the assessment of whether the
Member State concerned has taken effective action in
response to the previous Council recommendation and
whether adverse economic circumstances occurred
with a significant impact on the budget.
vii. Clarification of the concept of effective action in the
excessive deficit procedure. The Code specifies that,
when assessing effective action, account should be
taken of whether the Member State concerned has
achieved the annual improvement of its cyclically
adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary
measures, initially recommended by the Council. In
case the observed adjustment proves to be lower
than recommended, a careful analysis of the reasons
for the shortfall would be made.
Provisions related to the content and format of Stability 
and Convergence Programmes
The revised Code of Conduct contains the following ele-
ments compared to the initial Code of Conduct:
i. Status of the programme and of the measures. Mem-
ber States should mention the status of their Stability
or Convergence Programme in the context of
national procedures, notably with respect to the
national Parliament. The programme should also
indicate whether the Council Opinion on the previ-
ous programme has been presented to the national
Parliament.87
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on national fiscal rules. The Code specifies that
Member States should provide information on the
measures and the structural reforms implemented
(detailed quantitative cost-benefit analysis of the
short-term costs and of the long-term benefits of the
reforms, analysis of the projected impact of the
reforms on economic growth, used methodology)
and on the national budgetary rules in force.
iii. Assessment of the sustainability of government
finances. The revised Code of Conduct specifies that
the basis for the assessment of sustainability of gov-
ernment finances should be the common projections
endorsed by the Working Group on Ageing attached
to the Economic Policy Committee.
Provisions related to the data requirements of Stability 
and Convergence Programmes
Stability and Convergence Programmes should contain
all the necessary data to assess recent economic and fis-
cal developments, medium-term budgetary strategies
and targets, deviations from previous commitments and
long-term sustainability projections. By placing empha-
sis on an overall assessment of Member States’ public
finances, the reformed Stability and Growth Pact neces-
sitates a wider set of economic indicators than its previ-
ous version. This has been reflected in an extension of
actual data – that is, statistics for the recent past – projec-
tions and targets, which according to the revised Code of
Conduct, should be provided by Member States in their
programmes.
Although the Stability and Convergence Programmes
are a national responsibility and budgetary practices dif-
fer across countries, the Code of Conduct sets out the
essential data to be provided. The transmission of com-
plete and harmonised tables facilitates their examination
by the EU institutions and their scrutiny by the public.
Thus, the stability and convergence programmes should
include detailed tables dealing with macroeconomic
prospects (Table 1a in Annex 2 of the revised Code of
Conduct), price developments (1b), labour market (1c),
government revenue, expenditure and balances (2), debt
developments including information of its main drivers
(4), cyclical developments including potential growth,
output gap and cyclically adjusted balances (5), and dif-
ferences in the main variables as compared to the previ-
ous programme (6). To permit a fuller understanding of
the path of government balance, information should also
be provided on one-off and temporary measures.
Member States are also invited to provide data on (1d)
sectoral balances for the private sector and for the external
sector, to ensure internal consistency of the medium-term
projections and make more explicit the link between
budgetary consolidation and the correction of any external
disequilibrium that may exist. Moreover, Member States
should also transmit to the Council and the Commission
their external assumptions for their medium-term fore-
casts, such as interest and exchange rates, World and EU
economic growth and oil prices (table 8). Member States
are required to provide actual data for year t–1 and yearly
projections until at least year t+3.
In several of these tables, data requirements are some-
what more detailed than they were in the previous Code
of Conduct and a few variables, the transmission of
which was optional, have now become mandatory. A
case in point is the detailed government expenditure and
revenue account, which has now become fully manda-
tory, while in the past only total revenue and expendi-
ture, interest and balances were so. Besides detailed data
on a central scenario, Member States should also provide
information on alternative macroeconomic scenarios,
specifying in particular how changes in economic activ-
ity and monetary conditions may affect the main budget-
ary targets. Moreover, Member States are also encour-
aged to provide data on government expenditure broken
into the ten categories of the classification of govern-
ment expenditure by function (COFOG) for the latest
available year and for the end of the horizon covered by
the programme (Table 3).
Last but not least, the revised Code of Conduct has also
extended the number of variables to be provided in rela-
tion to the long-term sustainability of public finances
(Table 7). These data, which should be projected until
2050, cover the government expenditure categories
which are most affected by demographic changes, that
is, old-age pensions, healthcare, long-term care for the
elderly and education, as well as the assets set aside to
cater for the ageing-related increase in expenditure. The
latter should be consistent with the common long-term
projections prepared by the Commission and the Ageing
Working Group (AWG) attached to the Economic Policy
Committee.88
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(Continued on the next page)
In the revised SGP, the assessment of budgetary developments in the EDP should take into account the budgetary
impact of the implementation of systemic pension reforms. Article 2(5) of amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 stip-
ulates that ‘the Commission and the Council, in all budgetary assessments in the framework of the excessive deficit pro-
cedure, shall give due consideration to the implementation of pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that
includes a mandatory, fully-funded pillar’. Article 2(7) states that ‘in the case of Member States where the deficit exceeds
the reference value, while remaining close to it, and where this excess reflects the implementation of a pension reform
introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully-funded pillar, the Commission and the Council shall also
consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit figures’.
These provisions imply that, when considering whether a deficit above 3 % of GDP is excessive, the net cost of pension
reforms should be considered only if the government deficit is close to the reference value. In case of a deficit above 3 %
of GDP but not close to it, the provisions of Article 2(7) do not apply, even if the excess of the deficit over the Treaty reference
value was due to the pension reform costs.
The SGP refers to costs of reforms which establish a mandatory fully-funded pension pillar. The Code of Conduct spec-
ifies that the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar stems from the fact that revenue, which used to be recorded as
government revenue, is diverted to a pension fund, which is fully funded and classified in a sector other than general govern-
ment, and that some pensions and other social benefits, which used to be government expenditure, will be, after the reform,
paid by the pension scheme. The introduction of a new pension pillar only creates a direct short-term cost for the government
if the new pension schemes are classified outside government, for example because they have a defined-contribution nature.
Consideration should be given to the net cost of the reform on a linear degressive basis for a transitory period of
five years. The Code of Conduct specifies that ‘consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given for the initial five
years after a Member State has introduced a fully-funded system, or five years after 2004 for Member States that have
already introduced such a system. Furthermore, it will also be regressive, i.e. during a period of five years, consideration
will be given to 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 percent of the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar. The net cost of
the reform is measured as its direct impact on the general government deficit.’ The adjustments to the deficit ratios to reflect
the pension reform costs should be done in the context of the economic analysis underlying the implementation the exces-
sive deficit procedure.
The application of the degressive scale requires two basic pieces of information: the initial year of the reform and the
yearly costs of the reform. The impact of the reform starts in the year social contributions and other revenue start being
diverted from government to the new pension scheme (this is not necessarily the year the reform was formally adopted). More-
over, according to the Code of Conduct, for the Member States that have already implemented reforms, the degressive scale
is applied for five years starting in 2005. The cost of the reform is made up of three elements (a) the social contributions or
other revenue collected by the new pension scheme which otherwise would be collected by government; (b) the interest
expenditure that the government has to bear since the diversion of revenue to the new pension scheme leads to a higher deficit
and an accumulation of debt, less (c) the pensions paid by the new pension scheme which otherwise would be paid by the
government. The cost of the reform can be directly estimated by the difference between (i) the government deficit as compiled
according to ESA95 rules and (ii) an alternative government deficit compiled as if the new pension scheme remained classi-
fied in the government sector (1). 
The following table shows a numerical example. Line 1 shows the government deficit, compiled according to ESA95.
In this example, the government deficit increases in 2005 because of the pension reform cost. Line 2 shows the government
deficit if the new pension scheme was classified as government. Line 3 is the short-term cost of the pension reform for the
government. It is approximated in this example by (1) – (2). Line 4 shows the degressive linear scale, from 100 % to 20 %
during the first five years of the reform. The example assumes that the reform entails a cost for government from 2005 on.
Line 5 shows the pension cost to be specifically considered by the Council and the Commission (i.e. (3) x (4)). No data are
¥1∂ This estimate assumes that the debt issued by the government because of the pension reform equals the accumulation of assets by the pension scheme,
and that the interest paid by the government because of this higher debt is similar to the income of the pension scheme assets.89
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shown for 2005 and 2006, as the government deficit (1) for those years cannot be considered close to the Treaty reference
value. Line 6 shows the government deficit adjusted by the pension reform cost to be considered in application of the SGP
provision on pensions ((1) – (5)). 
Numerical example on the implementation of the SGP provision on the net cost of pension reforms
(% of GDP, except line 4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(1) Government deficit 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.4
(2) Alternative deficit, calculated as if the new pension scheme 
remained classified in the government sector3.8 3.4 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4
(3) Cost 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
(4)  Degressive scale 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
(5) Cost to be considered - - - 0.6 0.4 0.2 -
(6) Adjusted government deficit to be considered in EDP 3.8 4.4 4.2 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.490
2. Making the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact operational – the preventive arm
2.1. Introduction
The reform of the SGP introduced some new and revised
concepts, definitions and principles which leave room
for judgment. In order to ensure a coherent and consist-
ent application of the rules, the Commission and the
Member States have further specified and clarified cer-
tain essential elements of the revised SGP. Work is still
ongoing on some issues. This section reviews these spec-
ifications and the implementation of the new principles
in the preventive arm of the SGP.
A first issue covered in this section concerns the method-
ology for setting the country-specific medium-term
budgetary objectives. One of the most important changes
introduced by the reform is that countries are no longer
required to aim for the uniform position of ‘close-to-bal-
ance or in surplus’ in the medium term. Rather, medium-
term objectives are set taking into account country-spe-
cific economic and budgetary circumstances, notably
those related to the sustainability of government
finances. This raises a number of methodological ques-
tions. Some of them, concerning the application of the
principles for setting the MTOs in the short-term, were
addressed by the Commission and the Member States in
the context of discussions in the Economic and Financial
Committee. Other issues related to the relation between
sustainability considerations and the country-specific
MTOs require further technical work.
A second issue is related to the adjustment path towards
the medium-term budgetary objectives. In light of the
experience of recurrent failures to stick to the medium-
term targets under the preventive arm of the SGP, clear
provisions on the adjustment path towards the MTOs
were agreed. In particular, it was agreed that Member
States would take active steps to reach the MTO and
make larger structural efforts in good times. Under cer-
tain conditions, Member States implementing structural
reforms may deviate temporarily from the MTO or the
adjustment path towards it. A number of specifications
were agreed concerning the definition of the adjustment
path towards the MTO. This section also provides the
Commission assessment of whether medium-term budg-
etary projections presented by Member States in their
programmes were in line with the agreed principles.
2.2. Setting the medium-term budgetary 
objectives
In the original SGP, all Member States had to pursue the
attainment of a budgetary position close-to-balance or in
surplus in the medium-term. The revised SGP has
changed this and foresees that medium-term budgetary
objectives (MTO) may diverge from close-to-balance or
in surplus and are differentiated to take into account dif-
ferences in Member States economic fundamentals and
risks to budgetary sustainability.
The revised SGP specifies that MTOs pursue a triple aim:
• provide a safety margin with respect to the 3 percent
deficit limit;
• ensure rapid progress towards sustainability; and
• taking the first two objectives into account, allow
room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking
into account the needs for public investment.
Additional provisions were agreed for euro-area and
ERM II Member States: for these countries, the country-
specific MTOs are specified within a defined range
between –1 percent of GDP and balance or surplus, in
cyclically-adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary
measures.91
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mentioned above (related to the need to ensure rapid pro-
gress towards sustainability) fully operational requires
further work. The Council Report of 20 March 2005
therefore says that, in a transitory phase until criteria and
modalities for taking into account implicit liabilities are
appropriately established, MTOs are differentiated on
the basis of the debt ratio and potential growth, while
preserving sufficient margin below the reference value of
-3 percent of GDP. A new method for setting country-
specific MTOs will be discussed once there will be
agreement on how to take into account implicit liabilities
(related to increasing expenditures in the light of ageing
populations) in the definition of the medium-term budg-
etary objectives. By the end of 2006, the Commission
will report on the progress achieved on this issue.
2.2.1. Country-specific MTOs in the current phase
In the 2005 updates of the Stability and Convergence
Programmes, each Member States has, for the first time,
presented its own medium-term budgetary objective. As
foreseen by the revised SGP, this followed a methodo-
logical discussion with the Member States in order to
ensure a consistent application of the agreed criteria for
differentiation of the MTOs. This section summarises
the specifications of the principles agreed with the Mem-
ber States for the definition of country-specific MTOs
before implicit liabilities are taken into account. It also
provides an assessment of whether the MTOs presented
by Member States in their Stability and Convergence
Programmes were set in accordance with the agreed
principles.
Setting MTOs on the basis of debt, growth and a safety 
margin
The following variables had to be taken into account by
the Member States when presenting their country-spe-
cific MTOs:
i. The government debt ratio. The revised SGP speci-
fies that the current general government debt ratio is
the relevant variable. When the 2005 updates of Sta-
bility and Convergence Programmes were prepared
by the Member States, the latest official estimates of
the gross debt ratio in the 25 Member States were
those of 2004.
ii. Potential growth. The Code of Conduct stipulates
that, for the purpose of the definition of the country-
specific MTOs, ‘potential growth should be
assessed in a long-term perspective on the basis of
the projections produced by the Working Group on
Ageing attached to the Economic Policy Commit-
tee’, which are made on the basis of common and
agreed assumptions. In order to make sure that coun-
try-specific MTOs are based on up-to-date informa-
tion, the Commission and the Working Group on
Ageing of the EPC updated growth estimates for the
period 2005-2050 for all 25 Member States.
iii. A measure of a safety margin with respect to the ref-
erence value of 3 percent of GDP. Country-specific
MTOs cannot be set at a level which does not ensure
a sufficient safety margin against breaching the
3 percent ceiling. The Code of Conduct stipulates
that such a safety margin is assessed for each Mem-
ber State taking into account past output volatility
and the budgetary sensitivity to output fluctuations.
The MTO therefore cannot be set at a level which is
below the so-called ‘minimum benchmark’ (see sec-
tion 4.3.2 for a definition of the concept and calcula-
tion on this indicator). Minimum benchmarks
estimates were updated by the Commission for the
EU-15 Member States and calculated (for the first
time) for the ten recently acceded Member States in
the autumn 2005.
Table II.2. Data taken into account by Member States
when setting their own medium-term budgetary objec-
tive summarises the data available when Member States
had to present their country-specific MTO.
An emphasis on current debt
To ensure a consistent application of the principles
established by the Council for setting the country-spe-
cific MTOs, some clarification was necessary on how to
combine the information on debt, potential growth and
minimal benchmarks.
One option for ensuring a consistent use of the agreed
criteria for setting the country-specific MTOs would
have been to define an ad hoc algorithm or function
which, applied to the current debt ratio, minimal bench-
marks and future potential growth, would allow deriving
MTOs for all EU Member States. Such an approach
would have had the advantage to take into account debt
and potential growth consistently for all Member States.
Instead, and considering that such a mechanistic
approach would not have allowed for a sufficient room
for economic judgment and leeway for Member States to92
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ber States considered preferable to stick to the simple
and transparent principles included in the Council report
of 20 March 2005.
A relevant specification agreed with Member States con-
cerns the hierarchy between the criteria taken into account
for the definition of the country-specific MTOs. While the
revised SGP makes clear that the MTOs should always be
more ambitious than the minimal benchmarks (and
therefore allow a safety margin with respect to 3 per-
cent), the Council report of 20 March 2005 does not con-
tain clear indications on whether the two other criteria
(i.e. potential growth and the current level of govern-
ment debt) should be given the same weight. Member
States considered that the criterion related to debt should
be given some more weight in determining the country-
specific MTOs.
The main arguments were that (i) the current debt ratio is
observed and does not rely on assumptions, while expe-
rience has shown that estimates for long-term potential
growth can fluctuate substantially over a relatively short
period of time; and (ii) that debt is the relevant indicator
for assessing the risk to sustainability of government
finances in the short to medium term. For this reason, it
was considered reasonable that Member States with a
very high debt ratio should have particularly ambitious
medium-term budgetary objectives today, in order to
ensure a rapid reduction in this ratio.
MTOs presented by Member States in the 2005 updated 
Stability and Convergence Programmes
Member States presented their MTO in the 2005 update of
their Stability or Convergence Programme (1). Only in the
case of the UK a quantitative medium-term objective
(MTO) for the structural balance of the general government
was not specified (2). The MTOs were then examined by the
Commission and the Council in the context of the assess-
ment of the Programmes. When assessing the country-spe-
cific MTOs, the Commission and the Council considered
whether there was a deviation from the agreed principles.
It came out from this examination process that Member
States presented MTOs in line with the principles agreed
in the revised SGP. Graph II.1 and Graph II.2 below
show the relation between the debt ratio (2004 figures),
potential growth and the country-specific MTOs (in case
the MTOs were defined as a range, the chart shows the
centre of the range).
These graphs show that Member States effectively gave
a strong weight to the criterion related to the current level
of the debt ratio. They also show that some countries
have set targets that are more ambitious than required by
¥1∂ In some cases, the MTO was not explicitly mentioned in the programme,
but it could be inferred from it. 
¥2∂ For this country, the programme refers to fiscal objectives under the
domestic rules, which imply a medium-term path for the cyclically-
adjusted deficit, consistent with stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio at a low
level and with keeping the current budget in balance or surplus on average
over the economic cycle.
Table II.2
Data taken into account by Member States when 
setting their own medium-term budgetary objective
Minimal 
benchmark
(updated)
Debt
(2004)
Potential growth
(average 
2005-2050)
DK – 0.5 42.8 1.6
SE – 0.6 51.2 2.2
FI – 1.1 45.1 1.7
BE – 1.1 95.5 1.7
DE – 1.8 66 1.4
EL – 1.3 110.5 1.4
ES – 1.2 48.9 1.5
FR – 1.4 65.6 1.8
IT – 1.5 105.8 1.3
AT – 1.5 64.2 1.5
EE – 2.0 4.9 2.6
MT – 1.8 75.9 2.4
IE – 1.3 29.9 2.8
PT – 1.1 61.9 1.5
CY – 1.9 72.1 2.9
NL – 1.0 55.7 1.7
HU – 2.0 57.3 2.0
LU – 0.8 7.5 3.1
SK – 2.2 43.6 2.3
CZ – 1.6 37.4 1.9
LV – 2.1 14.3 2.8
LT – 1.8 19.6 2.7
PL – 1.6 43.6 2.4
SI – 1.9 29.5 2.0
UK – 1.4 41.6 1.9
NB: Figures for debt refer to estimates available in the autumn 2005 relative to
the level of the general government gross debt ratio for the year 2004.
The ﬁgures on potential growth are based on the estimates made in the con-
text of the projection exercise of DG ECFIN and the Ageing Working Group
(baseline scenario).
The minimal benchmark estimates were updated for all Member States in
the autumn 2005 (see section 4.3.2 for a detailed description of the method-
ology).93
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Sweden and Estonia aim at relatively more demanding
MTOs. Some Member States, like Italy and Greece, with
high current debt ratios and potential growth prospects
below the EU average could have been expected to set
more ambitious MTOs. An assessment of whether the
Member States currently respect their MTO is made in
Part I of this report.
2.2.2. MTOs in perspective: taking into account 
implicit liabilities
The Council agreed on 20 March 2005 that Member
States’ medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs)
should, interalia, pursue the aim of ensuring rapid progress
towards sustainability. In the 20 March 2005 Council
report it is also stated that ‘[in the determination of MTOs]
implicit liabilities (related to increasing expenditures in the
light of ageing populations) should be taken into account’.
The Commission was asked to report, by the end of
2006, on progress made concerning the methodology for
taking into account implicit liabilities in the definition of
the MTO.
This section presents preliminary considerations on how
implicit liabilities could be taken into account in the
determination of MTOs. The aim is to illustrate the
rationale for considering implicit liabilities related to
ageing in the determination of MTOs, to overview which
indicators of age-related liabilities could be used for
such purpose, and to highlight alternative broad
approaches that could be followed to include implicit lia-
bilities in the determination of MTOs.
Why ageing considerations in the determination 
of MTOs?
Countries, by targeting appropriate values for their
budget balance over the medium run, and by sticking to
them, would be able to create room in their budgets
which would contribute to face the looming impact of
ageing. In order to define MTOs that appropriately cre-
ate such a budgetary room an adequate notion of govern-
ment liabilities needs to be used. The current MTOs take
into account government debt, namely, government lia-
bilities arising as a result of past explicit commitments.
Such notion of government liabilities however is not suf-
ficient to capture the stock of implicit commitments by
the government to continue providing in the future serv-
ices like pensions or health. Taking into account also
implicit liabilities would indeed permit a better assess-
ment of which budgetary margin is needed to keep pub-
lic finances sustainable in a context where age-related
expenditures are expected to rise substantially.
Although creating budgetary room is key to ensure sus-
tainability, structural reforms aimed at containing the
impact of ageing on public finances are also crucial.
These reforms contribute to contain the growth in age-
related expenditures, thereby reducing the amount of
government implicit liabilities. It is therefore necessary
that MTOs that are defined on the basis of implicit liabil-
ities could be revised regularly and in any case after the
implementation of major structural reforms having an
impact on age-related expenditures. To this purpose, the
revised SGP states that MTOs ‘…can be revised when a
major structural reform is implemented and in any case
every four years’ (Art. 2a, CR 1055/2005).
Which notion of government implicit liabilities?
The term ‘implicit government liability’ is often used with
different meanings. In general, by implicit liabilities are
meant unfunded government commitments that are not
necessarily backed by law or by contractual obligations but
rather grounded in strong expectations by the public (1).
Pension expenditures are the most typical example.
The concept of implicit liabilities could be more or less
forward-looking. In a strict sense, from an accounting
viewpoint, government liabilities arise from past events.
National accountants often use the term implicit liabili-
ties to refer to liabilities arising from commitments
already taken which are however not included in stand-
ard accounting systems. This is the case for instance for
accrued-to-date pension liabilities, i.e., the stock of pen-
sion rights linked to pension contributions paid already.
A more forward-looking notion of implicit liability
would instead include also future pension expenditures
linked to contributions not paid yet. A comprehensive
assessment of the public finances consequence of ageing
requires a forward-looking notion of implicit liabilities.
Second, the notion of implicit liabilities could be gross
or net of government revenues. For instance, in the case
of PAYG pension systems, accumulation of deficits or of
surpluses could emerge over time, depending on whether
the total amount of resources arising from pension con-
tributions fall short or exceed that of pension payments.
¥1∂ For a taxonomy of government liabilities see European Commission
(2004) and Polachova-Brixi and Schick (2002). 94
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meaningful needs to consider not only the future implicit
commitments of governments but also their entitlement
to receive revenues.
Third, the notion of implicit liabilities could be more or
less broad, i.e., it may include either a narrow or a com-
prehensive set of future expenditures and revenues. In
particular, a broad definition of implicit liabilities could
include not only the major age-related expenditures
(pensions, health, long-term care) but also other type of
expenditures that are recurrent and for which there is a
strong presumption that will be carried out also in the
future (education expenditure, social transfers, …). A
broad notion of implicit liabilities is needed for MTOs to
incorporate information on the overall sustainability of
public finances.
A further issue is whether to include among government
implicit liabilities those liabilities that are contingent,
Graph II.1:  MTOs and debt levels
Graph II.2:  MTOs and potential growth prospects
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discrete events occur. The typical example are guaran-
tees and insurances provided by the government to pri-
vate agents (e.g., counterparts in Public-Private-Partner-
ships for public-purpose investments, private pension
funds,…). The government in these cases may or may
not have to make any actual payment, depending on
whether the events that justify calling government guar-
antees or using government insurance schemes realise.
This type of liabilities are problematic to consider, as
they may never translate into an actual obligation by the
government. In addition, the availability and quality of
information on contingent liabilities across EU Member
States is at present not fully satisfactory (1). Progress in
the statistical information on contingent liabilities is
however crucial for an appropriate assessment of sus-
tainability risks. This holds especially for the new Mem-
ber States but also for some EU-15 Members (see, e.g.,
European Commission (2004)).
The analysis of public finance sustainability made by the
Commission and the Council in the context of budgetary
surveillance considers a relatively broad definition of
net, non-contingent, implicit liabilities. Age-related
expenditures stemming from government commitments
relating to pensions, health and long-term care, unem-
ployment benefits and education are projected on the
basis of the criteria agreed within the EPC/AWG, while
revenues and non-age-related expenditures as a share of
GDP are assumed to remain constant (see section I.4 of
this report).
Which indicators for government liabilities?
Turning to the issue of how to measure implicit liabilities
a first distinction can be made between stock and flow
measures of (net) government liabilities. Stock measures
aim at providing a measure of the mass of outstanding
net liabilities at a given point in time. Stock measures
often include a comprehensive notion of government net
liabilities. Flow measures aim at quantifying the budget-
ary position needed to dispose of enough room to absorb
the future impact of ageing.
Stock measures
A first approach to obtain stock measures of implicit lia-
bilities is to estimate the net present value of future
entitlements and commitments of the government
weighted on current GDP. This amounts to summing up
the discounted value of the future budget balances, i.e.
the estimated revenues and expenditures. This indicator
measures the mass of net implicit liabilities at the start of
the projection period. It permits to construct comprehen-
sive government balance sheets, which include not only
current liabilities and assets, both real and financial, but
also implicit liabilities (2). Additionally, comprehensive
government balance sheets could also include measures
of contingent liabilities (3).
An alternative approach is to project future debt levels.
This permits to evaluate the whole path of debt/GDP
ratios and to evaluate at which points in time tensions in
public finances could arise. Debt projections are a con-
stant feature of the Commission assessment of long-term
public finance sustainability within the framework of the
assessment of Stability and Convergence Programmes.
Flow measures
In the Commission’s practice for assessing long-term
sustainability, different synthetic indicators providing a
flow measure of the impact of implicit liabilities are con-
structed (see section I.4 of this report). The main indica-
tor used in the sustainability assessment is the sustaina-
bility gap (S2). This indicator provides a measure of the
permanent improvement in the unchanged-policy struc-
tural primary balance necessary to guarantee that the
inter-temporal budget constraint of the government is
satisfied (i.e., that the debt/GDP ratio does not grow
indefinitely). In order to give a clear indication of the
medium-term budgetary policy implications of achiev-
ing sustainable public finance over an infinite horizon,
the S2 indicator can be expressed as a required primary
balance (RPB). This is the unchanged-policy structural
primary balance achieved over the medium term which
would allow the respect of the government inter-tempo-
ral budget constraint.
¥1∂ See European Commission (2004), section II.4. 
¥2∂ See, e.g., Buiter, (1985) among the first analytical contributions supporting
a comprehensive approach (i.e., including also implicit assets and liabili-
ties) to the construction of government balance sheets.
¥3∂ Since the computation of comprehensive government balance sheets
requires estimates of the current stock of real and financial assets and lia-
bilities, which are not easily available for all Member States, this approach
does not feature among those commonly used by the Commission to assess
the sustainability of public finances. Nevertheless, progress in the area of
statistical information on government assets and liabilities could permit a
better assessment of public finance sustainability including from the view-
point of the contribution that productive government assets (e.g., infra-
structure) can make to potential growth and then to government revenues.96
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tors are sensitive to the quality and availability of age-
related expenditure projections and assumptions on
growth and interest rates and that there are aspects that are
relevant in an overall assessment of public finance sus-
tainability that are not captured by the quantitative indica-
tors. In order to take into account the limitations men-
tioned above, the quantitative sustainability analysis made
by the Commission services is complemented by a quali-
tative assessment which covers elements such as the cur-
rent debt/GDP ratio, the current level of the tax burden,
the degree of reliability of age-related projections, the
presence of contingent liabilities, and the overall policy
scenario with particular reference to structural reforms
improving sustainability (see section I.4 of this report).
Overall, although there are inevitable uncertainties
related with the measurement of implicit liabilities, the
information on implicit liabilities currently used in EU
budgetary surveillance could be a valid starting point for
taking into account implicit liabilities in the determina-
tion of MTOs.
How could a link between MTOs and implicit liabilities 
be made?
A first broad approach consists of determining the MTO
on the basis of the required primary balance indicator. (1)
As previously illustrated, this indicator measures which
primary balance achieved over the medium term would be
consistent with public finances sustainability at
unchanged policy. Since the MTO needs to define a safety
margin against a reference value for the overall budget
balance (the Maastricht 3 percent deficit ceiling), the
MTO needs to be gross of interest expenditures, i.e., the
RPB needs to be translated into a ‘required balance’ (RB)
which includes interest expenditures. A crucial issue
relates to the degree of frontloading of age-related expen-
ditures via ambitious MTOs. Medium-term objectives
may be set equal to the RB, namely, ambitious enough to
permit to accommodate for the impact of ageing without
the need to further raise taxes or cut expenditures in the
future. Following this strategy, MTOs will permit to fully
frontload the impact of ageing. Alternatively, a gradual
approach could be followed, such that MTOs would only
partly account for the ageing impact. This partial front-
loading strategy would require additional adjustment in
response to future increases in age-related expenditures
and would imply a more adverse debt profile and then a
higher present value of interest expenditures.
A different approach for the determination of MTOs to
address the above limitations would be to take into
account not only the RB but a broader set of quantitative
and qualitative elements relevant to assess the public
finance perspectives of a given country. One possible way
would be to define groups of countries characterized by
different sustainability risks, each group with MTOs
incorporating a ‘sustainability margin’ increasing with
the degree of risk. Sustainability risks could be identified
on the basis of a comprehensive assessment taking into
account debt projections, synthetic sustainability indica-
tors, available information on contingent liabilities, and
qualitative elements relating to the overall current and
planned policy scenario. After major structural reforms
countries may enter a different risk group and be subject
to a different sustainability margin. Regarding the size of
the sustainability margins, it could be determined, inter
alia, on the basis of average values of the required balance
within the country group. However, comprehensive stock
measures of government liabilities could also be consid-
ered, as well as qualitative elements.
2.3. The adjustment path towards the 
medium-term budgetary objectives
The past failure to reach the medium-term budgetary
objective of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ was one of
the main reasons for a strengthening of the preventive
arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. In the context of
the SGP reform, the Council notably agreed on a number
of principles, including numerical benchmarks, for the
definition of the appropriate adjustment path towards the
country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives. In
order to strengthen the growth-oriented nature of the
SGP, the 2005 reform also introduced the possibility for
Member States to deviate from the agreed benchmarks
for the adjustment path towards the MTO or from the
MTO itself, in case major structural reforms are imple-
mented. It was also decided that due account would be
taken of the needs for public investment when assessing
medium-term budgetary projections.
This section recalls the main elements of the agreement
on the SGP reform concerning the definition of the
adjustment path towards the MTO and the conditions for
allowing a deviation from the MTO or from the adjust-
ment path towards it. It also provides a Commission
¥1∂ Proposals along these lines were put forward in the debate that took place
with Member States in late 2004/ early 2005 and that was preparatory to
the agreement reflected in the March 2005 Council report on the SGP
reform.97
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Member States in their 2005 updated Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes (SCPs) were designed according
to the agreed principles.
2.3.1. The definition of the adjustment path towards 
the MTOs
The revised SGP includes a number of principles con-
cerning the adjustment path towards the MTO:
i. Member States that have not yet reached their MTO
should take steps to achieve it over the cycle. Mem-
ber States of the euro area or of ERM-II should pur-
sue an annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted
terms, net of one-offs and other temporary meas-
ures, of 0.5 percent of GDP as a benchmark.
ii. A higher adjustment effort is required in good times;
it could be more limited in bad times. Notably,
Member States of the euro area or participating in
ERM-II need to pursue, and achieve, an annual
adjustment of their structural balance larger than 0.5
percent of GDP as a benchmark in good times.
iii. Member States should base their budgetary projec-
tions on realistic and cautious macroeconomic fore-
casts.
2.3.2. Deviations from the adjustment path for 
the implementation of structural reforms
In order to enhance the growth-oriented nature of the
SGP, the 2005 SGP reform introduced the possibility to
modulate the adjustment path towards the MTO for
Member States which have not reached it, or to deviate
temporarily from the MTO for Member states which
have reached it, in case major structural reforms are
implemented.
Taking into account structural reforms in the context 
of budgetary surveillance
With a view to preserving the rules-based nature of the
system, the revised SGP includes a number of conditions
to take into account structural reforms when defining the
adjustment path towards the MTO or allowing a devia-
tion from it. These conditions concern the nature and sta-
tus of reforms, the budgetary situation and prospects,
and the information requirements concerning the
expected effects of reforms.
i. Only major reforms that have a verifiable positive
impact on the long-term sustainability of public
finances are taken into account. This includes
reforms with direct long-term cost-saving effects and
reforms raising potential growth. The reference to
‘major’ reforms suggests that a Member State could
deviate from the adjustment path only in exceptional
cases (reforms are a normal feature in EU countries).
The reference to a ‘verifiable’ positive impact on the
sustainability of government finances implies that, for
a reform to be taken into account and allow a devia-
tion from the adjustment path to the MTO or from the
MTO itself, the degree of uncertainty on the impact of
the reform should be low.
ii. Only adopted reforms are considered. This implies
that no deviation from the adjustment path towards the
MTO is allowed for planned or envisaged reforms. In
this respect, it was underlined in recent discussions
with the Member States that ‘adopted reforms’ does
not necessarily imply ‘adoption of the reforms by the
Parliament’. Depending on each country’s institu-
tional arrangements, a reform officially decided by the
government (but not yet voted by the Parliament)
could also be considered in case the implementation of
the reforms is certain and the detailed characteristics
of the reforms are already known.
iii. A safety margin to ensure the respect of the 3 per-
cent of GDP reference value for the deficit needs to
be guaranteed. No deviation from the adjustment
path towards the MTO should be allowed for Mem-
ber States which have not reached the minimum
benchmark; deviations from the MTO or the adjust-
ment path towards it should not lead to a breach of
the minimum benchmark. 
iv. The budgetary position is expected to reach the MTO
within the period covered by the Stability or Conver-
gence Programme. The revised Code of Conduct
specifies that the period under consideration for this
purpose is limited to the four years following the year
of presentation of the programme (1).
v. A detailed cost-benefit analysis of the reforms from
the budgetary point of view would need to be pro-
vided in the Stability and Convergence Pro-
¥1∂ It should be stressed that this condition does not apply in full to the spe-
cific case of systemic pension reforms. For these types of reforms, the
revised SGP only specifies that the deviation should remain ‘temporary’,
without specifying when the budgetary position is expected to return to the
MTO.98
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content and format of Stability and Convergence
Programmes specifies that the programmes should
include comprehensive information on the budget-
ary and economic effects of structural reforms. It is
up to the Member State to provide evidence of the
impact of a given major structural reform.
Magnitude of deviations
The revised SGP does not include specific provisions on
the possible magnitude and timing of deviations from the
adjustment path to the MTO or from the MTO itself.
Only in the case of systemic pension reforms, the Coun-
cil agreed that the allowed deviation from the MTO
reflects the net cost of the reform to the publicly man-
aged pillar. For other reforms, points (iii) and (iv) above
de facto impose limits to the size and duration of devia-
tions. In addition, in the case of Member States which
have not yet reached their MTO, deviations from the
adjustment path should never lead to a deterioration of
the fiscal position, in cyclically-adjusted terms net of
one-off and temporary measures.
Discussions have highlighted that, in all cases, devia-
tions from the MTO or the adjustment path to the MTO
should take due account of the uncertainties associated
with the implementation of reforms. The complexity of
the issue and the wide variety of possible reforms does
not allow for a mechanistic approach. The expected ben-
efits and costs of reforms, especially the indirect ones,
should be assessed with caution.
2.3.3. Implementation of the agreement in the 2005 
Stability and Convergence Programmes 
updates
This section provides an assessment by the Commission
services of whether budgetary projections in the 2005
updated Stability and Convergence Programmes are in
line with the principles agreed in the context of the 2005
SGP reform for the definition of the adjustment path
towards the MTO. A detailed presentation of the projec-
tions made by Member States in their programmes is
provided in Part I of the report.
A number of positive developments
Significant adjustments projected over the medium-term
On the positive side, it can notably be underlined that the
0.5 percent benchmark adjustment is, on average,
respected in 2007 and 2008 in most countries not yet at
their MTO, including those outside the euro area and not
participating to ERM-II. Graph II.3 shows the planned
improvement in the structural balance for two groups of
countries: (i) Member States which have achieved their
MTO; (ii) Member States with deficits below 3 percent
of GDP but which have not yet achieved their MTO.
Plausible macroeconomic assumptions
Another positive development is that Member States
have lived up to the commitment taken in March 2005 to
base their budgetary projections on realistic and cautious
macroeconomic forecasts. Budgetary projections
included in the 2005 updates of the Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes seem to be based mainly on cautious
or plausible growth assumptions. This is illustrated by
Graph II.4 which shows that the average planned
increase in nominal GDP and revenue is very similar to
that observed over the period 1995-2005. Only in two
cases the Council considered the macroeconomic projec-
tions as favourable. This constitutes a clear improvement
compared to the experience of the last few years.
Fewer one-off and temporary measures
Finally, according to the 2005 updates of the Stability and
Convergence Programmes, the recourse to one-off and
temporary measures will be marginal in the coming years.
In the revised SGP, one-off and temporary measures are
excluded from the assessment of the budgetary adjust-
ment. This avoids circumvention of the rules by measures
that do not contribute to sound public finances and budg-
etary sustainability. On average in the EU-25 and in the
euro area, one-off and temporary measures will amount to
0.1 percent of GDP in 2006, following 0.2 percent of GDP
in 2005. One-off and temporary measures are projected to
be negligible in 2007 and 2008.
As illustrated by Graph II.5, some countries however
still foresee some one-off measures in the period covered
by Stability and Convergence Programmes to improve
the budget. Large one-offs are expected over the coming
years in Malta, Cyprus and, to a lesser extent in Belgium,
Denmark, and Greece (in 2006 only).
Deviations from the agreed principles were however 
identified
Lack of fiscal adjustment in 2006
Graph II.3 shows that the adjustment planned by Member
States which have not yet reached their medium-term
budgetary objective (but not in EDP) falls short of the 0.599
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Commission spring forecast (see Graph II.6), the struc-
tural balance would even deteriorate in most of these
countries in 2006.
In the same vein, while the budgetary plans of coun-
tries already at MTO respect the principle to keep a
neutral fiscal stance and let automatic stabilisers play
for the years 2007 and 2008, there is a deviation from
this principle in 2006 (see Graph II.3. The worsening
of the structural balance in 2006 reflects the large
deterioration projected by Ireland, Denmark and the
Netherlands (respectively by 1.0 percent, 0.9 percent
and 0.7 percent of GDP). In the Netherlands and Den-
mark, the large deterioration however partly reflects a
reversal of the large improvement in the year 2005
explained by exceptional revenues which the govern-
ments prudently considered not to be repeated in
2006, and is therefore not the result of discretionary
measures.
Graph II.3:  The adjustment path towards the medium-term objectives projected by Member States 
in the 2005 updated Stability and Convergence Programmes
Graph II.4:  More cautious macroeconomic assumptions
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concrete measures
There is in some Member States, an unfortunate combi-
nation of a back-loaded fiscal adjustment with a lack of
specification of the measures underlying the (back-
loaded) projected consolidation. While the compliance
with the 0.5 percent effort should be assessed in a multi-
annual perspective, the concentration of the adjustment
in the outer years of the programme in some Member
States is a source of concern, especially if it is not under-
pinned by concrete measures. This calls for a close mon-
itoring of budgetary developments in the coming months
and years and explains why the Commission spring 2006
forecast (made under the no-policy change assumption)
projects the structural balance expected to remain
unchanged in 2006 and to improve by only ä percent of
GDP in 2007.
Graph II.5:  One-off and temporary measures implemented in 2005 and projected by Member States 
for the period 2006-2008
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The lack of fiscal adjustment in 2006 suggests that the
benign economic environment with growth close or
above potential is not being exploited to progress
towards the MTO. As mentioned above, the revised SGP
requires Member States to pursue a larger adjustment
effort in good times. Member States of the euro area and
participating to ERM II are expected to pursue improve-
ments in their structural balance by more than 0.5 per-
cent of GDP as a benchmark. In practice, according to
the information in the programmes, the 0.5 percent
benchmark is, on average, not achieved in countries with
a positive output gap (the same is true for countries with
a positive change in the output gap).
It should however be noted in this respect that the discus-
sions on the 2005 updated Stability and Convergence
Programmes showed the difficulties of a forward-look-
ing assessment of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ times, and confirmed
that the estimated level or change of the output gap may
not always be a good measure of good times. This con-
firms that the appraisal of good and bad times should be
made in line with the provisions of the revised Code of
Conduct according to which ‘the identification of peri-
ods of economic “good times” should be made after an
overall economic assessment’.
No structural reforms were taken into account in this 
round of programmes
A last point to be noted is that a combination of the lack
of information provided in the programmes on the con-
tent of the reforms and their budgetary implications and
the conditions set by the SGP for allowing deviations
from the adjustment path on ground of structural reform
meant that virtually no cases of structural reform were
discussed. An improved operation of the clause related
to structural reforms could possibly benefit from the
specification of the quantitative information necessary
for assessing the impact of structural reforms. In addi-
tion, in the context of the re-launch of the Lisbon agenda,
further progress on the integration between the National
Reform Programmes and the Stability and Convergence
Programmes would be desirable.102
3. Making the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact operational – the corrective arm
3.1. Introduction
The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact intro-
duced more economic rationale and more room for judg-
ment in the application of the excessive deficit proce-
dure. The revised SGP foresees that the influence of
economic developments on the budgetary outcomes
should be considered more systematically when prepar-
ing reports under Article 104(3) launching the excessive
deficit procedure and when setting deadlines for the cor-
rection of excessive deficits, but also possibly when
deciding on the existence of excessive deficits. It also
increases emphasis on fiscal consolidation efforts rather
than only on nominal results, which allows a better iden-
tification of inappropriate policies and contributed to
a permanent and sustainable correction of excessive
deficits.
This section assesses the implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure since the 2005 SGP reform, tak-
ing into account that, at the time of the reform, con-
cerns were raised that the flexibility introduced in the
excessive deficit procedure would be abused, weaken-
ing the fiscal framework. This section does not aim at
providing a comprehensive overview of the ongoing
EDP procedures concerning the various countries
(this is done in Part I of the report), but rather at
assessing how the rules were applied in line with the
letter and spirit of the revised SGP. In a second part,
this section elaborates on a feature of the revised SGP
which deserves particular attention and careful imple-
mentation: the assessment of effective action in the
excessive deficit procedure. Provisions related to
effective action play a central role in the revised SGP,
which allows repeating steps in the EDP in case a
Member State has acted in compliance with the previ-
ous recommendations of the Council. A number of
simple and transparent principles for the implementa-
tion of the concept of effective action are presented,
with a view to stimulating discussion on this issue.
3.2. The application of the excessive deficit 
procedure
This section discusses how the increased room for eco-
nomic judgment of the revised SGP was used in the
application of the excessive deficit procedure.
3.2.1. Preparation of Commission reports in 
accordance with Article 104(3)
The revised SGP foresees that the Commission should
always prepare a report under Article 104(3) of the
Treaty when a reported or planned deficit exceeds 3 per-
cent of GDP. It also provides specifications on the con-
tent of the reports.
As was already foreseen in the original SGP, the Com-
mission reports in accordance with Article 104(3)
should notably examine if one or more of the excep-
tions foreseen in Article 104(2)(a) of the Treaty apply.
The original SGP also foresaw that that the Commis-
sion reports should take into account whether the gov-
ernment deficit exceeds government investment
expenditure and take into account all other relevant
factors. The revised SGP specifies the nature (and
role) of these ‘other relevant factors’: it states that the
Commission report should appropriately reflect
developments in the medium-term economic position
and in the medium-term budgetary position. Further-
more, consideration should be given to any other fac-
tors which, in the opinion of the Member State con-
cerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively
assess in qualitative terms the excess over the refer-
ence value. To this end, Member States may put for-103
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cific factors that they consider relevant (1).
Since March 2005, the Commission has adopted reports
in accordance with Treaty Article 104(3) for three Mem-
ber States: Italy, Portugal and the UK. In all cases, the
Commission report contained a comprehensive assess-
ment of ‘other relevant factors’:
• Under the heading ‘medium-term economic posi-
tion’, the reports took into account considerations
related to (i) the current and expected cyclical posi-
tion of the economy; (ii) potential growth develop-
ments and (iii) the recent implementation of structural
reforms and their expected impact on the economy.
• Considerations related to the ‘medium-term budget-
ary position’ included (i) an assessment of the struc-
tural position of government finances (net of
cyclical influences and one-off and temporary meas-
ures); (ii) a review of the fiscal stance in previous
episodes of economic good times; (iii) an overall
assessment of the sustainability of government
finances in the Member State concerned; and (iv) an
analysis of recent developments in public invest-
ment and in the quality of government finances.
• Specific relevant factors put forward by the Member
State concerned were also considered and assessed
in a balanced way in the Commission reports. For
instance, the UK provided information on a number
of factors that influenced budgetary developments
in the recent past (e.g. related to the timing of net
payments to the EU and commitments to interna-
tional aid and debt relief). Italy put forward factors
on the nature of the statistical revisions in the recent
years, the budgetary impact of the net contribution
to the EU budget and the contribution to fostering
international solidarity (due to the late submission,
these factors could not be explicitly mentioned in the
104(3) Commission report; they were however duly
taken into account by the Commission and the
Council in the following steps of the excessive defi-
cit procedure).
• Finally, the 104(3) reports took into account other
factors that were considered relevant by the Com-
mission for an overall appreciation of the situation.
These factors were related, inter alia, to the quality
of the statistical system, the institutional settings of
the country concerned (existence of independent
institutions in charge of providing inputs or analysis
in the area of fiscal policy, quality of the budgetary
process, strength of expenditure-control mecha-
nisms, etc.).
In all cases, the Commission reports in accordance with
Article 104(3) were accompanied with detailed technical
annexes produced by the Commission services. The con-
sideration of a wide range of relevant factors in the initi-
ating step of the excessive deficit procedure ensures that
decisions and recommendations are based on a compre-
hensive assessment of the budgetary developments in the
context of the economic conditions prevailing in the
country concerned. This contributes to an economically
rationale implementation of the EU fiscal rules.
3.2.2. All deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP have 
been considered excessive
The revised SGP foresees that ‘other relevant factors’
can be taken into account when deciding on the existence
of an excessive deficit only if the excess of the deficit
over 3 percent of GDP is temporary and the deficit
remains close to the reference value. At the moment of
the reform, some critics — ignoring these provisions —
argued that Member States could be allowed under the
¥1∂ The Code of Conduct specifies that the Member State concerned may put for-
ward to the Council and to the Commission the specific factors that it consid-
ers relevant, in due time for the preparation of the report under Article 104(3)
and as a rule within one month of the reporting dates established in Article 4
(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. The Member State shall provide
the information necessary for the Commission and the Council to make a
comprehensive assessment of the budgetary impact of these factors.
Table II.3
Data taken into account by the Council when deciding 
on the existence of an excessive deficit
2004 2005 2006 Conclusions
IT 3.1 % of GDP 
(observed)
3.6 % of GDP
(COM spring-
05 forecast)
4.6 % of GDP
(COM spring-
05 forecast)
Close, not 
temporary
PT 2.9 % of GDP
(observed)
6.2 % of GDP
(Plans of the 
Portuguese 
authorities)
4.8 % of GD
(Plans of the 
Portuguese 
authorities)
Not close, not 
temporary
UK 3.2 % of GDP
(observed)
Just below 
3â % of GDP
(COM 
autumn-05 
forecast)
Around 3.1 % 
of GDP
(COM 
autumn-05 
forecast)
Close, not 
temporary
Source: Commission services.104
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GDP for long periods without being considered in exces-
sive deficit.
Since the reform all deficits in excess of 3 percent of
GDP have been considered excessive. In all cases, defi-
cits could not be considered close to the reference value
or the excess could not be considered temporary (see
Table II.3). For instance, the Commission and the Coun-
cil considered the slight excess of 0.1 percent of GDP
over the reference of 3 percent of GDP in Italy in 2003
and 2004 close to the reference value, but not temporary.
Similarly, the excess of 0.2 percent of GDP over the ref-
erence value in the UK in fiscal year 2004/05 was con-
sidered close to the reference value, but not temporary as
the deficit was not projected to decline below the refer-
ence value without corrective policy action. The large
planned deficit in Portugal could not be considered close
or temporary.
As the excess over the reference value was not close and
could not be considered temporary under unchanged pol-
icies in any of these three cases, corrective action was
necessary to correct the excessive deficit. Enhanced sur-
veillance under the excessive deficit procedure was
therefore appropriate and in line with the spirit of the
revised SGP rules. The application of the provisions
related to ‘other relevant factors’ in the steps leading to
a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit has
confirmed that the SGP remains essentially a rules-based
framework. The increased room for judgment did not
affect predictability of the actions taken and equal treat-
ment across Member States. This reflects the fact that the
room for judgment and the basis on which judgment has
to be exerted have been well defined and codified in the
revised Regulations and in the revised Code of Conduct.
3.2.3. Initial deadlines for the correction of excessive 
deficits were set taking into account economic 
circumstances
The revised SGP foresees that deadlines for the correc-
tion of excessive deficits should be set taking into
account an overall and balanced assessment of ‘other rel-
evant factors’. Since the agreement on the revised SGP,
recommendations in accordance with Article 104(7) of
the Treaty were issued for three EU Member States. The
room for judgment in the excessive deficit procedure has
been applied to set realistic deadlines for Member States
to correct their excessive deficits.
Italy and Portugal, two Member States with high initial
deficits and relatively weak economic growth situations
and prospects, were given longer deadlines for the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit (two to three years). The
Commission and the Council considered, after an overall
economic assessment of the situation, that shorter dead-
lines could have implied an overly large fiscal effort in a
single year. This does not mean that the revised SGP sys-
tematically allows for longer deadlines and lower con-
solidation efforts. On the contrary, a comparison of the
recommendations in accordance with Article 104(7)
addressed under the original and revised SGP shows that
the fiscal efforts recommended to Italy and Portugal are
larger than those recommended on average in the past
(see Table II.4). The recommended efforts are also sig-
nificantly larger than the agreed benchmark of an annual
fiscal effort of at least 0.5 percent of GDP in structural
terms. The case of the UK illustrates that longer dead-
lines are not the standard. This country had a deficit
slightly above 3 percent in the fiscal year 2004-05 and
growth expected to be close to potential in the coming
years. It was therefore given a short deadline for the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit and recommended to
achieve fiscal efforts in line with the 0.5 percent of GDP
benchmark.
3.2.4. An obligation of structural efforts, 
to ensure that excessive deficits are corrected 
in a permanent way
The Council recommendations and notices issued since
the reform always specified the required structural fiscal
effort, which excludes one-off and temporary effects on
the budget balances. The emphasis on structural fiscal
efforts ensures that excessive deficits will be corrected
permanently. Recent updates of the Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes confirmed that Member States in
EDP plan significant consolidation efforts in the years
2006 to 2008. The improvement in the structural balance
planned by these countries is on average significantly
above the 0.5 percent benchmark introduced by the
revised SGP.
The adjustment planned by Member States in EDP var-
ies considerably. As shown in chart II.8, most of former
EU-15 Member project significant improvements of
their structural balance in the coming years. The pro-
jected fiscal adjustment in some new Member States in
EDP falls short of the 0.5 percent of GDP adjustment
benchmark, also taking a multi-annual average. In part,
this reflects the fact that 104(7) recommendations for
these Member States were issued under the original105
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ment in the cyclically-adjusted or structural balance.
Since the deadlines were set, the growth situation has
improved in a number of Member States, and the
planned structural fiscal adjustment in these countries
was revised downward but remains sufficient to correct
the excessive deficit by the deadline set by the Council
in the recommendation under article 104(7) set under the
original SGP (the reduction in the deficit relies more on
favourable growth conditions and less on structural
efforts). Recommendations under the revised SGP will
ensure that Member States in EDP are always required to
achieve improvements in their structural balance by at
least 0.5 percent of GDP.
3.2.5. Improved economic dialogue between the 
Commission, the Council and the Member 
States
In March 2005, the Council stressed that improved cooper-
ation between the Commission, the Council and Member
Table II.4
104(7) recommendations formulated in the past for EU-15 Member States
  
Indentification 
( = year t)
Deadline for 
the correction Effort in t Effort in t+1 Effort in t+2 Effort in t+3 Yearly average
104(7) rec. under 
the original SGP 
to EU-15 Member 
States
DE 2003 2004 (t+1) 1.0 % of GDP of structural 
measures
— — 0.5 % of GDP
FR 2003 2004 (t+1) > 0 % of GDP at least 0.5 % 
of GDP
— — 0.3 % of GDP
NL 2004 2005 (t+1) 0.6 % of GDP at least 0.5 % 
of GDP
— — 0.5 % of GDP
GR 2004 2005 (t+1) Structural measures of at least 
1 % of GDP over the 2 years
—  0.5 % of GDP
104(7) rec. under 
the revised SGP
IT 2005 2007 (t+2) > 0 % of GDP Change in the structural 
balance of at least 1.6 % of 
GDP cumulated
— 0.6 % of GDP
PT-II 2005 2008 (t+3) Package of 
0.6 % of GDP
1.5 % 
structural
0.75 % 
structural
0.75 % 
structural
0.9 % of GDP
UK 2006 (fiscal 
year)
2006 (t) 0.5 % 
structural
— — — 0.5 % of GDP
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.7:  Medium-term budgetary plans of Member States in EDP (simple averages)
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enforcement of the SGP rules. The experience with the
revised SGP has shown that, by introducing more room for
economic judgment in the fiscal surveillance process, the
reform stimulated a constructive and transparent economic
policy dialogue at EU level on the individual country
cases. This allowed better explaining decisions and recom-
mendations in the context of the excessive deficit proce-
dure and strengthened peer support and pressure.
The improved economic dialogue contributed to a
smooth and efficient operation of the Pact. The large
convergence of views between the Commission and the
Council in the assessment of the 2005 Stability and Con-
vergence Programme Updates and in the recommenda-
tions and decisions under the excessive deficit procedure
since the SGP reform should be seen in this context. The
progress made with the SGP reform highlights the
importance of good communication and coordination of
policies in the EU and the euro area.
3.3. The concept of ‘effective action’ 
in the excessive deficit procedure
The revised SGP formalises the important distinction
between policy errors and events unrelated to policy. In
the revised SGP, it is possible to repeat steps in the
excessive deficit procedure if failure to correct the
excessive deficit cannot be attributed to a policy error
but to unexpected adverse economic event with a consid-
erable negative impact on the budget. The revised SGP
makes clear that a repetition of these steps can only be
invoked under the provision that effective action has
been taken by the country concerned in compliance with
the initial recommendation or notice. How the assess-
ment of ‘effective action’ will be done in practice is
therefore a key element for the success and credibility of
the revised EU fiscal rules.
3.3.1. New definition and role of ‘effective action’ 
in the excessive deficit procedure
The 2005 SGP reform clarified the definition of effective
action and how to assess it. The amended Regulation
1467/97 and the revised Code of Conduct make clear
that the notion of ‘effective action’ covers both the
announcement of appropriate measures within the six
months period following the adoption of a 104(7) recom-
mendation or the four months period following a 104(9)
notice and whether these measures are duly implemented
and ensure the achievement of the fiscal effort initially
recommended by the Council. In line with Article 10(2)
of Regulation 1467/97, which specifies that ‘if action by
a participating Member State is not being implemented
or, in the Council’s view, is proving to be inadequate, the
Council shall immediately take a decision under Article
104 (9) or Article 104 (11) respectively’, the surveillance
of budgetary developments is made in real time.
The revised Code of Conduct provides elements on how
the assessment of effective action should be made. It
notably specifies that:
Graph II.8:  The adjustment path towards the medium-term objectives
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effective action if it has acted in compliance with the
recommendation or notice, regarding both the
implementation of the measures required therein
and budgetary execution.
ii. The assessment should in particular take into
account whether the Member State concerned has
achieved the annual improvement of its cyclically
adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary
measures, initially recommended by the Council. In
case the observed adjustment proves to be lower
than recommended, a careful analysis of the reasons
for the shortfall would be made.
The following section elaborates on these provisions.
3.3.2. A broad assessment of compliance with EDP 
recommendations
The revised SGP makes clear that the reference for the
assessment of effective action in the EDP is whether the
Member State concerned has achieved the annual
improvement of its CAB, net of one-off and other tem-
porary measures, initially recommended by the Council.
However, taking into account that the ultimate objective
is to determine whether national authorities have taken
actions in compliance with the Council recommenda-
tions under Article 104(7) or notices under Article
104(9) of the Treaty, the revised Code of Conduct asks
for a detailed analysis in case the improvement of the
CAB, net of one-off and other temporary measures
proves lower than recommended. In this analysis, a
number of factors influencing developments in the CAB
net of one-off measures should be taken into account,
which can be classified in the following two broad cate-
gories:
i. The factors which can be considered outside the
control of the government (budgetary effect of fluc-
tuations in interest rates on the debt burden, revi-
sions in potential growth, developments in the
composition of growth, fluctuations in tax elastici-
ties).
ii. The factors which can be considered as under the
control of the government. This includes notably an
assessment of whether all the announced corrective
measures were actually introduced. As specified in
the Code of Conduct, the analysis should also take
into account whether budgetary plans were ade-
quately implemented.
Factors outside the control of the government
The following factors can be considered to be largely
outside the control of the government.
The effect of fluctuations in interest rates on the debt
burden. This effect can be neutralised by focusing atten-
tion on the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary bal-
ance. When relevant, the impact on the general govern-
ment balance of changes in the structure of the debt,
which results from decisions of the government, could
be taken into account (in most of cases, this effect should
however be negligible).
Developments in potential growth. The change in the
CAB net of one-off and temporary measures should be
corrected for the effect of the change in the estimated
potential growth compared to the level (implicitly or
explicitly) assumed in the recommendation or notice.
The idea underlying this correction is that of assessing
the adjustment conditional upon a potential growth esti-
mate established ex ante. The methodological elements
are detailed in the 2004 edition of the Public Finance
Report (1). The ‘surprise’ in potential growth is the dif-
ference between the potential growth assumed in the rec-
ommendation or notice and the potential growth used to
compute the change in the CAB at the moment of the
assessment of compliance with the recommendation.
Composition of economic growth. A difference between
the recommended change in the CAB, net of one-off and
other temporary measures, and the one estimated at the
time of the assessment can be due to shifts in the compo-
sition of economic growth towards more or less tax rich
components compared to the projections underlying the
recommendation or notice. Such unexpected changes
need to be taken into account when measuring the fiscal
effort.
Other factors such as changes in tax elasticities and the
budgetary effects of revenues which may not be synchro-
¥1∂ This report showed that the effect of potential growth surprises on the
change in the CAB can be computed as follows: ,
where is the expenditure to GDP ratio net of cyclical factors in year
and is the forecast error of the growth rate of poten-
tial GDP growth in year t. 
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include the effect of unexpected developments in the
elasticity of individual taxes relative to their base and the
behaviour of revenues the base of which is not necessar-
ily synchronised with the economic cycle (1). In view of
the diversity of these factors, their assessment cannot
follow a uniform approach and should be done on a case-
by-case basis.
Factors under the control of the government
Introduction of measures and policy changes. In line
with the provisions of the revised Code of Conduct, the
assessment of effective action takes into account
whether all the measures or reforms announced by the
government within the six or four months period follow-
ing the adoption of the recommendation or notice were
actually introduced. The assessment also takes into
account other measures introduced since the adoption by
the Commission of its Communication following the
expiry of the 6-month or 4-month deadline.
Budgetary execution. As specified in the Code of Con-
duct, the assessment takes into account other elements
related to the implementation of budgetary plans (it
should encompass budgetary execution as a whole).
What ultimately matters for the assessment of effective
action is not only the impact of the specific corrective
measures, including those activated following the Coun-
cil recommendation or notice, but also the overall devel-
opments in the execution of the budget. The Code of
Conduct assumes that all items of primary general gov-
ernment expenditure net of cyclical factors as well as
discretionary measures on the revenue side are under the
control of the government.
Possible discrepancy between the expected and
observed budgetary impact of measures and reforms. An
element that deserves particular attention concerns the
possible discrepancy between the expected and observed
budgetary impact of measures and reforms. Considering
that the decisions to implement specific measures and
reforms are taken by the Member States and that their
effectiveness largely depends on whether adequate con-
trol mechanisms were put in place, the responsibility for
possible shortfalls in the effect of measures and reforms
should, as a rule, fall on the Member State concerned. A
lower-than-expected improvement in the CAB net of
one-off and temporary measures resulting from a lower-
than-expected impact of a given measure should there-
fore as a rule be considered as a lack of effective action
by the Member State concerned. This is consistent with
the focus put in the SGP framework on ‘effective
actions’ rather than on ‘actions’.
A point that may justify an exception to this principle
concerns the particular case of certain major structural
reforms. The economic effects of such reforms (labour
market reforms and certain pension and health reforms
for instance) depend on complex microeconomic inter-
actions and on the behavioural response of private agents
to new incentives. The ex ante estimation of the budget-
ary impact of such reforms therefore involves objective
uncertainties. In some cases, the budgetary slippage – or
part of it – stemming from a lack of effect of such struc-
tural reforms could be considered as an event outside the
control of the government. This should however be con-
ditional on the fact that the lack of effect of reforms was
not predictable. The Commission forecasts could play a
role in this respect.
¥1∂ Based on past experience, temporary movements of some tax revenues do
not necessarily follow the economic cycle as measured by the output gap.
In such a case there is the risk of misjudging the level of structural reve-
nues. 109
4. Measurement and statistical issues
4.1. Introduction
The revised SGP increases the number of factors to be
taken into account in budgetary surveillance. Stronger
focus is also put on the quality of EU fiscal surveillance.
As a consequence, the need to dispose of appropriate fis-
cal indicators has increased. Three issues treated in this
section are related to the specific question of the meas-
urement of budgetary positions and policies.
The first issue concerns the identification of temporary
influences, other than those stemming from the cycle, on
budgetary statistics. The Council Report of 20 March
2005, amending Regulations 1055/05 and 1056/05 and
the revised Code of Conduct all refer to fiscal adjust-
ments in cyclically-adjusted terms, net of one-off and
temporary measures. The introduction of this concept in
all documents of the SGP implies a common understand-
ing between the Commission, Member States and the
public of what are one-off and temporary measures, and
agreeing on how to identify and take them into account
in a transparent manner.
The second issue is that of the cyclical adjustment of
budget deficits. The revised SGP clarifies that the com-
pliance with the MTO and progress towards it need to be
measured in cyclically-adjusted terms. Moreover, the
MTO should be set in such a way to allow for a safety
margin against the breach of the 3 percent deficit ceiling
as a result of weak cyclical conditions. This means that
MTOs need to be set below the so-called minimal bench-
marks, i.e., the level of the CAB consistent with the full
operation and the respect of the 3 percent ceiling for def-
icits under normal cyclical conditions. In the following,
it will be described the recent work done within the EPC
Working Group on Output Gaps on the estimation of
budget elasticities and sensitivities for New Member
States and on the updating of the same parameters for
EU-15 Member States. It will also be illustrated the
recent work done by the Commission services for the
estimation of a new set of values for minimal bench-
marks for the 25 Member States.
Statistical issues have been given more prominence by
the SGP reform. Concrete initiatives in this field have
been taken by the Commission and the Council in recent
times. The third sub-section provides a summary of the
recent developments in relation to the governance of
budgetary statistics in the EU. In particular, it provides
an illustration of the recent legislative changes in the reg-
ulation governing the reporting of deficit and debt statis-
tics for the implementation of the SGP.
4.2. Definition and identification of one-off 
and temporary measures
The revised SGP requires that Member States in exces-
sive deficit as well as those that have not yet reached
their MTO have to achieve a minimum structural effort
every year, defined as a change in the cyclically-adjusted
balance net of one-off and temporary measures. This will
ensure that respect of the nominal deficit limits of the EU
fiscal framework is achieved through the implementa-
tion of sustained consolidation packages rather than by
the use of non permanent measures.
This section first examines the rationale for the existence
of one-off and temporary measures. Then, it specifies the
concept of one-off and temporary measures and princi-
ples for taking into account such measures in the context
of budgetary surveillance. It also provides an indicative
list of types of operations that could be considered as
one-off and temporary measures.
4.2.1. One-off and temporary measures 
in the context of numerical fiscal rules
The rationale for isolating temporary influences on the
budget is to identify the more permanent or the underly-
ing budgetary trends and efforts. Although one-off and
temporary measures are not always associated with an
intention to make the figures look better, it is clear that110
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budget deficit or public debt through ‘easy’ measures,
which leave the government’s net worth unchanged and
imply no political cost. Some authors have also shown
that the recourse to one-off and temporary measures is
more frequent in Member States with high deficits and
weak institutional settings or non-transparent budget
processes and when there are numerical fiscal rules. The
main explanation for this is related to the so-called
Goodhart’s Law, which says that when an economic
indicator is made a target for the purpose of economic
policy, which is generally the case following the intro-
duction of a numerical fiscal rule, policy-makers change
their behaviour and tend to take decisions which facili-
tate the respect of the target.
In the context of the revised SGP, relevant one-off and
temporary measures are those with an impact on the gen-
eral government balance. This section focuses exclu-
sively on such measures.
4.2.2. Recent experience with one-off measures 
in the EU
The introduction of provisions on one-off and temporary
measures in the revised SGP is a clear improvement in
the economic rationale of the fiscal framework. This
change was notably motivated by the frequent recourse
to one-off and temporary measures in recent years.
Graph II.9 below shows the impact of one-off and tem-
porary measures on the general government balance in
the euro area since 1993 (1). While in theory one-off and
temporary measures can be deficit-reducing and deficit-
increasing, the chart shows that, on average, they have
been deficit-reducing. This tends to confirm the view
that one-off and temporary measures were used as a
mean to improve budgetary figures. The size of one-offs
also seems to be linked to cyclical developments. When
growth was high (periods 1994-1995 and 19989-2000 on
the chart), the budgetary effect of one-offs was on aver-
age small.
Graph II.10 below shows the link, for euro area coun-
tries, between the level of the deficit and the frequency
and importance of one-off and temporary measures since
1993. Negative and small one-offs (below 0.3 percent of
GDP) are not represented on the chart. The graph shows
that there are more one-off measures when the deficit
approaches 3 percent of GDP or is slightly above this
ceiling. It also suggests that one-off measures are poten-
tially larger when the deficit approaches 3 percent of
GDP.
The recourse to one-off and temporary measures implied
difficulties in the application of the SGP rules. The graph
below illustrates the case of Portugal. This country
brought its nominal deficit below 3 percent of GDP
¥1∂ This series was constructed using the database built by Van den Noord and
Koen (2005) and Commission services’ information on the recent past.
Graph II.9:  One-off and temporary measures in the euro area, as a % of GDP
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through the implementation of very large one-off meas-
ures. There was no structural effort during this period
(the cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and tem-
porary measures was virtually unchanged) while the
nominal deficit and the CAB improved to below 3 per-
cent of GDP in the years 2002 to 2004. When the effect
of the one-off measures vanished, the actual deficit con-
verged towards its structural level, and reached 6 percent
of GDP in 2005.
4.2.3. Guidance for the identification of one-off and 
temporary measures
Specification of the definition of one-off and temporary 
measures
Given the diversity of the measures potentially con-
cerned, providing a simple and concise definition of one-
off and temporary measures is difficult. The revised
Code of Conduct specifies that ‘one-off and temporary
measures are measures having a transitory budgetary
Graph II.10:  More and bigger one-offs when the deficit is close to 3 % (1993-2005, euro area countries)
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intertemporal budgetary position’. However, the need
for clarity of the concept calls for further specifications
of this general definition. The following common fea-
tures of one-off and temporary measures can be identi-
fied:
i. By nature, one-off and temporary measures have
only a temporary influence on the headline and the
cyclically-adjusted fiscal position. Their impact on
the general government balance is concentrated in
one or a very limited number of years.
ii. Such measures are non-recurrent. When deciding
whether a particular measure is non-recurrent, the
measure should be assessed in the context of the
chain of measures of the same type. For instance,
although each investment project is unique, a spe-
cific investment decision should be seen in the con-
text of a continuity of investment decisions over
time. As a rule, such measures should therefore not
be considered as one-off and temporary measures,
unless their size is exceptional (1).
The Council Report of 20 March 2005 and other SGP-
related documents refer to one-off and temporary meas-
ures. However, to identify the underlying developments
in the budgetary position, transactions resulting from
events outside the control of the government (Court
decision, call of a contingent liability agreed in previous
years), and therefore not strictly corresponding to ‘meas-
ures’, having an important one-off or temporary impact
on the general government balance, should also be taken
into account in the context of budgetary surveillance.
One-off and temporary measures and the calculation 
of structural fiscal efforts
The assessment of whether specific measures should be
considered as one-off measures and be taken into
account in the context of fiscal surveillance and in the
calculation of the structural balance and effort will inev-
itably depend on the issue at hand. However, a number
of principles should be followed. 
• First, only measures having a significant impact on
the general government balance should be consid-
ered. Widening the definition to a large number of
measures would considerably increase the complex-
ity of the monitoring of government finances devel-
opments.
• Second, as a rule no deficit-increasing measures
should be excluded from the calculation of the fiscal
effort (2). In implementing the provisions related to
one-off and temporary measures, the aims of the
Council should be kept in mind. The Council
intended to (i) ensure objective and transparent
analysis of government finances developments;
(ii) reduce incentives to pursue fiscal consolidation
on the basis of one-off measures and; in turn,
(iii) stimulate the implementation of sound consoli-
dation measures with a sustained effect on govern-
ment finances. The provisions on one-off and
temporary measures were therefore primarily intro-
duced in order to avoid that deficit-reducing one-off
and temporary measures are treated as structural
measures. They should not create incentives for
Member States to present some deficit-increasing
operations which could have a permanent character
as one-off measures (3).
4.2.4. An indicative and open list of one-off 
and temporary measures
The difficulty to establish a clear definition of one-off
and temporary measures is a strong argument in favour
of relying on concrete examples to identify them. An
indicative and open list facilitates the identification of
one-off measures, although it is clear that this list cannot
be exhaustive and definitive. In the report ‘Public
finances in EMU – 2004’, the Commission services
made an analysis of one-off and temporary measures
and, without the ambition of being fully inclusive, gave
a tentative list of one-off and temporary measures which
could be taken into account in the context of budgetary
surveillance.
In light of this previous work, recent economic literature
on the issue, and recent developments in the EU Member
¥1∂ When considering whether the costs associated with a natural catastrophe
(flooding, livestock diseases) should be considered as a one-off and tem-
porary measure, account should be taken of the fact that relatively minor or
medium-size catastrophes occur every year and therefore do not require
exceptional spending. Unless expenditure directly related to the catastro-
phe are significantly larger (as a percent of GDP) than those of the same
type observed in ‘normal’ times, they should not be considered as a one-
off measure.
¥2∂ Exceptions could be made in cases where there is a high degree of cer-
tainty on the transitory nature of the measure and on the fact that it will not
be extended in time or repeated.
¥3∂ The exclusion of permanent deficit-increasing measures from the calcula-
tion of the fiscal effort would lead to an ‘artificial’ improvement of the fis-
cal effort, which would not reflect an improvement of the underlying fiscal
position.113
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considered as one-off or temporary measures and trans-
actions, provided that they satisfy the criteria and princi-
ples mentioned above. The classification makes a dis-
tinction between deficit-reducing and deficit-increasing
measures, which, as stated before, should be treated with
particular caution.
Deficit-reducing measures
i. Tax amnesties implying a one-off tax payment. The
typical case is that of a government offering an
amnesty in order to repatriate capital from abroad.
The amnesty may be subject to a one-off tax pay-
ment, which can potentially be large.
ii. Sales of non-financial assets (real estate, publicly
owned licenses and concessions). (1) (2) The most
famous example is the sale of UMTS licences in
2000 (and in some countries in subsequent years).
iii. Temporary legislative changes in the timing of out-
lays or revenues with a positive impact on the gen-
eral government balance. This includes changes in
tax rates that are clearly announced as temporary
and temporary changes in the timing of expenditure
and collection of revenues.
iv. Exceptional revenues linked to the transfer of pen-
sion obligations (3). These revenues correspond to
the payment by a given company to the government,
in exchange for the transfer of the responsibility for
the future payment of pensions of its employees.
The magnitude of the one-off payment depends on
the value of the pension commitments assumed by
government and is potentially important.
v. Changes in revenues or expenditure consecutive to
Court or other authorities rulings. Such measures
include for instance reimbursements of subsidies to
general government decided by the Commission. 
vi. Securitisation operations with a positive impact on
the general government balance.
vii. Exceptional revenues from State owned companies.
Deficit-increasing measures
i. Short-term emergency costs associated with major
natural catastrophes or other exceptional events
(e.g. military actions, others). Experience shows that
the exceptionality of these costs depends considera-
bly on the size of the country.
ii. Changes in revenues or expenditure consecutive to
Court rulings or consecutive to Commission deci-
sions.
4.2.5. Information requirements on one-off 
and temporary measures
The role played by one-off and temporary measures in
the revised SGP strengthens the need for timely and reli-
able information on such measures.
The revised Code of Conduct specifies that ‘measures
having significant one-off’ effects should be explicitly
identified’ in the programmes. Annex 1 of the Code of
Conduct on the structure of Stability and Convergence
Programmes foresees that Member States will provide in
their programme information on one-off and temporary
measures and developments in the structural balance.
These provisions imply that implemented and planned
one-off and temporary measures should be described and
quantified in the Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes. These refer both to planned measures and
measures that took place in the recent past.
As regards the nature of the information to be provided
by the Member States, the following elements seem par-
ticularly relevant:
i. A description of the transaction and of the events at
the origin of the measure. This includes information
on the entities involved and the flows foreseen by
the operation.
ii. The observed or expected impact of the transaction
on general government expenditure and revenues
over time. Information on how the measure was
quantified, including the main assumptions for the
calculations and on the assumed treatment of the
transaction in the national accounts should be pro-
vided.
¥1∂ One refers here to non-financial assets (buildings, land, licences and con-
cessions) as, according to accounting rules, the disposal of financial assets
does not reduce the deficit.
¥2∂ In the national accounts, such receipts are recorded as negative investment
expenditure at the moment the sale takes place.
¥3∂ Regular payments and receipts in connection with the transfer of pension
obligations of specific individuals are not relevant.114
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Stability and Convergence Programmes constitutes a clear
progress compared to the previous situation, exchanges of
information on an annual basis may not seem sufficient
for a timely monitoring of one-off and temporary meas-
ures, especially in the case of Member States in Excessive
Deficit which are subject to an enhanced surveillance.
Additional information could be provided in the context
of the national budgetary procedures.
The Commission contributes to an improved transpar-
ency concerning these measures. The Commission serv-
ices provide information on the effect of one-off and
temporary measures included in its bi-annual forecasts.
When assessing Stability and Convergence Programmes
and compliance with the recommendations addressed by
the Council, the Commission provides clear information
on the measures that it considered as one-off and tempo-
rary measures, and that were excluded when estimating
the fiscal effort.
4.3. The estimation of new and updated 
budgetary sensitivities and 
the determination of minimal 
benchmarks
Since the inception of the SGP, a great deal of attention
was put on the need to distinguish the structural from the
cyclical component of budget balances in EU budgetary
surveillance. Progress was made in the past years on the
front of defining an agreed methodology for the compu-
tation of output gaps, a necessary ingredient for adjust-
ing budget balances for the cycle. In a first step, a meth-
odology for computing output gap figures based on
production function-based estimates of potential output
was developed for the EU-15 Member States within the
Working Group on Output Gaps (OGWG) of the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee, and agreed by the Ecofin
Council in July 2002 (1). In 2003, the OGWG undertook
new work on to refine the production function method-
ology, and extend it to all EU countries, including the
new Member States (2). Since 2004, production func-
tion-based output gap figures are available for all Mem-
ber States.
In spite of this progress on the front of the estimation of
output gaps, up to 2005 cyclically-adjusted budget bal-
ance (CAB) figures for new Member States were not
available, due to missing values for budgetary sensitivi-
ties, the other necessary ingredient for the cyclical
adjustment of budget balances. In 2005, progresses have
been made on this front: values for the budgetary elastic-
ities for the new Member States were computed accord-
ing to a methodology agreed at EU level and values for
EU-15 Member States were updated to account for pos-
sible changes in the structure of government revenues
and expenditures. This work was carried out by the
OECD and the Commission services within the frame-
work of the OGWG. On the basis on the new set of budg-
etary elasticities, the Commission services constructed
budgetary sensitivities, providing this way the link
between output gaps and budget balances when comput-
ing CABs.
As a result of the 2005 SGP reform, medium-term budg-
etary objectives can differ across countries and will be
set with the aim, inter alia, to ensure an adequate safety
margin against the breach of the 3 percent reference
value for deficits (see section II.3 of this report). In order
to gauge the respect of such adequate safety margin, the
Commission introduced in 2000 the concept of minimal
benchmark and used it regularly in previous years in
budgetary surveillance, mostly in the assessment of sta-
bility and convergence programmes. During 2005, on
the basis of the recently computed full set of budgetary
sensitivities, a new set of values for minimal benchmarks
have been calculated by the Commission services, dis-
cussed and approved by the Member States.
4.3.1. Updating the estimation of budgetary 
sensitivities and computing sensitivities 
for the new Member States
Background information
In the European Commission approach, the CAB is com-
puted by deducting from overall budgets the cyclical
component, which is the product of the output gap and
the sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle (see Box
II.3). The budgetary sensitivities used in budgetary sur-
veillance by the European Commission are based on
OECD estimates of budgetary elasticities, and the meth-
odology for linking output gaps to budget balances is
discussed and agreed by the EPC. Although figures for
New Member States’ output gaps computed according to
the agreed production function methodology were avail-
able already since 2004, the computation of CABs was
¥1∂ See Denis, McMorrow and Roeger (2002) for a description of the EU pro-
duction function approach to the computation of output gaps.
¥2∂ An illustration of the main methodological improvements in the computa-
tion of output gaps is contained in Denis et al. (2006). 115
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New Member States until June 2005.
The EPC OGWG, following the latest EU enlargement,
received a mandate by the Ecofin Council with a view
‘…to focus, together with the Economic and Financial
Committee, on the linking of the output gaps and the
cyclically-adjusted balance …’. On the basis of this
mandate, the EPC OGWG, with the participation of the
OECD, has been working in 2004 and 2005 towards pro-
ducing budgetary elasticities for the EU-10 and to update
the existing set of elasticities and sensitivities for the
EU-15 Member States (published back in 2000, see Van
den Noord (2000)), in order to take into account changes
that occurred since then in the policy environment and in
structural fiscal parameters. The OECD also proposed
some revisions in the methodology for estimating budg-
etary elasticities, that were discussed and agreed in the
OGWG. The OECD computed new values for the elas-
ticities for all OECD countries, including the four coun-
tries of recent EU accession (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia). As for the six non-OECD EU Mem-
bers, the elasticities were estimated by the Commission
services using the OECD methodology.
Based on the work carried out by the EPC Output Gap
Working Group (OGWG), on 27 June 2005 the EPC has
approved the updated elasticity estimates by the OECD
Box II.3: Budgetary sensitivities: definition and construction
Budgetary sensitivities are a basic ingredient for the computation of cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) according
to the Commission method. Specifically, the CAB is derived by subtracting the temporary component of the budget bal-
ance from the overall nominal figure:
(1)
where is the nominal budget balance-to-GDP ratio in year t, the budgetary sensitivity parameter and the output gap
in year t (i.e., the difference between real GDP and potential GDP expressed in percent of potential GDP).
The sensitivity parameter represents the change in the budget balance-to-GDP ratio associated with an additional per-
centage point of output gap. It is obtained by aggregating the elasticities of individual budgetary items (the percentage
change in budgetary items associated with a percentage change in output). The individual revenue elasticities, , are
first aggregated to an overall revenue elasticity using the share of each on the total current tax burden ( ) as
weight:
(2)
Elasticities are computed according to the OECD methodology agreed within the OGWG. The weights are
computed by the Commission services as an average over the period 1995-2004. As for the expenditure elasticity, , it
can expressed as
(3)
where is the elasticity of unemployment-related expenditures and is the share of unemployment related
expenditure on total current primary expenditure. Parameter is computed on the basis of the methodology developed
by the OECD. The weight is computed by the Commission services using OECD data or data from national source
for non-OECD countries. The reference year is 2003.
The revenue and expenditure elasticities and are transformed into sensitivity parameters as follows:
, (4)
where is the share of the current tax burden on GDP and  is the share of primary current expenditure on GDP.
Both weights are computed by the Commission services using 2003 as the reference year. The difference even-
tually yields the sensitivity parameter of the overall budget balance used in equation (1).
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10 Member States. A new set of budgetary sensitivities
was then computed by the European Commission that
was used in the Autumn 2005 forecast and in the assess-
ment of the 2005 vintage of stability and convergence
programmes.
The new and updated values for budgetary sensitivities 
for all new Member States
The first step for computing budgetary sensitivities is the
estimation of budget elasticities. Table II.5. New and
updated budgetary elasticities below reports the results
from the latest estimates by the OECD (for all EU OECD
countries) and the Commission services (non-OECD
countries). Four different types of tax elasticities are esti-
mated separately: personal income tax, corporate income
tax, indirect taxes and social contributions. On the expend-
iture side, it is estimated the elasticity of only one cycli-
cally-sensitive item: unemployment-related transfers.
The elasticity of personal taxes is just above unity for
most countries, this being mainly the result of progres-
sive tax schedules. The elasticity of corporate taxes is
also higher than one in general, but in this case the result
is mostly driven by the fact that corporate profits, the tax
base for corporate taxes, react more than proportionally
with output. Regarding the elasticity of social contribu-
tions, this is generally below unity instead, mainly due to
a less than proportional reaction of the tax base (i.e., the
wage bill) to output. As for indirect taxes, the elasticity
is assumed to be equal to unity for all countries. On the
expenditure side, elasticities are relatively small (equal
to -0.12 for EU-25 average), given the relatively low
share of unemployment related transfers on total primary
current expenditure. EU-15 countries exhibit on average
slightly higher revenue elasticities than EU-10 countries
(by about 1 decimal point). A stronger difference is
observed for expenditure elasticities (-0.15 for EU-15
versus -0.06 in the case of EU-10 countries).
Revenue elasticities for each tax component are aggre-
gated into a single revenue elasticity using the weight of
each tax category on the current tax burden (see columns
(5) and (6) in Table II.5 and Box II.3). The figures
obtained indicate that aggregate revenue elasticities are
equal to 1.04 for EU-15 and to 0.96 for EU-10 countries.
In comparison with the elasticities used in EU budgetary
surveillance up to September 2005, for the EU-15 aver-
age there is a slight increase in the overall revenue elas-
ticity, coupled with a more marked and generalised
reduction in expenditure elasticities due to changed esti-
mations methodology (1).
The budgetary sensitivity parameters used for calculating
cyclically-adjusted budget balances in EU budgetary sur-
veillance aggregate revenue and expenditure elasticities
into a single parameter representing the change in the
budget balance/GDP ratio associated with a unit change in
the output gap. The budgetary sensitivity is obtained as the
difference between the a revenue and an expenditure sen-
sitivity. The weight used to transform the revenue elastic-
ity into the revenue sensitivity is the share of current tax
burden on GDP, while that for translating the expenditure
elasticity into the expenditure sensitivity is the share of
primary current expenditure on GDP (see Box II.3).
Results are reported in Table II.6. New and updated
budgetary sensitivities. Overall, budgetary sensitivities
are on average lower for EU-10 Member States (0.36 as
opposed to 0.49 for the EU-15 average).
The result is explained both by average lower revenue
elasticities and expenditure elasticities and by both a
lower share of current tax burden on GDP and of primary
current expenditure on GDP. A comparison of the updated
budgetary sensitivities for EU-15 Member States with
those used so far in EU budgetary surveillance reveals that
on average the overall sensitivity dropped slightly (from
0.51 to 0.49). However, this drop is entirely due to
reduced values for expenditure sensitivities (in absolute
value), since revenue sensitivities have slightly increased.
The major increases in the overall budgetary sensitivity
are observed for France, Ireland, Italy and Austria. Nota-
ble declines are observed instead in Belgium, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden.
4.3.2. The computation of new values for minimal 
benchmarks for budget balances
Background information
One of the key elements of the 2005 SGP reform is the
differentiation of the medium-term budgetary objectives
(MTOs) in accordance with country-specific characteris-
¥1∂ In the previous methodology unemployment-related expenditures included
unemployment subsidies, subsidised employment and compensations for
early retirement, while in the current methodology only unemployment
subsidies, for which data availability is more homogenous across coun-
tries, are included. Moreover, the elasticity of unemployment with respect
to the output gap is estimated directly, without the split between two sepa-
rate elasticities (labour force wit respect to employment gap and employ-
ment with respect to the output gap). See Van den Noord (2000) and
Girouard and André (2005).117
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to have a budgetary objective, defined in structural
terms, with the view to ensure, inter-alia, a safety margin
with respect to the 3 percent of GDP government deficit
ratio. This implies that the country-specific MTOs needs
to be set above a threshold value which ensures the
respect of the 3 percent reference value under normal
cyclical fluctuations. In EU budgetary surveillance this
threshold value for budget balances is referred to as
‘minimal benchmark’.
The estimation of minimal benchmarks require two
ingredients. First, a measure of the impact that cyclical
fluctuations have on budgets. This is the budgetary sen-
sitivity (see previous section). Second, an estimate of a
‘representative output gap’ capturing by how much very
negative, but still likely cyclical conditions would bring
output below potential. Minimal benchmarks were esti-
mated by the Commission services in past years. How-
ever, no estimates were available for the new Member
States. Moreover, the updating of budgetary elasticities
and sensitivities for all Member States in 2005 (see pre-
vious section) required re-estimating minimal bench-
marks for EU-15 Member States as well.
On the basis of the new and updated values for budgetary
sensitivities, the Commission services computed a new
set of values for minimal benchmarks. On 26 October
Table II.5
New and updated budgetary elasticities
Personal tax
(1)
Corporate tax
(2)
Social 
contributions
(3)
Indirect taxes
(4)
Elasticity of 
revenues
(5)
Elasticity of 
expenditure
(6)
BE 1.09 1.57 0.80 1.00 1.00 – 0.16
CZ 1.19 1.39 0.80 1.00 0.99 – 0.02
DK 0.96 1.65 0.72 1.00 1.00 – 0.30
DE 1.61 1.53 0.57 1.00 0.97 – 0.27
EE 0.80 1.40 0.70 1.00 0.88 – 0.05
EL 1.80 1.08 0.85 1.00 1.07 – 0.04
ES 1.92 1.15 0.68 1.00 1.09 – 0.16
FR 1.18 1.59 0.79 1.00 0.98 – 0.12
IE 1.44 1.30 0.88 1.00 1.14 – 0.16
IT 1.75 1.12 0.86 1.00 1.17 – 0.04
CY 2.10 1.50 0.70 1.00 1.14 – 0.02
LV 0.90 1.30 0.70 1.00 0.89 – 0.05
LT 0.90 1.40 0.70 1.00 0.90 – 0.03
LU 1.50 1.75 0.76 1.00 1.14 – 0.04
HU 1.70 1.44 0.63 1.00 1.02 – 0.03
MT 2.20 1.40 0.40 1.00 1.04 – 0.02
NL 1.69 1.52 0.56 1.00 1.01 – 0.42
AT 1.31 1.69 0.58 1.00 0.96 – 0.08
PL 1.00 1.39 0.69 1.00 0.91 – 0.17
PT 1.53 1.17 0.92 1.00 1.08 – 0.09
SI 1.40 1.50 0.70 1.00 0.96 – 0.13
SK 0.70 1.32 0.70 1.00 0.88 – 0.04
FI 0.91 1.64 0.62 1.00 0.92 – 0.21
SW 0.92 1.78 0.72 1.00 0.94 – 0.19
UK 1.18 1.66 0.91 1.00 1.10 – 0.05
Euroarea 1.48 1.43 0.74 1.00 1.04 – 0.15
EU-5 1.39 1.48 0.75 1.00 1.04 – 0.16
EU-10 1.29 1.40 0.67 1.00 0.96 – 0.06
EU 25 1.35 1.45 0.72 1.00 1.01 – 0.12
Source of elasticity parameters: Girouard and André (2005) for OECD Member States, Commission services for non-OECD Member States.118
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computed by the Commission services but invited the
EPC to carry out further methodological work to explore
the ways indicated by the Commission on possible meth-
odological improvements compared with the current
method.
The concept of minimal benchmark
Budget balances are affected by cyclical fluctuations
through the effect of automatic stabilisers. Since in the
EU fiscal framework the 3 percent reference value for
deficits needs to be respected even in the event of
adverse cyclical developments (with the possible excep-
tion of ‘severe downturns’ enabling the use of the
‘exceptional circumstances’ clause in the excessive def-
icit procedure), automatic stabilisers can be allowed to
play freely over the cycle without breaching the 3 per-
cent reference value only when the structural fiscal posi-
tion incorporates a sufficient cyclical safety margin.
With a view to provide Member States with an indication
on the minimal structural budgetary position consistent
with a sufficient safety margin, the Commission intro-
duced in 2000 the concept of ‘minimal benchmark’ (see
European Commission (2002, 2000).
Graph II.12 an illustration provides a graphical illustra-
tion of the role and functioning of minimal benchmarks.
The thin curve is the output gap, while the bold continu-
ous curve is the general government balance. If a struc-
Table II.6
New and updated budgetary sensitivities
Sensitivity of revenues Sensitivity of 
expenditure Budget sensitivity
Budget sensitivity used 
up to September 2005
BE 0.47 – 0.07 0.54 0.62
DE 0.40 – 0.11 0.51 0.48
EL 0.42 – 0.01 0.43 0.42
ES 0.38 – 0.05 0.43 0.40
FR 0.44 – 0.06 0.49 0.41
IE 0.36 – 0.05 0.40 0.32
IT 0.49 – 0.02 0.50 0.44
LU 0.48 – 0.01 0.49 0.60
NL 0.39 – 0.17 0.55 0.64
AT 0.43 – 0.04 0.47 0.29
PT 0.41 – 0.04 0.45 0.35
FI 0.41 – 0.09 0.50 0.66
Euro area 0.42 – 0.06 0.48 0.47
DK 0.50 – 0.15 0.65 0.77
SE 0.48 – 0.10 0.58 0.68
UK 0.40 – 0.02 0.42 0.49
EU-15 0.43 – 0.06 0.49 0.51
CZ 0.36 – 0.01 0.37 n.a.
EE 0.29 – 0.01 0.30 n.a.
CY 0.38 – 0.01 0.39 n.a.
LV 0.26 – 0.02 0.28 n.a.
LT 0.26 – 0.01 0.27 n.a.
HU 0.45 – 0.01 0.46 n.a.
MT 0.36 – 0.01 0.37 n.a.
PL 0.33 – 0.06 0.40 n.a.
SI 0.39 – 0.05 0.44 n.a.
SK 0.27 – 0.02 0.29 n.a.
EU-10 0.33 – 0.02 0.36 n.a.
EU-25 0.39 – 0.05 0.44 n.a.
Source: Commission services.119
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2 0 0 6tural position in line with the minimal benchmark (dot-
ted bold horizontal line) is maintained the budget
balance oscillates in line with the output gap around the
minimal benchmark. Even when the cyclical conditions
are particularly negative, as assumed in the Graph, the
budget balance would be above the -3 percent referent
value without the need to carry out a discretionary
adjustment.
Although, before the 2005 SGP reform, countries were
expected to achieve over the medium term a budgetary
position close-to-balance-or-in-surplus, without refer-
ence to country-specific considerations relating to mini-
mal benchmarks, compliance with minimal benchmarks
was systematically assessed by the Commission in the
context of the analysis of the SCPs.
After the 2005 reform of the SGP medium-term budgetary
objectives will be differentiated across countries, inter
alia for what concerns the respect of a safety margin
against the breach of the 3 percent reference value for def-
icits. Minimal benchmarks in the new system provide
therefore key information for the determination of MTOs.
Updating the values for minimal benchmarks
In Autumn 2005, estimates for minimal benchmarks
have been updated by the Commission for the EU-15
Member States and computed for the first time for New
Member States. These new figures have been used
already in EU budgetary surveillance, notably in the
preparation and assessment of the 2005 vintage of Sta-
bility Programmes.
The minimal benchmark is calculated in two steps. First,
a cyclical safety margin against the 3 percent ceiling is
calculated by multiplying the budgetary sensitivity by a
‘representative output gap’, which captures the value of
the output gap that would realize under particularly
weak, yet still typical, cyclical conditions. In the second
step, the minimal benchmark itself is obtained by
deducting the safety margin from the 3 percent deficit
ceiling. Hence, the computation of the minimal bench-
marks requires, for each Member State: (i) an estimate of
the budgetary sensitivity to output fluctuations; (ii) the
identification of a ‘representative output gap’ for partic-
ularly weak cyclical conditions.
The EPC OGWG has recently updated its estimates of
the budgetary elasticities for EU-15 Member States and
computed for the first time those for new Member States
(see previous section). The identification of a ‘represent-
ative output gap’ for particularly weak cyclical condi-
tions is based on the analysis of past cyclical develop-
ments in the EU. The data used for the computation of
the representative output gap are obtained by applying
the reference ‘production function’ method for the esti-
mation of potential output and output gaps adopted by
the Council on 12 July 2002.  
Graph II.12:  Minimal benchmarks: an illustration
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EU 15 countries, while the available output gap data for
the New Member States starts in 1995 at the earliest. The
‘representative output gap’ for each Member State is cal-
culated as the simple average of the highest and lowest
of the following three alternatives:
i. The largest negative output gap observed for each
country in the period considered.
ii. The unweighted average of the largest negative out-
put gaps in each country observed in the period.
iii. Two times the country-specific standard deviation
of the output gap taken with minus sign (1).
Note that criterion ii. above considers information per-
taining not only to the country concerned but to the
whole sample of output gap data. The reason is that, in
past years, some economies may have experienced
structural changes that have modified their standard
cyclical pattern. A way to overcome this problem is to
complement country-specific information with infor-
mation embedded in series of other countries, on the
ground that output gap series of EU Member States
have similar properties and that there are elements of
the cycle that are common across countries.
Table II.7. reports synthetic statistical indicators for the out-
put gap data for each EU Member States (mean, minimum,
maximum values, standard deviations). The variation
across countries of minimum values for output gaps high-
lights the need of eliminating possible ‘outliers’ from the
sample, i.e., output gap observations exhibiting exception-
ally high or low values that are likely to correspond to par-
Table II.7
The output gap series for the EU-25 Member States: synthetic indicators (starting year see table, end year 2004)
Starting year Min Max Average Standard deviation
BE 1980 – 3.7 2.0 – 0.7 1.6
CZ 1997 – 4.6 – 0.3 – 2.3 1.4
DK 1980 – 4.3 3.0 – 0.6 1.8
DE 1991 – 1.3 3.9 0.2 1.6
EE 1995 – 7.6 1.0 – 2.1 3.0
EL 1980 – 4.2 3.0 – 1.1 2.0
ES 1980 – 5.0 2.3 – 1.8 2.2
FR 1980 – 2.9 2.0 – 0.5 1.5
IE 1980 – 4.9 5.2 – 0.2 2.6
IT 1980 – 2.4 3.1 0.1 1.5
CY 1995 – 1.9 1.9 0.0 1.2
LV 1995 – 3.2 1.3 – 0.9 1.5
LT 1995 – 5.3 2.0 – 2.1 2.6
LU 1982 – 5.9 5.8 – 0.2 3.3
HU 1995 – 1.0 2.2 – 0.3 0.9
MT 1995 – 2.3 4.7 0.1 2.1
NL 1980 – 3.7 3.3 – 0.5 1.8
AT 1980 – 3.0 2.5 – 0.3 1.5
PL 1995 – 4.2 0.1 – 1.5 1.4
PT 1980 – 7.5 4.3 – 0.8 3.2
SI 1997 – 1.7 1.2 – 0.1 0.9
SK 1996 – 2.2 0.3 – 1.0 0.9
FI 1980 – 7.9 6.9 – 0.3 3.3
SE 1980 – 6.6 2.8 – 1.5 2.3
UK 1980 – 3.9 4.1 – 0.4 2.0
Simple averages
EU-25 .. – 4.1 2.7 – 0.7 1.9
EU-15 .. – 4.5 3.6 – 0.6 2.2
EU-10 .. – 3.4 1.4 – 1.0 1.6
Euro area – 4.4 3.7 – 0.5 2.2
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ When output gaps are normally distributed, about 95 percent of the obser-
vations fall within the range of two times the standard deviation around the
mean. Thus, since the average value of output gaps is theoretically close to
zero, only about 2.5 percent of the observations fall below a value of the
output gap equal to -2 times the standard deviation. 121
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fluctuations and which will hardly be repeated in the future.
The sample of output gaps used to calculate the repre-
sentative output gap was therefore re-defined in such a
way to exclude all observations below and above,
respectively, the 2.5 percent and the 97.5 percent per-
centiles of the distribution of output gaps for the sample
including all EU Member States. Table II.7 also shows
that, on average over the sample, new Member States
have less negative minima for their output gaps than
EU-15 countries as well as smaller standard deviations.
These differences are due to a large extent to the shorter
time series available for the new Member States and are
likely to bias upward the estimation of ‘representative
output gaps’ for these countries.
Table II.8 reports the updated minimal benchmarks. The
minimal benchmarks for all countries result to be nega-
tive (meaning that a moderate structural deficit would be
compatible with absence of risks of breaching the 3 per-
cent deficit ceiling under normal cyclical fluctuations),
while positive values were found in few cases in the pre-
vious computations. The simple average of minimal
benchmarks across the EU-15 is -1.2, as opposed to an
average of -1 in the previous computations. This revision
is due to both to revised representative output gaps and
to changes in the budgetary sensitivities. It is also to
notice that the minimal benchmarks for the new Member
States are in general considerably less ambitious than
those of EU-15 Member States. This is to some extent
the result of less negative representative output gaps, but
also the consequence of smaller budgetary sensitivities
(see Table II.5 in the previous section).  
4.4. Recent developments in the 
governance of budgetary statistics
This section summarises recent developments in relation
to the governance of budgetary statistics in the EU. It is
an update of information provided on this topic on the
2003 and 2005 editions of this report (1).
This chapter places the discussions on the governance of
budgetary statistics as a component of the reform of the
Stability and Growth Pact (section 4.4.1) and summa-
rises recent changes in the legal text governing the pro-
vision of deficit and debt statistics for the implementa-
tion of the SGP (4.4.2).
Moreover, it summarises progress concerning the
availability of fiscal statistics, with a specific emphasis
on quarterly statistics (4.4.3), and describes some
developments on the governance of statistics in gen-
eral, a topic that goes much beyond, but have a direct
impact on, fiscal statistics (4.4.4). The final section
(4.4.5) concludes.
4.4.1. Statistical governance reform is part 
of the SGP reform
The long and in-depth discussions on the governance of
budgetary statistics in EU reflect the increasing percep-
tion that high-quality budgetary statistics constitute the
basic infrastructure of a rule-based fiscal framework.
Low-quality fiscal statistics, or more generally poor
macroeconomic statistics, may lead economists to draw
wrong conclusions about the behaviour of economic
agents and result in misguided choices by policy-
makers.
The effectiveness of fiscal rules depends on the quality 
of statistics
To be enforceable, fiscal rules require fiscal statistics
which are timely, accurate, relevant and reliable; more-
over, the credibility and transparency of fiscal surveil-
lance depends much on the credibility and transparency
of the underlying statistics. Therefore, the debates on the
governance of budgetary statistics over the last two years
– in particular since the call for action by the Ecofin
Council of 2 June 2004 – should be seen as an integral
part of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact.
In its Communication of 3 September 2004 (2), which
initiated the reform of the SGP, the Commission recog-
nised that ‘the implementation of the fiscal framework
and its credibility (…) relies on the quality, timeliness
and reliability of fiscal statistics’ and that ‘an improved
monitoring (…) of the reported data’ was necessary.
Moreover, the Ecofin Council Report ‘Improving the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’ of
21 March 2005, which was endorsed by the European
Council of 22 and 23 March 2005, devoted a full section
¥1∂ See Chapter II-4 –The governance of budgetary statistics in EMU in the
2003 edition and box II-2 – Strengthening the governance of budgetary
statistics in the 2005 edition.
¥2∂ ‘Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact’, COM(2004) 581.122
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to ensure that national statistical institutes and Eurostat
have sufficient resources and capabilities and to put in
place adequate safeguards so as guarantee their inde-
pendence, integrity and accountability for the production
of high-quality statistics.
4.4.2. Legislative changes related to reporting of 
deficit and debt levels
On 12 December 2005, the Council adopted a regulation
amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 on the notifica-
tion of deficit and debt data (1).
Table II.8
Updated values of the minimal benchmarks for the 25 EU Member States
Budget 
Sensitivity to the 
cycle
Max negative 
output gap
- 2*std. dev. of 
the output gap
Average of the 
largest negative 
output gap 
across EU-25
Representative 
output gap:
0.5min[(2),(3),
(4)]+0.5max[(2),
(3),(4)]
Minimal 
benchmark
Minimal 
benchmark, 
old value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=-(1)*(5)-3
BE 0.54 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 1.1 – 0.7
DE 0.51 – 1.3 – 2.4 – 3.5 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.6
EL 0.43 – 4.2 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 1.3 – 1.7
ES 0.43 – 5.0 – 4.4 – 3.5 – 4.2 – 1.2 – 1.5
FR 0.49 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 1.4 – 1.7
IE 0.40 – 4.9 – 4.6 – 3.5 – 4.2 – 1.3 – 1.3
IT 0.50 – 2.4 – 3.0 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 1.5 – 1.5
LU 0.49 – 4.3 – 4.5 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 0.8 0.1
NL 0.55 – 3.7 – 3.6 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 1.0 – 0.7
AT 0.47 – 3.0 – 3.1 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 1.5 – 2.1
PT 0.45 – 4.5 – 4.6 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 1.1 – 1.2
FI 0.50 – 3.8 – 3.4 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 1.1 0.8
Euro area 0.50 – 3.6 – 3.7 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 1.3 – 1.1
DK 0.65 – 4.3 – 3.6 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 0.5 – 0.8
SE 0.58 – 4.9 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 4.2 – 0.6 – 0.8
UK 0.42 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 3.5 – 3.7 – 1.4 – 1.4
EU-15 0.50 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 1.2 – 1.0
CZ 0.37 – 4.6 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 3.7 – 1.6 n.a.
EE 0.30 – 4.0 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 2.0  n.a.
CY 0.39 – 1.9 – 2.5 – 3.5 – 2.7 – 1.9  n.a.
LV 0.28 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 2.1  n.a.
LT 0.27 – 4.9 – 5.1 – 3.5 – 4.3 – 1.8  n.a.
HU 0.46 – 1.0 – 1.8 – 3.5 – 2.2 – 2.0  n.a.
MT 0.37 – 2.3 – 3.1 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 1.8  n.a.
PL 0.40 – 4.2 – 2.9 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 1.6  n.a.
SI 0.44 – 1.7 – 1.8 – 3.5 – 2.6 – 1.9 n.a.
SK 0.29 – 2.2 – 1.8 – 3.5 – 2.7 – 2.2  n.a.
EU-10 0.40 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 3.5 – 3.1 – 1.9 n.a.
EU-25 0.40 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.4 – 1.5 n.a.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 (OJ No L 337, 22.12.2005, p. 1).123
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2005, which had already been shortly described and
commented in last year’s Public Finances in EMU
report. While the final legal text adopted by the Council
kept the main thrust of the Commission proposal, a
number of differences should be noted.
Postponement of reporting deadlines…
Following a proposal by the Council, the reporting date
for deficit and debt figures was postponed by one month,
that is, from 1 March and 1 September to 1 April and
1 October, respectively. This move in the reporting
deadlines intends to better align the reporting of govern-
ment deficit and debt levels with the availability of other
related statistics, such as the detailed government reve-
nue and expenditure accounts, the government financial
transactions and financial balance sheets, as well as with
the transmission of quarterly government accounts (on
the availability of quarterly government accounts, see
below 4.4.3). Therefore, the new reporting dates should
contribute to improve the consistency and completeness
of government statistics.
…will contribute to improve the reliability of data
Moreover, the extension by one month of the time lag for
the compilation of the first outcome of government
Box II.4: Alternative methods for computing minimal benchmarks
Minimal benchmarks have been computed using alternative methods both by international organisations and academic
economists. In spite of notable differences among the various approaches followed, results are remarkably similar.
Among the first estimates of minimal benchmarks were contained in OECD (1997) and IMF (1998). These approaches
were analogous to that of the European Commission, but simpler and more direct. In OECD (1997) different hypothesis
are made regarding the representative output gap in weak cyclical conditions. The alternatives considered are – 1, – 2
and – 3 percent of potential output. These output gap figures are in turn multiplied by the budgetary sensitivity to the cycle
to obtain the cyclical safety margin and then the minimal benchmark for budget balances. In case of a representative output
gap of – 3 percent the estimated minimal benchmarks appear broadly in line with those obtained using the Commission
method. In IMF (1998), the method followed is that of choosing as representative output gap of each country the min-
imum output gap observed over the previous three decades. Results lead to minimal benchmarks ranging between
– 0.5 percent of GDP and – 1.5 percent for most countries, dispersed around a simple average of – 1 percent.
Some analyses, rather than using ex-post information to infer which minimal benchmark should be kept by countries to
avoid a breach of the 3 percent reference value for deficits, adopt an ex ante approach, based on model simulations. A
further distinction can be made between the papers that base simulations on estimated structural VARs and the work
carried out via macro models. In both cases the approach followed is that of providing random shocks to the model and
deriving which level of the starting budget balance guarantees the respect of the 3 percent ceiling with a pre-determined
level of statistical confidence. Dalsgaard and de Serres (2000) construct a structural VAR for 11 euro-area countries and
show that for most countries minimal benchmarks between -1 percent and -1.5 percent would avoid breaching the 3 per-
cent limit for deficits over a three year period with a 90 percent degree of statistical confidence. Artis and Onorante
(2005) perform a similar exercise on a structural VAR estimated on quarterly data and identified along the same lines
as Dalsgaard and de Serres, but define the benchmarks probability values on the basis of the ‘exceptional circumstances’
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. They estimate minimal benchmarks for the ‘pre-2005-refom Stability and Growth
Pact ranging around budget balance positions, while minimal benchmarks for the ‘reformed’ Stability and Growth Pact
consist of deficits slightly above 1 percent for most countries.
An indirect assessment of minimal benchmarks on the basis of stochastic simulations with the applied NiGEM macro
model of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research is found in Dury and Pina (2003). The objective of analy-
sis is to assess the probability of breaching the 3 percent reference value for deficits and incurring into sanctions under the
SGP under the assumption that the budgetary commitments of EU countries incorporated in their first vintage of Stability
programmes are respected. The analysis considers 10 euro area countries (all bar Greece and Luxemburg). This means
assuming structural budget balances averaging – 1.9 percent in the first programme year (1999) and declining towards
– 0.8 percent in the following years of the programme. The simulations show that cases of a 3 percent breach would have
been very rare should countries have stuck to their commitments. This evidence also indirectly proves that deficits in the
range assumed in the simulation could have served as effective minimal benchmarks.124
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critical dimensions of government quality, notably
reliability (1). Given the fundamental objective of the
excessive deficit procedure, namely of promptly identi-
fying situations of excessive deficit and of putting an end
to them, the first budgetary outcomes are those that
really matter for the procedure. Revisions often arrive
too late to be of relevance in the implementation of the
fiscal surveillance. As a result, revisions in deficit and
debt data – more than the revision of other macroeco-
nomic statistics – may be detrimental for the credibility
of the EU fiscal framework and raise issues of equal
treatment among Member States, though experience
indicates that, for most countries, data revisions are rel-
atively small. The extension of the reporting deadlines
by one month is all the more revealing of the importance
of reliable and consistent government accounts as it goes
against the trend for improving the timeliness of other
macroeconomic statistics in the EU, such as GDP growth
or HICP. As proposed by the Commission, the revised
regulation also established the Member States’ obliga-
tion of informing the Commission of any major revision
in deficit and debt data occurring between the statutory
deadlines, in particular when these revisions imply defi-
cit and debt figures in excess of the Treaty reference
values.
Assessment of data quality
As in the Commission proposal, the regulation adopted
by the Council maintains a key role for Eurostat in
assessing the quality of data reported by Member States
– the topic which was the leitmotiv of the amended reg-
ulation. Eurostat’s powers to check compliance of
reported data with accounting rules were in this way
strengthened (2).
According to the Commission proposal of March 2005,
the assessment of the quality of government accounts
would take place in dialogue visits and in in-depth mon-
itoring visits, both of which should be carried out
regularly in all Member States. While the former are
designed to review reported data and examine methodo-
logical issues, the latter would monitor the processes and
accounts underlying the reported data, thus allowing
detailed conclusions on the compliance with accounting
rules, completeness, reliability and consistency of statis-
tics. In the final text adopted by the Council, the dialogue
visits remained as in the Commission proposal, but the
in-depth monitoring visits (renamed methodological vis-
its) became exceptional — ‘in cases where substantial
risks of potential problems with the quality of data are
identified’ — rather than a regular feature of the quality
assessment.
The Council adopted the Commission proposals that
strengthen the Eurostat’s role in the provisions of data
for fiscal surveillance. In particular, the amended regula-
tion establishes that data for the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure are provided by Eurostat,
and that the latter has the right of unilaterally amending
the data compiled by a Member State and of publicly
raising reservations to the quality of statistics.
Transparency and integrity
The Council adopted the Commission proposals aimed
at strengthening the transparency of government
accounts with no substantial changes. This covers the
public availability of inventories describing the methods,
procedures and sources used by Member States for the
compilation of government finance statistics, the publi-
cation by Member States of the tables reported to the
Commission, and the publication by Eurostat of regular
reports on the quality of data reported by Member States,
notably after each dialogue and methodological visit.
The regulation also requires Member States to put in
place mechanisms that ensure that data reported are
compiled with a number of statistical principles and that
national officials responsible for the production of statis-
tics abide by these principles, notably impartiality.
Clarification of accounting rules ex post and ex ante
Concerning the interpretation of rules for the accounting
recording of government expenditure and revenue, and
their application to complex cases, the Council estab-
lished a distinction between the accounting of past trans-
actions and guidance on the appropriate accounting
treatment of planned government measures. As to the
former, the amended regulation strengthens and clarifies
a long-standing procedure involving Eurostat and the
Committee on monetary, financial and balance of pay-
ment statistics (CMFB). Whenever there are doubts on
how to apply the accounting rules to complex transac-
¥1∂ Reliability denotes how statistical series are revised after their first publi-
cation; the more reliable series are those for which the first outcome is
closer to final data. In the case of government accounts, final figures are
only published after four years, or even later.
¥2∂ However, not all the elements included in the original proposal by the
Commission aimed at enhancing the data quality checking function of
Eurostat were taken on board in the amending regulation 2103/2005.125
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sultation of the CMFB. The committee opinion itself is
prepared by technical discussions in dedicated task-
forces and working groups which involve the statistical
authorities of all Member States. This procedure ensures
that the final decision is widely shared among the EU
statistical community, that is is based on technical con-
siderations only and that all viewspoints have been duly
taken into account. Simple cases can be solved bilater-
ally between Eurostat and the concerned Member State.
However, to ensure accountability and multilateralism,
Eurostat should inform the other Member States of
issues solved without consulting the CMFB.
The clarification of the appropriate treatment of planned
government measures is not dealt with by the amended reg-
ulation. However, the Ecofin Council of 8 November 2005
acknowledged that a timely clarification of accounting rules
was essential to facilitate effective fiscal planning and fore-
casting. The Council invited the Commission to reflect on
establishing procedural guidelines for the supply of
accounting guidance on planned measures, with the aim of
maximising the certainty of the guidance provided by Euro-
stat to Member States before the latter implement their fis-
cal policy measures.
The Eurostat’s procedural guidelines on ex ante account-
ing guidance have already been discussed by the CMFB
and the Economic and Financial Committee in spring
2006 and are expected to be endorsed by the Ecofin
Council later in the year.
4.4.3. Progress in the availability of budgetary 
statistics
Quarterly government expenditure and revenue
In April 2006, Eurostat started the dissemination of data
on the quarterly government deficit (1), revenue and
expenditure, as well as quarterly financial accounts (2)
for most Member States. This publication is a milestone
in a long process initiated in 1998 when the first discus-
sions on the compilation of government accounts with a
quarterly frequency started. Quarterly data on taxes,
some social benefits and government debt have already
been available for some time for most countries.
Although the implementation of the SGP and EDP will
and should remain on an annual basis — most notably
because the government budgets are adopted by the
political institutions of each country with a yearly fre-
quency — quarterly statistics will be an important tool
for fiscal and economic analysis. They will provide early
indications of budgetary developments allowing Mem-
ber States’ policy-makers to better react whenever any
deviation vis-à-vis the plans occur within the year, and
the EU institutions to better assess fiscal efforts put in
place in each country. Infra-annual budgetary statistics
should also help to better understand the interaction
between fiscal developments and the economic activity.
However, quarterly statistics require a specifically care-
ful interpretation, as they are less reliable – i.e. they are
subject to larger revisions – than annual data, and are
more volatile from one period to the next (3).
Statistics on the functional classification 
of government expenditure
Concerning the availability and use of budgetary statis-
tics, one should also mention the increased attention
given by both data compilers and policy analysts to the
functional classification of government expenditure. The
functional classification of government expenditure —
which consists at a breakdown of expenditure according
to ten categories (4) — is more and more considered an
appropriate framework to assess and compare develop-
ments in the quality of public expenditure (5). This is
reflected in the inclusion of statistics on government
expenditure by function in the stability and convergence
programmes. Moreover, the national statistical institutes
and Eurostat are currently working to improve the qual-
ity of these figures, in particular concerning their further
harmonisation and availability of detailed breakdowns.
4.4.4. Institutional reform
Independence, integrity and accountability 
of the national statistical authorities
In a parallel development which concerns all official sta-
tistics, though it also has an impact on budgetary statis-
tics, there have been discussions on the independence,
¥1∂ However, a few Member States — notably France and Germany — do not
yet allow publishing quarterly deficits for the ongoing year.
¥2∂ Financial accounts cover below-the-line transactions, that is, the accumu-
lation and decumulation of financial assets and liabilities.
¥3∂ Notably, quarterly government accounts for most countries are not yet sea-
sonally adjusted.
¥4∂ These ten categories are general public services; defence; public order and
safety; economic affairs; environmental protection; housing and commu-
nity amenities; health; recreation, culture and religion; education; and
social protection.
¥5∂ For most countries, these data are available 12 months after the end of the
reference year.126
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institutes and of Eurostat.
On 24 February 2005, the director generals of the national
statistical institutes and of Eurostat, gathered at the Statis-
tical Programme Committee (SPC), unanimously adopted
a European Statistics Code of Practice (1). This code of
practice includes fifteen principles, notably professional
independence of data compilers, statistical confidentiality,
impartiality and objectivity, accuracy, reliability and time-
liness of data and adequacy of resources of statistical insti-
tutes.
The code also contains a set of indicators associated to
each of these principles which will facilitate reviewing
the implementation of the Code. The Commission for-
mally recommended that Member States recognise the
European Statistics Code of Practice as a common set of
standards for statistical authorities in the EU (2).
The Commission is setting up a reporting system to mon-
itor adherence to the Code of Practice among the
national statistical authorities, but also by Eurostat. In
this context, the Ecofin Council of 8 November 2005
reiterated that the independence and credibility of Euro-
stat stems from its competence and operational capacity.
The Council proposed the creation of a high-level advi-
sory body to enhance the independence, integrity and
accountability of Eurostat and of the national statistical
authorities. This new body, which should draw up an
annual report on the respect of the European Statistics
Code of Practice should be composed by a small group
of independent and competent persons and chaired by an
influential and well-regarded person. A formal Commis-
sion proposal on this issue is expected very soon.
4.4.5. Conclusion
This section described developments in the governance
of statistics which have direct implications for the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. Although the interest in the govern-
ance of budgetary statistics – that is on the accounting
principles, rules, procedures and behaviour of institu-
tions on the compilation and publication of fiscal indica-
tors – was sparked by episodes of large revisions in the
deficit and debt figures concerning a very limited
number of countries, such debate is welcome and is, in
fact, indispensable.
The implementation of the SGP has shown that the effec-
tiveness of fiscal rules depends much on the quality of
the underlying government finance statistics, and that
these depend to a great extent on their governance. By
moving the emphasis from a single indicator to a more
reasoned analysis of the budgetary position of Member
States, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact has
even reinforced the need for high-quality statistics, that
is statistics which are accurate, reliable, timely, consist-
ent across time and among countries, transparent and
which are compiled by credible institutions.
As discussed previously, over the last months, several
developments have contributed to improving the quality
of budgetary statistics: notably the reinforcement of the
Eurostat powers and responsibility in checking the qual-
ity of fiscal data reported by Member States, the publica-
tion of budgetary statistics with an infra annual fre-
quency, as well the establishment of minimum standards
for of the institutional set up of national and European
statistical authorities.
¥1∂ The European Statistics Code of Practice can be downloaded from: http://
epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_DS_QUALITY/
TAB47141301/VERSIONE_INGLESE_WEB.PDF.
¥2∂ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to
the Council and Recommendation on the independence, integrity and
accountability of the national and Community statistical authorities
(COM(2005) 217 of 25 May 2005).127
5. New long-term budgetary projections 
and improvements of the analysis of the 
long-term sustainability of public finances
5.1. Introduction
In the analysis of long-term sustainability of public
finances in view of the budgetary challenge posed by age-
ing populations, long-term projections of government
budgetary items are crucial. The recently completed long-
term budgetary projections have been conducted with
commonly agreed assumptions and methods for a wide
range of budgetary items (pensions, healthcare, long-term
care, education and unemployment benefits). In the con-
text of EU multilateral budgetary surveillance, such pro-
jections need to be comparable across countries in order to
ensure a consistent treatment and analysis of long-term
budgetary trends and challenges in the different Member
States. The new long-term projections therefore represent
an important improvement of the analysis of public
finance sustainability at EU level.
With regard to the analysis of public finance sustainability in
the context of the assessment of the annual updates of stabil-
ity and convergence programmes, some improvements were
introduced in the latest assessment round. First, a decompo-
sition of the sustainability indicators has been introduced,
which enables the analysis of whether risks to public finance
sustainability mainly come from the short-term or long-term
budgetary developments. Second, a new sensitivity test has
been introduced. It shows the supplementary budgetary cost
that arises if an adjustment that ensures sustainable public
finances is made in the future rather than today. In other
words, it illustrates the ‘cost of delay’.
5.2. The 2005/06 long-term projections of 
age-related expenditure for the EU-25
A new set of age-related expenditure projections for all
EU-25 Member States has just been completed. The pro-
jections, based on a new population projection provided
by Eurostat, cover pensions, healthcare, long-term care,
education and unemployment transfers for the period
2005 to 2050. As part of the exercise, projections have
also been made for the labour force and GDP growth
potential up to 2050.
The projections have been prepared together by the
Commission (DG ECFIN) and the Member States within
the Ageing Working Group of the EPC, a group estab-
lished in 1999.
Successive European Councils have recognised the need
to address the implications of ageing populations at
European level. In particular, by agreeing that ‘the
Council should regularly review the long-term sustaina-
bility of public finance, including the expected strains
caused by the demographic changes ahead’. Following
the indications of the European Council, the Commis-
sion and the Council now examine the long-term sustain-
ability of public finance as part of the annual surveil-
lance exercise, reflecting a broadening of the scope of
public finance issues covered in the stability and conver-
gence programmes, and the increased emphasis on
medium to long-term sustainability issues.
The new projections provide a much more comparable,
transparent and robust basis for assessing the budgetary
implications of demographic change and the sustainabil-
ity of public finances across Member States, which are a
major element in the reformed Stability and Growth Pact
in view of establishing appropriate budgetary plans. The
new age-related expenditure projections are a key input
to the reinforced analysis of the sustainability of public
finances in the EU. Specifically, the Ecofin Council
stressed in its report of 20 March 2005 that in the surveil-128
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E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c elance of budgetary positions, sufficient attention should
be given to debt and sustainability so as to safeguard the
sustainability of public finances in the long run, and that
the link between longer-term sustainability concerns and
medium-term budgetary planning needs to be strength-
ened.
Europe’s population will be older in 2050, with a much
smaller population of working age. This is due to fertility
rates remaining below the natural replacement rate and
continuous increases in life expectancy which are only
partially offset by inward migration. From an economic
perspective, the most important development concerns
the working-age population (15 to 64), which is pro-
jected to drop by 48 million (16 percent), between 2004
and 2050. In contrast, the elderly population aged 65+
will rise sharply by 58 million (77 percent). Europe will
go from having four to only two persons of working-age
for every elderly citizen (see Graph II.13.)
Despite higher employment rates, the number of
employed persons will eventually fall and act as a drag
on growth. The labour force projection shows that the
overall employment rate would rise from 63 percent in
2003 to the 70 percent Lisbon employment rate target in
2020. The increase is mainly due to higher female
employment rates as older women retire and are replaced
by more economically active younger women. Notwith-
standing this, the decline in the size of the working age
population will eventually dominate. After increasing by
Graph II.13:  Age pyramids for EU-25 population  
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2 0 0 6some 20 million between 2004 and 2017, total employ-
ment in the EU-25 is thereafter projected to contract by
almost 30 million by 2050, a fall of nearly 10 million
over the entire projection period.
Potential GDP growth is therefore projected to decline.
For the EU-15, the annual average potential GDP growth
rate would fall from 2.2 percent in the period 2004-10 to
1.8 percent in the period 2011-30, and to 1.3 percent
between 2031 and 2050. An even steeper decline is fore-
seen in the EU-10 Member States, from 4.3 percent in
the period 2004-10 to 3 percent in the period 2011-30
and to 0.9 percent between 2031 and 2050. Moreover,
the sources of economic growth would alter dramati-
cally. Employment will make a small positive contribu-
tion to growth up to 2010, become neutral in the period
2011-2030, and turn significantly negative thereafter.
Over time, labour productivity will become the domi-
nant, and in some countries the only, source of growth
(see Graph II.14). These GDP growth projections rest on
several assumptions, including projected demographic
developments, labour force developments and on
assumptions regarding the structural unemployment rate
and labour productivity growth.
Overall, the projections show that Europe faces a signifi-
cant budgetary challenge posed by ageing populations.
Most of the projected increase in public spending will be
on pensions, healthcare and long-term care, becoming
apparent as of 2010 and with the largest increases in
spending projected to take place between 2020 and 2030.
Public spending on pensions will significantly rise, but
there is a very large diversity across countries. In five
Member States, it is projected to decrease, while in nine
countries the increase is projected to be over 5 percent-
age points of GDP. The potential offsetting savings in
terms of public spending on education and unemploy-
ment benefits are likely to be limited (see Table II.9).
The projections confirm the validity of the Lisbon strat-
egy and the need to vigorously pursue measures that
raise labour supply/utilisation and enhance productivity.
Successfully implementing such measures, in line with
achieving the Lisbon strategy, would imply raising
potential GDP growth rates, with positive consequences
for future living standards as well as for the long-term
sustainability of public finances. Indeed, in many coun-
tries, substantial benefits could be reaped by reducing
structural unemployment further. Even if the EU reaches
the Lisbon employment target as projected, significant
pools of unused labour will remain. For example, while
the EU as a whole is projected to meet the 70 percent
employment target by 2020, the euro area would only do
so by 2035. Moreover, even with the significant pro-
jected increase in the employment rates of older workers
by 2025, the average exit age from the labour market
would be 62 despite life expectancy increasing to well
over 80 for most persons.
The projections confirm the large potential benefits of
pension reform, especially measures which extend work-
Graph II.14:  Potential growth rates and their determinants (employment/productivity)  
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E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eing lives. Higher levels of employment does not per se
lead to lower public spending on pensions since it leads
to the accumulation of additional pension entitlements.
However, raising employment is unequivocally welfare
enhancing. It strengthens the financial sustainability of
pension systems, delays the start of expenditure rises,
increases contributions to pension schemes, and can gen-
erate additional budgetary savings if higher employment
results from lower unemployment and less early-retire-
ment. In addition, the projections indicate that pension
reforms linking retirement age and pension benefits to
life expectancy can reduce pension spending signifi-
cantly.
The projections show that the recent pension reforms are
helping to address the challenge of ageing. They provide
concrete evidence that recent pension reforms in half of
all EU-15 Member States are helping to raise the effec-
tive retirement age and are curtailing the impact of age-
ing on pension systems. In recent pension reforms, some
Member States have introduced a link between life
expectancy at retirement and pension benefits and these
measures appear to achieve a better sharing of demo-
graphic risk.
The three-pronged strategy to deal with the economic
and budgetary challenge of ageing needs to be pursued.
Firstly, Member States need to achieve and sustain
sound underlying budget positions and to run down pub-
lic debt at a faster pace: reducing public debt can contrib-
ute to the financial sustainability of social security
schemes in the long run. Moreover, sound public
finances are a prerequisite for low interest rates and high
and stable growth. Secondly, there is a need to raise
employment rates, especially amongst women and older
workers, and appropriate steps should be envisaged to
raise labour supply, including the better management of
economic migrants. Thirdly, appropriate reforms are
required of pension, healthcare and long-term care, to
ensure that they are financially viable in the face of age-
ing while at the same time securing core policy goals of
adequacy and access. The three-pronged strategy there-
fore supports and complements the Lisbon strategy inso-
far as raising employment rates and running sound
macro- and micro-economic policies are conducive to
growth.
In the coming months, a fuller assessment of the sustain-
ability of Member States’ public finances should be car-
ried out using these budgetary projections in line with
the new code of conduct on the Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes. Further analysis is needed to
achieve a comprehensive understanding of the new pro-
jection results, and in particular to get clearer insights of
the key driving factors for each Member States and the
impact on public finances sustainability.
The February 2006 Ecofin Council adopted conclusions
among others inviting the Commission to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the sustainability of Mem-
ber States public finances by the end of 2006. The new
common long-term budgetary projections will be used as
the basis in this report.
5.3. Improvements of the analysis of the 
long-term sustainability of public 
finances
The approach used at EU level to assess the long-term
sustainability of public finances is based on a compre-
hensive assessment including elements of both quantita-
tive and qualitative nature. This approach enables the
formulation of an overall assessment of the degree of
budgetary challenge that ageing populations represent in
the different Member States and to identify the main
driving factors of this challenge.
In the 2005/06 assessment round of stability and conver-
gence programmes, Member States were classified in three
categories in the Council Opinions: low risk / medium risk
/ high risk. This is a change compared with last year, when
the Member States were divided in four categories in the
Council Opinions: favourable position, relatively favour-
able position, at some risks, at (serious) risks.
This new risk categorisation involves:
• recognising that ageing population represents a
budgetary challenge for all countries, albeit to vary-
ing degrees;
• providing a clear distinction between the different
degrees of risks to public finance sustainability
countries are facing.
The assessment of the long-term sustainability of public
finances including the overall classification of risks to
public finance sustainability is given in Part I of this
report. In the following two sections, two improvements
that were introduced in the 2005/06 assessment round of
the stability and convergence programmes are described.131
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Based on the long-term budgetary projections and a set
of assumptions, sustainability gap indicators are calcu-
lated. They provide an indication of budgetary adjust-
ment required for a Member State to reach a sustainable
public finance position over the long term as measured
by the different definitions used. The two main indica-
tors are called the S1 and S2 indicators.
The S1 indicator shows the difference, the sustainability
gap, between the constant revenue ratio as a share of
GDP required to reach a debt ratio in 2050 of 60 percent
of GDP and the current revenue ratio (1). It is possible to
decompose S1, which is shown in equation 1.
The S2 indicator shows the difference, the sustainability
gap, between the constant revenue ratio as a share of GDP
that guarantees the respect of the inter-temporal budget con-
straint of the government, i.e. that equates the actualized
flow of revenues and expenses over an infinite horizon, and
the current revenue ratio. In this case, the budgetary adjust-
ment is such that no other reform would be needed to ensure
long-term sustainability. As for the S1 indicator it is pos-
sible to decompose S2, shown in equation 2.
A decomposition of the indicators has been introduced in
the 2005/06 assessment round. It now separates the pure
impact of ageing (i.e. the impact of the rise in age-related
expenditure on the indicators) and the impact of the ini-
tial budgetary position (mainly the distance between the
actual structural primary balance from the long-term
debt-stabilising primary balance) (2).
This distinction reveals whether risks to public finance
sustainability mainly come from the current budgetary
situation or from the projected future budgetary trends in
the Member States. Age-related expenditures are pro-
jected to rise in nearly all Member States over the long-
term, which implies that difficult policy choices will
have to be made. In general, countries may rely on either
primarily a budgetary consolidation strategy to offset the
future increase in spending or on a reform strategy aim-
ing at curbing the long-term trend in spending, or on a
combination of the two. This is an important policy deci-
sion and the sustainability gap indicators and their
decomposition provide interesting information on the
scale of adjustment that is required to ensure sustainable
public finances over the long-term.
The formal decomposition of the S1 and S2 indicators is
shown in equations 1 and 2, respectively.
(1)
where:
  = gross government debt (including pension funds
assets) at date t relative to GDP;
  = structural primary balance, i.e. cyclically-
adjusted primary balance net of one-off and temporary
measures at date t relative to GDP;
 = change in structural primary balance;
, relative to GDP
  = difference between nominal interest rate and nom-
inal GDP growth rate (3).
The first term (A) is a condition concerning the initial
budgetary position. The debt/GDP ratio increases by the
difference between the nominal interest rate and the
nominal growth rate. Should the initial structural pri-
mary balance exactly compensate for this increase, the
debt/GDP ratio would remain stable and no adjustment
would be necessary. However, if the initial structural pri-
mary balance is not sufficient, the debt/GDP ratio would
be on an explosive path and the sustainability gap would
be positive.
¥1∂ The sustainability gap indicators (S1, S2) do not necessarily suggest that
taxes should be increased; strengthening the fiscal position by permanently
reducing the level of non-age-related primary spending could be preferable
and has the same impact. 
¥2∂ In the case of S1, the decomposition also separates the impact of the debt
position (60 percent of GDP in 2050). In particular, if the current debt/
GDP ratio is below 60 percent of GDP debt is allowed to rise and this com-
ponent reduces the sustainability gap as measured by the S1 indicator, and
vice versa.
¥3∂ The GDP growth assumptions set up in the AWG varies over time in line
with development of labour supply while the real interest rate is set at 3
percent for the entire projection period, implying a non-constant discount
rate. For presentational purposes, the formulae here (S1 and S2) are given
under the assumption that the differential between nominal interest rate
and nominal GDP growth rate is constant. A complete description of the
case with non-constant discount rate is given in Annex 12 of ‘The impact
of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States
on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment
transfers (2004-2050)’, European Economy, Special Reports No 1, 2006.
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2 0 0 6The S1 indicator is set so that (adjusted) government debt
will converge towards 60 percent of GDP at the end of the
projections period: this is ensured by the second term (B).
Finally, the third term (C) calculates the discounted aver-
age of the future (up to 2050) changes in the structural
primary balance compared with the base year. This is the
impact of the, in nearly all countries, projected increase
in age-related expenditure as a share of GDP over the
long-term.
(2)
Concerning the S2 indicator, the first term (D) in equa-
tion (2) is the same as (A) for S1 in equation (1): it
ensures that the debt/GDP ratio remains constant, what-
ever its initial level: there is therefore no constraint on
the level of debt. The second term (E) is very similar to
the term (C) for S1 except that it takes into account
changes in the structural primary balance compared with
the base year over an infinite horizon rather than up to
2050.
The cost of delay in closing the sustainability gap
The timing of implementing a policy that results in sus-
tainable public finances over the long-term has medium-
term budgetary consequences. In order to illustrate this,
a sensitivity test was introduced in the latest assessment
round of the stability and convergence programmes. The
‘cost of delay’ is the difference between the size of the
sustainability gap if it is closed at time t via a fiscal
adjustment and its size if it is closed instead at time t+5,
i.e. with a delay. It was calculated on the basis of the both
the S1 and S2 sustainability gaps (1).
The application of the sensitivity test may be illustrated
by an example. Assume that a country is facing a sustain-
ability gap of 3 percent of GDP at time t. The fiscal
adjustment that results in sustainable public finances is
thus 3 percent of GDP. Assume further that the fiscal
adjustment instead is made 5 years later. The sustainabil-
ity gap in t+5 is instead 3.3 percent of GDP, reflecting
the fact that additional interest payments will have had to
be made over these five years. This is illustrated in
Graph II.15 which shows that budgetary savings can be
made if a consolidation of public finances is made
sooner rather than later.
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¥1∂ A complete description of the sensitivity test is given in Annex 13 of ‘The
impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Mem-
ber States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unem-
ployment transfers (2004-2050)’, European Economy, Special Reports
No 1, 2006.
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Part III
National numerical fiscal rules 
and institutions for sound public finances

Summary
The economic literature has provided abundant analysis
on how taxes, government expenditures and budget bal-
ances should be set over the business cycle for fiscal pol-
icy to be considered optimal and sustainable. However,
experience has shown that such policies were in practice
not always pursued by policymakers. Some of the most
evident signs have been the tendency to conduct pro-
cyclical fiscal policies and the large increase of debt
ratios in a number of developed economies. The debate
on the ways to favour sound fiscal policies has focused
on the need to rebalance the incentives of policy-makers
or impose constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy via
the introduction of adequate fiscal rules and institutions.
At EU level, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) impose budgetary obligations on
Member States. In order to ensure the respect of objec-
tives, both of them also stress the importance of national
rules and institutions for budgetary discipline. In partic-
ular, the report on the SGP reform endorsed by the Euro-
pean Council on 22 March 2005 states that national
budgetary rules should be complementary to the Mem-
ber States’ commitments under the Stability and Growth
Pact and that national institutions could play a more
prominent role in budgetary surveillance to strengthen
national ownership, enhance enforcement through
national public opinion and complement the economic
and policy analysis at EU level. The importance attached
to national fiscal rules and institutions in the reformed
SGP reflects the consensus among Member States that
appropriate national fiscal rules and institutions could
provide the basis for sound and sustainable budgetary
developments and contribute to the respect of the objec-
tives of the EU fiscal framework.
This chapter focuses on national numerical fiscal rules
and independent institutions which may influence fiscal
policy-making (e.g. ‘fiscal councils’). It exploits the
results of surveys which review the rules and institutions
in force in the 25 EU Member States and assesses
whether these arrangements have an effect on budgetary
outcomes. The definition of ‘fiscal rules’ follows that
proposed by Kopits and Symanski (1998), i.e. a perma-
nent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a
summary indicator of fiscal performance. Numerical fis-
cal rules therefore specify numerical targets or limits for
key budgetary aggregates such as annual budget balance,
expenditure, revenue, or debt. The ‘independent institu-
tions’ covered by the analysis are the national bodies,
primarily financed by public funds, other than govern-
ment and Parliament, which can be considered as
functionally independent, and which regularly provide
independent inputs, analysis, assessments or recommen-
dations in the area of fiscal policy. The questions related
to the desirable characteristics of the budgetary process,
which have already been extensively addressed in the lit-
erature, are outside the scope of this chapter.
The analysis of the survey on numerical fiscal rules leads
to the following conclusions:
• The number of rules in force in EU Member States
has increased continuously over the past twenty
years. This tendency has been accompanied by an
interesting evolution in terms of the government
sub-sectors covered by rules. While in the early 90s
fiscal rules were mostly applied to territorial (local
and regional) governments, a relatively recent fea-
ture has been the development of fiscal rules for the
whole of the general government sector and the
social security sub-sector. This may be a response to
the increasing spending pressures in the social secu-
rity sector and to the introduction of the EU fiscal
rules, which impose requirements for the general
government deficit and debt.
• The characteristics of the numerical fiscal rules in
place vary depending on the sub-sector to which
they apply. Most of the numerical rules applied to
regional and local governments are enshrined in a
legal text or constitution, while rules applying to the
central government or the whole of the general137
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coalition agreements or political commitments.
Similarly, while rules for regional and local govern-
ments seem to have relatively strong enforcement
mechanism, rules applying to general and central
governments generally do not envisage ex ante
defined actions in case of non-compliance. Another
interesting finding appears when taking into account
the type of budgetary governance, namely the dis-
tinction between the so-called contract and delega-
tion countries (1). Both sets of countries have a
similar number of numerical fiscal rules. However,
contract countries have more numerical fiscal rules
applied to central government and social security
sectors while delegation countries have a higher
number of fiscal rules implemented at regional and
local level.
• Statistical and econometric exercises suggest the
existence of a link between numerical rules and
budgetary outcomes. A preliminary descriptive
analysis of data shows two interesting results.
Firstly, the primary CAB on average improved in
the years following the introduction of fiscal rules
while it remained broadly stable over the period
under consideration (1990-2005). Secondly, pri-
mary government expenditure adjusted for the cycle
tend to grow more slowly in the years following the
introduction of numerical expenditure rules.
• When enriching the analysis by taking into account
the coverage and characteristics of fiscal rules and
by controlling for various factors that may affect
government budget balance and developments in
primary expenditure (debt ratio, cyclical condi-
tions), the presumption of a link between numerical
fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes is strengthened.
The analysis suggests that an increase in the share of
government finances covered by numerical fiscal
rules leads, ceteris paribus, to lower deficits or
higher surpluses. In the case of expenditure rules, it
appears that an increase in the coverage of govern-
ment finances by expenditure rules leads to a reduc-
tion in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The
analysis also suggests that the characteristics of fis-
cal rules matter for their influence on budgetary out-
comes. Strong rules, enshrined in law or constitution
and foreseeing automatic enforcement mechanisms,
seem to have a larger influence on budgetary out-
comes.
The main conclusions of the analysis of the survey on
national independent institutions can be summarised as
follows:
• Institutions having the characteristics of an inde-
pendent fiscal institution (or ‘fiscal council’) exist in
fifteen EU countries, thirteen of them being former
EU-15 Member States. Interestingly, and contrast-
ing with the results of the survey on fiscal rules,
most of the institutions in place were created a long
time ago, and there is no visible tendency towards
the development of such institutions in the EU.
There is a great deal of variety in the type of institu-
tions in place. Two major categories of institutions
can be distinguished: (i) institutions in charge of
providing forecasts or/and conducting positive
analyses on fiscal policy issues; and (ii) institutions
issuing normative statements and recommendations
on the conduct of fiscal policy.
• As regards the activity of forecasting, in ten EU
countries there is at least one independent institution
that produces macroeconomic or budgetary fore-
casts on a regular basis, against which the official
projections can be assessed. In most cases, however,
the government remains free to use its own mac-
roeconomic forecasts for the preparation of the
budget. There are, in the whole EU, only three
exceptions to this rule. The basis for the forecast to
be used for the budget preparation differs: in two
cases, there is no formal obligation for the govern-
ment, while there is a legal requirement in the third
case. There are in the EU sixteen institutions con-
ducting independent analysis on fiscal policy devel-
opments. Most of them also regularly issue
recommendations in the area of fiscal policy. In
almost all cases, there is no formal obligation for the
government to follow the recommendations of the
independent institution. According to the replies to
the survey, independent institutions issuing fiscal
policy recommendations mainly influence decisions
through their effect on the public debate and reputa-
tion costs.
¥1∂ Delegation countries tend to centralise their budget process by delegating
powers to a strong Minister of Finance. They generally have single-party
governments or government coalitions of ideologically aligned parties. In
contrast, contract or commitment countries usually present governments
with a larger political dispersion. Different parties and ministries take part
in the negotiation process leading to an agreement (a ‘contract’) on a set of
key fiscal objectives. In theory, contract countries are expected to show a
greater number of fiscal rules than delegation countries (see Box III.1 for
more details). 138
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by the study on the conduct of fiscal policy is by
nature a complex exercise. However, combining
descriptive analysis, the result of existing empirical
studies and the answers to the questionnaires, a
number of conclusions on the possible contribution
of such institutions to fiscal discipline can be drawn.
First of all, delegation of the forecasting activity
seems to be an efficient way to address possible
optimistic biases in macroeconomic projections.
Secondly, the institutions in place seem to have had
a considerable impact on the public debate. In most
of the cases, forecasts or recommendations issued by
independent institutions benefit from large media
coverage and the analysis undertaken by the institu-
tions are generally considered above or well above
standards. The survey also provides evidence that
recommendations formulated by the institutions
covered by the study have an influence on fiscal pol-
icy developments. There is notably a perception that
such institutions have contributed to fiscal disci-
pline.
Overall, the empirical analysis in this part of the report
confirms the influence of national fiscal rules and insti-
tutions in determining budgetary outcomes. It underlines
the relevance of well-designed national fiscal rules and
appropriate institutional fiscal frameworks to ensure
sound fiscal policies and the respect of the objectives of
the EU fiscal surveillance.139
1. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) impose budgetary obligations on the Member
States. In order to facilitate the respect of these obliga-
tions, both of them also stress the importance of national
rules and institutions for budgetary discipline. The Pro-
tocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the
EU Treaty states that Member States shall ensure that
national procedures in the budgetary area enable them
to meet their obligations in this area deriving from this
Treaty. The report on the SGP reform endorsed by the
European Council on 22 March 2005 states that national
budgetary rules should be complementary to the Mem-
ber States’ commitments under the Stability and Growth
Pact and that national institutions could play a more
prominent role in budgetary surveillance to strengthen
national ownership, enhance enforcement through
national public opinion and complement the economic
and policy analysis at EU level.
The importance attached to national fiscal rules and
institutions in the reformed SGP is not fortuitous. Recent
economic history provides evidence that policymakers
do not always pursue time consistent and sustainable fis-
cal policies: the tendency to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal
policies and the recent increase of debt ratios in a number
of developed economies point to the existence of a defi-
cit bias. The explanations for this bias generally point to
the consideration that policymakers may not have the
right incentives to pursue sound public finances in the
long run. In this context, a number of proposals have
been put forward with the intention of modifying
national fiscal frameworks that form the environment,
the incentives and the constraints under which policy-
makers operate, in a way that would foster the conduct of
sound fiscal policies.
The proposals concerned notably (i) the procedural rules
laid down in law or constitution governing the elabora-
tion and implementation of the annual budget law;
(ii) the numerical fiscal rules which are guiding or
imposing constraints on the discretion of policy-makers;
and (iii) national independent institutions, other than
government and Parliament, possibly influencing fiscal
policy.
This chapter reviews the numerical fiscal rules and the
independent bodies or institutions in force in the 25 EU
Member States and assesses their influence on budgetary
developments. The questions related to the desirable
characteristics of the budgetary process have already
been extensively addressed in the literature and are out-
side the scope of this chapter. The aim of the analysis is
not to make an overall judgment on the quality of
national budgetary rules and institutions in the EU coun-
tries. The study should therefore not be read as a plea per
se in favour of particular arrangements, since there is no
single best institutional framework that would be suit-
able for all countries.
The first section provides empirical evidence on the
existence of a deficit bias in the EU countries and other
developed economies. It discusses the main reasons for
the existence of such a bias and some possible ways to
address it. The second section is devoted to the analysis
of numerical fiscal rules in the EU Member States and
their impact on budgetary developments. The analysis is
based on a new dataset providing a comprehensive over-
view of existing numerical fiscal rules in the EU. The
third section focuses on the existing independent bodies
and institutions playing a role in the conduct of fiscal
policy, either by providing inputs for the conduct of fis-
cal policy (e.g. forecasts on which budgets are based),
conducting analysis on budgetary developments, or issu-
ing normative statements or recommendations in the
area of fiscal policy. Compared to fiscal rules, it is more
difficult to analyse and reach firm conclusions on the
effectiveness of fiscal institutions by means of statistical
tools, in part because the institutional arrangements dif-
fer considerably from one country to another. The analy-
sis is therefore supported by illustrative case studies on
the reality of selected countries.140
2. Rationale for the introduction 
of numerical fiscal rules and independent 
institutions at national level
2.1. Introduction
The economic literature has provided abundant analy-
sis on how taxes, government expenditures and budget
balance should be set over the business cycle for fiscal
policy to be considered optimal and sustainable. How-
ever, experience has provided ample evidence that
such policies were in practice not always pursued by
policy-makers. Some of the most evident signs have
been the tendency to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies and the propensity to finance public expenditure
with debt in a number of industrialised economies. The
debate on the ways to address the deficit bias has
focused on the need to rebalance incentives of policy-
makers and impose constraints on the conduct of fiscal
policy, via the introduction of adequate fiscal rules and
institutions. This section first provides empirical evi-
dence for the existence of a deficit bias in most of
developed economies (considerations related to the
conduct of pro-cyclical policies are addressed in Part 4
of this report). Next, the main explanations for the
existence of such a bias mentioned in the literature are
reviewed. Finally, proposals for limiting or eliminat-
ing the deficit bias are examined.
2.2. The deficit bias in perspective
When looking at fiscal developments in a long-term
perspective, it appears that episodes of protracted
departure from budgetary balance have been rather
uncommon in the history. Up to the first oil price shock,
budgetary deficits were almost exclusively related to
war episodes and were typically corrected promptly
(see European Commission, 2004). The picture
changed from the 70s onwards, when sustained deficits
not related to exceptional public finance needs as dur-
ing war periods were recorded in the most advanced
economies.
The propensity to finance public spending with debt has
become an increasing source of concern in Europe. As
illustrated in Graph III.1 below, in the last thirty years
the general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio has
been increasing rapidly in the EU. In countries like Ger-
many and France, for example, debt ratios – not debt lev-
els – more than tripled over the last three decades. Even
if most EU governments started to shift gear during the
1990s with the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty and
the run-up to EMU, deficit and debt levels remain high
in a number of EU countries (1).
In the absence of policy measures, government deficits
and debt will further increase in the medium and long
term. In most of EU countries, governments made in the
past long-term welfare expenditure commitments which,
against the background of demographic changes, i.e. low
birth rates and longer life expectancy resulting in popu-
lation ageing, may lead to unsustainable government
finances. The recent long-run projections of the Com-
mission (see Graph I.22) show that, under unchanged
policies, the debt ratio could follow an explosive path in
most EU countries due to the large amounts of implicit
liabilities that Member States have accumulated and
continue to build up. In light of this challenge, address-
ing the causes for the deficit bias is a major and urgent
challenge in a number of EU countries.
¥1∂ For instance, in 2005, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 107.5 percent of GDP
in Greece, 106.4 percent in Italy, 93.3 percent in Belgium, 67.7 percent in
Germany and 66.8 percent in France. 141
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short-term horizon of policy-makers
2.3.1. Explanations for the deficit bias
The reasons for the conduct of undesirable fiscal policies
leading to persistent deficits have been addressed exten-
sively in the economic literature. Most explanations are
based on political economy considerations related to the
short-term horizon of policy-makers, which in turn leads
to time-inconsistent fiscal policies.
The electoral cycle and voters’ fiscal illusion
A first possible explanation for the existence of a deficit
bias is related to the fact that individuals (voters) tend to
see the short-term benefits they can get from lower taxes
and increased government spending but are not always
fully aware of the possible long-term costs of such
policies (1). This ‘fiscal illusion’ would notably explain
why governments conducting policies leading to high and
unsustainable deficits are not always punished by voters.
Instead, voters’ behaviour would provide incentives for
opportunistic politicians to improve their chances to be re-
elected through the implementation of unfinanced tax
reductions or expenditure increases (2). This can also
result in asymmetric fiscal policy over the cycle, since
governments generally get more support for implement-
ing expansionary fiscal policies during downturns than for
consolidating government finances in upturns (3).
An alternative argument why voters would not punish
excessive lending has to do with intertemporal redistri-
bution. The generation that is alive today may prefer
leaving the burden of debt to future generations while
taking advantage of today’s lower taxes and higher pub-
lic spending. Since the current generation is the only one
that votes, such preferences may provide incentives for
undesirable policies from a society point of view.
Short-term strategic behaviour of political parties
Another explanation for the deficit bias is based on the
influence of strategic actions of political parties. Several
authors (see notably Persson and Svenson, 1989) argued
that the behaviour of political parties that are likely to alter-
nate in office can feed the deficit bias. For instance, gov-
ernments with little chances of being re-elected may be
tempted to run deficits and accumulate debt in the course
Graph III.1:  Developments in the debt ratio in the main industrialised regions since 1970
N.B.: Data for EU are the weighted average by all the old 15 Member States, data for BE are available since 1971, for DK since 1971, for NL since 1975 
and for PT since 1973 
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¥1∂ See Alesina and Perotti (1994) and papers of the ‘public choice’ school
(Buchanan (1959), Buchanan and Wagner (1977), Buchanan and Tullock
(1962)).
¥2∂ Persson and Tabellini (1998) showed that taxes are generally cut before
elections and that painful fiscal adjustments are postponed after elections.
Buti and van den Noord (2004) put in evidence the role of electoral cycles
in explaining budgetary developments. 
¥3∂ While electoral cycles and ‘fiscal illusion’ have so far been widely
accepted as explanatory elements for the deficit bias, this view has been
challenged by recent research. See notably Brender and Drazen (2006).142
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engaging in ambitious programmes or in activities incon-
sistent with the priorities of the administration currently in
power (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). As a result, the larger
the probability of an electoral defeat for the administration
in power and the larger the difference in preferences
between parties, the larger the deficit bias may be (Calm-
fors, 2005). This explanation might be particularly relevant
for those countries experiencing a high political unrest.
Fragmented governments and the common pool problem
Another part of literature has studied the influence of
voting rules and political systems on budgetary out-
comes. Roubini and Sachs (1988) argued that the extent
of dispersion of political power among different parties
in the government could explain part of the rising spend-
ing pressures that appeared in the 70s and 80s. At that
time, the growing strains on public budgets were not
associated to demographic factors but to pressures exer-
cised by different groups of interest through political
parties. The theoretical underpinning of this explanation
draws on the ‘common pool’ problem, which arises
when several players representing different interest
groups bargain on the allocation of public resources with
the view to satisfy their own base. Each actor tends to
maximise appropriation, without internalising the over-
all budget constraint (Hallerberg and Von Hagen, 1999).
In the absence of a clear delegation of powers to a strong
Finance Minister (delegation approach) or of prelimi-
nary agreements or pacts within the cabinet (contract
approach) to decide on budgetary allocations in a cen-
tralised manner, this situation can lead to a deficit bias.
2.3.2. Recent economic and political developments 
might have strengthened those elements 
behind the deficit bias
Most of the possible explanations for the deficit bias
described above were already valid a long time ago. How-
ever, as previously seen, the deficit bias has gained con-
siderable strength from the 1970s onwards. This suggests
that a number of recent political and economic develop-
ments have had an influence on the deficit bias (1).
Lower potential growth, the size of the public sector and 
globalisation
The increase in the deficit bias has coincided with decel-
erating growth rates in most advanced economies and an
increase in the size of the public sector reflecting the
involvement of governments in a growing number of
economic activities (e.g. the production of goods and
services) and the extension of the welfare state (see
Graph III.2) (2). The higher expenditure associated with
the increasing demand for public services were not
always matched by similar increases in revenues. This
can be explained by the potential economic and electoral
costs of raising an already high tax burden in an integrat-
ing world economy in which certain tax bases have
become more mobile. Obviously, this does not entail a
causality relationship between the size of the govern-
ment and the deficit bias; some countries show simulta-
neously sizeable public sector and sound fiscal positions.
This only suggests that large public sectors might favour
those elements behind the deficit bias. 
The role of monetary unions
The incentives for the conduct of unsound fiscal policies
may also be stronger in a monetary union (Weale, 2004).
In flexible exchange rate regimes, the negative effects of
unsustainable or pro-cyclical fiscal policies have a direct
negative impact on the country concerned (e.g. through
higher real interest rate and lower growth prospects) (3).
In a monetary union, the effects of an expansionary fiscal
policy on economic growth may be larger than would be
the case in absence of monetary union because there is
little crowding out of private investment and consump-
tion due to the partial interest rate response. In addition,
the adoption of a common currency eliminates the
exchange rate risk and the associated interest rate risk
premia among the participant countries, thus weakening
the discipline and signalling function normally exerted
by financial markets (4). In the long term, if excessive
¥1∂ Political changes occurred during the twentieth century could also partially
explain why those elements behind the deficit bias have gained strength. It
is broadly recognised that policy-making in democratic systems is associ-
ated to an inherent deficit bias largely due to the elements described in sec-
tion 2.3.1. As democratic regimes extended through most of industrialised
countries those factors linked to the electoral cycle and ‘selfish generation’
may have had an increasing influence on the deficit bias.
¥2∂ Explanations for the growing size of public sectors over the last decades
point to a wide range of possible causes: from the Wagner’s Law and Bau-
mol disease theories to interpretations arguing that the expansion of the
public sector mostly stemmed from economic policy decisions reflecting
changing perceptions about the role of the government. In line with this
reasoning, Rodrik (1998) argues that trade openness and market integra-
tion experienced in recent decades may help explain the rising burden on
public budgets caused by public social expenditure, subsidies and trans-
fers. The degree of exposure to international competition would increase
the demand for insurance against external shocks and more open econo-
mies would have larger public sectors. This might have bolstered the ten-
dencies towards time inconsistent fiscal policies and led to a higher deficit
bias (Annet, 2005).
¥3∂ Obviously, such policies would also have negative effects in fixed
exchange rate regimes. 143
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inflationary pressures or even, in the extreme, to a risk of
default, the implications in terms of monetary policy and
financial stability may be shared by all the members of
the union.
2.4. How can the deficit bias be addressed?
The debate on the ways to address the deficit bias has
focused on the need to rebalance the incentives of policy-
makers and/or to impose constraints on the conduct of
fiscal policy. A commonly accepted view is that budget-
ary governance structures should provide sufficient
information and the right incentives for governments and
institutions concerned to interact in a way that favours or
ensures sound fiscal policies.
Institutional settings at national level can play an impor-
tant role in containing spending and deficit biases. These
settings include in particular (i) the procedural rules of
the budgetary processes, i.e. the process laid down in
law or constitution governing the elaboration of the
annual budget law; (ii) the numerical fiscal rules which
are guiding or imposing constraints on the discretion of
policy-makers; and (iii) the independent bodies or insti-
tutions in charge of providing inputs (forecasts, analysis)
and formulating recommendations in the area of fiscal
policy.
As mentioned in the introduction, the questions related
to the desirable characteristics of the budgetary process
are outside the scope of this chapter. The main findings
of the literature on this issue are summarised in
Box III.1. Procedural rules of the budget process and
budgetary outcomes. The following sub-sections focus
on the role of numerical fiscal rules and independent
institutions, other than government and Parliament,
which may have an influence on the conduct of fiscal
policy.
2.4.1. Numerical fiscal rules
A simple way to promote or ensure the implementation
of time-consistent policies is the introduction of numer-
ical fiscal rules. Such rules can be defined in many dif-
ferent ways. They can for instance introduce limits on
the deficit or debt of entities of the general government
sector (budget balance and debt rules), on a yearly basis
or on average over a given period. Alternatively, they
can impose constraints on some categories of govern-
ment expenditure or tax revenues (expenditure and reve-
nue rules). A detailed typology and review of the prop-
erties of different types of fiscal rules is included in
section 3.2 of this chapter.
Graph III.2:  Developments in the debt ratio in the main industrialised countries and in the EU 
over the last 30 years
N.B.:  Data for EU are the weighted average by all the old 15 Member States, data for BE are available since 1971, for DK since 1971 for NL since 1975 and
for PT since 1973 
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¥4∂ This can be seen in developments of euro area government bond yields,
which point to a narrowing of spreads across countries.144
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rules, if enshrined in constitution or law and having strict
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, can impose
binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy, and
thereby directly contribute to fiscal discipline. The influ-
ence of numerical fiscal rules based on political commit-
ments or informal agreements between different tiers of
general government is more indirect. Such rules provide
guiding principles for the conduct of fiscal policy and
benchmarks against which it can be assessed. Apart from
their influence on the deficit bias, numerical fiscal rules
can also positively contribute to policy coordination
between different levels of government, help mitigate
uncertainty as to future government actions and, if prop-
erly designed, contribute to improving the quality of
public finances.
Numerical fiscal rules are also subject to a number of
drawbacks. Notably, they may be ineffective if they are
not backed by strong political commitment or if they are
not complemented by domestic budgetary institutions
ensuring an appropriate monitoring and enforcement
(von Hagen and al., 2005). Other well-known criticisms
are that numerical fiscal rules do not easily allow dealing
with unexpected circumstances, changes in the eco-
nomic situation and preferences. For instance, some cat-
egories of fiscal rules may hamper the stabilisation func-
tion of fiscal policy (e.g. some types of balanced budget
rules). Several authors (see notably Wyplosz, 2002a)
also argued that rules tend to be rigid and artificial (set-
ting arbitrary debt or deficit limits) and that they can be
easily circumvented, e.g. through creative accounting.
As argued by Kopits and Symanski (1998), there is
therefore a need to carefully consider the design of fiscal
rules (see also European Commission, 2005) (1).
2.4.2. Independent institutions, other than 
government and Parliament, influencing the 
conduct of fiscal policy
Another way to address the deficit bias is to complement
the existing national institutional framework by inde-
pendent public bodies designed to limit or ensure an
appropriate use of discretion in the conduct of fiscal pol-
icies. In principle, such bodies can contribute to improve
the conduct of fiscal policy in two different ways.
The first possibility would be to delegate part of fiscal
policy to an ‘independent fiscal agency’. There is cur-
rently no example of such ‘independent fiscal agency’
and their creation is not seriously envisaged anywhere.
However, a number of theoretical proposals, inspired by
the success of delegation of monetary policy to inde-
pendent central banks, were put forward by the
academia (2). 
According to these proposals, a number of fiscal policy
choices would be entrusted to a non-political body.
Wyplosz (2005) argues for instance that an independent
fiscal agency could be mandated to decide, every year,
on the general government balance to be targeted in the
Budget. The agency would set the target with the view to
achieve in the long run a debt ratio objective specified by
the Parliament. Whether there is a case for delegation of
part of fiscal policy to such independent institutions is
discussed more in depth in Box III.2.
The second possibility consists of institutions whose work
may contribute to improving the conduct of fiscal policy
in a more indirect way. These institutions, denominated as
‘Fiscal Councils’ in some pieces of literature, are not man-
dated to carry out any particular fiscal policy task (no del-
egation). Among other activities, they can ensure that fis-
cal policy is based on unbiased inputs (e.g. through the
provision of independent macroeconomic forecasts), pro-
vide analysis on fiscal policy issues (e.g. independent esti-
mates of the cost of policy measures; analysis of the sus-
tainability of government finances), and release regular
assessments and recommendations related to fiscal policy,
with the view notably to increasing ‘reputation costs’ for
the conduct of unsound policies.
These institutions differentiate from existing ‘think
tanks’, such as some private banks’ research depart-
ments, by the fact that they are primarily financed by
public funds. Specific arrangements (legal provisions,
appointment procedures…) are foreseen with a view to
ensuring a high degree of independence vis-à-vis politi-
cal authorities. As will be seen in section 4 of this chap-
ter, several institutions of that kind are already in force
in EU and other advanced economies and seem to have
contributed to the conduct of sound fiscal policies.
¥1∂ According to Kopits and Symanski (1998), eight criteria should be taken
into account when assessing the design of fiscal rules. Fiscal rules should
be well-defined (no ambiguous definitions and competence divisions and
clear escape clauses); there should be a transparent data reporting and
accounting conventions; rules should be simple and flexible (rules should
allow to deal with exceptional events). Rules should be adequate in rela-
tion to their final objectives, credible and enforceable. Finally, they should
be consistent internally and with other policy objectives and supportive of
structural reforms. ¥2∂ See notably Calmfors (2003) and Wyplosz (2005).145
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Economic literature has underlined the importance of the characteristics of the budgetary process to achieve a level
of aggregate expenditure consistent with overall macroeconomic constraints (see von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden
1994; Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Strauch and von Hagen 2000; Hallerberg 2004). The budget process is governed by a
number of procedural rules laid down in law or constitution. These rules establish the role of a limited number of partici-
pants which have to carry out their distinct tasks according to a specified timetable. A key element of the process is related
to the distribution of powers between the government and the legislative branch and within the executive. Other important
aspects concern which ministry has the agenda-setting power, how possible disputes between Ministries can be solved and
the amendment power of the Parliament.
Among the desirable characteristics of the budget system, comprehensiveness, transparency and reliability are par-
ticularly important. Comprehensiveness is ensured if the budget covers almost all of government transactions. In practice,
all public resources should be directed to a common pool from which expenditures are decided according to policy prior-
ities. In this context, the use of extra budgetary funds should be exceptional. Transparency is notably achieved through a
specification of the roles and responsibilities of all participants to the budget process and publication of reports at different
stages of the process (pre-budget report, infra-annual monitoring reports, end-year report on compliance with plans, audit
reports examined by Parliament). Finally, the budget plans are considered reliable if they are based on reasonable mac-
roeconomic projections and if new policies are assessed carefully and their future costs and implications taken into account
on a multiyear planning horizon.
Empirical research has looked at whether the key characteristics of the budget processes have an influence on bud-
getary outcomes. For example, the pioneering study by von Hagen (1992) builds an index that captures the degree of cen-
tralisation of the budget process. It covers the stages of: (i) budget formulation (including restrictions on the budget and
the relative position of the minister of finance vis-à-vis the spending ministers) (ii) budget approval (focusing on the degree
to which amendments in Parliament may increase the size of the budget) and (iii) budget implementation. Alesina et al.
(1999) considered three different dimensions: (i) fiscal constraints that may be conducive to fiscal discipline; (ii) hierar-
chical procedures and (iii) transparency of the procedures. Both studies found evidence of a statistically significant link
between the characteristics of the budgetary procedures and budgetary outcomes.
Centralisation of the decision-making in the budgetary process helps addressing the common pool problem. Several
authors underlined that a high degree of centralisation is necessary to ensure a comprehensive view of the budgetary impli-
cations of all spending requests, and that it forces participants to recognise the real costs and benefits of each spending
decision. Two main approaches to centralisation are generally identified (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999). Under the del-
egation approach a single policymaker, usually the finance minister, can significantly influence the budget process. Typ-
ically he is vested with agenda-setting power relative to other ministries in the preparation stage. He is responsible for
monitoring the implementation of the budget and can correct deviations from plans. In countries adopting the delegation
approach, the Parliament has generally a limited role in amending the cabinet’s proposals. In the contract approach all
ministries take part in a negotiation process leading to an agreement on a set of key fiscal figures and objectives, generally
in a medium-term perspective. The Finance Minister has strong monitoring and enforcement powers in the execution stage.
The Parliament has, in general, strong powers to amend the budget proposal.
The choice of the approach to centralisation depends on country-specific characteristics. Literature (Hallerberg and
Hagen 1999) has underlined that the ideal way for a country to address common pool problems (see section 2.3.1) depends
on its electoral system and the resultant degree of political dispersion of governments. Countries with an ideologically uni-
fied government (i.e. a one-party government or in which parties in government are close ideologically) generally rely on
the delegation approach. Countries in which the government is less unified ideologically generally rely on fiscal contracts
(e.g. coalition agreements). Several studies have shown that the approach followed by countries is also linked to their size
(see European Commission (2005) and Von Hagen et al. (2002)). Large EU Member States are mostly delegation coun-
tries. In practice, the classification of countries according to the approach chosen to centralise the budgetary process is not
always evident. Indeed, some countries combine features of both approaches (e.g. Denmark and Sweden), which compli-
cates the categorisation, and reforms of fiscal institutions may change the classification of some countries over time.146
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Numerical fiscal rules and independent institutions: 
complements or substitutes?
At first sight, independent institutions can be viewed as
an alternative to numerical fiscal rules since they also
aim at eliminating possible distortions in the conduct of
fiscal policy. However, in general, numerical fiscal rules
and institutions should not be seen as mutually exclu-
sives but rather as complements.
The existence of numerical fiscal rules reflecting the
main fiscal policy objectives of a country can help
specifying the mandate and facilitate the work of
independent institutions. Fiscal institutions, on their
side, can effectively contribute to an independent
Box III.2: Is there a case for delegating part of fiscal policy to independent institutions?
Proposals for delegating part of fiscal policy to independent institutions are generally inspired by the experience of
independent central banks. Like monetary policy, fiscal policy faces trade-offs between short- and long-term objectives
and is subject to time-inconsistency risks. Considering that delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks has
been an efficient way to address the adverse effects of electoral incentives, several authors support the creation of ‘inde-
pendent fiscal agencies’ that would be given responsibilities in the fiscal policy-making. Another relevant argument in
favour of delegation of fiscal policy to ‘independent fiscal agencies’ is that, compared to other possible ways to directly
address the deficit bias (e.g. implementation of strong numerical fiscal rules), reliance on independent institutions would
safeguard a high degree of judgment and discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy. Budgetary objectives could for instance
still be adjusted depending on cyclical circumstances and the desired degree of stabilisation of the economy.
Although so far no such independent institution with delegated fiscal tasks has been implemented, available litera-
ture provides a number of concrete proposals (see notably Calmfors, 2003; and Wyplosz, 2005). According to these
proposals, the mandate of the institution would include an overall objective (e.g. debt sustainability, stabilisation), set by
the government or the Parliament. This objective would have to be attained through intermediate short-term targets set by
the independent fiscal agency (e.g. a budget balance consistent with an ‘appropriate’ debt level or/and with stabilisation
purposes). Some proposals consider that the independent institution could also be given responsibilities for some fiscal pol-
icy instruments (e.g. control of some tax rates). Most of existing proposals foresee however that decisions on overall rev-
enues and expenditures plans and their composition should remain under the authority of elected politicians. Literature also
stresses that concrete features of independent fiscal institutions would vary depending on the country-specific characteris-
tics (e.g. nature of the fiscal problem, institutional and political setting etc.).
Literature proposes a number of criteria to gauge whether some degree of economic policy delegation from govern-
mental or political bodies to independent institutions would be desirable (see for instance Alesina and Tabellini
(2003)). First, there may be harmful distortions in policymaking caused by political considerations (e.g. electoral cycles).
Second, there must be a broad and stable consensus on what sound policy consists of. Without such a consensus, it would
be difficult to establish a mandate for which the independent body can be held accountable. Third, the delegated mandate
must not have any distributive consequences, since distributional decisions can be legitimately exercised only by elected
representatives (there is no stable consensus on the optimal degree of redistribution). Fourth, delegation should not lead to
a problem of policy coordination. If delegated policies are in conflict with other areas of policy that have not been dele-
gated, coordination difficulties might outweigh the benefits from delegation.
While these four criteria are broadly met by monetary policy, it is not the case for fiscal policy. It can be argued that
fiscal policy complies with the first criterion. Concerning the second criterion, the case is less simple than for monetary
policy. While for central banks price stability is the ultimate goal, fiscal policy has to deal with a trade-off between sus-
tainability and stabilisation (see Calmfors (2003) and Wyplosz (2002b)). As regards the third criterion, while monetary
policy (under low inflation regimes) is not primarily redistributive, almost all fiscal policy decisions have redistributive
consequences. Only if delegated fiscal policy tasks solely deal with budget balance and debt level targets while total
expenditure and revenues levels and their composition remain under the control of elected bodies, the redistributive effect
would be limited. Finally, the consequences of fiscal policy decisions on other policies (labour market, product market pol-
icies) are more likely to lead to policy coordination problems than in the case of monetary policy. Overall, considering that
most of the required criteria making advisable delegation of fiscal policy are not met satisfactorily, there seems to be no
strong case for fiscal policy delegation.147
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fiscal rules, thereby increasing the chances that rules
are respected. At the stage of budgetary planning and
implementation, independent institutions can provide
an assessment of whether budgetary plans and devel-
opments are in line with the rules. Ex post, independ-
ent institutions can increase the public accountability
of the government, e.g. by providing a critical assess-
ment of the reasons for possible non-compliance with
the rule.
Another reason why rules and institutions could com-
plement each other is that they potentially focus on dif-
ferent aspects of government finances. Numerical fis-
cal rules often apply to one sub-sector of the general
government and generally have a short to medium-term
orientation. On the contrary, independent fiscal institu-
tions potentially conduct analysis covering the whole
of government finances and may also consider the situ-
ation of government finances in a long-term perspec-
tive.
Consistency with the EU fiscal framework
The objectives of national fiscal rules and institutions
largely fit with those of the EU fiscal framework. Adequate
rules foster the attainment of sustainable budgetary posi-
tions and respect of the Treaty and SGP rules. Subject to
their design and targets, national fiscal rules may also help
preventing pro-cyclical loosening of the fiscal stance in
economic ‘good’ times, which is also in line with one of the
objectives of the 2005 reform of the SGP. However, com-
pliance with national fiscal rules does not necessarily secure
the respect of the EU fiscal rules. For instance, respect of
expenditure rules does not guarantee convergence of the
deficit towards levels consistent with the SGP, since this
also depends on developments on the revenue side.
National independent institutions can also contribute to
an effective functioning of the EU fiscal framework not
only by tackling the main sources of fiscal profligacy at
its roots but also by improving the knowledge and public
awareness about economic and budgetary developments
and raising reputation costs of non-compliance with the
EU fiscal framework.148
3. Numerical fiscal rules 
in the 25 EU Member States
3.1. Introduction
This section provides an overview of the numerical fiscal
rules in force in the EU Member States and assesses
whether these rules effectively influence budgetary out-
comes. The definition of ‘fiscal rules’ followed in this
chapter is that proposed by Kopits and Symanski (1998),
i.e. a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in
terms of a summary indicator of fiscal performance, such
as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt or a
major component thereof. What distinguishes a numerical
rule from the usual budget appropriations in the yearly
budget cycle is therefore that there should be a constraint
on one of the aggregates mentioned and that this constraint
should be permanent. Numerical fiscal rules specify
numerical targets for key budgetary aggregates such as
annual budget balance, expenditure, revenue, or debt.
This section first reviews the different types of numeri-
cal fiscal rules and their properties with respect to vari-
ous objectives assigned to fiscal policy. Then, it provides
a descriptive analysis of the numerical fiscal rules in
force in the EU Member States. Finally, the analysis
investigates the existence of a link between numerical
fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes.
3.2. Various types of numerical fiscal rules 
and their respective properties
The following broad categories of rules can be distin-
guished:
— Budget balance, borrowing and debt rules. Provided
that targets are properly set, respect of such rules
over time ensures the sustainability of government
finances. These rules have been criticised for possi-
bly introducing a pro-cyclical bias in the conduct of
fiscal policy. Common ways to address this problem
are to extend the time-horizon of the rule or exclude
the cyclically-sensitive items of the budget from the
rule coverage. Another well-known potential draw-
back is the risk that respect of these rules might be
achieved through cuts in the most productive
expenditure items (investment, R & D expenditure),
which may be less politically-sensitive. To avoid
this problem some items may be excluded from the
coverage of the rule (e.g. golden rules). However,
this can in turn lead to monitoring difficulties and
may facilitate circumvention of the rule.
— Expenditure rules. The main objective of these rules
is to ensure fiscal discipline through improved
expenditure control. Such rules directly target the
part of the budget that the government controls most
directly, making the authority responsible fully
accountable for the respect of these rules. Expendi-
ture rules can also be part of a strategy for redirect-
ing public expenditure according to the priorities of
the government by allowing increases above or
below baseline for specific components. They can
be instrumental in limiting the size of the govern-
ment and hardly prevent automatic stabilisers from
operating.
— Revenue rules can pursue different objectives. They
can notably be designed to limit the increase in the
tax burden or the size of the government, or on the
contrary to ensure a sufficient amount of revenues
for the government to finance its priorities. They can
also aim at avoiding the conduct of pro-cyclical pol-
icies by pre-defining the allocation of possible
higher-than-expected revenues.
Table III.1 below provides a review of the respective
properties of various ‘families’ of fiscal rules with
respect to different possible economic objectives.149
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Member States
With a view to having a comprehensive picture of
numerical fiscal rules in place in the EU Member States
and to investigate the existence of a possible link
between the design of these rules and budgetary out-
comes, a questionnaire was prepared (see box III.3) and
submitted to the national authorities of the 25 EU coun-
tries. Both numerical fiscal rules enshrined in the consti-
tution or law and those based on political commitment or
agreement between different general government tiers
were included in the survey. As already mentioned, the
procedural rules governing the annual budget process are
not covered.
The survey covers the period 1990-2005. Sixty numeri-
cal fiscal rules were considered in the analysis (1).
Replies by Member States pointed to a larger number of
rules, but some of them were not considered in the study
because they did not meet the pre-defined conditions to
be considered genuine numerical fiscal rules. The rea-
sons justifying these exclusions were notably that:
(i) some questionnaires concerned policy measures
(e.g. freeze in the number of civil servants over a
number of years) rather than genuine numerical fis-
cal rules;
(ii) some replies were related to procedural rules gov-
erning the budget process (relative powers of Parlia-
ment and government) and, therefore, could not be
regarded as numerical fiscal rules;
(iii) some questionnaires concerned fiscal policy targets
rather than numerical fiscal rules: the annual budg-
etary targets included in documents such as the
Budget Law and the Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes cannot be considered as numerical fiscal
rules;
(iv) some rules were excluded to ensure a sufficient
homogeneity of the sample (2).
The analysis of the questionnaires shows that there is a
great deal of variety in the design of numerical fiscal
rules as regards their coverage, the type of rule and the
definition of the target. Likewise, the statuses of the rules
as well as the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
vary considerably. The interesting messages emerging
from the descriptive analysis of the questionnaires are
summarised below.
Distribution of rules by sub-sectors 
of general government
A first result is that the number of fiscal rules in force in
the EU Member States has grown continuously over the
past twenty years (see Graph III.3) (3). At present, almost
all EU Member States have numerical fiscal rules. The
number of rules varies widely across countries: Germany
and Finland have five numerical fiscal rules; Hungary
and Austria have one (see Annex 1 for more details).
There has been an interesting evolution in terms of the
government sub-sectors covered by numerical fiscal
rules. In the early 1990s, most numerical fiscal rules
were applied at local or regional levels of government
(see Graph III.3 above). This reflected the willingness of
higher levels of government to impose constraints on
local entities and the need to ensure sufficient coordina-
tion among general government tiers. Such rules contin-
ued to develop in the 90s and exist today in almost all EU
Member States. A large and increasing number of
numerical fiscal rules are found at the central govern-
ment level. A relatively recent feature is the introduction
of numerical fiscal rules in the social security sector and
rules covering the whole of the general government sec-
tor. This may be a response to the increasing spending
pressures in the social security sector and to the introduc-
tion of the EU fiscal rules, which impose requirements
for the general government deficit and debt.
Distribution of the various types of numerical fiscal 
rules by fiscal aggregate
More than one third of the numerical rules in force in the
EU Member States are budget balance rules (including
golden rules) whereas expenditure and debt rules each
represent about 25 percent of the total rules. Revenue
¥1∂ If those rules applied to more than one general government tier are counted
according to number of sub-sector concerned (e.g. a balanced budget rule
for regional and local governments would represent two rules), the sum of
fiscal rules considered in the study would amount to 69 (66 in force in
2005). This figure is however attained by keeping rules for the whole of
the general government as single rules.
¥2∂ An example of such rules consists of arrangements foreseeing minimal
expenditure increases for some strategic items or rules governing transfers
among general government tiers.
¥3∂ Obviously, the growing number of national fiscal rules in the EU is partly
explained by the enlargements occurred since the 90s. 150
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2 0 0 6rules account for less than 10 percent. Most of budget
balance and debt rules are applied to regional and local
governments and, to a lesser extent, to the central gov-
ernment. In contrast, expenditure rules are more frequent
in the central government and social security sub-sectors
(see Graph III.4 below) (1).
There is also a large diversity as regards the aggregates
targeted by the various types of rules (see Table III.2).
One third of budget balance rules in force target a bal-
anced budget while one quarter are golden rules. Inter-
estingly, only few budget balance rules, all of them
applying to the general and central governments, are
defined in structural (or cyclically-adjusted) terms.
About half of debt rules, generally applied to local gov-
ernments, establish debt limits depending on the repay-
ment capacity (e.g. limit to total indebtedness in relation
Graph III.3:  Number of numerical fiscal rules in force in the EU Member States
N.B.: Data for EU are the weighted average by all the old 15 Member States, data for BE are available since 1971, for DK since 1971, for NL since 1975 and
for PT since 1973 
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¥1∂ In the following graphs, the total number of fiscal rules does not always
coincide since some replies did not answer all the questions included in the
survey.
Graph III.4:  Number of numerical fiscal rules by sub-sector of general government
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tributed between those defining ceilings and those tar-
geting expenditure growth rates. While ceilings are gen-
erally expressed in nominal terms, targeted growth rates
are equally divided between nominal and real increases.
Finally, more than half of revenue rules establish pre-
defined principles for the allocation of higher-than-
expected revenues.
The characteristics of the rules depending on the level 
of government to which they apply
Numerical fiscal rules in EU Member States are evenly
divided between those that are incorporated into a
multi-annual budgetary framework and those applied on
an annual basis. Rules applied to regional and local gov-
ernments rely preponderantly on annual schemes while
most of those concerning the general government and
central government sectors have a time horizon that goes
beyond the yearly budgetary cycle and are integrated
into a multi-annual fiscal framework (see Graph III.5).
This provides an indication that fiscal rules applied at
higher levels of government pursue medium-term policy
objectives while those concerning local governments
focus on short-term budgetary considerations.
Interestingly, the large majority of numerical fiscal rules
applied to local and regional levels of governments are
enshrined in law or in constitution, while rules concern-
ing central and the whole of the general government sec-
tor tend to be more based on political agreements (inter-
nal stability pacts or other forms of political agreement
or commitment).
Likewise, enforcement mechanisms are generally
stronger for those rules applied at local and regional gov-
ernment levels than for rules applying to the central gov-
ernment (see Graph III.7). A majority of rules applying
to local and regional governments sectors foresee either
automatic correction mechanisms or the obligation for
the authority responsible to adopt measures in case of
non-compliance with the rule. In contrast, most of rules
concerning the central government sub-sector do not
include ex ante defined actions in case of non-respect of
the rule.
The apparent weaker status and enforcement mecha-
nisms of rules in force at the central government and
general government levels may be linked with the fact
that such rules draw much more public opinion and
media interest than other rules (see Graph III.8). A high
media visibility of the rule can, ceteris paribus, be
expected to contribute to the enforcement of the rule,
through higher reputation costs in case of non-
compliance.           
Table III.2
Target definitions by type of rule (1)
Budget balance 
rules
Golden rules Balanced 
budget rules
Nominal ceiling Ceiling as a % 
GDP
Rules in 
structural terms
Total
5 8 5 1 3 22 38.6
Debt rules Debt ceiling in 
nominal terms
Debt ceiling as 
a % of GDP
Debt ceiling 
related 
to repayment 
capacity   
Other    Total
5 2 7 1  15 26.3
Expenditure 
rules
Nominal 
expenditure 
ceiling  
Real 
expenditure 
ceiling  
Expenditure 
growth rate 
(nominal)
Expenditure 
growth rate 
(real)
Other   Total
5 2 3 3 2 15 26.3
Revenue rules Tax burden as a 
% GDP
Rule related to 
tax rates      
Allocation of 
extra revenues   
Other    Total
0 1 3 1  5 8.8
      Total 100.0
(1) Without disaggregating ﬁscal rules according to number of sub-sectors concerned. Only rules in force in 2005 were considered in this table (57 rules). 153
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countries
An interesting exercise consists of analysing whether
there is a pattern in the distribution of different types of
fiscal rules in EU Member States depending on the
approach chosen by the country concerned for centralising
its budget process. In other words, we examine whether
the fact that a particular country adopts a delegation or
contract (or commitment) approach yields specific results
in terms of the numerical fiscal rules in force.
Broadly speaking, delegation countries (examples are
the UK, France and most countries generally relying on
single-party governments or on coalitions of ideologi-
cally aligned parties) tend to centralise their budget pro-
cess by relying on the discretionary powers of a strong
finance minister. In the contract or commitment
countries (for instance Belgium and the Netherlands) all
ministries take part in the negotiation process leading to
a binding agreement on a set of key fiscal figures, often
in a medium-term perspective. In practice, there are in
some specific cases difficulties in distinguishing
Graph III.5:  Time horizon of fiscal rules by sub-sector of general government
Graph III.6:  Statutory base of fiscal rules by sub-sector of general government
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countries combine features of both approaches (e.g.
Denmark and Sweden) and reforms of fiscal institutions
may change the classification of some countries over
time (1).
One would expect a priori countries following the con-
tract approach to have a greater number of fiscal rules
than those Member States that base their budgetary pro-
cedures on the delegation scheme. Table III.3 shows the
existing fiscal rules in EU countries classified by type of
rule and general government sub-sector, and distributed
according to the approach chosen by the country
concerned for centralising its budget process.
This table shows that delegation and contract countries
present a similar number of fiscal rules (29 and
31 respectively), which departs from what could have
been expected. In fact, rather than the number of rules by
Graph III.7:  Enforcement mechanisms of numerical fiscal rules by sub-sector of general government
Graph III.8:  Media activity and numerical fiscal rules in different sub-sector of general government
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¥1∂ The classification used in our analysis is based on relatively recent papers
(Von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) and Yläoutinen (2004)).155
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bution of fiscal rules among general government sub-
sectors. Countries following the contract approach hinge
more on numerical fiscal rules applied to central govern-
ment and social security sectors, which contrasts with
the few rules applied to these sub-sectors in delegation
States. Conversely, delegation countries have a higher
number of fiscal rules implemented at regional and local
level than Member States relying on the delegation
approach.
This distribution seems consistent with the fact that the
larger political dispersion of governments in contracts
countries is likely to promote fiscal rules (‘contracts’) at
central level, while territorial sub sectors are likely to
enjoy fewer restrictions imposed by central authorities.
Likewise, delegation countries having a strong minister
of finance and more homogeneous political majority in
the Parliament are expected to enact relatively few fiscal
rules for central levels of government and more rules
(constraints) on regional and local governments in order
to implement a more effective control on the whole of
general government finances.
3.4. Do numerical fiscal rules improve 
budgetary performance?
In this section, the detailed information from the ques-
tionnaires on fiscal rules in the EU Member States is
used to analyse whether there is link between numerical
fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes. The analysis is con-
ducted in three stages:
• In a first step, the analysis focuses on the link
between the existence of numerical fiscal rules and
budgetary outcomes. It notably looks at whether
budgetary developments in the years immediately
following the introduction of rules differ from those
typically observed on average during the sample
period 1990-2005 considered in the survey.
• In a second step, the analysis takes into account the
coverage of fiscal rules and tests the existence of a
link between the share of government finances cov-
ered by numerical fiscal rules and budgetary devel-
opments. In order to carry out such a test, a time-
varying ‘fiscal rule coverage index’ is constructed,
for each Member State, which summarises the infor-
mation on the share of government finances covered
by numerical fiscal rules.
• In a third step, the analysis takes into account the
characteristics of fiscal rules along with their cover-
age. To this aim, an index on the strength of individ-
ual fiscal rules is constructed based on the desirable
characteristics of fiscal rules defined in the literature
(i.e. statutory base, body in charge of monitoring,
body in charge of enforcement, enforcement mech-
anisms and media visibility of the rule) (1).
3.4.1. Relation between the introduction 
of numerical fiscal rules and budgetary 
outcomes
A first and simple way to assess the influence of fiscal
rules on budgetary outcomes is to see whether budgetary
developments in the years immediately following the
introduction of fiscal rules differ from those observed on
average during the sample period 1990-2005.
Table III.4 reports the average changes for different time
horizons in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (pri-
mary CABs) and in the ratio of cyclically-adjusted pri-
mary expenditure to GDP (over 1990-2005), and com-
pares them with the changes recorded for the same
variables in the years immediately following the adop-
tion of new numerical fiscal rules (2). All fiscal rules
were considered when comparing the changes in the pri-
mary CABs and only expenditure rules when changes in
the cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure were
analysed (3). Major changes in the design of rules were
treated in the same way as the introduction of new fiscal
rules.
The results indicate that the primary CAB on average
improved in the years following the introduction of
numerical fiscal rules. This conclusion holds for the dif-
ferent time-horizons considered, i.e. one, three and five
years after the introduction of the rule. It contrasts with
the fact that the primary CAB has on average been
unchanged over the same time-horizons in the period
¥1∂ Although there is a close relationship, these characteristics do not have to
be confused with the eight criteria listed in footnote 10 on the design of fis-
cal rules.
¥2∂ For instance, the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit in the
year immediately after the introduction of a rule is compared to the aver-
age yearly change registered during the whole of the sample period. Simi-
larly, the average change in the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit in the
three years following the implementation of a rule is compared to the aver-
age three-year change over the sample period. An identical comparison is
carried out for a five-year time horizon. 
¥3∂ A third possibility would have consisted of looking at developments in
cyclically-adjusted revenue after the implementation of revenue rules.
However, the relatively low number of revenue rules and their heterogene-
ity would have prevented from drawing any meaningful interpretation. 157
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2 0 0 61990-2005. There seems to be also a link between devel-
opments in general government expenditure and expend-
iture rules. The decline in the ratio of primary govern-
ment expenditure adjusted for the cycle is significantly
larger in the years following the introduction of numeri-
cal expenditure rules than the average change in the
period 1990-2005. Nevertheless, the results for expendi-
ture rules have to be taken with caution given the rela-
tively small number of expenditure rules in the sample.
This preliminary analysis suggests that there may be a
link between the introduction of numerical fiscal rules
and budgetary outcomes. However, this result should be
considered cautiously since the analysis does not take
into account the coverage and characteristics of fiscal
rules and does not control for other factors that may have
affected government budgets and developments in pri-
mary expenditure in the last fifteen years (e.g. position in
the economic cycle, level of the government debt…).
3.4.2. Relation between the share of government 
finances covered by numerical fiscal rules and 
budgetary outcomes
One major difficulty in assessing the influence of numer-
ical fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes is that a large
number of these rules apply to lower levels of govern-
ments while detailed budgetary data (notably estimates
of budgetary aggregates corrected for the effect of the
cycle) are only available for the general government. In
order to overcome this difficulty, there is a need to take
Box III.3: The questionnaire on numerical fiscal rules
In order to collect the most comprehensive and accurate information on the existing numerical fiscal rules in the
EU, a questionnaire was sent to all EU Member States in the context of the Working Group on the Quality of Public
Finances (WGQPF) attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). The questionnaire covers all types of numer-
ical fiscal rules such as budget balance rules including golden rules, debt rules, expenditure rules and rules concerning the
revenue side of the budget. Member States were invited to fill out one questionnaire per fiscal rule. The questionnaire con-
siders rules applied to all levels of government. The time frame covered by the questionnaire is the period from 1990 to
2005. Member States were invited to signal changes in their definition and/or contents during the period under review.
Likewise, Member States were also requested to fill out the questionnaire for those fiscal rules that had prevailed for a cer-
tain period between 1990 and 2005. The survey is made up of 24 questions, which are grouped in 6 sections:
1. General description of the rule. This section required Member States to provide information on the general character-
istics of the rule (targeted variable, coverage), the motivations for its introduction, and the relevant dates of introduction
and entering into force of the rule, and concerning the main changes in the period under review.
2. Design, time frame coverage, exclusions and target definition of the rule. This section includes questions concerning
the time span covered by the rule (annual/multiannual), specification on the aggregate targeted (definition of the variable
and accounting system in which it is expressed, exclusions from the coverage of the rule, ratios vs. level and growth
rates, aggregates defined in nominal vs. real term). This section also contains questions related to the properties of the
rule.
3. Statutory base of the rule. This section allows to make a distinction between rules based on political commitments
(coalition agreements, agreement reached by different levels of government), and those based on legal acts (law, consti-
tution).
4. Monitoring of compliance with the rule. This section requests information on the body responsible for the monitoring of
the rule. Answers provided by Member States give important indications on whether the rule is monitored by a partisan or
a non-partisan institution and whether monitoring of compliance with the rule is ensured in real time or only ex post.
5. Enforcement procedures. This section contains questions related to the body in charge of ensuring enforcement of the
rule (partisan vs. non-partisan) and the description of actions in case of non-compliance (obligation to propose corrective
measures for the relevant authority, automatic correction mechanisms, possibility of imposing sanctions, existence of
well-defined escape clauses). This section also contains questions related to the media visibility of the rule.
6. Experience with the rule. The last section of the questionnaire asks questions related to the track record in terms of
compliance, and to the reasons for possible non-compliance with the rule. It also contains subjective questions related
to the perception on whether the rule has contributed to fiscal discipline (definitively / significantly / modestly).158
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ered by fiscal rules. To this aim, a ‘fiscal rule coverage
index’ was constructed, for each Member State, which
summarises the information on what fraction of general
government finances is covered by numerical fiscal
rules. This index was calculated for all the years covered
by the study, i.e. the period 1990-2005. Details on the
construction of the ‘fiscal rule coverage index’ are pro-
vided in box III.4 below.
As seen in section 3.2, the number of numerical fiscal
rules in the EU Member States has continuously
increased over the last two decades. The share of govern-
ment finances covered by fiscal rules has naturally fol-
lowed the same evolution. On average, less than 25 per-
cent of government finances of EU Member States were
covered by numerical fiscal rules in the beginning of the
1990s. This proportion today approaches 75 percent,
with considerable differences across Member States (1).
Relation between the time-varying ‘Fiscal rule coverage 
index’ and budgetary outcomes
Graph III.10 reports the average value of the primary
cyclically-adjusted balance observed in EU Member
States over the period 1995-2005 for different groups of
countries classified according to the value of the ‘Fiscal
rule coverage index’. This graph suggests that there may
Table III.4
Average change in budgetary variables following the introduction (or major changes) of fiscal rules 
in the EU-25 Member States (1990-2005)
A fiscal rule is introduced
(or strengthened) Average over the sample 
Change in the Primary CAB
— In the following year
— In the following three years
— In the following five years
0.2 (– 0.2; 0.7)
0.4 (– 0.7; 1.5)
0.3 (– 0.9; 1.4)
0.0 (– 0.2; 0.2)
0.0 (– 0.4; 0.3)
– 0.1 (– 0.5; 0.3)
An expenditure rule is introduced
(or strengthened) Average over the sample 
Change in Primary Exp/GDP
— In the following year
— In the following three years
— In the following five years
– 1.5 (– 2.8; – 0.2)
– 1.9 (– 3.3; – 0.6)
– 3.1 (– 4.4; – 1.3)
– 0.2 (– 0.5; 0.0)
– 0.9 (– 1.3; – 0.4)
– 2.1 (– 1.4; – 2.7)
NB:  Extreme values from the sample were eliminated. For all time-horizons, the 2.5 % highest and lowest changes in the primary CAB and cyclically-adjusted primary
expenditure-to-GDP ratio were removed from the sample. Conﬁdence interval values (5 %) are in brackets.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ In 2005, about 30 percent of Hungarian Government finances were cov-
ered by numerical fiscal rules. This percentage reaches about 70 percent to
80 percent of general government finances in some countries (e.g. Bel-
gium, France). In some other EU Member States (Sweden, the Nether-
lands, United Kingdom) 100 percent of general government are covered by
one or more numerical fiscal rules.
Box III.4: Construction of a time-varying ‘Fiscal rule coverage index’ and a time-varying 
‘Expenditure rule coverage index’
(Continued on the next page)
In order to analyse the existence of a possible link between the share of government finances covered by fiscal rules
and budgetary outcomes, a time-varying ‘Fiscal rule coverage index’ was constructed. This index summarises, for
each Member State, the information on what part of general government finances is covered by numerical rules (measured
as the share of government expenditure of the general government sub-sector to which the rule applies in total general gov-
ernment expenditure). When constructing this indicator, two main issues had to be addressed.159
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 6Box III.4 (continued)
• The first one concerns how to deal with the fact that some Member States rely on different types of rules (e.g. a coun-
try can have an expenditure rule for the central government and a budget balance rule for regional governments). Taking
into account that the purpose of the analysis is to assess whether numerical fiscal rules can contribute to fiscal discipline, it
was considered that all numerical fiscal rules – i.e. all expenditure, budget balance, borrowing, debt and revenue rules –
could be aggregated in terms of coverage. In other words, if a part of government finances is covered by an expenditure
rule, and another part is covered by a budget balance rule, the part of government finances covered by numerical fiscal rules
can be considered to be the sum of both. A specific ‘Expenditure rule coverage index’, taking into account only expenditure
rules, was calculated to assess the influence of expenditure rules on developments in primary expenditure.
• The second issue is how to treat cases in which several rules apply to the same sub-entity of the general govern-
ment sector, e.g. the case of a Member State in which an expenditure rule at general government level (100 % coverage)
coexists with a budget balance rule for local governments (for instance 10 % coverage, i.e. in a case where local govern-
ments’ spending represent 10 % of total general government expenditure). In this situation, a possible approach would
have been to consider that the coverage is 100 % since the whole of general government finances are covered by fiscal
rules. However, this would not have allowed to take into account that the existence of several fiscal rules applying to the
same sub-sector could potentially bring more benefits in terms of fiscal discipline than one single rule (in our example,
local government finances are subject to an expenditure and a budget balance rule), even if the marginal benefit of the
second rule can be assumed to be lower than for the first one. In order to take these considerations into account, the ‘Fis-
cal rule coverage index’ and the ‘expenditure rule coverage index’ were constructed following this simple approach:
when more than one rule apply to the same sub-sector of general government, the index gives a weight of 1 to the cov-
erage of the first rule considered (in practice, the rule with the wider coverage). In our example, the expenditure rule has
100 % coverage since it applies to the whole of the general government sector; the contribution of this rule to the ‘Fiscal
rule coverage index’ is therefore equal to 1. The coverage of the second fiscal rule is given a lower weight of 0.5. In our
example, the second fiscal rule is a budget balance rule for local governments covering 10 % of government finances.
The contribution of this rule to the ‘fiscal rule coverage index’ equals to 10 % multiplied by 0.5 that gives 0.05. There-
fore, the ‘fiscal rule coverage index’ for the country considered reaches 1.05 in the year considered.
A time-varying ‘Expenditure rule coverage index’ measuring the share of government finances covered by expenditure
rules was constructed following exactly the same methodology, but restricting the sample to numerical expenditure rules.
Graph III. 9 below plots the ‘fiscal rule coverage index’ and the ‘Expenditure rule coverage index’ for the EU-25
(unweighted averages) since 1990.
Graph III.9:  ‘Fiscal rule coverage index’ and ‘Expenditure rule coverage index’ – EU-25 (unweighted average)
Source: Commission services.
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ered by fiscal rules and the underlying position of gov-
ernment finances. However, such a static analysis does
not allow to conclude on a possible relation between the
two variables, and there is a need to control for other fac-
tors that may have an impact on government budgets.
A way to perform such control, and to infer more robust
conclusions on the relation between fiscal rules and budg-
etary outcomes, is to estimate relations describing the
reaction of fiscal authorities (in terms of chosen levels of
budget balances or developments in government expendi-
ture) to key macroeconomic and budgetary developments,
such as those related to the cycle and the level of debt. The
strategy followed consists of augmenting traditional
forms of fiscal reaction functions with our indicator meas-
uring the share of government finances covered by numer-
ical fiscal rules in the 25 EU Member States. In such a
relation, the influence of the coverage of numerical fiscal
rules on budgetary policy can be gauged by looking at the
sign of the regression coefficient of the ‘Fiscal rule cover-
age index’ and its statistical significance.
Table III.5. below reports the results for panel data esti-
mation of a fiscal reaction function for the 25 EU Mem-
ber States. The dependent variable is the primary cycli-
cally-adjusted balance (CAPB). The explanatory
variables are the lagged CAPB, the lagged debt, the out-
put gap, two dummy variables, taking value 1, respec-
tively, after 1992 and after 1999, and our fiscal rule cov-
erage index. The CAPB and the debt level capture the
fiscal stabilisation motive of fiscal authorities. The two
dummy variables are aimed at capturing possible behav-
ioural changes occurred in correspondence with, respec-
tively, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and
the completion of the EMU project (1999). The constant
term captures the portion of the fiscal stance not
explained by the chosen explanatory variables. The out-
put gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged
indicator of foreign output gap in order to avoid endo-
genity problems. All fiscal variables are expressed as
shares of potential output. The period chosen for the esti-
mation reflects the time frame considered in the ques-
tionnaire on fiscal rules, which includes all rules into
force starting from 1990. The sample includes episodes
of very large and rarely observed changes in budgetary
data, observed mostly in New Member States. In order to
avoid results being driven by these ‘outliers’, the sample
was trimmed in such a way to exclude the observations
exhibiting changes in the CAPB and in the primary
cyclically-adjusted expenditure outside the 2.5 percent
and the 97.5 percent percentiles of the overall distribu-
tion.
In accordance with existing estimates of fiscal reaction
functions for EU countries, results indicate a non-signif-
icant response of fiscal authorities to output gap and a
significant positive response to debt (1). As for our ‘Fis-
¥1∂ This would mean that EU countries attached more importance to the objec-
tive of fiscal consolidation that to stabilisation purposes during the period
1990-2005. This finding is consistent with the results obtained by others
studies (see for instance Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002). 
Graph III.10:  Fiscal rule coverage index and average primary CABs in the EU-25 countries
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which indicates that an increase in the share of govern-
ment finances covered by numerical fiscal rules leads to
an improvement in the primary CAB. The coefficient is
significant at the 10 percent level.
The same analysis was carried out focusing on the relation
between expenditure rules and developments in general
government expenditure. The dependent variable is now
the ratio of cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure to
GDP. The ‘Fiscal rule coverage index’ is replaced by the
‘Expenditure rule coverage index’. The coefficient of this
variable in the regression is negative and significant at the
10 percent level. This provides an indication that an
increase in the coverage of government finances by expend-
iture rules leads, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in the pri-
mary expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Again, the results concern-
ing expenditure rules must be interpreted with care, due to
the relatively low number of expenditure rules considered.
3.4.3. Relation between the characteristics 
and coverage of numerical fiscal rules 
and budgetary outcomes
The previous sections examined the link between the
existence and coverage of numerical fiscal rules and
budgetary outcomes. However, economic literature
stresses that the effectiveness of fiscal rules also depends
on their properties (see notably Inman, 1996), i.e. their
statutory base and whether there are independent and
efficient monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to
ensure the respect of the rule.
An index on the strength of numerical fiscal rules
A fiscal rule is generally considered to be ‘stronger’, in the
sense of having a higher likelihood to be respected and to
influence developments in the targeted fiscal variables, if
it has a strong statutory base, i.e if the provisions related
to the existence of the rule are enshrined in the constitu-
tion or in law. While not ruling out discretionary policy,
such rules impose binding constraints on the conduct of
fiscal policy, thereby addressing the deficit bias in a direct
way. The statutory base also provides an indication of the
difficulty to amend or derogate the rule and of the impor-
tance given to the rule in the Member State concerned, at
least at the moment of its introduction (1).
Table III.5
Coverage of fiscal rules and developments 
in the primary CAB (EU-25, 1990-2005)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: primary CAB (CAPB)
OG 0.09 (1.5)
Constant – 0.93 (– 2.1)**
Lagged CAPB 0.63 (15.8)***
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.02 (3.0)***
Fiscal rule coverage index 0.19 (1.6)*
Dummy 1992 0.68 (2.2)**
Dummy 1999 – 0.51 (– 2.7)***
N. obs. 260
R sq. within 0.59
R sq. between 0.93
R sq. overall 0.80
NB: Estimations method: ﬁxed effects, instrumental variables regression. The
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of for-
eign output gap. The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted
output gap of the 3 major export markets of each market. All ﬁscal varia-
bles are expressed as shares on potential output. ‘t’ values are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent level. Coefﬁcients for country ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: Authors’ calculation and DG ECFIN AMECO database.
Table III.6
Coverage of expenditure rules and developments 
in primary expenditure (EU-25, 1990-2005)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: primary CAE (PCAE)
OG 0.10 (1.5)
Constant 6.28 (4.0)***
Lagged PCAE 0.90 (25.4)***
Lagged debt/GDP ratio – 0.02 (– 2.7)***
Expenditure rule coverage index – 0.24 (– 1.7)*
Dummy 1992 – 0.51 (– 1.5)
Dummy 1999 0.01 (0.2)
N. obs. 260
R sq. within 0.77
R sq. between 0.99
R sq. overall 0.96
NB: Estimations method: ﬁxed effects, instrumental variables regression. The
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of for-
eign output gap. The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted
output gap of the 3 major export markets of each market. All ﬁscal varia-
bles are expressed as shares on potential output. ‘t’ values are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent level. Coefﬁcients for country ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: Authors’ calculation and DG ECFIN AMECO database.
¥1∂ A distinction should be made between situations where the rule itself is
enshrined in law or constitution (i.e. higher-than-expected revenues should
be allocated to the reduction of the deficit) and cases where only the prin-
ciple of the rule is considered in the relevant legal text (i.e. the government
has to specify ex ante the use of possible higher-than-expected revenues). In
the first case, the rule can be considered ‘stronger’ than in the second one.162
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respect of the rule is another important element. When
respect of the rule is monitored by an independent body,
which has the possibility to send alert signals in case a
risk of non-compliance is identified, the probability that
fiscal variables are adjusted to ensure compliance with
the rule can be expected to be higher. The nature of the
enforcement mechanisms also matters. The existence of
automatic correction mechanisms or the possibility to
impose sanctions in case of non-respect of the rule can be
expected to foster compliance. Enforcement of the cor-
rective measures and sanctions should preferably be
ensured by an independent authority. Finally, it is worth
noting that those rules that are neither enshrined in law
or constitution nor regularly monitored and for which no
enforcement mechanisms have been defined ex-ante
may also contribute to the conduct of sound fiscal poli-
cies. As a matter of fact, such rules can be useful in pro-
viding benchmarks against which fiscal policy can be
monitored and assessed by the public. Therefore, the
effectiveness of fiscal rules in ensuring fiscal discipline
can be expected to be stronger when the rule benefits
from a large media visibility and when not compliance is
likely to trigger a public debate.
In order to assess whether the design of fiscal rules has
an impact on their effectiveness, the country-specific
‘Fiscal rule coverage index’ constructed in section 3.4.2
was augmented to take into account the characteristics of
the individual fiscal rules. To this aim, an index of the
‘strength’ of numerical fiscal rules was calculated, for
each of the rules considered in the sample. The index
takes into account the five criteria mentioned above: the
statutory base of the rule; whether there is an independ-
ent monitoring of the rule; the nature of the institution
responsible for the enforcement of the rule; the existence
of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and the media
visibility of the rule. For each criterion, scores were
attributed, the higher value corresponding to the charac-
teristic that is presumed desirable for a strong/effective
rule. Details on how the scores were attributed depend-
ing on the characteristics of the rules and on the calcula-
tion of the synthetic index measuring the strength of each
fiscal rule are provided in Box III.5.
Box III.5: Calculation of an index of strength of fiscal rules
(Continued on the next page)
The index of strength of numerical fiscal rules was calculated taking into account five criteria: the statutory base of the
rule; whether there is an independent monitoring of the rule; the nature of the institution responsible for the enforcement of the
rule; the existence of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and the media visibility of the rule. The methodology followed was
inspired by the previous work by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2005). This box provides details on how the scores were attrib-
uted for each of these criteria and on the calculation of the synthetic index measuring the strength of individual fiscal rules.
Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two elements below:
Statutory or legal base of the rule
4 is assigned for a constitutional base 
3 if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility Law)
2 if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by different general government tiers (and
not enshrined in a legal act)
1 for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government, Minister of Finance)
Room for setting or revising objectives
3 if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the document underpinning the rule)
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule merely contains broad principles or
the obligation for the government or the relevant authority to set targets)
Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:
3 if there is a monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court of Auditors or any other Court) or the
national Parliament
2 monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assessing compliance)163
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The score of this variable is augmented by one point in case there is a real time monitoring of compliance with the rule
(e.g. existence of alert mechanisms in case there is a risk of non-respect of the rule).
Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:
3 enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court) or the National Parliament
2 enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no specific body in charge of enforcement
Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:
4 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-compliance
3 there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the possibility of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of non-compliance or is obliged to present
corrective proposals to Parliament or the relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen and clearly specified.
Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-compliance is likely to trigger a
public debate
2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke a public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
In absence of strong theoretical base or preference regarding the weight to be given to each criterion, it was decided to
calculate the synthetic index in a large number of different ways, reflecting different possible weightings for the five cri-
teria. The scores of the five criteria were first standardised to run between 0 and 1. Then, a random weights technique was used
following the method used by Sutherland and al. (2005). This technique uses 10 000 sets of randomly-generated weights to
calculate the synthetic indicator in 10 000 different ways. The random weights are drawn from a uniform distribution between
zero and one and then normalised to sum to one. The resulting distribution for the synthetic indicator reflects the possible range
of values given no a priori information on the weight to be given to each component of the index. Given that the weights are
drawn from a uniform distribution, the mean value of the synthetic indicator is asymptotically equivalent to the indicator cal-
culated using equal weights for the constituent components (unweighted arithmetic average). The chart below shows, for all the
fiscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98 % of the values of the index of strength of the rule calculated with
10 000 different sets of random weights (we eliminated the 1 % lowest and highest values of the synthetic index).
Graph III.11:  Index of strength of the fiscal rules in force in EU Member States in 2005 (classified according to the average value)
NB:
1. The chart shows, for all the numerical ﬁscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98 % of the values of the index of strength of the ﬁscal rule concerned. Rules were classiﬁed in an ascending
order. The scores of the individual criteria taken into account in the calculation of the overall index were normalised to one. The size of the vertical line provides an indication of the heterogeneity of the
scores related to the ﬁve criteria considered in the calculation of the synthetic index.
2. When the characteristics of a rule have evolved over time, the chart only present the index consistent with the most recent features. Three rules presented in the chart are not anymore in force in 2005. For
Belgium, the expenditure rule and the revenue rule were implemented for the convergence process leading to EMU qualiﬁcation. For Slovenia, the debt rule was in force over 2000-2004.
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account the coverage and the characteristics of 
numerical fiscal rules
By combining the information contained in the ‘Fiscal
rule coverage index’ and the information of the strength
of each fiscal rule, a time-varying ‘Fiscal rule index’ was
constructed, for each Member State, which takes into
account all the available information on the national
numerical fiscal rules. The indicator is calculated in two
steps. First, we calculate the potential contribution of
each rule to the ‘Fiscal rule index’ by multiplying the
share of government finances covered by the rule by the
indicator of the strength of the rule. Second, we sum
these indicators by country, taking into account their
changes over time (1). In case two rules apply to the same
general government sub-sector, we follow the same
methodology as for the calculation of the ‘Fiscal rule
coverage index’. We give a weight of 1 to the rule which
can be considered as the strongest one, based on the
index of strength of fiscal rules, and a weight of 0.5 to the
weaker rules. Following the same approach but taking
into account only expenditure rules, a time-varying
‘Expenditure rule index’ was constructed for each Mem-
ber State (2).
The influence of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes 
depends on their characteristics
Like in section 3.4.2, we augment standard fiscal reac-
tion functions with our ‘Fiscal rule index’, which incor-
porates information on the coverage and characteristics
of the numerical fiscal rules in the EU-25 Member
States (3). Table III.7 reports the results of the economet-
ric analysis.
A remarkable result is that the inclusion of information
on the strength of the individual fiscal rules improves the
quality and robustness of the relation between fiscal
rules and budgetary outcomes. When comparing this
regression to the one including the ‘Fiscal rule coverage
index’, it appears that the coefficient measuring the
influence of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes is clearly
more significant (4). The level of this coefficient is also
higher, suggesting that a change in the coefficient has a
larger impact on budgetary outcomes (all ‘Fiscal rule
indexes’ and ‘Fiscal rule coverage indexes’ were stand-
ardized, so that the size of the coefficients in the various
regressions can be compared). Overall, these results pro-
vide a strong indication that the characteristics of fiscal
rules matter for their influence on budgetary outcomes.
In order to test the robustness of the results, we estimated
other regressions including alternative calculations of
the ‘Fiscal rule index’ using different weighing for the
calculation of the index of strength of fiscal rules (in
practice we used the low and high values of the brackets
in Graph III.11). It appeared (regressions results are not
reported here) that weighing differently the various com-
ponents of the index of strength of fiscal rules does not
change the results significantly, suggesting that the rela-
tion is not strongly sensitive to the choice of the weights
for the aggregation of the criteria taken into account in
the calculation of the index on the strength of fiscal rules.
The same analysis was made for assessing the influence
of expenditure rules on developments in cyclically-
adjusted primary government expenditure (results are
reported in Table III.8). The conclusions are very much
the same as for the analysis considering all fiscal rules.
Taking into account the characteristics of expenditure
rules in the calculation of the index leads to a stronger
relation between expenditure rules and budgetary out-
comes. The coefficient of the ‘Expenditure rule index’ is
higher and more significant than in the regression con-
sidering only the coverage of expenditure rules. Like for
the regression on the ‘Fiscal rule index’, robustness tests
confirm that results are not significantly affected by a
change in the coefficients to calculate the index measur-
ing the strength of expenditure rules.
3.4.4. Main conclusions from the study
The survey on numerical fiscal rules shows that the
number of fiscal rules in force in the EU Member States
has increased continuously over the past twenty years. At
¥1∂ For example, take the case of a country having three fiscal rules in year n:
an expenditure rule to contain developments in healthcare spending (index
of strength x) covering about a percent of general government expenditure;
a budget balance rule for local governments (index of strength y) covering
about b percent of general government finance and an expenditure rule at
central government level (index of strength z) covering about c percent of
total general government expenditure. The indicator for that country in
year n equals to a*x + b*y + c*z. 
¥2∂ In order to test the sensitivity of the results to different choices for the
weighting of the five criteria used in the calculation of the index of
strength of fiscal rules, we calculated the ‘Fiscal rule index’ in two alterna-
tive ways, taking into account the low and high values of the possible
index as illustrated in Graph III.11.
¥3∂ In the analysis, the ‘Fiscal rule index’ is calculated using an index of
strength of fiscal rules that gives an equal weight to the five criteria enter-
ing in the calculation of the indicator.
¥4∂ The coefficient becomes significant at the 5 percent level as against 10
percent in the regression including an index taking into account only the
share of government finances covered by fiscal rules.165
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This growing number of rules during the latest years has
also undergone an interesting evolution in terms of the
government sub-sectors covered by rules. In the early 90s,
fiscal rules in EU countries were mostly to applied to ter-
ritorial (local and regional) governments. A relatively
recent feature has been the introduction of fiscal rules for
the whole of the general government sector and for the
social security sub-sector. This may be a response to the
increasing spending pressures in the social security sector
and to the introduction of the EU fiscal rules, which
impose requirements for the general government deficit
and debt.
The characteristics of fiscal rules vary depending on the
sub-sector to which they apply. Fiscal rules applying to
higher levels of government are usually incorporated into a
multi-annual budgetary framework whereas most rules
applied to regional and local governments rely preponder-
antly on annual schemes. Most of the numerical rules
applied to regional or local levels of governments are
enshrined in law or constitution, while rules applying to the
whole of the general government sector are more frequently
based on coalition agreements or political commitments.
Similarly, while rules for regional and local governments
seem to have relatively strong enforcement mechanisms,
rules applying to general and central governments generally
do not envisage ex ante defined actions in case of non-com-
pliance.
An interesting finding appears when taking into account the
type of budgetary governance, namely the distinction
between the so-called contract and delegation countries.
Both sets of countries have a similar number of fiscal rules.
However, contract countries tend to a have more numerical
fiscal rules applied to central government and social secu-
rity sectors while delegation countries have a higher
number of fiscal rules implemented at regional and local
level. This seems consistent with the fact that the (a priori)
larger political dispersion of governments in contracts
countries is likely to promote fiscal rules at central level,
while territorial sub sectors are likely to enjoy fewer restric-
tions imposed by central authorities. Likewise, delegation
countries are expected to enact relatively few fiscal rules for
central levels of government and more rules on regional and
local governments in order to implement a more effective
control on the whole of general government finances.
Statistical and econometric exercises suggest the exist-
ence of a link between numerical rules and budgetary
outcomes. A simple analysis of data shows two interest-
Table III.7
Influence of fiscal rules on the primary CAB 
(EU-25, 1990-2005)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: primary CAB (CAPB)
OG 0.09 (1.4)
Constant – 0.90 (– 2.0)**
Lagged CAPB 0.63 (15.8)***
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.02 (3.1)***
Fiscal rule index 0.25 (2.1)**
Dummy 1992 0.63 (2.0)**
Dummy 1999 – 0.53 (– 2.9)***
N. obs. 260
R sq. within 0.59
R sq. between 0.94
R sq. overall 0.81
NB: Estimations method: ﬁxed effects, instrumental variables regression. The
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of for-
eign output gap. The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted
output gap of the 3 major export markets of each market. All ﬁscal varia-
bles are expressed as shares on potential output. ‘t’ values are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent level. Coefﬁcients for country ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: Authors’ calculation and DG ECFIN AMECO database.
Table III.8
Influence of expenditure rules on developments 
in primary expenditure (EU-25, 1990-2005)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: primary CAE (PCAE)
OG 0.10 (1.6)
Constant 6.43 (4.1)***
Lagged PCAE 0.89 (25.2)***
Lagged debt/GDP ratio – 0.02 (– 2.8)***
Expenditure rule index – 0.28 (– 2.0)**
Dummy 1992 – 0.44 (– 1.3)
Dummy 1999 0.01 (0.1)
N. obs. 260
R sq. within 0.77
R sq. between 0.98
R sq. overall 0.95
NB:  Estimations method: ﬁxed effects, instrumental variables regression. The
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of for-
eign output gap. The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted
output gap of the 3 major export markets of each market. All ﬁscal variables
are expressed as shares on potential output. ‘t’ values are reported in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent level. Coefﬁcients for country ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: Authors’ calculation and DG ECFIN AMECO database.166
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years following the introduction of fiscal rules while on
average it remained broadly stable over the period under
consideration (1990-2005). Secondly, the decline in the
ratio of primary government expenditure adjusted for the
cycle has been significantly larger in the years following
the introduction of numerical expenditure rules than the
average change observed over the sample period. When
enriching the analysis to take into account the coverage
and characteristics of fiscal rules and control for various
factors that may affect government budget balance and
developments in primary expenditure, the presumption
of a link between numerical fiscal rules and budgetary
outcomes is strengthened. The analysis suggests that an
increase in the share of government finances covered by
numerical fiscal rules leads, ceteris paribus, to an
improvement in the structural position of government
finances. In the case of expenditure rules, it appears that
an increase in the coverage of government finances by
expenditure rules leads to a reduction in the primary
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The analysis also suggests
that the characteristics of fiscal rules matter for their
influence on budgetary outcomes. Strong rules,
enshrined in law or constitution and foreseeing auto-
matic enforcement mechanisms, seem to have a larger
influence on budgetary outcomes.167
4. National independent institutions
4.1. Introduction
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, there is
no independent fiscal agency in the EU to which part of
fiscal policy has been delegated and the establishment of
such institutions seems unlikely in the foreseeable
future. This section therefore focuses on other national
bodies, coming on top of or besides the usual budgetary
process, which are providing independent analysis and/
or recommendations in the area of fiscal policy, on a reg-
ular basis (including the so-called ‘Fiscal councils’) (1).
The institutions covered by the study should be primarily
financed by public funds. They should be functionally
independent; specifically, the institution should be given
a large discretion in relation to the tasks considered in its
mandate and there must be guarantees against any ex
ante political guidance (2).
The influence of such bodies on fiscal policy-making
can take place through different channels: they can pro-
vide inputs for ensuring a proper preparation of the
budget (e.g. unbiased macroeconomic and/or budgetary
forecasts), conduct analysis on fiscal policy issues (e.g.
long-term sustainability analysis; alternative estimates
of the budgetary impact of policy measures; assess the
respect of existing fiscal rules); and issue normative
reports and recommendations on appropriate policies in
the prevailing circumstances. The institutions consid-
ered in the study are expected to have an impact on the
public debate and possibly raise the reputation costs for
the conduct of unsound policies.
The field covered in this part of the study is by nature
more difficult to outline than in the case of numerical fis-
cal rules, due to the large diversity of the institutions
considered. A possible consequence is that the survey
may be less exhaustive than in the case of numerical fis-
cal rules. The analysis and findings should be considered
with this caveat in mind. In addition, the matter is less
prone to be analysed through traditional econometric and
statistical instruments.
This section first reviews the different activities of the
national bodies, other than government and Parliament,
which may have an influence on the conduct of fiscal
policy. Then, it provides an overview of the existing
institutions in the 25 EU Member States. Finally, a
number of considerations on the effectiveness and desir-
able characteristics of the institutions are made.
4.2. Independent institutions can 
participate in different activities
Given the potential wide diversity of the institutions cov-
ered in the study, classifying them is not an easy task.
Overall, two main categories of institutions can be dis-
tinguished: those institutions operating in the field of
positive economics, which provide independent fore-
casts and analyses of macroeconomic and budgetary
developments and plans; and those operating in the field
of normative economics, which issue normative assess-
ments on budgetary developments and/or policy recom-
mendations.
4.2.1. Institutions operating in the field of ‘positive 
economics’
Preparation of macroeconomic forecasts
The Council report of 20 March 2005 on the SGP reform
recognised that it is important to base budgetary projec-
tions on realistic and cautious macroeconomic fore-
casts. Macroeconomic forecasts are one of the main
inputs for the preparation of budgetary plans. They
largely determine revenue projections which will be the
basis for expenditure plans.
¥1∂ Bodies like special Parliamentary Commissions or ad hoc Expert Groups
that could fulfil such tasks on a one-off or occasional basis are not covered
by the study. 
¥2∂ Thus, private ‘Think Tanks’ and research departments of private compa-
nies are not covered (private institutions can be vehicles of their own bias).
Central Banks and Directorates of the Ministry of Finance are not covered
either.168
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degree of uncertainty. If official growth forecasts are
unbiased (i.e. on average over time the projection does
not differ from the observed value), the effect of over- or
under-estimating economic growth on the budget bal-
ance target has to be accepted as the price of uncertainty
and cancels out over time. However, a different conclu-
sion is warranted if official growth forecasts suffer from
some sort of structural optimism, systematically overrat-
ing the underlying rate of the economy. Recent analysis
on the role of growth forecasts over the period 1987-
2003 shows a forecast bias in three out of four large EU
Member States (Larch and Salto, 2003). Graph III.12
which shows the difference between plans formulated by
the EU Member States in their Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes and the final outcomes illustrates the
optimistic bias in the macroeconomic forecasts in the EU
Member States and its consequences for budgetary
developments (most of points are on the left hand side of
the chart). Milesi-Feretti and Moriyama (2004) provided
a possible explanation for the optimistic bias in macr-
oeconomic forecasts. They argued that opportunistic
governments may try to avoid the political cost associ-
ated with the implementation of difficult consolidation
measures by using overly favourable growth assump-
tions. Corrective measures can then be avoided ex ante,
while ex post the deficit will turn out to be higher-than-
expected as growth is lower-than-projected. The result-
ing higher deficit is then blamed on bad luck, even if it
results from a forecast bias in growth projections.
The recent experience of several countries has shown
that a way to remedy such a bias is the establishment of
institutions in charge of providing independent mac-
roeconomic forecasts. This may have a direct beneficial
impact if the government is obliged to use the forecasts
of the independent institution in the preparation of the
budgetary plans. A positive effect can also be expected
when there is no formal obligation for the government to
take into account these forecasts. In such cases, the inde-
pendent forecasts provide benchmarks against which the
plausibility of the macroeconomic forecasts of the gov-
ernment can be assessed, which may limit the temptation
to overestimate growth (1) (2).
Provision of budgetary forecasts
Like in the case of macroeconomic forecasts, opportun-
istic governments may be tempted to avoid or postpone
the implementation of unpopular consolidation meas-
ures by providing optimistic budgetary forecasts. One of
the main functions of independent budgetary forecasts is
then to provide benchmarks against which the govern-
ment fiscal projections can be assessed. Like for mac-
¥1∂ Such institutions can be particularly useful for the provision of medium-
term and long-term projections. The supply of short-term forecasts (t and
t+1) is large, which facilitates the identification of a possible optimistic
bias in the assumptions chosen by the government, while independent pro-
jections for medium- to long-term horizons are more rare.
¥2∂ A noteworthy consideration is that forecasts produced by the government may
be biased but need not be. A number of examples can be found in the EU. 
Graph III.12:  Shortfall in real GDP growth and in the general government balance
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2 0 0 6roeconomic projections, budgetary forecasts from inde-
pendent institutions could also be directly used in the
budget process and, therefore, directly address any pos-
sible optimistic bias in budgetary projections. Independ-
ent budgetary forecasts can also contribute to a non-par-
tisan assessment of whether fiscal policy plans are in line
with the fiscal policy objectives and rules in force. If
they are regularly updated, they can participate to an effi-
cient monitoring of the implementation of budget plans
and respect of the fiscal rules.
Improving the quality of the information for the conduct 
of fiscal policy
Independent institutions can also provide regular analysis
on issues relevant for the conduct of fiscal policy. They
can provide, inter alia, independent quantifications of the
economic and budgetary impact of specific measures and
reforms for different time horizons, and detailed assess-
ments of the sustainability of government finances. These
institutions contribute to fiscal discipline by raising the
awareness of politicians and the public opinion on the
short- and long-run consequences of budgetary decisions.
4.2.2. Institutions operating in the field 
of ‘normative economics’ issue statements 
and recommendations on fiscal policy
Independent institutions can also make regular norma-
tive assessments in the area of fiscal policy. They can
notably monitor whether fiscal developments are in line
with the main fiscal policy objectives of the government
or with the traditional objectives assigned to fiscal policy
(sustainability of government finances, stabilisation).
They can also issue statements and recommendations on
the appropriateness of specific policy measures and
ensure a regular and independent monitoring of the
respect of budgetary targets and rules in force, for differ-
ent levels of governments (e.g. internal stability pacts).
An important function of such institutions is to influence
the public debate and possibly raise the reputation costs
for the conduct of unsound policies. Advisory councils,
Wise Men committees and some Court of auditors fall in
this category.
4.3. Institutions in place in the EU
With the view to having a comprehensive picture of the
institutions currently in place in the EU, a questionnaire
was prepared and submitted to the 25 EU Member States
(see Box III.6). The survey concerns the independent bod-
ies, other than government and Parliament, providing
independent inputs, analysis, assessment or recommenda-
tions in the area of fiscal policy. The questionnaire made
clear that (i) institutions providing independent forecasts
for the preparation of the budget, or against which the offi-
cial projections are systematically assessed, or/ and releas-
ing regular and positive analyses on fiscal policy issues
are covered by the survey; (ii) institutions formulating rec-
ommendations or normative statements on government
finances developments and fiscal policy orientations
(budgetary plans and their implementation) are also cov-
ered by the survey.
Answers by Member States show that twenty-three insti-
tutions corresponding to these characteristics exist in fif-
teen EU Member States, thirteen of them being former
EU-15 Member States. Interestingly, and contrasting
with the results of the survey on fiscal rules, most of
these institutions were created a long time ago, and there
is no visible tendency towards the development of such
institutions in the EU Member States. Answers to the
questionnaire confirm that there is a wide variety in the
institutions currently in place. They can be classified into
the two groups mentioned in the previous paragraph   
4.3.1. Institutions in charge of providing forecasts 
and/or conducting positive analysis on fiscal 
policy issues
According to the results of the survey, there are in the EU
twenty-one institutions in charge of preparing independ-
ent projections for macroeconomic or/and budgetary
variables or/and conducting positive analysis on fiscal
policy issues. Nine institutions are providing both mac-
roeconomic and budgetary forecasts. Two are providing
only macroeconomic forecasts and two only budgetary
forecasts.
Sixteen institutions are making positive analysis on fis-
cal policy issues. Most of them also regularly issue fiscal
policy recommendations.
Institutions in charge of providing macroeconomic 
forecasts
In ten EU countries, there is at least one institution that
regularly produces independent macroeconomic fore-
casts against which the official projections can be
assessed. However, in the large majority of cases, the
government is free to base its budgetary plans on its own
forecasts, without having to provide any justification in
case there are deviations compared to the forecasts of the170
P a r t  I I I
N a t i o n a l  n u m e r i c a l  f i s c a l  r u l e s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  s o u n d  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e sindependent institution. There are three exceptions to
this rule:
— In Belgium, the National Account Institute (NAI,
see Box III.7) provides the macroeconomic fore-
casts to be used by the federal government in the
budgetary process. There is a legal obligation for the
government to use the macroeconomic assumptions
approved by this independent institution. Interest-
ingly, among the twelve institutions providing mac-
roeconomic forecasts, the NAI is one of the rare
institutions which is ‘specialised’ in the production
of macroeconomic forecasts, in the sense that it does
not at the same time provide projections for govern-
ment finances. Likewise, it is the only institution
whose macroeconomic forecasts have to be used for
the budget on a compulsory basis.
— The second exception concerns Austria and the
Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). This
research institute analyses national and international
economic trends and supplies short- to medium-
Box III.6: The questionnaire on fiscal institutions or councils
In order to collect the most comprehensive and accurate information on the existing independent fiscal institutions
in the EU, a questionnaire was sent to all EU Member States in the context of the Working Group on the Quality of
Public Finances (WGQPF) attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). The questionnaire concerns the exist-
ing national institutions, others than the government, thecentral banks and the Parliament, which may have a direct or indi-
rect influence on the conduct of fiscal policy. The bodies covered by the survey are the institutions providing independent
analysis/assessment, forecasts/projections and/or recommendations in the area of fiscal developments and policy. Courts
of Auditors were included when their activities go beyond the accounting control and include any of the abovementioned
tasks. Only institutions primarily financed by public funds were considered; private think tanks and private research bodies
were therefore excluded. Finally, Central Banks and Directorates of the Ministry of Finance are not considered by the def-
inition. Member States were invited to fill out one questionnaire per institution. The time frame covered by the question-
naire is the period 1990-2005. For those institutions currently in place, Members States were invited to signal changes in
their mandate/status or role during the period under review.
The questionnaire is made up of 35 questions which are grouped in 6 sections covering different aspects:
1. General description of the institution. This section required the Member States to provide an overall description of the
institution, the main motivations for its introduction and the relevant dates (creation and any major changes) over the
period considered. 
2. Mandate. This section contains questions concerning the mandate of the institution considered; the specific task(s) ful-
filled, and whether it has a specific role in the budgetary process.
3. Role/Functions. This section requests more details on the mandate of the institution, its publications, the variables pro-
jected or/and the type of recommendations issued, as well as on the existence of an obligation for the government to use
the inputs, analysis or recommendations released by the independent institution.
4. Composition. This section is related to the composition of the governing board of the institution (background of the
members, appointment procedures, compatibility of members’ responsibilities with other political posts, size of the
board, years in post, voting procedures) and the size of the institution.
5. Status. This section required information on the status of the institution. It notably asks whether the institution is for-
mally attached to the Parliament or the government. It also contains questions related to whether the body has to assess
political parties’ economic programme ahead of the election and about the sources of financing of the institution.
6. Visibility and influence. The last section of the questionnaire allows evaluating the influence in the public debate of the
analysis of the institution. It also compares the quality/reputation of the Fiscal Council’s work with that of other (public
or private) institutions operating in the same field. This section also contains questions related to the perception of the
influence of the institution on budgetary discipline and the quality of public finances.171
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2 0 0 6term economic forecasts. It is generally consulted
(no obligation) by the government in the course of
the budgetary process. Even if the government is
formally free to prepare the budget and/or the Stabil-
ity or Convergence Programme using its own mac-
roeconomic assumptions, the WIFO macroeconomic
forecasts usually constitute the basis for the prepara-
tion of fiscal plans. Deviations from this principle
have in practice been rare.
— The third exception is the Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis (CPB, see Box III.8). Like for
Austria, there is no formal obligation for the govern-
ment to use the projections of the CPB. However, the
CPB macroeconomic forecasts are in practice (almost)
always used for the preparation of the Budget.
A number of interesting remarks can be made concerning
these three institutions. First, the basis for the forecast to
be used for the budget preparation differs considerably.
While in the case of Austria and the Netherlands the use
of the projections of the independent institute is not based
on any formal obligation, there is a legal requirement in
the case of Belgium. Second, none of these institutions
issues normative statements or policy recommendations
in the area of fiscal policy. Their activity is circumscribed
to ‘positive’ economic analysis. Third, these agencies are
all largely independent, in the sense that they are mostly
or exclusively financed by public funds and that the gov-
ernment cannot interfere in the activities of the institution
or influence its conclusions.
Institutions in charge of producing budgetary forecasts
According to the results of the survey, there are in the EU
twelve independent institutions in charge of producing
budgetary forecasts. In all cases, the government
remains free to base the budget on its own assumptions
for revenues and expenditure. In two cases, however, the
projections of the independent institution play a central
role in the preparation of the budget.
• The first case concerns the German Working Party on
Tax Revenue Forecasting. This body prepares inde-
pendent tax forecasts for different sub-sectors of gen-
eral government. The broad composition of the
institution contributes to its independence (1). Interest-
ingly, the Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting
Box III.7: The Belgian National Account Institute (NAI)
The NAI coordinates the production of the economic statistics and of the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the
federal budget. It also fulfils a role of adviser to the public administration on the interpretation of the ESA 1995 Regula-
tion. This institution was created by law in 1994.
There is a legal obligation for the government to base budgetary plans on the macroeconomic projections approved
by the NAI. This obligation has not been respected only occasionally. When it was the case, the government based its
budgetary projections on more prudent assumptions than those prepared by the NAI. The NAI functions like a committee
(it has no own staff and resource) in which officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Federal Plan Bureau, the
Central Bank and the National Statistical Institute agree on macroeconomic accounts and projections. These institutions
have access to the inside information of the other institutions collected for the special purposes of the NAI. The NAI, which
is attached to the Ministry of Economic Affairs with an autonomous legal statute, works in full independence and decisions
are adopted at the majority.
To ensure a high level of independence and quality, the projections published by the NAI have to be submitted for
advice to a committee of experts including economists from the Central Bank, the Federal Planning Bureau and various
Ministries. In a subsequent step, they have to be approved by the NAI Board, which includes the highest civil servant of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Planning Bureau Commissioner, the Director
General and a civil servant of the National Statistics Institute, and two members proposed respectively by the Central Bank
and the Federal Planning Bureau. In practice, the projections discussed by the NAI are prepared by the Federal Plan Bureau
(FPB). The forecasts are largely diffused and commented in the media by professional economists and by politicians. Sev-
eral surveys recognised their quality and unbiased character.
¥1∂ The institution includes the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Federal
Ministry of Economics, the six leading independent economic research
institutes, the Federal Statistical Office, the German Federal Bank
(Bundesbank), the German Council of Economic Experts, the Finance
Ministries of the Länder and the Federal Union of Central Associations of
Local Authorities.172
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ing tax revenue estimates between the Ministry of
Finance and a leading research institute. Since 1968
the federal government has adopted the results of the
Working Party for the preparation of its medium-term
budgetary plans. It should however be stressed that the
revenues projections prepared by the Working Party
on Tax Revenue Forecasting are usually based on the
macroeconomic assumptions prepared by the German
federal government, which limits the potential bene-
fits of the work of the institution (any possible opti-
mistic bias in the macroeconomic projections of the
government may translate into an optimistic bias of
the tax revenues projections of the institution).
• The second exception is the Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). This institution
prepares forecasts for the main macroeconomic and
budgetary aggregates (including developments of
total expenditure and sub-categories and on total
revenue, divided by the different tax items and
social security contributions). Although there is no
obligation for the government to base the budget on
these projections, there are usually no major differ-
ences between the budgetary projections of the gov-
ernment and those of the CPB.
Institutions conducting independent analysis on fiscal 
policy issues
There are in the EU seventeen institutions conducting
independent analysis on fiscal policy developments.
Almost all of them provide regular analyses of budget
plans and monitor their implementation. Some of them
also provide alternative quantifications of short-term and
long-term effects of measures and reforms, and conduct
analysis on the sustainability of government finances (see
Table III.9 for more details). Finally, some institutions
examine whether budgetary plans and outcomes are con-
sistent with existing budgetary rules. Most of these bodies
are also involved in normative activities and regularly
issue recommendations in the area of fiscal policy. The
only three institutions not involved in normative activities
are the Greek KEPE (Center of Planning and Economic
Research), the Dutch CPB (see Box III.8 for a detailed
description) and the ISAE in Italy.
• In Greece, the KEPE is a Public Institute attached to
the Minister of Economy and Finance. The govern-
ing members are appointed by the government. This
institution does not have a particular mandate for
conducting independent analysis of fiscal policy
issues, but in practice fulfils such tasks in the context
of its research. It regularly issues projections and
technical advice on economic policy issues to the
Minister of Economy and Finance. The work of this
institution goes beyond fiscal policy issues.
In Italy, the ISAE (Institute for Studies and Economic
Analyses) is a research body which carries out analyses
and research on economic and social policy issues. The
ISAE also provides technical and scientific support and
advice upon request of the Ministry of Economics. Sim-
ilarly, ISAE may be called upon request of the Prime
Minister to collaborate to the analyses of the economic
policy and public finance problems and contribute to
draw up the economic policy decisions. The Parliament
regularly includes ISAE in its calendar of parliamentary
hearings on the most important documents of economic
policy (the Economic and Financial Planning Document
and the Financial Law project). Among other activities,
the ISAE provides macroeconomic and budgetary fore-
casts and conducts national and international short-,
medium- and long-term analyses, and studies on public
finances.
4.3.2. Institutions in charge of issuing normative 
statements on the conduct of fiscal policies and 
recommendations
According to the survey, there are in the EU fifteen insti-
tutions in charge of issuing normative statements or rec-
ommendations in the area of fiscal policy. There are con-
siderable differences as regards the mandate, status, and
staff composition of these institutions.
The following three broad categories can be distin-
guished (i) advisory bodies which are mandated to make
recommendations to the government; (ii) independent
research institutes; and (iii) some Court of Auditors that,
apart from their traditional task of expost monitoring and
analyses on fiscal developments, provide normative
statements and recommendations on fiscal policy issues.
Advisory bodies
According to the survey, institutions falling in this cate-
gory can be found in four EU countries (1).
¥1∂ France has recently (in 2006) created a ‘Conseil d’orientation des finances
publiques’. This institution was not in place at the moment the study was
launched (see Box III.9 for further details).173
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‘Public sector borrowing requirements’) is a coordi-
nation body that determines since 1992 the contribu-
tion of federated entities to the stabilisation function
of fiscal policy and to the respect of the EU fiscal
rules. Every year, around March, the HCF assesses
the realisation of the objectives of the Belgian inter-
nal Stability Programme. In early summer, it analy-
ses the budgetary situation and perspectives and
makes recommendations about the fiscal targets for
the short, medium and (since 2002) long term for the
whole of the public sector, the federal and regional
levels. The analyses of the HCF are limited to rec-
ommendations on the budget balances, and do not
concern issues related to the redistributive function
of fiscal policy. Since 2001 a Study Committee on
Ageing within the High Council of Finance is in
charge of approving and releasing projections of
age-related budgetary expenditures, which are pre-
viously prepared by the Federal Plan Bureau (FPB).
Box III.8: The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) started its work in September 1945. Its creation was
inspired by the financial crisis in the 1930s and it was meant to contribute to the policy preparation for the recovery of the
Dutch economy after World War II.
The main function of the CPB is to provide independent macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. The CPB pub-
lishes a forecast in spring (called the Central Economic Plan), providing the first forecast for the upcoming year. In Sep-
tember the CPB publishes the macroeconomic outlook (called the MEV), on the same day that the budget is presented to
Parliament. The macroeconomic outlook includes the proposed policy measures within the budget, the budgetary and eco-
nomic impacts of which are discussed in the document. The CPB also produces medium-term forecasts (usually in prepa-
ration of a new coalition agreement) and long-term forecasts.
Besides its work on forecasting, the CPB also makes analyses on a broad range of issues that are relevant for policy-
making in the Netherlands. CPB analyses topics like the welfare State, ageing, labour market, knowledge economics,
competition, regulation and international economics. In particular, the CPB makes independent analyses on government
finances and regularly assesses whether government policy is consistent with the policy goals and rules in force. In each
short-term forecast, the CPB analyses the recent budgetary developments. The CPB does analyse the economic conse-
quences of proposed government policy, in the short, medium and long term. It does not issue normative statements on the
objectives and policies and does not formulate policy recommendations.
The activities of the CPB and its involvement in the budgetary process are not governed by formal rules. Although
there is a Law (1947) that obliges CPB to prepare the Central Economic Plan (see above), there is no formal obligation for
the CPB to provide inputs for the preparation of the budget, to assess budgetary developments, election platforms and
coalition programmes. There is also no legal obligation for policy-makers to use the CPB projections in the preparation of
the budgetary plans. However, in practice, all government parties use the CPB forecasts as a common basis for their budget
proposals. Political parties generally submit their economic programme to the CPB ahead of the elections, for assessment.
Besides, employees’ and employers’ organisations use the CPB forecasts in their wage negotiations.
The CPB is a research institute that is independent with respect to content, but at the same time is formally part of
the central government. The CPB’s independence is respected even at times when the government disagrees with its con-
clusions. Also contributing to CPB’s independence is its funding from public resources. This provides CPB with consid-
erable freedom in determining its research agenda. Another element possibly contributing to the independence of the CPB
is that the institution places itself in an ‘expert’ position, and never interferes in political choices. The director is appointed
by the government. There is no formal rule concerning the mandate of the members of the Board of the CPB, but the posi-
tion of the director has to be formally extended every two years. There are about 170 employees (150 full-time equivalent
employees).
The analyses of the CPB generally benefit from a high media coverage, possibly resulting in public debate on the
subject. New macroeconomic forecasts always get attention of the media. The reputation of the institution reflects the qual-
ity of the analysis undertaken, the transparency of the institution, the broad scope of the fields covered (going clearly
beyond fiscal policy issues), the active contacts with the academic world and regular evaluations, which are made public.174
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of the High Council of Finance takes these projec-
tions into account for its fiscal policy recommenda-
tions.
• In Denmark, the Economic Council is an advisory
body that meets twice a year to discuss a report pre-
pared by the Chairmanship. The report contains a set
of forecast for the Danish economy and economic
analyses and recommendations related notably to
fiscal policy issues, covering the functioning of the
public sector, the tax system, fiscal sustainability,
and the appropriate fiscal stance in the prevailing
cyclical conditions. The Council also monitors the
fiscal rules in force (e.g. the 2010-plan of the Danish
government) and issues recommendations with the
view to ensure compliance.
• In Germany, the Advisory Board to the Federal Min-
istry of Finance (Board) is an independent body
which advises the Federal Minister of Finance on
fiscal policy issues. The advices are made public in
reports and contribute to feed the public policy
debate. Another institution, the Joint Economic
Forecast made up of the six leading research insti-
tutes (JEF) formulates recommendations in the area
of fiscal policy (1). Twice a year, this institution pub-
lishes a report which contains policy recommenda-
tions, notably on fiscal policy issues. Another
important institution in Germany is the Council of
Experts for the Assessment of Overall Economic
Trends. In line with the mission assigned to it by
law, this institution produces and publishes annually
a report on the state of the economy as a whole and
the foreseeable macroeconomic developments in
Germany. The federal government has to respond to
the Annual Report in Parliament in short delays. The
government is free to prepare the budget using its
own macroeconomic assumptions, but it has to pub-
licly justify the deviations from the macroeconomic
projections produced by the Council.
• In Austria, the Government Debt Committee makes
written recommendations in the area of fiscal policy,
taking economic conditions into consideration. It
also provides budgetary forecasts and analysis of
fiscal policy issues. This institution makes public in
a report its recommendations to the Federal Minister
of Finance (the report includes the main results of
the researches and analyses).
The composition of these institutions varies considera-
bly from one case to another. It is generally relatively
broad, which contributes to protect the instititution
against possible political pressures from the government.
In Belgium, the High Council of Finance (section ‘Pub-
lic sector borrowing requirements’) is made up of twelve
Members from the academia, the Government and the
Central Bank. In Denmark, the Economic Council is
made up of 29 members from the academia, the Govern-
ment, the Central Bank, trade unions and employers. In
Germany, the Advisory Board to the Federal Ministry of
Finance consists of about 25 members, mainly univer-
sity professors of economics or law with a special
knowledge of fiscal policy issues. The Council of
Experts for the Assessment of Overall Economic Trends
is a body of academic policy advisers which consists of
five independent members with special academic knowl-
edge of economics and experience on national economic
policy issues. Finally, in Austria the governing board of
the Government Debt Committee is made up of twelve
experts in the area of public finances who are appointed
by the government.
There are also differences in the status and administra-
tive position of these institutions. In Belgium, the High
Council of Finance is attached to the Ministry of Eco-
nomics and its independence benefits from the fact that
its members are appointed upon proposals of various
institutions (Ministry of Finance, Regional Governments
and Central Bank) and cannot hold political mandates.
The Danish Economic Council resides under the Minis-
try of Economic and Business Affairs, but in practice
works in full independence since the Minister has no
mandate to decide which analysis the chairmanship
should carry out or what the conclusions should be. In
Germany, the independence of the Council of Experts for
the Assessment of Overall Economic Trends is ensured
by Law (from the year 1963). The Advisory Board to the
Federal Ministry of Finance is a completely independent
body which advises the Federal Minister of Finance on
all questions of fiscal policy. In Austria, the Government
Debt Committee is attached to the Austrian National
Bank.
There are also considerable differences as regards the
formal role of such institutions in the fiscal policy
debate. In Belgium, the government has to follow the
recommendations on the fiscal targets of the federated¥1∂ This institution also provides macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. 175
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Moreover, the annual report of the HCF is annexed to the
budget and the chairman of the section is regularly audi-
tioned by the Parliament. In Denmark, the Economic
Council has no authority to ensure that its recommenda-
tions are followed by the government, and is not
involved in the budgetary process. Its recommendations,
which find a large visibility in the media, influence deci-
sions through the public debate. In Germany, the Coun-
cil of Experts for the Assessment of Overall Economic
Trends plays no part in the drafting and passage of the
budget but the federal government is required by law to
respond to its Annual Report in Parliament within eight
weeks following its publication. Its recommendations
find a large visibility in the media and influence deci-
sions through the public debate. As regards the Austrian
Government Debt Committee, the report on the recom-
mendations made to the Federal Minister of Finance has
to be presented by the Federal Minister of Finance to the
National Council and Federal Government.
Research institutes
Some research institutes, which are not specifically man-
dated to issue normative statements or recommendations
in the area of fiscal policy, in practice contribute to the
fiscal policy debate. According to the survey, the only
one research institute regularly issuing normative state-
ments and recommendations on fiscal policy issues is
the Swedish National Institute of Economic Research
(NIER), which is an agency under the Ministry of
Finance, which also produces macroeconomic and budg-
etary forecasts. The NIER uses its forecasts as a basis for
its assessment of the economic, fiscal and wage develop-
ments and for its advices on fiscal and other economic
policy issues. The Institute provides regular analysis and
formulates recommendations on fiscal policy orienta-
tion. It has no formal role in the budget process, no for-
mal mandate in the area of fiscal policy, and the govern-
ment is free to accept or ignore its recommendations.
However, this institution plays in practice an important
role in the internal fiscal policy debate. Its forecasts of
public finances developments, assessments of compli-
ance with fiscal rules and regular advices on the appro-
priate fiscal stance find a large visibility in the media.
Court of Auditors
The last category concerns the Court of Auditors. As
already mentioned, these institutions were considered in
the study only if their activities go beyond the control of
public accounts. These institutions have specific charac-
teristics and deserve a particular treatment compared to
the advisory bodies and research institutes described
above, for several reasons. First, the main task of these
institutions is the control public accounts and such insti-
tutions exist in all EU Member States. Second, they are
fully independent from the executive and their status is
generally enshrined in constitution. Finally, the Court of
Auditors generally have competences in the retrospec-
tive assessment of the implementation of the budget
plans (as will be seen below, there are some exceptions).
Seven countries provided replies concerning their Court
of Auditors and therefore considered that the task of this
institution goes beyond the ex post monitoring and
analysis on fiscal developments: Estonia, France, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United King-
dom. In all these countries, the Court of Auditors issues
normative statements or recommendations in the area of
fiscal policy. In four countries, the recommendations are
issued with a clear forward-looking orientation (norma-
tive judgments on the plausibility of budgetary plans,
respect of the fiscal policy rules and alternative estimates
on the budgetary impact of policy measures included in
the budget). It is worth noting that apart from the Luxem-
bourg case, these institutions do not provide independent
forecasts, which contrasts with the significant number of
advisory bodies releasing both forecasts and analyses (1).
Among the Court of Auditors considered in the survey
the following cases are particularly interesting.
• In the UK, the main role of the National Audit Office
(NAO) is to scrutinise public spending on behalf of
Parliament. However, since 1997, this institution has
also the mandate to audit the key assumptions underly-
ing the fiscal projections, e.g. trend growth, price
developments, unemployment projections, with access
to all relevant government documents. The NAO
reports on whether the key assumptions for the prepa-
ration of the budget can be considered reasonable and
cautious. Its statements are confined to the assumptions
underpinning the fiscal projections, and do not concern
the overall stance of fiscal policy or performance
against the Government’s fiscal rules. The Treasury is
not obliged to follow the NAO’s recommendations
concerning the key assumptions underpinning the fis-
cal projections, but in practice generally does.
¥1∂ The ‘Cour des Comptes’ of Luxembourg provides revenue forecasts for
the current year. In its analysis of the draft budget for year n+1, the plausi-
bility of the n+1 revenue forecast in the draft budget is assessed on the
basis of a ‘Cour des Comptes’ revenue forecast for the year n.176
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(Continued on the next page)
This box provides a short description of the institutions that were not considered in the analysis. A number of differ-
ent reasons motivated the decision not to consider some institutions in the analysis: some of them could not be considered
as independent, since they consist of meetings between elected representatives of different levels of government; some of
them are not primarily financed by public funds; some of them issue statements that are confidential; finally, some insti-
tutions not yet in force in 2005 (when the study was started) or dealing only marginally, occasionally or with very specific
aspects of fiscal policy were not included. This does not mean that the institutions listed below do not contribute to sound
fiscal policies. The exclusion was indeed primarily motivated to ensure a sufficient homogeneity of the sample.
(i) Institutions that were not considered as independent institutions
Spanish Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy (CPFF). This institution conducts the coordination between the Central
and the Regional Governments. It brings together the State Ministers of Economy and Finance and the State Public Admin-
istration’s Minister with 19 Regional Ministers of Finances. It assesses the overall fiscal objective for the Autonomous
Communities, sets out the individual fiscal objectives for each Regional Government and makes normative statements con-
cerning the compliance with these objectives. By Law, regional governments and the central government have to follow
the objectives set out by the CPFF for each Autonomous Community.
German Financial Planning Council. In Germany, the coordination of the budgets and financial plans of the different lev-
els of government is undertaken in the Financial Planning Council, which operates since 1968. The members of the Finan-
cial Planning Council are the Federal Ministers of Finance and of Economics, the Finance Ministers of the Länder as well
as representatives of municipalities and associations of municipalities. The Deutsche Bundesbank has the right to partici-
pate to the sessions of the Financial Planning Council.
German Interdepartmental Working Party. Within the German Government, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs is
in charge of producing forecasts of aggregate economic development in close cooperation and coordination with the Fed-
eral Ministry of Finance. The Interdepartmental Working Party (IWP) notably prepares the projections used in budgetary
and fiscal planning. The IWP is under the supervision of a steering group consisting of the Finance Ministry, the Economics
Ministry, the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Security.
(ii) Institution whose work is confidential
Economic Council of Finland. The Economic Council of Finland was established in 1966. It is an advisory body chaired
by the Prime Minister. Its main objective is to facilitate cooperation between the Government, the Bank of Finland and
major interest groups. The Council meets at least once a month to discuss economic and social issues that are of central
importance (related to growth, stabilisation and incomes policy and questions of a structural nature). The discussions in the
Council are confidential. The Economic Council is generally consulted (but there is no obligation) in the course of the
budgetary process.
(iii) Institutions not primary financed by public funds
‘Chambres Professionnelles’ in Luxembourg. Six different ‘Chambres’ (agriculture, trade, private sector employees, pub-
lic sector employees, craft and engineering, labour and employment) were created by law in 1924. These professional asso-
ciations provide an opinion on the draft laws which are likely to have consequences in any of their specific sector. They
give also their opinion on the draft budget. The Government has to consult the ‘Chambres Professionnelles’ in the course
of the budgetary process but the government is not obliged to publicly respond or to follow the recommendations.
(iv) Institutions not yet in force when the study was started
Spanish State Agency for Evaluation of Public Policies and the Quality of Services. This body assesses public policies and
the quality of public services. Its mission is to improve effectiveness and efficiency on the allocation of public resources.
It provides evaluations and recommendations. The government has the possibility to consult the Agency in the course of
the budgetary process. The Agency is attached to the government. Its creation is now under discussion in the Parliament
and was expected to be approved in May 2006.178
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statements when it considers the official projections
of some revenues or expenditure as not plausible.
The office may notably warn the government for
possible risks of overspending or if it considers that
projections for some revenues are overoptimistic.
This analysis is made on the basis of the macroeco-
nomic assumptions of the budget law.
4.4. Link with budgetary outcomes and 
conclusions from the analysis 
of the questionnaires
Assessing the influence of the institutions covered by the
study on the conduct of fiscal policy is by nature diffi-
cult. However, combining descriptive analysis, the result
of existing studies on the subject and the answers form
the questionnaires, it is possible to draw tentative con-
clusions on the possible contribution of such institutions
to fiscal discipline. The questionnaires and economic lit-
erature also raise a number of considerations on the ele-
ments that favour a larger influence of independent insti-
tutions on fiscal policy.
4.4.1. Link with budgetary outcomes
Existing studies and answers form the questionnaires
suggest that independent institutions can make a signiﬁ-
cant contribution to ﬁscal discipline.
Delegation of forecasting activity
As shown by Jonung and Larch (2004), in countries
where the task of the preparation of the macroeconomic
forecasts underlying the budget is delegated to an inde-
pendent authority, the macroeconomic forecasts have no
statistically significant bias, while, such a bias exists in
some of the other countries where the government is in
charge of the preparation of the forecasts. These conclu-
sions are consistent with those reached earlier by Haller-
berg et al. (2001), who showed that, where an independ-
ent agency is in charge of the macroeconomic forecasts,
growth projections are more cautious than in countries
where the government makes the predictions. These two
studies provide convincing evidence that independent
forecasting institutions can contribute to remove the pos-
sible biases in the macroeconomic projections used for
fiscal planning, thereby contributing to addressing one
of the causes for the deficit bias.
Impact on the public debate and credibility
Responses to the questionnaires show that, in about
70 percent of cases, the analysis, forecasts or recommen-
dations issued by the independent institution considered
benefit from a large coverage in the media and possibly
trigger a public debate. Only in one third of cases, there
seems to be a modest interest by the media and public
opinion to the analysis of the institution. This suggests
that independent institutions have a significant influence
on the public debate.   
Follow up to recommendations issued by the institutions
In more than half of the cases, there is a perception that
recommendations issued by independent institutions are
followed by the government. A number of question-
naires indicate that the analysis carried out by the insti-
tutions considered in the study triggered in the past sig-
nificant policy debates and inflections. These elements
are probably related to the fact that the institutions in
place are highly credible. According to the replies to the
questionnaires, the analysis undertaken by the institu-
tions are never considered to be below standard, and, in
Box III.9 (continued)
French Orientation Council of Public Finances. This Council has been created in March 2006 and is directly attached to
the Prime Minister. Its mission is to analyse the situation of public finances and to assess the challenges related the sus-
tainability of government finances. Each year, after the budget is adopted and before the National Conference of public
finances is held, a report is prepared for the Prime Minister and is then published. The Council can formulate proposals
and recommendations to ensure the respect of the fiscal rules in force and of the budgetary objectives of the government.
(v) Institution dealing only occasionally with fiscal policy issues
Economic and Social Council in Spain. It is a consultative council in socioeconomic and labour issues which was estab-
lished in 1991. The 1978 Spanish Constitution foresees the creation of such a council bringing together business organisa-
tions, trade unions and other professional organizations. Its main objective is to offer to civil society the opportunity to
cooperate with the government by giving their opinion on relevant economic issues. The Council belongs to the Ministry
of Labour and Social Affaires but has full operational and functional autonomy from the government to perform its tasks.179
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2 0 0 6more than two-thirds of cases, are considered above or
well above standards.
Contribution to fiscal discipline
As illustrated in Graph III.14 in more than 90 percent of
cases, the institution is considered to have contributed to
fiscal discipline. This can be considered a remarkable
result. This is consistent with the fact that countries in
which such institutions exist exhibit better budgetary
results. As shown by Graph III.15 countries having inde-
pendent institutions have had, over the last ten years, bet-
ter budgetary results than others. On average, countries
having at least one independent institution had a larger
primary surplus and the general government debt ratio
has on average gone down in the last ten years, which is
not the case in the group of countries with no independ-
ent institutions. Moreover, Member States where institu-
Graph III.13:  Perception of respondents on the visibility of the analysis made by independent 
institutions
Graph III.14:  Perception of respondents on the quality of the analysis made by independent institutions 
and their impact on fiscal discipline
Modest interest of media
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High level of media activity related
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High level of media activity
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to-GDP ratio over the last ten years while in other coun-
tries this ratio has increased.
These results must be interpreted with caution and hasty
conclusions should be avoided. A key consideration is
indeed whether the causality runs from institutions to
outcomes or the other way round. On the one hand, the
argument that the causality may run from budgetary out-
comes to institutions is based on the observation that fis-
cal rules and institutional reform have generally been
introduced in response to dissatisfaction with budgetary
outcomes or/and because governments had a strong pref-
erence for budgetary discipline. On the other hand, the
argument that budgetary institutions can be considered
as an explanatory factor for budgetary outcomes is that
the large majority of the institutions considered in the
study existed well before the beginning of the period
covered and that such institutions change very slowly
over time so that it is reasonable to assume that they are
exogenous (1).
4.4.2. General considerations inspired 
by the answers to the questionnaires
Answers to the questionnaires and literature (see notably
IMF, 2005) prompt a number of considerations on the
elements that favour a larger influence of independent
fiscal institutions. The following points seem particu-
larly relevant.
The credibility and reputation of the instititution are key 
parameters
A key element seems to be related to the reputation of
the institution. Since there is in general no formal obliga-
tion for the government to take into account the fore-
casts, analysis and recommendations formulated by the
independent institutions, their influence generally
depends on their capacity to impact on the public debate.
The quality of the analysis undertaken has therefore to be
considered above standards (which is generally the
case), and there should be a high degree of transparency
on the work of the institution. The results of the analysis
and the underlying assumptions as well as the models
and data used should be easily accessible. The appoint-
ment of the staff should preferably be based on profes-
sional capabilities in the fields of economics rather than
on any other consideration.
In this respect, the nature of the tasks fulfilled by the
institution has some relevance. As seen above, institu-
tions can cover ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ activities. An
¥1∂ It may also be the case that both budgetary institutions and budgetary out-
comes may be a function of a third variable of voter preferences (Poterba
(1996)). If this view is right, then countries with a strong preference for
particular types of budgetary outcomes use the institutions as tools for
reaching particular budgetary results.
Graph III.15:  Budgetary developments in countries with and without independent institutions 
(1995-2005)
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2 0 0 6open issue is whether it is desirable that the same institu-
tion participates to both types of activities. On the one
hand, it can be argued that the quality of normative state-
ments and policy recommendations would benefit from
the production of independent forecasts and analysis. On
the other hand, there are good arguments for considering
that the activities should be clearly separated. The repu-
tation and independence of institutions operating in the
area of ‘positive’ economics could be affected if these
institutions started issuing normative statements on the
conduct of fiscal policy. The government could be
tempted, in the event of negative statements by the inde-
pendent instititution, to criticise in return the institution.
This could weight on the reputation of the institution and
thus undermine the credibility of its work related to ‘pos-
itive’ activities. Interestingly, it seems that the most
influent institutions in charge of ‘positive analysis’ in the
EU stay in a modest ‘expert’ position and try not to inter-
fere in political choices.
A direct involvement of the institution in the budget 
process is preferable
A direct involvement of the institution in the budget
process can also be considered a positive factor.
Although this is neither necessary nor a guarantee for
ensuring a sufficient influence of the Council (there are
counter-examples in the EU), it can be considered that a
direct involvement may allow the independent institu-
tion to convey its messages in a more direct and efficient
way. The strongest involvement would imply that the
draft budget has to be approved by the independent insti-
tution. So far this option has not been implemented in the
EU. However, other less strict arrangements are cur-
rently in place in some EU countries. The most wide-
spread options consist of regular hearings of the institu-
tion by the Parliament, consultations by the government
in the course of the budgetary process, or the obligation
of the government to justify departures from the fore-
casts or recommendations of the independent instititu-
tion.
Autonomy, independence and ownership
Autonomy and independence are other important ele-
ments. Firstly, there should be some guarantees related
to the financing of the institution, which should be pri-
marily based on public funds. Legal provisions may be
useful to protect the instititution in possible unfavour-
able political environments. Independence is however
not necessarily ensured by a particular status, and the
benefits of independence should be weighted against the
limitations to access to internal information, especially
for the institutions in charge of forecasts. In this particu-
lar case, independence within government can be a good
solution, since it can potentially ensure full access to
internal information and a satisfactory ownership of
institutions’ output by the government.
Finally, a high degree of ownership seems to be a key
condition for success. The country-specific dimension is
crucial, and there is no ideal arrangement that could be
transposed in all Member States (1). In order to ensure a
high degree of ownership, the institution should prefer-
ably have a clear and unambiguous mandate, broadly
accepted by the public opinion. This is particularly
important for cases in which there is a legal obligation
for the government to take into account the analysis
made by the independent institution.
4.4.3. Main conclusions and findings from the study
The survey on national independent institutions shows
that national bodies other than government and Parlia-
ment which are providing inputs, analysis or recommen-
dation in the area of ﬁscal policy exist in ﬁfteen EU
Member States, thirteen of them being former EU-15
countries. Contrasting with the conclusion reached for
numerical ﬁscal rules, there is no visible tendency
towards the development of such institutions in the EU
Member States. The analysis shows that there is a great
deal of variety in the type of institutions in place. Two
major categories of institutions can be distinguished:
(i) institutions in charge of providing forecasts or/and
conducting positive analyses on ﬁscal policy issues; and
(ii) institutions issuing normative statements and recom-
mendations on the conduct of ﬁscal policy. Some insti-
tutions pertain to both groups.
As regards the activity of macroeconomic forecasting,
results of the survey suggest that, in most of cases, gov-
ernments rely on ‘home-made’ forecasts for the prepara-
tion of the budget and the Stability and Convergence
Programmes. There are, in the whole EU, three excep-
tions to this rule. Interestingly, the basis for the forecast
to be used for the budget preparation differs considera-
bly: in two cases, there is no formal obligation for the
government, while there is a legal requirement in the
third case. According to the results of the survey, there
are in the EU twelve independent institutions in charge
¥1∂ An illustration of this is that the influence of international organisations
(IMF, COM), which fulfil a number of the typical tasks potentially cov-
ered by national independent institutions (forecasting, analysis of fiscal
developments, of compliance with fiscal rules), varies significantly
depending on the country.182
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the government remains free to base the budget on its
own assumptions for revenues and expenditure.
Fifteen institutions in charge of issuing normative state-
ments or recommendations in the area of fiscal policy are
currently in place in the EU countries. These institutions
have different mandate, status, and composition. In most
of cases, however, the independent institution has no
authority to ensure that its recommendations are fol-
lowed by the government, and the recommendations
may influence policy decisions through public debate.
Assessing the influence of the institutions covered by
the study on the conduct of fiscal policy is by nature
difficult. However, combining descriptive analysis, the
result of existing studies on the subject and the answers
from the questionnaires, it is possible to draw tentative
conclusions on the possible contribution of such insti-
tutions to fiscal discipline and the elements that favour
a large influence of independent institutions on fiscal
policy:
• Since there is in general no formal obligation for the
government to take into account the analysis and
recommendations formulated by the independent
institutions in place, their influence generally
depends on their capacity to impact on the public
debate and to increase reputation costs for the con-
duct of unsound policies. A high degree of credibil-
ity of the institution and a strong ownership of its
work by governments seem to be key conditions for
success.
• The institutions in place seem to have a considerable
impact on the public debate. In most of cases, fore-
casts or recommendations issued by independent
institutions benefit from large media coverage. Del-
egation of the forecasting activity seems to be an
efficient way to address possible optimistic biases in
macroeconomic projections. This is confirmed by
the answers to the questionnaire and empirical stud-
ies. Recommendations from independent institu-
tions are generally followed by governments.
According to replies to the questionnaires, the qual-
ity of the analysis undertaken by the institutions is,
in more than two-thirds of cases, considered above
or well above standards and there is a general per-
ception that such institutions contributed to fiscal
discipline.183
Annex 1. Numerical fiscal rules considered 
in the study
Country Type of rule 
Definition of 
the rule (agregate 
targeted & relevant 
accounting system)
Sector(s) covered Time frame Statutory base Body in charge of 
monitoring
Enforcement 
(body & actions 
in case of 
non-compliance)
Austria Budget balance rule Budget balance as a 
 % of GDP
ESA95 accounting
Central, regional and 
local governments
Multiannual
(4 years)
Legal act (based on 
Constitution)
Governmental 
structure 
(Committee with 
central, regional and 
local government 
representatives)
Governmental 
structure
Possibility of 
sanctions
Belgium Expenditure rule (in 
the convergence 
process leading to 
EMU qualification)
Real expenditure 
growth rate
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual
(4 years)
Coalition agreement Independent (Court 
of Auditors and the 
High Council of 
Finance) and 
National Parliament.
Governmental 
structure
No pre-defined 
action
Revenue rule (in the 
convergence process 
leading to EMU 
qualification)
Nominal growth of 
fiscal revenues in 
relation to nominal 
GDP growth
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual
(4 years)
Coalition agreement No body Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Expenditure rule Real expenditure 
growth rate
Budgetary 
accounting 
(consistent with 
ESA95)
Social security Multiannual
(4 years)
Legal act Independent (Court 
of Auditors and Wise 
Men Committee) 
and National 
Parliament
Government 
(Ministry of Health), 
possibly social 
partners
Automatic 
mechanism if 
sanction
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Social security Multiannual
(4 years)
Coalition agreement Governmental 
structure (Ministries 
of Budget and Social 
Affairs)
Governmental 
structure (Ministries 
of Budget and Social 
Affairs)
No pre-defined 
action
Budget balance rule Real expenditure 
growth rate
ESA95 accounting
Regional 
government
Multiannual
(5 years)
Political agreement 
between central and 
regional 
governments (1)
Independent (High 
Council of Finance)
Governmental 
structure
Possibility of 
sanctions
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Independent (High 
Council of Finance) 
and regional 
Government
Governmental 
structure (regional 
government) 
corrects possible 
slippages by taking 
appropriate actions
Czech 
Republic
Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure ceiling
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual
(3 years)
Political agreement 
(medium-term 
expenditure 
framework 
enshrined in legal 
act
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
None
No pre-defined 
action; government 
provides 
explanations in case 
of non-compliance
Debt rule Limit on debt service
Budgetary 
accounting
Regional and local 
governments
Annual Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government
Corrective measures 
are proposed — 
possibility of 
sanctions
Denmark Expenditure rule Real expenditure 
growth rate
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action 
Revenue rule Limits on direct or 
indirect tax rates (tax 
freeze)
General government n.a. Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action184
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Budget balance rule Target as a % of GDP 
in structural terms
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual
(up to 2010)
Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Estonia Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
General government Multiannual Coalition agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government and 
national Parliament
No pre-defined 
action; possibility of 
cuts in expenditure if 
revenue shortfall
Debt rule Debt limits as a  % of 
budgeted revenues
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government and 
national Parliament
Proposition of 
corrective measures 
(possible reduction 
in transfers)
Finland Expenditure rule Real expenditure 
ceiling
Budgetary accounting
Central government Multiannual
(5 years)
Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Governmental 
structure proposes 
corrective measures
Budget balance rule Budget balance as % 
GDP
ESA95 accounting
Central government Multiannual
(5 years)
Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Governmental 
structure
No pre-defined 
action (political 
pressure to ensure 
compliance)
Debt rule Debt to GDP ratio 
has to be reduced
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual
(5 years)
Political agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Governmental 
structure
No pre-defined 
action (political 
pressure to ensure 
compliance)
Revenue rule Allocation of 
revenue surpluses
ESA95 accounting
Social security Multiannual 
(business cycle)
Legal act Governmental 
structure (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
Health).
Independent 
enforcer
No pre-defined 
action
Budget balance rule Budget balance rule 
in nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Multiannual
(4 years)
Legal act Independent 
(auditing 
committees) and 
governmental 
structure (Ministry of 
Interior)
Same as monitoring
Preparation of plans 
to cover eventual 
deficits, possible 
personal 
admonitions
France Expenditure rule Real expenditure 
growth rate
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Annual Political agreement Independent (Court 
of Auditors) and 
National Parliament
No pre-defined 
action in case of 
non-compliance
Revenue rule The government has 
to pre-define the 
allocation of possible 
higher-than-expected 
tax revenue
Budgetary accounting
Central government Annual Legal act Independent (Court 
of Auditors) and 
National Parliament
No pre-defined 
action in case of 
non-compliance
Expenditure rule Ceiling in volume for 
health expenditure 
growth rate
ESA95 accounting
Social security Annual Legal act Independent Alert 
Committee and 
Court of Auditors
Independent Alert 
Committee proposes 
corrective measures
Budget balance rule Golden rule
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Independent 
(regional Court of 
Auditors)
Obligation to 
propose corrective 
measures
Germany Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Annual Constitution and 
legal act
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
and National 
Parliament
Possibility of a 
challenge at 
Constitutional Court
No pre- defined 
action
Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure growth 
rate
Budgetary 
accounting
Central and regional 
governments
Multiannual
(5 years)
Political agreement 
between central and 
regional 
governments
Governmental 
structure (Financial 
Planning Council with 
central, regional and 
local members)
None (Financial 
Planning Council can 
criticise rule violations 
and deviations)
No pre-defined action185
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Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms 
(golden rule)
Budgetary 
accounting
Regional 
government
Annual Constitution Government 
(Ministries of 
Finance of Länders)
None, but possibility 
of a legal challenge 
at the Constitutional 
Court
No pre-defined 
action
Debt rule Specific amount of 
debt in nominal 
terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual
(1 or 2 years)
Legal act Governmental 
structure (Communal 
Supervisory Agencies 
of the Länder)
Governmental 
structure
Permission for 
credits refused
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Governmental 
structure (Communal 
Supervisory Agencies 
of the Länder)
Governmental 
structure
Clear actions are 
foreseen in case of 
non-compliance
Hungary Debt rule Ceiling in proportion 
with capacity to 
repay debt
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act No official body
(supervision of 
private banks)
None
No pre-defined 
action
Ireland Expenditure rule Automatic allocation 
of expenditure to 
the National Pension 
Reserve Fund
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government
No pre-defined 
action
Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure ceiling
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual
(5 years)
Legal act Governmental 
structure
Ministry of Finance
No pre-defined 
action
Budget balance rule Budget balance 
nominal terms
ESA95 accounting
Local government Annual Political agreement Ministry of finance 
and governmental 
structure
Government
Limits imposed on 
borrowing of local 
authorities
Italy Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure ceiling
ESA95 accounting
Central and regional 
government
Annual Legal act and 
internal pact 
between central and 
regional 
government
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
and governmental 
structure (Italian 
Pharmaceutical 
Agency-Ministry of 
Health)
Governmental 
structure
Corrective actions
Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure growth 
rate
Targets set in ESA95 
(monitoring based 
on budgetary 
accounting)
Regional and local 
government
Multiannual
(3 years)
Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Independent 
Automatic sanction 
mechanism
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Targets in ESA95 
accounting
Regional 
government
Multiannual
(3 years)
Legal act Board of 
Performance 
Assessors (with 
central and regional 
government 
representatives)
Government
Automatic 
correction 
mechanism and 
possibility of 
financial sanctions
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
(excl. capital revenue 
and expenditure)
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Multiannual Constitution and 
legal act
Independent (Court 
of Auditors), 
Government 
(Ministry of Finance).
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Latvia Revenue rule Actual revenues 
must cover 
completely the 
special government 
budget
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government, 
social security
Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
and governmental 
structure (The State 
Treasury)
Governmental 
structure (The State 
Treasury)
No pre-defined 
action186
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Debt rule Debt ceiling in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Political agreement Independent Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Lithuania Debt rule Maximum possible 
net borrowing by 
the central 
government
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Annual Legal act Independent Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Governmental 
structure (Council of 
Municipality)
Government and 
National Parliament
Possibility of 
sanctions and of 
clam to the Court (2)
Luxembourg Expenditure rule Over the medium-
term, nominal 
expenditure increase 
in line with nominal 
GDP
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual Coalition agreement None None
No pre-defined 
action
Debt rule The debt-to-GDP 
ratio should remain 
moderate (new debt 
only to finance rail 
infrastructure 
projects)
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Multiannual Coalition agreement None None
No pre-defined 
action
Budget balance rule Reserve funds for 
healthcare, long-term 
healthcare and 
pension private sector 
schemes
Budgetary accounting
Social security Annual and
Multiannual
Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Social 
Security)
Governmental 
structure
Corrective measures
Netherlands Expenditure rule Real expenditure 
ceiling
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual
(4 years)
Coalition agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
proposes corrective 
measures
Revenue rule Allocation of higher-
than-expected 
revenues
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual
(4 years)
Coalition agreement Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
proposes corrective 
measures
Poland Debt rule Ceiling in terms of 
debt/GDP ratio
Budgetary 
accounting
General government Annual Constitution and 
legal act
Independent 
(Supreme Audit 
Office) and National 
Parliament
Government, 
Independent body 
(Supreme Audit 
Office) and national 
Parliament
Government 
proposes corrective 
measures.
Portugal Budget balance rule Budget balance 
in nominal terms
Budgetary accounting
Central government Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government (Ministry 
of Finance)
No pre-defined action
Budget balance rule Budget balance in 
nominal terms
ESA accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Government (Ministry 
of Finance) and 
governmental 
structure (Directorate 
General for Local 
Government)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action and possibility 
of imposing actions
Slovakia Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure ceiling
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government Annual Political agreement Independent 
(Supreme Audit 
Office), Government 
and National 
Parliament 
Independent 
(Supreme Audit 
Office, National 
Parliament)
Obligation to take 
effective measures 187
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monitoring
Enforcement 
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Debt rule Limits on total debt 
and annual 
repayments as a % 
of real current 
incomes of t-1 
budget year.
Budgetary 
accounting
Regional and local 
government
Annual Legal act Independent 
(Supreme Audit 
Office) and 
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government
Possibility of 
sanctions
Slovenia Debt rule Ceiling of debt/GDP 
ratio
Budgetary 
accounting
General government Multiannual
(4 years) (3)
Coalition agreement Governmental 
structure
Governmental 
structure proposes 
corrective measures
Debt rule Limit on local 
government’s total 
stock of debt
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Independent (Court 
of Auditors) and 
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Spain Budget balance rule Budget balance as % 
of GDP
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual
(3 years)
Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
and governmental 
structure
Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
presents corrective 
plan with 
appropriate actions
Debt rule Debt level in 
nominal terms
ESA95 accounting
Regional 
government
Annual Agreement between 
central and regional 
government
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Possibility of 
sanctions
Debt rule Limit in the debt 
level
Budgetary 
accounting
Regional 
government
Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
Government 
(Ministry of Finance)
No pre-defined 
action
Debt rule Ceiling for local 
government debt as 
a % of current 
revenue.
Budgetary 
accounting
Local government Annual Legal act Government 
(Ministry of Finance) 
and Regional 
government
Government or 
Regional 
government
Local government 
designs financial 
plan to be met in 
3 years.
Sweden Budget balance rule Budget balance 
target in structural 
terms.
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual 
(business cycle)
Government 
commitment, 
endorsed by 
Parliament
Independent (Court 
of Auditors) 
Government and 
National Parliament 
Government
No pre-defined 
action
Expenditure rule Nominal 
expenditure ceiling 
for central 
government and 
extra old-age 
pension system 
expenditures
Budgetary 
accounting
Central government 
and social security
Multiannual
(3 years)
Legal act Independent (Court 
of Auditors), 
Government and 
National Parliament 
Government
Obligation to correct 
by appropriate 
actions
United 
Kingdom
Budget balance rule  % of GDP (average 
across the cycle)
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual
(economic cycle)
Legal act Independent 
(National Audit 
Office), Ministry of 
Finance, Treasury and 
National Parliament
Government
Appropriate actions 
have to be taken (4)
Debt rule Ceiling for the 
government debt at 
level as a % of GDP
ESA95 accounting
General government Multiannual 
(economic cycle)
Legal act Independent. 
(National Audit 
Office), Ministry of 
Finance, Treasury 
and National 
Parliament
Government 
(ministry of Finance)
Appropriate actions 
have to be taken
(1) Domestic Stability Pact not enshrined in legal act.
(2) Administrative responsibility: The supervisor authorised by the Government has the right to submit a claim to the court in the case of infringement of legal acts.
(3) From 2000 to 2004.
(4) The Code for Fiscal Stability states that, ‘The Government may depart from its ﬁscal objectives and operating rules temporarily, provided that it speciﬁes: (a) the
reasons for departing from the previous ﬁscal policy objectives and operating rules; (b) the approach and period of time that the Government intends to take to
return to the previous ﬁscal policy objectives and operating rules; and (c) The ﬁscal policy objectives and ooperating rules that shall apply over this period.’188
Annex 2: Independent fiscal institutions 
considered in the study
Country Institution Date of creation of the institution
Tasks related to fiscal 
policy issues fulfilled 
by the institution 
(analysis / forecasts / 
recommendations)
Output from the 
Institution
(Publications, 
Variables projected, 
nature of 
Recommendations)
Role of the institution 
in the budgetary 
process and constraint 
(if any) for the 
government to use the 
output of the 
insititution
Status / composition of 
the governing board / 
indications on the size 
of the institution
Austria Institute for Advanced 
Studies (IHS)
1963 Analyses economic 
trends and supplies 
short- to medium-term 
economic forecasts
Publications: regular 
reports including 
forecasts and analysis
Variables projected: 
main macroeconomic 
variables, general 
government balance 
and debt (including for 
sub-sectors of general 
government)
HIS is generally 
consulted (no 
obligation) by the 
government in the 
course of the budgetary 
process
No obligation for the 
government to use the 
forecasts of the IHS
Status: Independent 
research institute
Composition: Board of 
trustees (politicians, civil 
servant, central bankers, 
Industry) and Advisory 
Council (international 
academics)
Staff: 60 scientific and 
26 administrative
Institute of Economic 
Research (WIFO)
 n.a Analyses national and 
international economic 
trends
Provides short- to 
medium-term economic 
forecasts
Publications: Regular 
reports (monthly, 
quarterly) and Working 
Papers
Variables projected: 
main macroeconomic 
variables, general 
government balance 
and debt level (including 
for sub-sectors of 
general government)
WIFO is generally 
consulted by the 
government in the 
course of the budgetary 
process. There is no 
obligation for the 
government to use the 
WIFO’s forecasts but 
deviations from WIFO’s 
macroeconomic 
projections have to be 
publicly justified
Status: Independent 
economic research 
institute Composition: 
Scientific Board 
(international 
economists) and 
Executive Committee 
(civil servants and Social 
partners)
Staff: 100 qualified 
researchers
Government Debt 
Committee (STA)
 1970 Analyses the 
sustainability and 
quality of government 
finances.
The STA also issues 
written policy 
recommendations.
Publications: annual 
reports on public 
finances
Recommendations: the 
instititution issues 
recommendations on 
fiscal policy and 
financing
The Federal Minister of 
Finance presents a 
report (including 
recommendations) 
prepared by the STA to 
the national Council and 
Federal Government. 
There is no obligation 
for the government to 
follow the STA’s 
recommendations.
Status: attached to the 
Austrian National Bank
Composition: 12 experts 
in the areas of finance 
and budgetary activities
Staff: provided by the 
Austrian National Bank
Belgium High Council of Finance 
(HCF)- Section ‘Public 
sector borrowing 
requirements"
HCF was created in 1936. 
The section ‘Public 
sector borrowing 
requirements’ was 
created in 1989 
(mandate extended in 
1992 and 2002)
Analyses budget 
developments
Verifies whether 
budgetary 
developments are in 
accordance with existing 
financial objectives for 
the federated entities
Issues recommendations 
about the fiscal targets 
for the whole public 
sector, the federal and 
regional levels
Publications: a first 
report monitors the 
achievement of the 
fiscal targets; a second 
report (the annual 
Report) analyses the 
budgetary situation of 
the public sector as a 
whole and of the 
federated entities and 
makes 
recommendations about 
fiscal targets for the 
short, medium and long 
term. 
Advice from HCF is an 
important input for the 
preparation of the 
budget. The chairman of 
the section ‘Public sector 
borrowing 
requirements’ is 
regularly auditioned by 
the Parliament
For Federal level: the 
government is not 
obliged 
(recommendations are 
generally taken into 
account)
For federated entities: 
the government obliged 
to take into account 
analysis and also, in 
some circumstances, 
HCF’s recommendations 
Status: attached to the 
government
Composition: 12 
Members (academics, 
civil servants, members 
of the Monetary Policy 
Committee) appointed 
by the government (half 
of the members are 
proposed by the 
governments of the 
Communities and the 
Regions)
Staff: 6 people189
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National Account 
Institute (ICN)
1994 Coordinates the 
production of main 
national macroeconomic 
statistics and provides 
independent forecasts 
and projections.
The ICN collaborates 
with three associated 
institutions: the National 
Statistical Institute, the 
Federal Planning Bureau 
and the National Bank 
of Belgium.
Variables projected (and 
published): main 
macroeconomic 
variables
As a rule, according to 
law, the macroeconomic 
forecasts of the ICN have 
to be used by the 
federal government for 
the preparation of the 
budget
Status: attached to the 
government, but works 
in full independence
Composition: highest 
civil servant of the 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, governor of the 
Central Bank, the heads 
of the National 
Statistical Institute and 
of the Federal Planning 
Bureau, plus one person 
proposed by each 
associated institutions 
(in total 3 persons)
Staff: provided by the 
participating institutions
Denmark Danish Economic Council 
(DEC)
1962 (mandate 
extended in 1994)
Analyses, inter alia, the 
overall functioning of 
the public sector, the 
sustainability of 
government finances, 
and the fiscal stance
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements on fiscal 
policy
The DEC meets twice a 
year to discuss a report 
prepared by the 
Chairmanship, which 
notably contains a 
forecast for the Danish 
economy
Publications: biannual 
report on the overall 
development of public 
finances by the 
chairmanship
Variables projected: 
detailed macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts, 
including for sub-sectors 
of general government 
are included in the 
report
The government is not 
obliged to respond to 
the analysis of the DEC 
but can comment on the 
report
Recommendations by 
the DEC affect the 
decisions process via 
their impact on the 
public debate
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own projections 
(without having to 
provide justification)
Status: independent 
body attached to the 
Ministry of Economic 
and Business Affairs
Composition: 3 chairmen 
(independent academics 
appointed by the 
minister of Economic 
and Business Affairs); 
the Council has 29 
members (from Unions, 
employers, the Central 
Bank, Government and 
Independent economic 
experts)
Staff: 15 (10 economists)
Estonia State Audit Office
(SAO)
The pre-war SAO was 
established in 1918 and 
it acted until year 1940
Re-established in 1990 
(enshrined in 
constitution in 1995; 
new act adopted in 
2002)
Issues normative 
statements with a view 
to ensure an effective 
use of public funds
Provides opinions on the 
implementation of the 
budget, formulates 
recommendations in 
case of deviation from 
initial plans
Fiscal policy 
recommendations are 
included in the audit 
reports and annual 
reports
Recommendations are 
used as an input for the 
preparation of the 
budget. The annual 
budget implementation 
review has to be audited 
by the SAO before being 
submitted to the 
Parliament
The government has no 
obligation to follow 
SAO’s recommendations 
(justifications are 
expected if 
recommendations are 
not followed).
Status: independent 
institution (enshrined in 
law and Constitution)
Composition: the SAO is 
chaired by an Auditor 
General
Staff: around 100
France Commission 
Economique de la 
Nation (CEN)
Annual Economic 
Conference (CEA)
1999 (replaced the 
Commission des comptes 
et des budgets 
économiques de la 
nation created in 1952)
1999
Analyses the provisional 
budget accounts and 
discusses economic 
issues selected by the 
Finance Minister
Provides independent 
forecasts (compilations 
of existing forecasts)
Holds meetings four 
times a year
Informs and consults 
social partners on the 
evolution of the French 
economy as well as on 
economic, fiscal and 
taxation policies
No publication
Variables projected: 
macroeconomic and 
government balance 
and debt forecasts (on 
the basis of a collection 
of forecasts from other 
institutions)
Yearly meeting
The government 
consults the CEN in the 
course of the budgetary 
process, but is free to 
prepare the budget 
using its own projections 
(no justification 
required)
The government 
consults the social 
partners in the course of 
the budgetary process
Status: Independent 
consultative body
Composition: 28 
members (academics, 
policy experts, members 
of the Central Bank, 
representatives of trade 
unions, private banks 
and companies) 
Staff: provided by the 
Ministry of Finance
Status: Independent 
consultative body
Staff: provided by the 
Ministry of Finance190
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Cour des Comptes 1807 (new budget 
organic law extends the 
mandate: the Court 
produces a report taken 
into account in the 
Budget Orientation 
Debate in June) 
Analyses the fiscal 
situation of the country
Audits and monitors the 
implementation of 
budget plans
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements on fiscal 
policy (including on the 
composition of 
expenditure, debt 
management…) 
Publications: Several 
regular reports 
published in the course 
of the year, including a 
Preliminary Report on 
the overall situation of 
government finances 
issued in June (first time 
in 2005); an Annual 
Public Report (published 
in October). Special 
Reports are also 
published.
Recommendations: the 
Court issues 
recommendations on 
the conduct to fiscal 
policy
The Court provides 
evaluations of recent 
and current pubic 
finances trends that are 
taken into account in 
the budgetary process
Status: independent 
body
Composition: the Court 
is chaired by the ‘First 
president’ nominated by 
decree in the Council of 
Minister; it is organised 
in 7 Chambers with 
particular competencies 
(about 30 magistrates 
and rapporteurs in each)
Germany Council of Experts for 
the Assessment of 
Overall Economic Trends 
(SVR)
1963 Analyses fiscal policy 
developments, and 
points undesirable 
trends and ways to avoid 
and correct them, but 
does not make 
recommendations for 
specific policy measures
Fosters cooperation 
between State and 
regional governments
Publications: annual 
Report on the state of 
the economy as a whole 
and the foreseeable 
economic developments 
in Germany
Issues macroeconomic 
forecasts and, 
occasionally, analysis of 
government finances. In 
its annual report the 
Council also examines 
issues related to the 
sustainability of 
government finances
No specific role in the 
budgetary process
The federal government 
has to publicly respond 
to the analysis prepared 
by the SVR.
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own 
projections, but 
deviations have to be 
publicly justified
Status: Independent 
institution
Composition: 5 
independent economics 
experts appointed by 
the Federal President at 
the suggestion of the 
federal government
Staff: about 20 (about 
half doing research)
Joint Economic Forecast 
by 6 leading research 
institutes (JEF)
1950 Provides projections for 
international and 
national economic 
trends
Issues policy 
recommendations, inter 
alia concerning fiscal 
policy
Publications: Spring and 
Autumn reports
Variables projected: 
short term 
macroeconomic 
forecasts; general 
government 
expenditure 
(consumption, public 
sector building 
investment), revenue 
(taxes social 
contributions), balance 
and debt level
Recommendations on 
economic policy in 
general, including fiscal 
policy especially if the 
JEF identifies a slippage 
compared to initial fiscal 
plans
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own forecasts 
and macroeconomic 
assumptions
No specific role in the 
budgetary process (the 
government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the JEF)
Status: independent 
research institution
Composition: 6 members 
in the Board (one per 
research institute 
involved)
Staff: during the two 
weeks which it takes to 
draw up the JEF, about 
60 economists are 
involved in its 
production
Advisory Board to the 
Federal Ministry of 
Finance
1950 Analyzes fiscal policy 
developments
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements on the area 
of fiscal policy to the 
Federal Finance Minister
Publications: reports are 
presented to the Federal 
Minister of Finance and 
published afterwards
Recommendations: the 
Advisory Board decides 
what issues it is going to 
consider, but it takes 
into account the 
priorities of the Federal 
Minister of Finance
No specific role in the 
budgetary process 
(government not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to its analysis). 
Reports contribute to 
the public policy debate.
Status: independent 
academic body that 
deliberates in complete 
independence on an 
honorary basis
Composition: 25 
honorary members 
(mostly university 
professors of economics 
or law)
Staff: No own staff (staff 
provided by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance)191
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Working Party on Tax 
Revenue Forecasting
1955 Provides independent 
forecasts for 
government revenues
Variables projected: 
forecasts of government 
revenues for the whole 
of the general 
government sector, 
central, regional and 
local governments
The Working Party is 
generally consulted (no 
obligation) by the 
government in the 
course of the budgetary 
process.
The Federal government 
adopts since 1955 the 
tax revenue forecast of 
the Working Group in 
the budget and since 
1968 also in medium-
term financial planning.
Status: independent 
advisory council at the 
Federal Ministry of 
Finance
Composition: Federal 
Ministers, the 6 leading 
research institutes, the 
Federal Statistical Office, 
the Bundesbank, the 
German Council of 
Economic Experts, the 
Finance Ministries of the 
Länders and the Federal 
Union of Central 
Associations of local 
authorities.
Staff::n.a
Greece Centre of Planning and 
Economic Research 
(KEPE)
1959
(under Private law since 
1964)
Analyses the problems 
of the Greek economy at 
national, regional level 
and by sector in applied 
research projects
Provides technical advice 
on economic policy 
issues to the Minister of 
the Economy and 
Finance, and 
independent projections
Publications: studies, 
reports on applied 
economics, statistical 
series and discussion 
papers series
Variables projected: 
macroeconomic and 
budgetary variables 
(expenditure and 
revenue) for the general 
government sector
No specific role in the 
budgetary process; the 
government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the KEPE
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own 
macroeconomic 
assumptions and 
projections (no 
justification required)
Status: Public institute 
attached to the Minister 
of Economy and Finance
Composition: the Board 
of directors has 5 
members (inducing the 
chairman of the 
institute) appointed by 
the government
Staff: 45 researchers
Hungary State Audit Office (ASZ) 1989 Analyses fiscal policy 
developments: The ASZ 
is in charge of assessing 
the draft budget and 
monitoring the 
implementation of 
budget plans.
It also verifies whether 
budgetary plans are in 
accordance with existing 
budgetary rules and 
issues normative 
statement and 
recommendations in the 
area of fiscal policy
Publications: report on 
the budget law and 
report on the fulfilment 
of the annual budget 
law
Normative statements 
generally take the form 
of warnings for 
‘improper’ projections of 
revenues or 
expenditures
The government 
consults the ASZ in the 
course of the budgetary 
process. ASZ is 
auditioned by the 
Parliament in the course 
of the budgetary 
process.
The government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the ASZ and 
is free to prepare the 
budget using its own 
macroeconomic 
assumptions
Status: attached to the 
Parliament
Composition: President 
and some vice presidents
Staff: around 600 civil 
servants
Italy Institute for Studies and 
Economic Analyses 
(ISAE)
1999 The ISAE is part of the 
Italian public research 
bodies and institutions. 
It carries out analyses 
useful for the economic 
and social policy 
decisions
It notably analyzes fiscal 
policy developments for 
the whole of the general 
government sector and 
provides independent 
forecasts and projections
Publications: ISAE 
reports devoted to 
forecasts (‘Forecasts on 
the Italian Economy’) 
are issued twice a year
Variables projected: 
main macroeconomic 
(quarterly an annual) 
and budgetary variables; 
forecasts are updated 
four times a year
The ISAE is generally 
consulted by the 
government and 
auditioned by the 
Parliament (no 
obligation for both) in 
the course of the 
budgetary process
The government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the ISAE 
and remains free to 
prepare the budget 
using its own 
macroeconomic 
assumptions (without 
having to provide 
justification)
Status: Independent 
body
Composition: 9 Members 
in the governing board 
(academics, policy 
experts, civil servants, 
members of the Central 
Bank)
Staff: around 150192
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Luxembourg Court of Auditors 1999 Analyses and performs 
an external control of 
public funds and audits 
the financial 
management of the 
State
Provides independent 
forecasts for 
government revenues 
(year n)
Issues recommendations 
(based on its analysis of 
the investment plan 
running over several 
years attached to the 
draft budget)
Publications: each year 
the Court of Auditors 
draws up a General 
Report on the Draft Bill 
of Settlement of the 
State General Account 
for the previous year. 
This report is sent to 
Parliament along with 
the point of view of the 
Government or the 
bodies concerned.
Also, the Court can at 
any moment, either at 
the request of 
Parliament or on its own 
initiative, present its 
observations on specific 
aspects of financial 
management in the 
form of special reports.
The Court is generally 
auditioned by the 
Parliament in the course 
of the preparation of 
the budget (no 
obligation)
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own 
macroeconomic 
assumption and 
projections
Status: Independent 
public institution
Composition: 
1 president, 1 vice 
president and 
3 counsellors
Staff: 34 civil servants
 Netherlands Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis
(CPB)
Created in 1945 Analyzes a broad range 
of economic and 
budgetary issues
Monitors the 
implementation of 
budget plans; quantifies 
short term and long 
term effects of measures 
and reforms and checks 
compliance with 
budgetary rules
Provides macroeconomic 
and budgetary economic 
forecasts and projections
Publications: the CPB 
yearly publishes a 
forecast in spring (the 
Central Economic Plan), 
providing the first 
forecast for the 
upcoming year. In 
September the CPB 
publishes the 
macroeconomic outlook 
(the MEV), on the same 
day that the budget is 
presented to Parliament. 
Besides these two 
forecast documents, the 
CPB provides some 
updates during the year.
Variables projected: 
macroeconomic and 
budgetary variables 
forecasts (including for 
sub-sectors of general 
government) for the 
short and medium-term. 
Also long term 
projections (not 
annually).
The CPB is generally 
consulted (no 
obligation) by the 
government in the 
course of the budgetary 
process.
The government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the CPB.
Forecasts are used for 
budget preparation, 
even if there is no legal 
obligation. If this would 
not be the case, an 
explanation would be 
expected.
Status: the CPB is 
formally attached to the 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, but works in full 
independence
Composition: the Board 
of the CPB consists of 
three members (one 
director and two 
assistant directors). 
Normally, these 
members are selected 
among high civil 
servants (from ministries 
or the CPB itself) or the 
academic world.
Staff: about 
170 employees193
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Portugal Court of Auditors 
(Tribunal de Contas)
1976 in Constitution
1990 sovereign organ by 
law 
Analyses fiscal policy 
developments. Monitors 
the implementation of 
budget plans of the 
State. Performs a control 
of public finances
Issues normative 
statements and 
recommendations on 
the implementation of 
fiscal plans and respect 
of fiscal policy rules 
Publications: annual 
reports on the Budget 
outturn for the State 
and other general 
government sub-sectors; 
occasional reports on 
issues relevant for public 
accounts
Normative statements 
on the implementation 
of fiscal plans
The Court controls the 
budgetary execution at 
its own initiative. It 
provides an assessment 
of the budgetary 
developments for the 
central government and 
social security sectors 
before the budget is 
approved by the 
Parliament.
The government has to 
follow the Court’s 
recommendations 
related to accounting 
control. No obligation to 
follow the Court’s 
recommendations on 
others fiscal policy issues
Status: sovereign organ
Composition: the board 
is made of 1 president 
and 18 judges
Staff: 596 (in 2004)
Spain National Committee of 
local administration 
(CNAL)
1985 Issues recommendations 
in the area of fiscal 
policy concerning local 
government finances
Fosters cooperation 
between State and local 
governments
Publications: report on 
the budgetary stability 
objectives for local 
governments fixed by 
Central Government.
Recommendations: the 
CNAL is notably in 
charge of assessing the 
draft budget, but only in 
those aspects concerning 
local finances, it 
provides 
recommendations on 
the distribution of state 
grants to Local 
Governments.
The government has to 
consult the CNAL in the 
course of the budgetary 
process concerning the 
articles related to local 
governments finances
Status: attached to the 
Ministry for Public 
Administration
Composition: members 
of the plenary board 
(28 members) are civil 
servants and politicians
Staff: na
Court of Auditors 1978 Analyses (ex post) the 
budget execution and 
monitors 
implementation. Verifies 
whether budgetary 
outcomes are in 
compliance with existing 
budgetary rules.
Assesses the quality of 
government finances.
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements in the area 
of fiscal policy.
Publications: annual 
report ’Final Declaration 
of the General 
Statement of State 
Accounts’; annual 
Memorandum of 
Performance; annual 
Report of the Activity of 
the Regional and Local 
Public Sectors; special 
audit reports; motions 
or notes
The Court only 
intervenes ex post. It 
examines the execution 
and provides 
information to the 
national and regional 
Parliaments and local 
governments
The government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analysis 
prepared by the Court, 
but generally takes into 
account the 
recommendations
Status: independent 
institution
Composition: the full 
session is made of 12 
Counsellors of Accounts 
and the Prosecutor (six 
Members are appointed 
by the Congress of 
Deputies and the other 
six by the Senate)
Staff: around 800194
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Sweden National Institute of 
Economic Research 
(NIER)
1937 Analyses, inter alia, fiscal 
policy developments of 
the whole of the general 
government sector and 
its sub-sectors. The 
analyses go beyond 
fiscal policy issues.
Provides macroeconomic 
and public finances 
forecasts
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements
Publications: fiscal and 
budgetary issues are 
analysed and 
commented in the 
institute’s quarterly 
report ‘Konjunkturläget’ 
(‘The Swedish economy’)
Variables projected: 
detailed macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts 
and long term 
projections on 
government finances 
(including for sub-
sectors of general 
government and 
pension system)
Normative statements 
on the budgetary plans 
and respect of the fiscal 
rules
No specific role in the 
budgetary process
The government is not 
obliged to publicly 
respond to the analyses 
prepared by the NIER. 
The government is free 
to prepare the budget 
using its own projection 
and macroeconomic 
assumptions, without 
having to provide any 
justification
The government has no 
obligation to follow the 
recommendations
Status: economic 
research institute under 
the Ministry of Finance
Composition: the 
General Director is 
appointed by the 
government. all other 
staff is appointed by the 
institute
Staff: 65
United 
Kingdom
National Audit Office 
(NAO)
Has existed since 1983 in 
its current form. 
Replaced the former 
Exchequer & Audit 
Department that had 
existed since 1866. 
Mandate extended in 
1998 and in 2000
Issues recommendations 
and normative 
statements in the area 
of fiscal policy
Recommendations: the 
NAO audits changes in 
key assumptions and 
conventions underlying 
fiscal projections for the 
whole of the public 
sector; the NAO’s 
conclusions and 
recommendations are 
confined to the 
assumptions 
underpinning the fiscal 
projections, not the 
overall stance of fiscal 
policy or performance 
against the 
Government’s fiscal rules
The government has to 
consult the NAO in the 
course of the budgetary 
process. The Treasury is 
not obliged to follow 
the NAO’s 
recommendations 
concerning the key 
assumptions 
underpinning the fiscal 
projections (in practice 
generally does)
Status: independent 
institution under the 
Parliament
Composition: by statute, 
the Comptroller & 
Auditor General, the 
head of the NAO, is 
completely independent 
of government.
Staff: the number of 
NAO officials involved in 
auditing the 
assumptions 
underpinning the fiscal 
projections varies 
depending on how 
many assumptions are 
due for audit alongside 
a specific Budget. In 
general, the number 
ranges from 5 to 10.195

Part IV
Fiscal policy in good times

Summary
In spite of the unanimous view among economists and
policy-makers that pro-cyclical fiscal policies should be
avoided, counter-cyclical fiscal policies are far from
being the norm in most countries. What is most surpris-
ing is that the available evidence seems to indicate that
in most advanced countries pro-cyclicality is an issue
that mostly arises in good times, when the economic
activity is above potential or when growth is above
trend. This is somehow puzzling, since while in bad
times a trade-off could emerge between the objective of
output stabilisation and that of budgetary discipline, the
two objectives go hand in hand in good times.
The direct consequence of a pro-cyclical behaviour of
fiscal policy is an unnecessary amplification of GDP
fluctuations. Furthermore, the prevalence of pro-cyclical
behaviour in good times is responsible for a considerable
share of the current stock of debt in EU countries. When
budgetary frameworks aimed at containing deficits are in
operation, pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times is
often the cause of fiscal retrenchments occurring during
periods where cyclical conditions are weak. This issue
was particularly evident in the EU over the past decade.
The failure of many countries to run a prudent budgetary
policy at the crossroad of the decade when output was
above potential and growth above trend translated in
some cases in budgetary adjustment carried out in the
periods of negative output gap following the downturn
occurred in 2001.
Different reasons are at the ground of pro-cyclical fiscal
policies in good times. First, the inevitable difficulty of
forecasting and measuring the cycle in real time, coupled
with the well-known implementation lags of fiscal pol-
icy. Second, there are so-called ‘political economy’
explanations, i.e, a suboptimal structure of incentives
and mechanisms in policy-making. Pressure groups,
spending ministries, local governments are likely to step
up their spending requests exactly when resources are
more abundant. Voters will normally expect to share in
budgetary surpluses accumulated during good times via
tax cuts. If governments lack effective commitment
instruments not to spend budgetary windfalls arising
from strong cyclical conditions, the result would be fre-
quent budgetary loosening in good times.
The analysis carried out in this part of the Report confirms
the findings of previous studies that episodes of pro-cycli-
cal fiscal policy were frequent in euro-area countries in the
past decades. During years where output was above poten-
tial, the fiscal stance was pro-cyclical in about 50 percent
of the cases. Evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour is found
using both a definition of good times based on the level
and on the year-on-year change in the output gap. The pic-
ture, however, is quite different depending on the period
considered. While during the run-up to EMU pro-cyclical-
ity took place mostly during bad times, after the comple-
tion of EMU budgetary corrections in bad times became
less common, but there was a greater incidence of pro-
cyclical policies in good times.
Quantitative analysis provided in this part of the Report
shows that there is evidence of a pro-cyclical bias of fis-
cal policy in good times also controlling for the major
factors that affect the fiscal stance and that such bias
emerges especially when output is above potential but
also during upswings in economic activity, namely,
when growth is above trend. The separate analysis of
government revenues and expenditures reveals that the
pro-cyclical bias is mainly related with the behaviour of
expenditures, which appear to grow faster in periods of
positive output gap. An explanation could be identifica-
tion and implementation lags. Expenditure plans are
based on growth forecasts. Such forecasts are likely to be
optimistic especially after protracted periods of growth
above trend, i.e., when the output gap is positive. Strong
pressures to spend budgetary windfalls accruing in good
times would be an aggravating factor.
A comparison between the values of the output gaps esti-
mated in real time and those computed ex post reveals
that measurement errors are potentially a serious issue.199
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assessment of the sign of the output gap of euro-area
countries over the period 1995-2003. This evidence mil-
itates against a mechanistic use of real-time output gap
figures in the identification of good and bad times. Fur-
ther analysis shows, however, that errors in measuring
the cycle in real time are not the main explanation for the
observed pro-cyclical behaviour. The analysis shows
that measurement errors may explain to some extent pro-
cyclicality in bad times, but the same does not hold for
pro-cyclical behaviour in good times. Furthermore, the
stance was more strongly pro-cyclical when the output
gap was large and positive: another piece of evidence
pointing against the view that pro-cyclical episodes in
good times were unintentional.
A possible response to the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal pol-
icy is setting up national-level rules and institutions that
permit governments to credibly commit not to surrender
to the pressures to raise spending or cut taxes in good
times. Expenditure frameworks aimed at capping the
growth of expenditure over a medium-term framework
can address the tendency for expenditure to grow faster
in good times. Revenue rules that determine ex ante
which share of revenue windfalls will be saved or the
establishment of rainy-day funds can strengthen the
commitment of governments not to spend or give away
via tax cuts better than expected budgetary outcomes
materialising in good times. ‘Fiscal councils’ providing
technical inputs in fiscal policy-making, including via
high-quality independent macroeconomic forecasts and
a thorough estimation of the budgetary impact of policy
measures could permit a better working of the rules
aimed at addressing the pro-cyclical bias.
The analysis in the report supports the view that expend-
iture rules could be an effective instrument to curb the
pro-cyclical bias. It is shown that the countries endowed
with effective expenditure frameworks were character-
ised, other things being equal, by a more moderate
growth of expenditure especially in good times. This
translated into a lower frequency of episodes in which
the behaviour of expenditure was pro-cyclical. While
this frequency was about 80 percent in countries without
expenditure frameworks or with only weak frameworks,
in countries with strong expenditure rules a pro-cyclical
behaviour of expenditure in good times is observed in
less that 60 percent of the cases.
Overall, the analysis in the report reveals that pro-cycli-
cal policies in good times are far from being an excep-
tion. A durable correction of the pro-cyclical bias could
be achieved by setting up adequate rules and institutions
at the national level. A strengthened institutional frame-
work for budgetary policy at national level would in this
sense be consistent with the reformed Stability and
Growth Pact, which puts enhanced emphasis on the need
for countries to step up adjustment efforts in good times
to achieve their medium-term budgetary objectives.
Efforts to make progress on this front should not be
delayed. There is mounting evidence that good times are
going to be there again. Growth in the euro area is recov-
ering and output may return above potential in a majority
of countries in the near future. Member States need to
avoid the mistakes of the past and be ready to make the
best use of such an opportunity to combine an appropri-
ate use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool with
progresses towards achieving their medium-term budg-
etary objectives.200
1. Introduction
This part of the report discusses the issue of pro-cyclical-
ity of fiscal policy. Much has been debated about a pos-
sible pro-cyclical bias in bad times induced by budget
balance rules. The focus here will be rather on pro-cycli-
cal behaviour in good times. There are several reasons
for this choice. First, the evidence shows that pro-cycli-
cal behaviour in good times was quite common in EU
countries, especially after the final stage of EMU. Sec-
ond, while pro-cyclical behaviour in bad times can be the
unavoidable price to pay when countries need to ensure
a prompt correction of budgetary imbalances, pro-cycli-
cal policies in good times not only destabilise output but
also worsen countries fiscal positions and may be the
cause of subsequent fiscal retrenchments in bad times.
Third, there appears to be a bias towards fiscal loosening
in good times related with the strong pressures to raise
spending or cut taxes which governments are faced in the
presence of budgetary windfalls. Such pro-cyclical bias
has a structural nature and needs to be addressed with a
structural response.
The bottom line of the following analysis is as follows.
Both government revenues and expenditures contributed
to the emergence of pro-cyclical policies in good times,
with a particularly significant contribution of expendi-
tures that appears to grow considerably faster during
periods in which output is above potential. In general,
pro-cyclical policies in euro-area countries do not seem
to be the outcome of unintentional mistakes related with
an incorrect reading of current cyclical conditions. Fiscal
expansions in good times appears rather to be the fruit of
deliberate decisions, with the episodes of strongest loos-
ening in periods of positive and large output gaps.
A response to the pro-cyclical bias can come from
strengthened national-level rules and institutions. Multi-
year expenditure frameworks can curb the tendency for
expenditures to grow faster during good times. Revenue
rules and the establishment of rainy-day funds can
strengthen the commitment by governments to save
windfall budgetary gains arising in good times. ‘Fiscal
councils’ providing technical inputs in fiscal policy-
making can be helpful to ensure an effective use of the
rules aimed at addressing the pro-cyclical bias. The anal-
ysis that follows shows that expenditure rules can indeed
be an effective instrument: countries with stronger
expenditure rules were characterised by slower growth
of expenditures especially during good times and by a
lower frequency of episodes in which expenditure policy
was used in a pro-cyclical fashion.
Part IV of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2
reviews the main theoretical arguments against a pro-
cyclical conduct of fiscal policy and surveys the existing
studies analysing how the fiscal stance behaved over the
cycle in practice. Explanations for the observed recur-
rence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times are dis-
cussed. Chapter 3 takes a close look at the behaviour of
the fiscal stance in the EU. The analysis focuses on euro-
area countries over the 1980-2005 period. The analysis
considers separately different sub-periods and different
definitions of good and bad times. Econometric analysis
is performed to analyse the determinants of the fiscal
stance in good and bad times separately for budget bal-
ances, government revenues and expenditures. The anal-
ysis of the cyclical behaviour of the fiscal stance is
examined by referring also to good and bad times
defined on the basis of real-time rather than ex post data.
Chapter 4 discusses alternative ways to address the pro-
cyclical bias via the establishment of national-level
budgetary rules and institutions. Original analysis using
questionnaires submitted to the Working Group on the
Quality of Public Finances attached to the Economic
Policy Committee is performed with a view to investi-
gate the link between national level fiscal rules and the
cyclical behaviour of the fiscal stance.201
2. The cyclical behaviour of the fiscal stance
2.1. Introduction
This section discusses the broad issue of how fiscal policy
should behave in theory over the cycle and what actually
happens in reality. In spite of recommendations from all
economic schools against pro-cyclical fiscal policy, exist-
ing analyses indicate that a pro-cyclical use of discretion-
ary fiscal policy is quite common. While pro-cyclical fis-
cal policy in bad times may easily find a rationale in the
inevitable trade-off between cyclical stabilisation and the
need to contain budgetary imbalances, the explanations
for pro-cyclical policy in good times are less obvious. A
loose fiscal stance in good times may not only be due to
difficulties in tracking correctly the cycle and to the well
known issue of identification and implementation lags of
fiscal policy, but also to weak control mechanisms over
the budget, which may result into fiscal authorities surren-
dering to the pressure for tax cuts or expenditure increases
when resources are more abundant.
2.2. Prescriptions from theory
The budget balance varies over the cycle for two main rea-
sons. First, the working of automatic stabilisers. Govern-
ment revenues and, to a lesser extent, government expen-
ditures vary with the level of economic activity as a result
of existing fiscal legislation. These variations are ‘auto-
matic’, do not need any additional policy to take place,
and are such that the budget balance follows the economic
cycle: tax revenues are higher in booms, while unemploy-
ment compensations and other social expenditure are
lower. The working of automatic stabilisers is thus coun-
ter-cyclical: fiscal policy behaves in such a way to counter
cyclical developments. Second, discretionary action by
governments. As opposed to automatics stabilisers, dis-
cretionary policies may induce a variation in the budget
balance that may be either pro or counter-cyclical.
The use of discretionary fiscal policy as a tool to stabilise
output has often given rise to controversy. Economists in
the Keynesian tradition are generally in favour of active
discretionary policies aimed at containing fluctuations of
economic activity. In Keynesian theories, fiscal policy
activism finds its rationale in widespread real and nomi-
nal rigidities that hamper a prompt adjustment of prices
and delay the adjustment of output towards potential.
New classical macroeconomics rather favours a cyclically
neutral fiscal stance. Such recommendation finds its foun-
dation in the tax-smoothing principle, which advocates
avoiding large changes in the tax burden over time in
order to limit the dead-weight losses of taxation (1). More-
over, the effectiveness of counter-cyclical discretionary
activism is put in question on the basis of the so-called
Ricardian equivalence (2). Overall, according to the pre-
scriptions from new classical macroeconomics fiscal pol-
icy should act counter-cyclically but mainly via the oper-
ation of automatic stabilisers.
Fiscal activism moved in and out of fashion over the past
decades. After a broadly positive attitude by economists
and policy-makers towards discretionary fiscal policy
for stabilisation purposes in the 1950s, 1960s and early
1970s, a more pessimistic view became common. This
change in attitude was partly associated with the stricter
constraints on the use of fiscal policy as a demand man-
agement tool ensuing from large and rising budgetary
imbalances, and partly was the result of accumulated
experience showing the practical limits and pitfalls of
discretionary fiscal policy. In recent years, a more bal-
¥1∂ See for instance Barro (1979).
¥2∂ The basic argument underlying Ricardian equivalence is that the economic
agents would anticipate future increases in taxes resulting from any present-
day increases in borrowing. This would render expansionary fiscal policies
ineffective as the economic agents save any additional income (stemming
from reduced taxes or increased transfers) rather than spend it (an analogous
argument can be made for contractionary policies). On the topic see, e.g.,
Barro (1974). Overall, the forward looking behaviour of economic agents
tend to reduce the effectivess of discretionary fiscal policy on output. Cases
in which fiscal policy had an impact on economic activity contrary to what
standard Keynesian macroeconomics would have predicted have also beeen
found, as highlighted by episodes of ‘expansionary fiscal consolidations’
(see, e.g., Giavazzi, Jappelli, Pagano, and Benedetti (2005), European Com-
mission (2003), Giudice, Turrini, and In’t Veld (2004)).202
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ing recognition that fiscal policy could be de-facto the
only macroeconomic stabilisation left in many situations
where exchange rates are kept fixed, given the stricter
constraints faced by monetary policy resulting from
increased capital mobility. A fortiori, this argument
applies to monetary unions. Moreover, although the
practical problems with discretionary fiscal stabilisation
related with identification and implementation lags are
now fully recognised in the academic and policy-making
community, there is also awareness that in some cases
automatic stabilisers may not be sufficient by themselves
to counter large and persisting cyclical imbalances (2).
Overall, there was always consensus that pro-cyclical
fiscal policy should be avoided. However, this judg-
ment is subject to a fundamental asymmetry. While the
objective of output stabilisation and that of debt stabili-
sation go hand in hand by running counter-cyclical poli-
cies in good times, a trade-off may emerge in bad times.
Since fiscal activism to sustain economic activity in bad
times comes at the cost of widening deficits and possibly
destabilising debt, a sound structural fiscal position is a
pre-requisite for running counter-cyclical policies in bad
times. Conversely, a counter-cyclical fiscal stance in
good times, by improving the budgetary position, sows
the seeds for a supportive fiscal stance in bad times. In
this respect, there is consensus that the lack of fiscal
adjustment in good times is responsible of a considerable
share of debt accumulation in many advanced economies
and that the budgetary consolidation episodes that were
carried out in periods of negative output gaps in several
EU countries in recent years could have been avoided
had the fiscal stance not been pro-cyclical in the good
time periods at the cross-road of the decade (3).
2.3. Broad evidence
Although normative arguments plead against the pro-
cyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy, the evidence
indicates that episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy are
far from being an exception. The issue became particu-
larly evident in the euro area in recent years. Graph IV.1
reports figures for the year-on-year changes in the cycli-
cally-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) taken as a meas-
ure of the fiscal stance and output gaps over the period
1996-2005 for the euro-area aggregate. The graph shows
that in periods of negative output gaps changes in the
CAPB were normally positive, denoting a pro-cyclical
fiscal tightening in bad times. Conversely, in years when
output was above potential, fiscal policy was loosened,
thereby taking a pro-cyclical stance in good times.
The common prima-facie approach to obtain information
on the behaviour of the fiscal stance over the cycle is to put
in relation a measure of fiscal stance (generally the change
in the CAPB) with cyclical indicators (normally the output
gap) as in Graph IV.1. Although helpful, such an approach
does not permit to gauge to what extent the observed stance
of the fiscal policy was motivated by the stabilisation pur-
pose or rather by other reasons. A more careful analysis of
the behaviour of fiscal authorities would also attempt at
isolating the main factors that affect the behaviour of fiscal
authorities, in primis the need to keep debt under control.
In recent years, it has become common practice to analyse
the determinants of discretionary fiscal policy through the
estimation of ‘fiscal rules’ summarising the behaviour of
fiscal authorities (4). The purpose of such analytical exer-
cises is that of identifying a limited set of macroeconomic
determinants that explain developments in measures of
discretionary fiscal policy. In most of these analyses the
primary CAB is used to capture the discretionary compo-
nent of the budget, which is assumed to depend upon cycli-
cal conditions (the output gap) and the starting fiscal con-
ditions (the level of debt and of the CAPB) (5).
The idea is that fiscal authorities are motivated by an objec-
tive of output stabilisation and by debt stabilisation motive.
Results from existing work analysing the cyclical
behaviour of fiscal policy via the estimation of fiscal
¥1∂ See, e.g., Auerbach (2005). 
¥2∂ See also European Commission (2002) on the use of discretionary fiscal
policy in currency unions. 
¥3∂ Balassone and Francese (2004) estimate that pro-cyclical discretionary
measures in good times explain almost one fourth of the total increase in
the debt/GDP ratio in industrial countries over the 1977-2000 period.
¥4∂ Among the first studies analysing the cyclicality of public finances via the
estimation of fiscal reaction functions see, e.g., Bohn (1988), Von Hagen,
Hugues-Hallet and Strauch (2001), Ballabriga and Mongay (2002), Melitz
(2002), Gali and Perotti (2003). For studies on the cyclical behaviour of
public finances using alternative regression-based approaches see, e.g.,
Gavin and Perotti (1997), Hallerberg and Strauch (2001), Lane (2003), and
Alesina and Tabellini.
¥5∂ One difficulty in the estimation of fiscal reaction functions is that of the
endogeneity of the output gap. The idea underlying fiscal reaction functions
is that the budget balance depends on the cycle. However, the reverse is also
true, i.e., the stance of fiscal policy affects economic activity. To get rid of
this circularity, estimation methods that permit to isolate the variation in the
output gap which is independent of the current fiscal policy of the country
concerned are necessary. The easiest solution is to use the output gap taken
with one lag as an explanatory variable. The most common solution is to use
an instrumental variable estimator and to use as explanatory variable the var-
iation of the output gap related with the chosen instruments, generally the
lagged output gap and measures of the international cycle. A different route
is that of using GMM methods, like the Arellano-Bond estimator.203
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on the sample considered and on the specific methodol-
ogy applied. However, a series of common findings on
the response of the fiscal stance to the cycle emerge.
First, in many studies the reaction of the CAPB to the
output gap appears to be weak, often not statistically
significant from zero. This suggests that on average,
over large samples, discretionary policy does not seem
to be strongly related to cyclical indicators. Second, fis-
cal policy appears generally pro-cyclical in middle
income and developing countries while for advanced
economies the cyclical behaviour of the fiscal stance
depends on specific periods and country aggregates (1).
Third, there appears to be a generalised tendency in
advanced economies to engage less frequently in pro-
cyclical fiscal policies over time (2). Third, for euro-
area countries, the evidence does not support the view
that in the past decades fiscal authorities acted in gen-
eral in such a way to counter cyclical imbalances via
discretionary measures. Moreover, most existing stud-
ies do not support the view that after the introduction of
the EU fiscal framework (the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty), fiscal policy became more pro-cyclical (3).
However, there are indications that pro-cyclical behav-
iour in good times has become more common after the
completion of EMU (4).
A number of studies also attempt to analyse whether
the response of fiscal authorities to cyclical develop-
ments was symmetric over the cycle or rather different
depending on whether good or bad times were prevail-
ing. The evidence from this series of studies is not
clear-cut. As evidenced in Table IV.1, some analyses
report that the response of fiscal authorities to the out-
put gap was not qualitatively different in good and bad
times while in other studies significant differences are
found. Moreover, results differ also for what concerns
the sign of the response of budget balances to the cycle.
This difference in results is due to several factors,
relating to the country and time coverage of the sample,
the source of data (e.g., different methodologies for
computing output gaps and adjusting budget balances
for the cycle) and the approach chosen in the
estimation (5).
Graph IV.1:  Fiscal stance (change in CAPB, GDP) measured against the output gap; euro area
–2.0
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
–2.0
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Change in CAPB, % of potential output (left axis)
Output gap, % of potential ouptut (right axis)
20001999199819971996 20022001 2003 20052004
¥1∂ Evidence on both advanced economies and developing countries is
reported for instance in Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Tabellini
(2005). Talvi and Vegh (2005) focus on developing countries only.
¥2∂ Gali and Perotti (2003) show that in most OECD countries the response of
the fiscal stance to output gaps become more counter-cyclical starting
from the early 1990s.
¥3∂ See, e.g, Gali and Perotti (2003), European Commission (2004a, 2004b),
IMF (2004). A greater stabilisation role for fiscal policy at national level in
monetary unions is one of the explanations put forward to explain a
reduced rather increased pro-cyclicality after the introduction of the EU
fiscal framework (Gali and Perotti (2003)).
¥4∂ IMF (2004).
¥5∂ Most studies use as the dependent variable capturing discretionary fiscal
policy the CAPB in level or in change (Forni and Momigliano (2004)). In
some studies, however, the overall budget balance is used instead (Balas-
sone and Francese (2004), Manasse (2006)). The specification of the
explanatory variables in the fiscal reaction function also varies somehow
across studies. For instance, normally fiscal reaction functions include
lagged budget balance measures as an explanatory variable, but there are
exceptions (e.g., OECD (2003)). 204
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response of discretionary fiscal policy to the cycle in
good times is seldom found, while some studies report
evidence consistent with counter-cyclical behaviour in
bad times (1).
In summary, the available evidence suggests that, in
spite of the prescriptions from economic theory and the
broad agreement in the policy community against pro-
cyclical fiscal policy, counter-cyclical behaviour was
far from being the norm in advanced countries and
notably EU countries in past decades. Overall, there is
also no strong evidence in favour of the view that that
the use of discretionary policy was effective in stabilis-
ing output (2). Even more puzzling seems the evidence
that pro-cyclical behaviour was quite common espe-
cially in good times. Although in good times there are
no fiscal discipline-related constraints to budgetary
policy in keeping a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, the
data suggest that fiscal authorities may find other type
of constraints that may explain frequent pro-cyclical
behaviour.
2.4. The recurrence of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy: in search of explanations
What could explain the fact that the fiscal stance is
quite often pro-cyclical? In the case of pro-cyclical fis-
cal policies in bad times, explanations are not hard to
find, in light of the already mentioned trade-off faced
by fiscal authorities between exerting an impulse on
aggregated demand consistent with cyclical conditions
and keeping a robust commitment towards fiscal disci-
pline. This trade-off is in some cases somehow solved
ex-ante, via the introduction of numerical rules aimed
at ensuring the respect of budgetary discipline, thus
limiting the discretion of fiscal authorities with the use
of discretionary policy with stabilising purposes when
deficits are too high. In a nutshell, the main explanation
for pro-cyclical fiscal policy in bad times is an unsound
starting fiscal position, which requires a correction irre-
spective of the prevailing cyclical conditions (3). The
reasons justifying the recurrence of pro-cyclicality in
good times are more subtle. Two broad set of explana-
tions are generally identified. A first set relates to prob-
lems in correctly measuring cyclical conditions. A sec-
ond set of explanations focuses on the effective
functioning of fiscal policy-making, which may lead to
results different from those advocated by normative
economic theory.
Measurement issues
Identification and implementation lags could explain
excessive growth of expenditure in good times. The exe-
cution of government expenditure plans follow budget-
ary decisions with some delay, so that expenditures at
time t are generally based on growth forecasts made at
time t-1 or t-2.  (4) Growth forecasts are generally influ-
enced by current or recent growth developments. It fol-
lows that it is exactly when output gap is positive, i.e.,
after protracted periods of growth above trend, that
expenditures are likely to grow faster. Moreover, due to
the difficulty of predicting turning points in the cycle,
the risk exists that expenditures grow fast also in corre-
spondence with growth slowdowns (5).
Related to the issue of identification lags, there is the
issue of satisfactorily measuring the cycle in real-time.
Governments may be willing to engage into counter-
cyclical fiscal policies, but they simply lack the tools to
do that adequately because they have an imperfect read-
ing of the current cyclical conditions. The estimation of
output gaps in real time is subject to substantial uncer-
tainty, mainly related to revisions in the estimates of
¥1∂ A significant counter-cyclical reaction, both in good and bad years, is
reported only in Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). This study, which
refers to the years starting from 1988, uses real time estimates for cyclical
conditions and initial deficits and controls for the impact of the european
fiscal rules on the behavior of countries in excessive deficits and for elec-
tions. Elections appear to induce a more expansionary stance, but only in
good times.
¥2∂ Quite at the opposite, Fatas and Mihov (2003) analysing a sample of 91
countries find that the discretionay fiscal policies have in general
increased, rather than reduced, output volatility.
¥3∂ An additional reason for pro-cyclicality in bad times are financing con-
straints: countries that rely heavily on foreign borrowing to finance their
deficits may find it more difficult to obtain such finance in periods where
the economy in undergoing recessions, due to lost confidence by interna-
tional investors. However, although this explanation seems relevant for
middle income and developing countries (Alesina and Tabellini (2005)) it
is much less for advanced economies.
¥4∂ Although the dynamics of government expenditure depend on the specific
expenditure item considered, several assumptions have been formulated in
the literature for what concerns the medium-term dynamic behaviour of
aggregate primary cyclically-adjusted expenditures (see, e.g., Hugues Hal-
let et al. (2003)). It is often assumed that governments target a constant
ratio of expenditure over potential GDP. In this case, expenditures are
planned on the basis of expected potential growth. Alternatively, fiscal
authorities could target the budget balance. In this case, expenditures
would grow on the basis of the expected growth of revenues. In both cases,
the growth of expenditures would be broadly in line with expected GDP
growth.
¥5∂ One needs to notice however that in case of long implementation lags and
the economy undergoing a severe downturn, the strong expenditure
increase planned during a period with positive output gap could end up
being executed in years characterised by a negative output gap, so that the
expenditure policy could turn up being counter-cyclical in bad times rather
than pro-cyclical in good times.205
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Discretionary fiscal policy in good and bad times: evidence from econometric estimation 
of fiscal reaction functions
Study, sample, 
data source
Dependent and
explanatory variables
Estimation method and 
instruments 
Response of the fiscal 
stance to the output gap 
in good times 
Response of the fiscal 
stance to the output gap 
in bad times
Good and bad times defined in terms of the level of the output gap
IMF (2004)
Euro area
1971-2003
OECD analytical database 
CAPB
Lagged CAPB, output gap, 
lagged debt, ‘monetary 
gaps’ 
IV, own lagged output gap, 
lagged output gap of US 
and FR for DE, and of US 
and DE for the other 
countries
Pro-cyclical Not statistically significant
Balassone and Francese, 
(2004)
14 EU countries
1970-2000
European Commission data 
Overall balance 
Lagged debt, lagged 
nominal balance, output 
gap
OLS, Arellano-Bond Pro-cyclical (the overall 
balance does not react to 
the output gap indicating 
that the fiscal stance 
counter the automatic 
stabilisers)
Not statistically significant 
(a variation in the overall 
balance of the same order 
as that of automatic 
stabilisers)
Cimadomo (2005)
Euro area
1981-2005
OECD Economic Out-look 
database
CAPB 
Lagged CAPB, lagged debt, 
lagged output gap 
OLS, lagged output gap Not statistically significant
Pro-cyclical in very good 
times (output gap>3) after 
1999
Not statistically significant
Manasse (2006)
Both Industrialised and 
Developing countries 1970-
2004
IMF World Economic 
Outlook database
Primary balance 
Lagged output gap, lagged 
debt, lagged primary 
balance
Pooled and fixed effect 
OLS on piece-wise linear 
specification (specification 
obtained via algorithms in 
the MARS software)
IV using lagged output gap 
as instrument as 
alternative method
Pro-cyclical Procyclical
Not statistically significant 
in very bad times (output 
gaps <2)
Good and bad times defined in terms of the change of the output gap
OECD (2003)
21 OECD countries
1980-2002
OECD Economic Outlook 
database
Change in the CAPB 
Change in the CAPB 
(output gap), lagged debt
Arellano-Bond estimator Pro-cyclical Counter-cyclical 
Output gap measured in real time
Forni and Momigliano, 
(2004)
10 Euro area countries
1993-2003
OECD Economic Outlook 
database
Golinelli and Momigliano 
(2006)
11 Euro area countries, 
1988-2006
OECD Economic Outlook 
database
Change in the CAPB 
Output gap, ‘Maastricht 
variable’, lagged debt, 
lagged CAPB
Change in the CAPB
Lagged output gap, 
lagged, lagged primary 
balance, election dummies; 
‘Maastricht variable’ in 
cases where it is binding
OLS, lagged output gap, IV: 
own output gap, (average 
weighted) output gap of 
the other countries in the 
sample
Arellano-Bond (alternative 
estimations method)
OLS (no fixed effects), 
lagged output gap
Not statistically significant 
with real-time data
Not statistically significant 
with expost data
Counter-cyclical with real-
time data
 
Counter-cyclical with real-
time data
Not statistically significant 
with ex post data
Counter-cyclical with real-
time data
Source: Commission services.206
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cycle, pro-cyclical policies may result expost while ex
ante the intention was to keep a counter-cyclical stance.
‘Genuine uncertainty’ on real-time output gap figures
can explain why fiscal policy is generally not counter-
cyclical. However, such an explanation fails to explain
why there are often stronger signs of pro-cyclicality in
good rather than in bad times. If errors are simply due to
lack of information, then one should expect measure-
ment errors to be symmetrically distributed over suffi-
ciently large samples: the probability of assessing that
times are ‘bad’ when they are not should be roughly
equal to the probability of assessing good times when ex
post data indicate instead weak cyclical conditions. A
possible explanation of such bias could be found in a ten-
dency by governments to inflate the growth projections
underlying their budgetary programmes, which has been
documented for some EU countries over the past
decade (2). Upward-biased growth forecasts result into
an inflated real-time estimate of potential output and
then into a downward-biased output gap level: fiscal
expansions meant to be counter-cyclical in bad times
may end up being pro-cyclical in good times (3).
Political economy
A different set of reasons for the observed pro-cyclical
behaviour of fiscal policy is often referred to as ‘political
economy’ explanations. The political economy argu-
ments underlying the deficit bias are well-known and are
reviewed in Part III in this report. Short-sighted govern-
ments may underestimate the longer term negative con-
sequences of deficits; pressure groups, when competing
for government resources neglect the repercussions of
their decisions on overall public finances (common pool
problem). The result is a tendency for deficits to build
up. As long as a deficit bias is present irrespective of
cyclical conditions, pro-cyclical policies could emerge.
More interestingly, recent theoretical work has shown
that the deficit bias associated with the common pool
problem can get worse during good times, thus leading
to a growth of deficits above normal. A reason could be
the so-called ‘voracity effect’: since competing pressure
groups will devote a greater effort to obtain a share of
government expenditure the higher is the total amount of
resources available, spending is likely to grow more than
proportionally with the increase in revenues.  (4) Alterna-
tive arguments refer to the revenue side rather than the
expenditure side of the budget. In order to curb pressures
to increase spending in good times, forward-looking
governments may decide not to allow the accumulation
of any budgetary surpluses in the first place, preferring
to cut taxes instead (5). Analogously, governments may
cut taxes in good times as a consequence of the pressures
by the electorate to benefit from budgetary windfalls (6).
Some implications for policy
The arguments that can explain pro-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies in good times listed above also indicate possible
solutions to address the pro-cyclical bias. These solu-
tions mainly consist of improved institutional settings
underpinning national fiscal policy-making. Independ-
ent forecasting agencies and fiscal councils with an advi-
sory role may be helpful in limiting a possible tendency
by governments to inflate the growth forecasts underly-
ing budgetary plans.
The procedures for the approval of the budget could be
reformed in such a way to contain the influence of pres-
sure groups on budgetary outcomes. Numerical ceilings
on expenditure could prevent excessive spending
increases during good times. The accumulation of rainy-
day funds and the introduction of rules that define ex
ante the use of the extra revenues accruing to the govern-
ment during good times could contribute to contain both
spending increases and tax cuts in good times. These
possible solutions for the issue of pro-cyclicality are fur-
ther discussed in section 4 of this part of the report.
¥1∂ Several reasons underly the uncertainties in real-time output gap figures.
First, when potential output is obtained by means of moving averages,
measuring potential output for time t at time t requires disposing of GDP
forecasts for subsequent periods: t+1, t+2, etc. Due to forecasting errors,
the estimate of potential output in real time may need to be revised after-
wards. Second, real-time estimates of GDP are inevitably subject to revi-
sions because the construction of GDP for the current year is based on
limited information. Third, GDP series may be modified backward due to
statistical revisions. Among the first analyses of the magnitude of real-time
errors in the estimation of the output gap (for the US) see Orphanides and
van Norden (2002). Analyses referred to the EU include Camba-Mendez
and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001) and Ruenstler (2002). 
¥2∂ Such findings are reported for instance in Strauch, Hallerberg and Von
Hagen (2004), Larch and Salto (2005), Moulin and Wierts (2006).
¥3∂ Of course, it is not always easy in short time series (such as those of the
record of stability and convergence programmes) to distinguish to what
extent optimistic growth forecasts are due to a bias by fiscal authorities or
to an objective difficulty in predicting growth slowdowns. 
¥4∂ This argument is formalised in Tornell and Lane (1999).
¥5∂ Argument provided in Talvi and Vegh (2005). 
¥6∂ An argument along this lines is developed theoretically in Alesina and
Tabellini (2005).207
3. The stance of fiscal policy in EU countries 
during good and bad times
3.1. Introduction
This section takes a closer look at the behaviour of fiscal
policy over the cycle in EU countries in recent decades.
The analysis will focus on the reaction of the discretion-
ary component of fiscal policy. Consistently, what will
be put in relation to measures of the cycle are budgetary
variables net of their cyclical component.
Although the vast majority of existing analyses consid-
ers good and bad times as periods in which actual output
is, respectively, above or below ex-post measures of
potential output, in practice there is less than full agree-
ment among policy-makers regarding when fiscal policy
should pay greater attention to avoiding a pro-cyclical
stance. In light of this consideration, in the following
analysis there will an effort to discuss the stance of the
fiscal policy in the EU with respect to alternative defini-
tions of good and bad times.
There will also be an attempt to take a step further to
disentangle which side of the structural budget, reve-
nues or expenditures, react to cyclical developments,
in which way, and for which reasons. As will appear
clear in the following analysis (Chapter 4 of this part
of the report) this distinction is relevant to better
understand the implications of national-level rules for
fiscal discipline on the output-stabilisation function of
fiscal policy.
The analysis covers the period 1980-2005 and in most
cases the focus will be on data for euro-area countries.
This permits to concentrate the analysis on a relatively
homogenous set of countries and to better compare
results from those from other existing studies, that are
focused on the euro area in most cases.
3.2. Defining good and bad times
3.2.1. In search of an operational definition
In spite of wide consensus in principle against a pro-
cyclical stance of fiscal policy, disagreement may occur
in practice among experts and policy-makers as to when
exactly fiscal policy should better be tightened or loos-
ened for stabilisation purposes.
A first key conceptual distinction is whether good and
bad times are defined according to the economic cycle or
rather as periods where budget balances are, respec-
tively, better and worse than expected. In the first case,
the notion of good and bad times is relevant both for the
purpose of keeping a fiscal stance consistent with the sta-
bilisation of economic activity and for ensuring the
adherence of budgetary results to plans. In the second
case, the notion of good and bad times is instead not nec-
essarily strictly linked to the economic cycle. Better
(worse) than expected budgetary results could be the
outcome of economic activity performing above (below)
expectations, but there could be other reasons. There
could be unforeseen developments in interest rates that
unexpectedly improve budgetary results (see Box IV.1).
Alternatively, unexpected changes in the elasticity of
revenues with respect to output could take place. This
could happen for several reasons. First, a non-negligible
share of temporary revenue fluctuations is related to
property taxes likely to be affected by swings in real and
financial asset prices which may not necessarily follow
the same pattern as economic cycles (1). Second, lags in
¥1∂ At the end of the 1990s, the boom in equity and real estate prices increased
revenues substantially in a number of developed countries (notably the US,
but also several EU countries), while depressed equity markets at the end
of 2001 explained, in a symmetrical fashion, part of the abrupt fall in reve-
nues. This may lead to the occurrence of ‘unexpected’ budgetary changes,
as discussed for instance in Jaeger and Schuknecht (2003) and Eschenbach
and Schuknecht (2004).208
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collected and then budget balances from current output.
A further reason is related to changing average tax
schedules: as output grows, the link between revenues
and budget balances changes since the income of house-
holds and corporations move into higher tax brackets. In
the remainder of the analysis the focus will be on a defi-
nition of good and bad times related to the economic
cycle. This is the definition which bears more interest
from the viewpoint of the implications of fiscal policy
for stabilisation purposes and is the one normally used in
existing analyses. However, alternative definitions of
good times based on higher than expected revenues or
budget balances will also be discussed since this is the
notion which is often used in the definition and imple-
mentation of national-level fiscal rules aimed at defining
ex ante how fiscal policy should behave in good times.
The major difficulties with the identification of good and
bad times are related to the inevitable uncertainty sur-
rounding the cycle (1). This uncertainty has two major
consequences. First, there is no trivial operational defini-
tion of good and bad times. Any operational definition
needs to define an indicator (or set of indicators) and a
range of values for such indicator corresponding alterna-
tively to good and bad times. However, these are no
obvious choices, in light of the fundamental uncertainty
underlying the origin of the shocks to economic activity
and their magnitude. The output gap is a commonly used
indicator to track the cycle (2). However, inflation data
(for instance, the difference between core inflation and
trend core inflation) also enter the assessment of cyclical
conditions, and additional leading indicators (e.g., indus-
trial production, energy consumption, real estate and
financial asset price indicators, confidence indica-
tors,…) could be useful especially in the assessment of
the presence of a turning point in the cycle. Second, as
already pointed out in section 2 of this part of the report,
there is an inherent difficulty in forecasting and tracking
the cycle in real time (3).
The level of the output gap provides information on
whether the fiscal stance is likely to reduce or exacerbate
any possible deviation of output from its potential level.  (4)
The year-on-year change in the output gap is strictly cor-
related with the difference between actual and potential
growth. It is also helpful to analyse whether economic
activity is falling below trend (a downturn, characterised
by a negative change in the output gap) or growing at
rates above trend (an upturn: the output gap is rising). In
most analyses, bad times are identified by positive val-
ues of the output gap, good times by negative output gap
values. However, especially in the context of defining
criteria for the conduct of fiscal policy over the cycle,
characterised by well-known implementation lags, con-
sideration could be given also to the change in the output
gap.
This would help understanding whether fiscal policy
would support or offset developments in economic activ-
ity already taking place due to the working of the cycle
and would also facilitate early action.
Graph IV.2 helps to visualise the issue of the identifica-
tion of good and bad times. The graph depicts the typical
behaviour of actual and potential output over time.
Potential output grows following a relatively stable
trend, while actual GDP follows a more erratic growth
path, broadly centred around that of potential output.
Four zones can be identified, depending on whether out-
put is above or below potential and whether it is growing
above of below trend. In a first zone (zone A), the output
gap is negative and falling; in zone B actual growth is
higher than potential (the output gap is improving), but
the level of the output gap is still negative; in zone C,
output is above potential and the economy is experienc-
ing an upturn; finally, in zone D, actual growth is below
potential, with an output gap that is still positive.
In most analyses, good (bad) times correspond to periods
of positive (negative) output gap, thus being identified
¥1∂ There is consensus among economists that economic fluctuations have not
a deterministic nature but are rather the result of disturbances of various
types and size occurring randomly and causing smooth movements in eco-
nomic activity. New classical economists put emphasis on ‘real business
cycles’ where economic disturbances generate on the supply side of the
economy and do not need price rigidities for their propagation, while econ-
omists in the Keynesian tradition emphasize demand shocks and the role
of nominal and real rigidities (see, e.g., Romer (2001)).
¥2∂ Strictly speaking, the cycle measured by deviations of actual from poten-
tial output is defined as ‘growth cycle’ or ‘deviation cycle’, which differs
from the ‘classical cycle’ where measurement is made directly on GDP
series (see, e.g., Artis, Marcellino, and Proietti (2004)). 
¥3∂ In EU budgetary surveillance, there is not a strict operational interpretation
of good and bad times. However, there are some guidelines outlined in the
‘Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact
and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence
Programmes’ (see Resource Section in this report). The document speci-
fies that ‘…good times should be identified as periods where output
exceeds its potential level, taking into account tax elastictities.’ Moreover,
‘…the change in the output gap could also be considered, especially when
the output gap is estimated to be close to zero…The identification of peri-
ods of…good times should be made after an overall economic assess-
ment’.
¥4∂ In the chapter the terms potential output or trend output are used inter-
changeably, irrespective of the specific computation method used. 209
by zones C and D (A and B) in Graph IV.2 (1). An alter-
native could be to identify good times as periods in
which the output gap is both positive and rising (area C)
and, symmetrically, bad times as periods with negative
and falling output gaps (area A). A definition of this type
would be more restrictive but would permit to isolate
episodes less subject to be followed by a change in the
output gap sign: a relevant feature in light of the imple-
mentation lags characterising fiscal policy. Finally, in
order to reduce the possibility of wrong real-time assess-
ment of the sign of the output gap a definition of good
and bad times could use a different benchmark, by con-
sidering for instance good times all periods characterised
by positive and sufficiently big output gaps.
3.2.2. Measurement errors
Available studies conclude that revisions between real-
time and ex-post output gaps can be substantial and
impact therefore policy choices aimed at containing the
amplitude of cyclical fluctuations (see section 2).
Table IV.2. Errors in assessing output gaps exante.
Absolute value of differences between ex-ante and ex-
post output gaps. EU-11, 1995-2003 reports information
on the real-time errors in measuring output gaps in EU
countries in the past decade obtained from Forni and
Momigliano (2004) (2). The table shows that the mean
absolute real-time measurement error was bigger for out-
put gap levels than for output gap changes. This is a reg-
ular feature observed also in other contexts (3). The real-
time measurement error in case of output gap levels can
be quite sizable: 1.4 percentage points of GDP on aver-
age, with 10 percent of cases in the sample with errors
above 2.6. The magnitude of these errors is better under-
stood when compared with statistics on the output gap
series. The average ex-post output gap in the sample was
equal to 0.07, with 80 percent of the values comprised
between -2 and 2.3. Figures for one-year-ahead forecast
errors are very close to those for real-time errors (4).
Information on real-time errors suggests that output gap
measurement issues could be relevant but does not per-
mit to assess whether real-time estimates or forecasts
had any particular bias or whether measurement errors
translated into a wrong assessment of the sign of the out-
put gap.   
To provide an answer to these questions Table IV.3. dis-
plays the frequency with which the sign of the output gap
(in level and change) was wrongly assessed, distinguish-
ing between cases where the output gap was estimated in
real time (or forecast) to be positive or negative. While a
wrong sign assessment for the output gap level was quite
rare in case of positive real-time or forecast output gap,
is was frequent in the case of negative real-time output
gaps (in 1/3 of the cases the assessment of the sign
results to be mistaken in the light of ex post revisions). In
Graph IV.2:  Distinguishing phases of the economic cycle on the basis of output gap changes and levels
output,
potential
output
output
output 
above 
potential
time 
output, 
potential 
output 
potential output 
D
∆ OG<0,
OG>0 
C
∆ OG>0, 
OG>0
A
∆ OG<0,
OG<0 
B
∆ OG>0,
OG<0 
output  
below 
potential 
upturn downturn
OG=output gap. ∆ OG=change in output gap.
¥1∂ However, in the literature both levels and changes are found to assess
budgetary behaviour over the cycle. A pioneer use of levels when assess-
ing budgetary behaviours is found in Buti and Sapir (1998). A relevant
example of using output gap changes is Fatas et al. (2003). 
¥2∂ The Forni and Momigliano (2004) dataset on real-time output gaps is one
of the most comprehensive for the EU. It covers the 1995-2003 period and
the original source is OECD. Lorenzo Forni and Sandro Momigliano have
kindly supplied their data for the analysis in this report and have given use-
ful comments and suggestions. Their contribution is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
¥3∂ To a very close approximation, the change in the output gap is equal to the
difference between actual and potential growth. It is well known that, irre-
spective of the method used for computing potential output, there is less
uncertainty on potential output growth rates than on levels.
¥4∂ Forni and Momigliano contains information also on on-year-ahead fore-
cast output gaps. Forecast output gaps appear to be highly correlated to
real-time output gaps (correlation coefficient 0.8). The size and distribu-
tion of forecast errors is thus similar to that of real-time errors.210
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a wrong assessment of good times was less frequent than
a wrong assessment of bad times. These findings are to
some extent the consequence of upward biased GDP
forecasts in several EU countries in the past decade (1).
Optimistic growth forecasts indeed tend to inflate the
real-time estimation of potential output (due to the so-
called end point problem) and then to underestimate the
output gap. It is important however to bear in mind that
the real time short series is relatively short, and that the
results are strongly influenced by the particular cyclical
situation in Europe observed during the sample period.
The number of cases in which output gaps were esti-
mated to be positive is much smaller than those in which
the output gap was negative. Part of the GDP forecasts
included in the sample appears as optimistic due to the
difficulty in predicting the turning point in 2001.
This downward bias is not evident instead for what con-
cerns the real-time measurement of output gap changes.
Moreover, the overall frequency of cases in which the
assessment of the sign of the change in the output gap
resulted mistaken is lower compared with output gap in
levels.
As pointed out previously, an operational definition of
good and bad times could adopt a more stringent bench-
mark to reduce the possibility of wrong real-time assess-
ment of the sign of the output gap. Good times could be
identified by a sufficiently positive output gap; bad times
by a sufficiently negative output gap. On the basis of past
values of ex post and real-time output gap estimations,
Table IV.4. permits to assess to what extent this could
actually reduce the probability of wrong measurement of
the output gap sign. Overall, there is an indication that a
wrong assessment of the sign of the output gap due to
real-time errors is less frequent the further away from
zero is the estimate of the output gap. Of course, the
choice of a more stringent benchmark value for the out-
put gap for the identification of good and bad times
implies a risk of restricting the attention especially to
periods close to a turning point in the cycle. For instance,
a very negative value for the output gap is likely to be
observed when the cycle is close to its trough, and to be
followed by growth above trend. In light of the long fis-
cal policy implementation lags, a loosening of the fiscal
stance when the cycle is close to its peak may translate
into a pro-cyclical expansion when the output gap turns
positive again. To avoid this issue, data on output gap
changes need to be evaluated in conjunction with output
gap levels.      
3.3. The fiscal policy stance in good and 
bad times: a close look at the EU
The aim in this section is to analyse how the fiscal stance
in EU countries related to the cycle in the past decades.
Compared with existing work, the analysis aims at tak-
Table IV.2
Errors in assessing output gaps ex-ante. Absolute 
value of differences between ex-ante and ex-post 
output gaps. EU-11, 1995-2003
Absolute value of errors from real time 
estimation
Output gap level
Output gap year 
on 
year change
Average 1.4 0.8
10 % percentile 0.3 0.1
Median 1.3 0.6
90 % percentile 2.6 1.9
Standard deviation 0.9 0.9
Source: AMECO database and Forni and Momigliano (2005).
Table IV.3
Frequency of wrong ex-ante assessment of output gap 
sign. EU-11, 1995-2003
Output gap level Output gap year 
on year change
Number of cases 99 99
Number of errors 
when the real time 
estimation was 
positive
3 12
Number of errors 
when the real time 
estimation was 
negative
30 13
N errors 33 25
Frequency of errors 0.33 0.25
Source: AMECO database and Forni and Momigliano (2005).
¥1∂ See, e.g., Strauch, M. Hallerberg and J. von Hagen (2004), Larch and Salto
(2005), Moulin and Wierts (2006). On the track record of Commission
GDP forecast in the 1990s see Keereman (1999). 211
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definitions of good and bad times will be considered.
Following the discussion in the previous section, the
baseline definition of good and bad times based on out-
put being above or below potential will be comple-
mented with an alternative definition based on the
change in the output gap (downturns vs. upturns). More-
over, the analysis will focus on the behaviour of year-on-
year changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance
(CAPB) as a measure of the fiscal stance, but there will
also be a separate analysis on cyclically adjusted reve-
nues and cyclically-adjusted primary expenditures.
Finally, it will be analysed whether the difference
between the ex ante and ex post estimation of output gaps
associated with real-time measurement errors matters for
the behaviour of the fiscal stance over the cycle.
The analysis will mainly focus on euro-area countries
(except Luxemburg) over the 1980-2005 period (1). This
set of countries will be referred to, interchangeably as
EU-11 or euro area in the remainder of the analysis. This
data set permits to observe relatively homogenous coun-
tries over a representative time period. The source of
public finance and output gap data is the AMECO data-
set of the European Commission DG ECFIN. Only pub-
lic finance data complied according the ESA95 account-
ing standard are considered (2). The output gap data are
based on the European Commission production function
methodology (see Denis et al. (2002)).
3.3.1. Basic evidence
A pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) fiscal stance in good
times would be characterised by a reduction (increase) in
the CAPB, interpreted as a measure of the discretionary
fiscal loosening (tightenining). Each point in Graph IV.4
represents the situation of a particular country in a par-
ticular year in the CAPB change/output gap space.
Observations falling in the top-right and in the bottom-
left quadrant are interpreted as cases of counter-cyclical
policy; in the top-left quadrant are found pro-cyclical
episodes in bad times while cases of pro-cyclical policy
in good times are in the bottom-right quadrant. The
graph shows that the frequency of pro-cyclical episodes
does not seem to be very different from that of counter-
cyclical ones. There is neither a very evident difference
between the frequency of pro-cyclical episodes in good
and bad times. The regression line fitting the cloud of
points in Graph IV.4, does not exhibit a high explanatory
power, as evidenced by the value of the R square statis-
tics. The linear coefficient linking the change in the
CAPB with the output gap represents the response of the
fiscal stance to the cycle (3). The estimated response
appears to be on average negative but weakly so. This
somehow contrasts with the more clear-cut evidence of
pro-cyclicality emerging from aggregate euro-area data,
reported in Graph IV.1, the explanation being that big
euro-area countries run in general a more pro-cyclical
fiscal stance during the past decade. Overall, this prima-
facie evidence confirms the findings presented in most
existing analyses: although there is an overall indication
of pro-cyclicality, the relation between measures of the
fiscal stance and the output gap is not a strong one.
Synthetic information on the relation between the fiscal
stance and cyclical conditions can be obtained by com-
paring the average change in the CAPB across the sam-
ple when the output gap is negative and when it is posi-
tive Graph IV.5 performs this comparison for a sample
Table IV.4
Probability of a wrong real-time assessment 
of the output gap sign 
Positive real-time output gap
Real-time output gap value Probability of error (%)
>0.5 2.0
>1 1.0
>1.5 0.0
>2 0.0
Negative real-time output gap
Real-time output gap value Probability of error (%)
<-0.5 21.2
<-1 14.1
<-1.5 9.0
<-2 4.0
Source: AMECO database and Forni and Momigliano (2005)
¥1∂ The exclusion of Luxemburg is due to shorter available output gap time
series. For this country there is also lack of data on trade weights necessary
to construct the measure for the representative foreign output gap used to
instrument the output gap variable in the econometric estimation of fiscal
reaction functions.
¥2∂ This reduces to some extent the length of the time series for some coun-
tries (Greece, Spain, Ireland) for which data for the early 1980s are availa-
ble only in ESA79 accounting standards.
¥3∂ Strictly-speaking, the variation in the y-o-y change in the CAPB associated
with a unit change in the output gap.212
P a r t  I V
F i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  g o o d  t i m e sBox IV.1: Interest rate developments and the fiscal stance. Are ‘interest rate good times’ coming to an end?
This box discusses the relation between the fiscal stance in EU countries since the early 1990s and an alternative definition of
good times, i.e., one defined in terms of the occurrence of budgetary windfalls associated with interest rate reductions. Overall,
the reduction in interest expenditure that took place in the past decade as a result of a prolonged and continuous decline in
nominal interest rates facilitated fiscal adjustment in most Member States. However, the relation between reduction in interest
expenditure and the stance of fiscal policy in EU countries was considerably different before and after the completion of EMU.
(i) 1992-1998: Using ‘good times’ to speed up deficit reduction
During the period between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the completion of EMU, most EU countries embarked
into a process of consolidation of their public finances. In Italy and Portugal, almost 5 percentage points of the improve-
ment in nominal balances (and cyclically adjusted balances) was due to the reduction in interest rate expenditure to GDP
ratio. Ireland and Belgium also benefited considerably from lower interest rate expenditure in that period. In all countries
(except Portugal and Austria), the decline in interest rate expenditure was compounded with an improvement in the cycli-
cally adjusted primary balances, leading to a rapid improvement in the nominal budget balances. The lack of a strong cor-
relation between savings on interest expenditure and changes in the CAPB in the run-up to EMU (Graph IV.3) (a) can be
interpreted as an indication that the fiscal challenge to meet the Maastricht criteria provided incentives to fully use the
windfall expenditure savings related to the reduction in interest expenditures to speed up deficit reduction. There was no
systematic redirection of savings in interest expenditure to other expenditure categories or tax reductions.
(ii) 1999-2005: Dissipating interest rate windfalls
During the period 1999-2005 the consolidation process stopped and budgetary developments took an opposite direction:
deteriorations in the CAPB were widespread. Graph IV.3 (b) shows that the deterioration in CAPBs were larger in coun-
tries which saved more on interest expenditures. This suggests that in this period interest windfalls were not used to speed
up the adjustment towards safe medium-term budgetary positions but were rather spent or translated into tax cuts.
Some policy lessons
The improvement of deficit positions in most EU countries in the past decade does not always closely reflect the effort of
fiscal authorities. While during the run-up to EMU ‘interest rate good times’ were used to speed up the consolidation pro-
cess, after 1998 the budgetary windfall arising from falling interest expenditures was spent or used to finance tax cuts. In
perspective, increased focus on the development of the CAPB in addition to the CAB and nominal budget balances could
improve the assessment of fiscal consolidation efforts and its effect on debt dynamics.
After an almost uninterrupted 15-year period, the good times in terms of declining interest rates on government debt seem to
be over. This implies that a given improvement in structural budgetary positions will on average require a stronger effort in
the future compared with the past decade. Some reversal of past interest rate developments would be a challenge for fiscal
consolidation and would put upward pressure on debt/GDP ratios if it were not matched by improving primary balances. 
Graph IV.3:  Correlation interest expenditure ratio and CAPBs
(a) 1992-1998 (b) 1999-2005
NB:  Excluding Luxemburg and Spain (data deﬁciency)
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 6with all EU-25 countries, euro-area countries only, and
EU-10 countries only. The graph indicates on average a
slight relaxation of the fiscal stance in good times and a
tightening in bad times for the EU-25 sample, an indica-
tion of pro-cyclical behaviour both in periods when out-
put is above and below potential. An analogous and
more clear-cut picture emerges for euro-area countries,
while for the EU-10 (i.e., the Member States of recent
accession), the stance appears to be on average expan-
sionary, especially in bad times (1).
This evidence seems to suggest that the pattern observed
for euro-area countries is not exactly the same as that in
New Member States. However, such conclusion needs to
be qualified in several respects. First, the comparison is
not fully homogenous, being the available sample of data
on output gaps and cyclically-adjusted budgetary figures
for EU-10 countries much shorter (the most recent infor-
mation on these variables is for 1995). Second, the
analysis does not permit to distinguish whether the the
average change in the CAPB is due to isolated episodes
of very big expansions or contractions or whether
instead it is the result of recurrent behaviour. In order to
disentangle these two aspects, Graph IV.6 reports the
frequency of cases of pro and counter-cyclical fiscal pol-
icy in good and bad times for the same country sample as
in Graph IV.5. The graph shows that in general the fre-
quency of pro and counter-cyclical episodes is roughly
equal for EU-25 and EU-10, but confirms the result that
in the euro area there was a prevalence of pro-cyclical
policies in recent decades (see survey of previous find-
ings in section 2). Indications of pro-cyclical behaviour
both in good and bad times on average for euro-area
countries are also found by defining good and bad times
in terms of upturns and downturns, i.e., periods where
the output gap improves or worsens (see Graph IV.10
below).
A different question is whether the behaviour of fiscal
authorities in euro-area countries was broadly the same
over the years or whether there were evident changes.
With a view to address this question Graph IV.7 and
Graph IV.8 repeat the same type of analysis as in Graph
IV.5 and Graph IV.6 but distinguishing this time the
euro-area sample in different sub-periods.
The sub-periods have been chosen in such a way to
reflect the main developments in the EU fiscal frame-
work. The first sub-period (1980-1991) includes the
years preceding the Maastricht Treaty. The second sub-
period (1992-1998) corresponds with the run-up to
EMU.
Finally, the third sub-period includes the years following
the introduction of the euro and the SGP (1999-2005).
The data reveal that over time there has been a substan-
tial change in the stance taken by fiscal authorities. The
1980s were years in which most countries inverted the
tendency for budget deficits to grow started in the 1970s
and where several countries undertook ambitious
Graph IV.4:  Fiscal stance and output gap. A basic scatterplot (EU-11, 1980-2005)
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¥1∂ This evidence contrasts somehow that provided in Coricelli and Ercolani
(2002), which covers a subset of CEEC countries over the 1991-2000
period and used a different methodology for correcting budget balances for
the cycle.214
P a r t  I V
F i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  g o o d  t i m e sconsolidation programmes to stabilise debt. This trans-
lated into a seemingly a-cyclical stance in good times
and into apparently frequent cases of pro-cyclical fiscal
policy in bad times. The run-up to EMU coincided with
a tight fiscal stance irrespective of the cyclical position,
so that pro-cyclicality concerned mostly bad times. A
different picture emerges after the introduction of the
euro. These years are characterised by a generalised
loosening of the fiscal stance with the result that pro-
cyclical behaviour seems to pertain mostly to good
times, as evidenced in previous analyses (1).
Graph IV.5:  Fiscal stance in good and bad times (EU-25, EU-11, EU-10, 1980-2005)
Graph IV.6:   Frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical in good and bad times 
(EU-25, EU-11, EU-10)
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¥1∂ E.g., IMF (2004).215
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2 0 0 63.3.2. The cyclical behaviour of revenues and 
expenditures
To what extent were the episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal pol-
icy related to the behaviour of revenues and to what extent
were they instead caused by expenditures? Graph IV.9 dis-
plays separately the average change in cyclically adjusted
revenues and in primary cyclically-adjusted expenditures
when output was alternatively positive or negative (1). The
Graph shows that while expenditures were strongly raised
in good times and reduced in bad times (thus behaving pro-
cyclically both in good and bad times), the behaviour of
revenues was not significantly different in periods of posi-
tive or negative output gaps.
Interesting information can be obtained by comparing
the dynamics of revenues and expenditures using the
change in the output gap as an alternative criterion to
identify good (upturn) and bad times (downturn). From
Graph IV.10 it appears that the CAPB deteriorates on
average during upturns and improve in downturns: indi-
cations of pro-cyclical behaviour are confirmed also
using this alternative notion of good and bad times.
Conversely, results appear radically different using this
notion of good and bad times for revenues and expendi-
tures. In this case, the behaviour of expenditures seems
almost unaffected by whether the economy is in an
upturn or in a downturn, while revenues generally fall
slightly in upturns and rise strongly in downturns.
A better understanding of the previous results requires
controlling for the main factors that could have affected
the fiscal stance. Without controlling for other factors,
the change in the CAPB provides a description of the fis-
cal stance, but is not sufficient to infer conclusions on
which reasons underlie the observed behaviour of fiscal
policy.
In such an attempt, the econometric estimation of fiscal
reaction functions is helpful in isolating the impact of
factors that have normally an influence on the stance of
fiscal policy. Estimating separately fiscal reaction in
periods of good and bad times permits to evaluate how
these factors played differently over the cycle.
Table IV.5 (a) presents the results from the estimation of
fiscal reaction functions distinguishing good and bad
times defined, alternatively, as periods of output above
or below potential or periods exhibiting a rising or fall-
ing output gap (growth above or below trend). The sam-
ple is EU-11 over the 1980-2005 period. The dependent
variable is the year-on-year change in the CAPB (2).
The explanatory variables are the lagged CAPB, the
lagged debt, the output gap, and two dummy variables,
taking value 1, respectively, after 1992 and after 1999.
The CAPB and the debt level capture the fiscal stabilisa-
Graph IV.7:   Fiscal stance in good and bad times (EU-11, 1980-2005, different sub-periods)
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¥1∂ Although a higher number of observations are available for revenues than
for CAPBs and expenditures (due to missing observations on interest
expenditures), the sample underlying the analysis presented in
Graphs IV.8 and IV.9 keeps the same sample in case of CAPBs revenues
and expenditures to improve comparability. ¥2∂ In analogy, for instance, with Forni and Momigliano (2004).216
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F i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  g o o d  t i m e stion motive of fiscal authorities. The improvement in the
CAPB is expected to be stronger the lower the starting
level of the CAPB and the higher the debt (negative and
positive expected sign expected, respectively, for these
two variables). The output gap captures the output stabi-
lisation motive. If fiscal authorities aim at stabilising
economic activity, a rising output gap is expected to trig-
ger a tightening in the fiscal stance (positive expected
sign) (1). Finally, the two dummy variables are aimed at
capturing possible behavioural changes occurred in cor-
respondence with, respectively, the signing of the Maas-
Graph IV.8:   Frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical in good and bad times (EU-11, 1980-2005)
Graph IV.9:  Change in the primary cyclically-adjusted budget balances and its components in good 
and bad times (EU-11, 1980-2005)
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¥1∂ To address the endogeneity problem, the output gap variable has been
instrumented with its own lag and the lag of a measure of foreign output
gap constructed, for each country, on the basis of export shares towards the
biggest three export markets. 217
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2 0 0 6tricht Treaty (1992) and the completion of the EMU
project (1999). The constant term captures the portion of
the fiscal stance not explained by the chosen explanatory
variables. By performing separate regressions for bad
and good times, looking at the constant coefficient per-
mits to test for a pro-cyclical bias in good times. A pro-
cyclical bias would be reflected into a smaller constant
term in good times in the regressions for the change in
the CAPB and the change in non-cyclical revenues,
while a pro-cyclical bias acting on the expenditure side
would translate into a higher coefficient in good times.
Results show that the coefficients of CAPB and debt lev-
els have the expected sign, are significant, and have
about the same value in good and bad times, however
measured (Table IV.5 (a)). The coefficient for the output
gap is not significantly different from zero, and has
roughly the same value irrespective of cyclical condi-
tions (good or bad times). Looking at the constant term,
there is evidence of a pro-cyclical bias in good times.
The estimated constant term in the equation indicates,
ceteris paribus, a looser fiscal stance in good times. This
difference is large and statistically significant when the
good times are measured in terms of the level of the out-
put gap, but the same qualitative results are obtained by
measuring good times in terms of an upturn in economic
activity. Overall, the prima-facie evidence emerging
from Graph IV.9 and Graph IV.10 is confirmed.
Table IV.5 (b) repeats the same exercise using cyclically-
adjusted revenues as dependent variable. The explanatory
variables are the same as those used for the CAPB, with
the exception that the starting level of the CAPB is
replaced by that of revenues. This variable captures the
objective of restructuring the revenue side of the budget:
revenues are more likely to be cut (increased) the higher
(lower) the starting revenue/GDP ratio. Results indicate
that this coefficient was more strongly negative in good
times, meaning that during periods of output above poten-
tial or upturns revenue restructuring was stronger. Look-
ing at the constant term of the regressions, there are no
strong signs of pro-cyclical bias. (1)
The analysis on expenditures is reported in Table IV.5 (c).
There is evidence that structural measures on the expend-
iture side were mainly taken during good times, as evi-
denced by a larger negative coefficient for the expenditure
and the debt variables. It was during good times that
expenditure cuts with the aim of containing the growth of
the public sector and stabilising the debt took place more
intensely. The constant terms gives a clear indication of
pro-cyclical bias. So, also controlling for the main deter-
minants of expenditure policy there is evidence that
expenditure growth is stronger in good times. Among the
possible explanations, as discussed previously, there
could be the strong pressures to spend the budgetary wind-
fall gains accruing in good times.
Graph IV.10:  Change in the primary cyclically-adjusted budget balances and its components in 
upturns and downturns (EU-11, 1980-2005)
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¥1∂ This contrasts somehow with the descriptive prima-facie evidence in
Graph IV.10. The results from the estimation of the fiscal reaction function
suggest that the fact that revenues grow slower in upturns is probably not
related to a pro-cyclical bias but rather to the fact that during upturns took
place more intensively tax cuts aimed at reducing the tax burden.218
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The fiscal stance over the cycle: evidence from the estimation of fiscal reaction functions: 
(a) Cyclically-adjusted primary balance, (b) Cyclically-adjusted revenues, (c) Cyclically-adjusted primary 
expenditures, (EU-11, 1980-2005)
Explanatory variables
Output below potential 
(OG<0)
(1)
Output above potential 
(OG>=0)
(2)
Downturn (∆OG<0)
(3)
Upturn (∆OG>=0)
(4)
(a) Dependent variable: ∆ primary CAB
Constant – 0.356
(0.59)
– 2.869***
(0.81)
– 0.811
(0.52)
– 1.427**
(0.60)
Lagged CAPB – 0.300***
(0.05)
– 0.376***
(0.07)
– 0.277***
(0.06)
– 0.234***
(0.05)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.023**
(0.009)
0.037***
(0.01)
0.027**
(0.009)
0.024***
(0.009)
Output gap 0.115
(0.13)
0.241
(0.21)
– 0.065
(0.07)
– 0.010
(0.06)
Dummy 1992 – 0.148
(0.30)
0.992**
(0.44)
– 0.137
(0.37)
0.263
(0.30)
Dummy 1999 – 0.698**
(0.32)
– 0.454
(0.41)
– 0.523
(0.34)
– 0.287
(0.33)
N. obs. 149 102 122 129
R sq. within 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.16
R sq. between 0.48 0.01 0.68 0.06
R sq. overall 0.19 0.06 0.21 0.05
(b) Dependent variable: ∆ cyclically-adjusted revenues
Constant 6.03***
(1.47)
4.876**
(2.06)
4.232**
(1.36)
6.395***
(1.68)
Lagged cyclically-adjusted 
revenues
– 0.116***
(0.03)
– 0.144**
(0.05)
– 0.079**
(0.03)
– 0.174***
(0.04)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.001
(0.008)
0.008
(0.01)
0.003
(0.007)
0.019**
(0.009)
Output gap 0.260**
(0.11)
0.515**
(0.20)
0.136**
(0.05)
0.033
(0.05)
Dummy 1992 – 0.121
(0.25)
0.652
(0.40)
– 0.107
(0.26)
0.059
(0.25)
Dummy 1999 – 0.516
(0.28)
– 0.463
(0.378)
– 0.900***
(0.25)
0.106
(0.28)
N. obs. 149 102 122 129
R sq. within 0.07 0.003 0.25 0.12
R sq. between 0.00 0.12 0.23 0.005
R sq. overall 0.05 0.07 0.21 0.02
(c) Dependent variable: ∆ cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure
Constant 2.805**
(1.28)
6.517***
(1.72)
2.446*
(1.42)
5.064***
(1.47)
Lagged cyclically-adjusted 
primary expenditures
– 0.033
(0.03)
– 0.128***
(0.04)
– 0.027
(0.03)
– 0.102***
(0.03)
Lagged debt/GDP ratio – 0.019**
(0.008)
– 0.016**
(0.007)
– 0.016**
(0.007)
– 0.008
(0.008)
Output gap 0.136
(0.11)
0.197
(0.168)
0.198***
(0.05)
0.052
(0.05)
Dummy 1992 0.135
(0.25)
– 0.197
(0.33)
0.231
(0.29)
– 0.149
(0.25)
Dummy 1999 0.267
(0.269)
0.116
(0.31)
– 0.283
(0.27)
0.383
(0.27)
N. obs. 149 102 122 129
R sq. within 0.12 0.27 0.14 0.15
R sq. between 0.009 0.04 0.03 0.08
R sq. overall 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.13
NB:  Estimations method: ﬁxed effects, instrumental variables regression. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of foreign output gap.
The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted output gap of the 3 major export markets of each country. All ﬁscal variables are expressed as shares on
potential output. Coefﬁcient standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Coefﬁ-
cients in bold are statistically different between good and bad times at the 10 percent level. Coefﬁcients for country ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Source: Elaborations on data contained in DG ECFIN AMECO database.219
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2 0 0 6A further reason could be identification and implemen-
tation lags in expenditure. Expenditures are planned on
the basis of the expected growth of GDP. Since GDP
forecasts are to some extent affected by past GDP
growth developments, the share of expenditure on GDP
is likely to be higher when the output gap is positive (i.e.,
after periods of growth above trend) (1). Finally, there
could be errors in estimating output gaps in real time, an
issue that is investigated in the following section.
3.3.3. Ex-ante vs. ex-post assessment of the cycle
As discussed in section 2, an explanation for the
observed pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities
could be errors in measuring the cycle. According to this
explanation pro-cyclical policies could occur for the
simple fact that fiscal authorities are giving a mistaken
reading the current cyclical conditions. An attempt to
analyse to what extent pro-cyclical policies could be
attributed to real-time measurement errors is made in
Graph IV.11 and Graph IV.12. The first graph presents
the average change in CAPBs, cyclically adjusted reve-
nues and primary cyclically-adjusted expenditures when
output was above or below potential using both ex post
and real time data (2). The graph shows that, according to
a real-time assessment of the cycle, the average fiscal
stance was more pro-cyclical in good times compared
with that assessed using ex post data, while the opposite
was true in bad times. The result is mostly explained by
the behaviour of revenues: revenues fall much more in
real-time good times than in ex post good times, while
they grow less in real-time bad times.
Graph IV.12 reports the frequency of cases of pro-cycli-
cal and counter-cyclical policies with output gaps esti-
mated both ex-post and in real time. Consistently with
the evidence presented in Graph IV.11, using real-time
data pro-cyclical policies were slightly more frequent in
good times and clearly less frequent in bad times (3).
In summary, the evidence seems to suggest that meas-
urement errors could be an explanation to some uninten-
tional pro-cyclical episodes that took place in bad times,
while this does not seem to be the case for pro-cyclical
behaviour in good times.
Although these results need to be interpreted with care,
given the relatively short sample of real-time output
gaps, several interesting questions emerge.
First, the results seem to indicate that a correct under-
standing of the current cyclical conditions do not neces-
sarily make pro-cyclical revenue policies less likely. ¥1∂ The evidence reported in Strauch et al. (2004) on the recent EU experienceseems consistent. GDP and budgetary forecasts reported in stability and
convergence programmes tended to be more optimistic the higher the out-
put gap at the time of forecast.
¥2∂ The sample on real-time output gap estimates is the one in Forni and
Momigliano (2004). The sample underlying the analysis in Graph IV.11and
IV.12 includes EU-11 countries over the period 1995-2003 both in case of
ex-post and real time output gap estimates to permit comparability. 
¥3∂ Overall, this result confirms the findings in Forni and Momigliano (2004)
who estimate the reaction of the fiscal stance to the output gap controlling for
other factors through the econometric estimation of fiscal reaction functions. 
Graph IV.11:  Fiscal stance and the cycle measured ex-post and in real time (EU-11, 1995-2003)
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estimates to be underestimated (see section 3.2), results
run against the intuition. One would expect indeed that
when real-time output gap estimates are below ex post
figures, the probability of unintentionally carrying out
pro-cyclical fiscal policies in good times increases, since
some of the ex post good times may have been read
instead as bad times in real time.
A possible explanation can be as follows. The episodes
that are classified as good times in real time are most
probably those associated with a largely positive ex-post
output gap (assessing wrongly the cycle is more likely
when output is close to potential). If the fiscal stance is
more strongly pro-cyclical when the output gap is large,
there could be stronger indications of pro-cyclical poli-
cies in good times when using real-time series. The his-
togram in Graph IV.13 provides information that corrob-
orates this hypothesis. It reports the average change in
the CAPB observed in correspondence with different
ranges for the output gap. It is confirmed that that in
cases of large positive output gaps the stance of the fiscal
policy tended to be characterised by strong loosening (1).
3.4. Summary of findings
Overall, the preceding analysis confirms the broad out-
come of preceding studies aimed at gauging whether in
past decades fiscal policy in the EU took a stance con-
sistent with the prevailing cyclical conditions. Although
the relation between the fiscal stance and the output gap
is in general rather weak, there are indications of fre-
quent pro-cyclical behaviour for euro-area countries.
While the need to maintain public finances under control
and measurement errors could explain pro-cyclical poli-
cies in bad times, the reasons for fiscal loosening in good
times need to be found elsewhere: identification and
implementation lags and lack of control of the budget in
periods when pressures for increased spending or tax
cuts become stronger.
The analysis in the previous sections allows making
some progress in the understanding of the features of
pro-cyclical fiscal policy episodes in the euro area,
which can be summarised as follows.
• Achieving a consistent conduct of fiscal policy over
the cycle is subject to difficulties related with the
identification of good and bad times. The output gap
Graph IV.12:  Frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
Real-time and ex-post output gap estimation (22 EU countries, 1990-2005)
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¥1∂ Graph IV.11 also shows that, symmetrically, strong consolidations seem
on average to characterize periods with largely negative output gaps. A
tentative interpretation of these findings can be as follows. It is when the
output gaps are very large that the pressures to increase expenditure or cut
taxes become stronger, while it is after protracted periods of depressed
economic activity that the deterioration in the budget balance can become
so large to require a strong correction.221
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2 0 0 6is a useful tool to for measuring the cycle, but a
mechanic definition of good and bad times based on
the sign of the output gap does not seem advisable.
The difference between actual and potential growth
(equivalently, the year-on-year change in the output
gap) should be considered together with the output
gap level to permit an early assessment of cyclical
developments.
• Output gap measurement errors can be considerable.
The data show that in the past decade real-time out-
put gap estimates were generally biased downward,
possibly as a result of overestimation of potential
output stemming from optimistic growth forecasts.
Measurement errors have led to a mistaken assess-
ment of the output gap sign in about 1/3 of the cases.
The probability of such mistakes could be consider-
ably reduced by adopting a notion of good and bad
times which would consider not only the output gap
in level but also its change and based on the out gap
being sufficiently positive (good times) or negative
(bad times).
• The fiscal stance in the euro area since the 1980s
seems on average moderately pro-cyclical both in
good and bad times, irrespectively whether meas-
ured on the basis of the output gap levels or changes.
The stance of fiscal policy, however, was quite dif-
ferent depending on the specific time periods con-
sidered. While during the 1980s and the run-up to
EMU pro-cyclical policies were mainly enacted in
periods where output was below potential, pro-
cyclical policies in good times characterised the
years following the completion of EMU.
• Evidence of a pro-cyclical bias in good times is there
also after controlling for the main factors that influ-
ence the fiscal stance. The evidence is particularly
strong for good times defined as periods with output
above potential but analogous qualitative results are
obtained also defining good times as upturns, i.e.,
periods with a positive change in the output gap. The
pro-cyclical bias is mostly due to faster expenditure
growth in good times. Possible explanations are
identifications and implementation lags in setting
government expenditures or pressures to spend
windfall budgetary gains accruing in good times.
• While real-time measurement errors can explain to
some extent pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy
in bad times, this does not seem the case for good
times. Fiscal loosening during periods with output
above potential appears to be more frequent when
measuring output gaps with real-time data. These
findings relate to another relevant piece of evidence:
the fiscal stance was more markedly pro-cyclical in
good times when output gaps were very large.
Graph IV.13:  Fiscal stance in correspondence with different levels of the output gap (EU-11, 1980-2005)
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4. National rules and institutions to prevent 
pro-cyclical policies in good times
4.1. Introduction
The main message from the previous sections is that pro-
cyclical policies are far from being an exception in the
EU. While the origins of pro-cyclical policies in bad
times can be generally related to the need to keep public
finances under control, the explanations for pro-cyclical-
ity in good times is less obvious. The main explanations
are identification and implementation lags and ‘political
economy’ arguments linked to the pressures for increas-
ing spending and cutting taxes when government
resources become abundant. This explanation has impli-
cations for an adequate response to avoid pro-cyclical
behaviour in good times: governments could strengthen
the instruments (rules, procedures, institutions) that per-
mit to improve the formation, execution and control of
their budgets.
This section first discusses how numerical fiscal rules at
state level relate (deficit and debt rules, revenues rules,
expenditure rules) to the cyclical behaviour of fiscal pol-
icy and which characteristics of such rules can prevent or
facilitate pro-cyclical behaviour. National experiences
aimed at dealing explicitly with pro-cyclicality in good
times are reviewed. The role of fiscal councils in improv-
ing the ability of governments to effectively put in place
counter-cyclical policies is discussed. In a second step,
building on a new dataset on numerical fiscal rules at
country level, there will be an attempt to measure how
different types of fiscal rules relate to the stance of fiscal
policy over the cycle in EU countries.
4.2. Fiscal rules
As illustrated in Part III of this report, the principal
objective of national-level numerical fiscal rules is to
limit the deficit bias by re-addressing the balance
between discretionary and rules-based behaviour in fis-
cal policy-making. As pointed out in this part of the
report, there is evidence supporting the view that numer-
ical fiscal rules at national level, however defined, can be
effective on outcomes: other things being equal, deficits
tend to be lower in countries and periods characterised
by stronger fiscal rules. The link between numerical fis-
cal rules and the cyclicality of public finances is neces-
sarily more complex. Being containing deficits the main
objective of fiscal rules, one may expect that such rules
may clash with counter-cyclical behaviour in bad times.
A more thorough analysis shows that this expectation is
not strongly supported by the facts. As will be clear from
the following discussion, the impact of fiscal rules on
cyclicality depends upon whether the rules apply to def-
icits or debt or rather to one side only of the budget
(expenditure or revenues) and on the specific design of
the rule. Moreover, the contemporaneous presence of
several type of rules would also matter for the impact on
the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. Appropriately
designed fiscal rules on deficits or debt complemented
by expenditure rules may help to reduce pro-cyclicality
in good times without necessarily inducing a pro-cycli-
cal behaviour in bad times.
4.2.1. Budget balance and debt rules
It is often held the view that rules that fix ceilings on def-
icits or on the amount of borrowing may introduce a con-
straint to the counter-cyclical use of fiscal policy in bad
times. While the argument is quite straightforward in
theory (the respect of numerical deficit results may
require a correction when budgetary slippages are
related with a worsening cyclical components in the
budget), the evidence on their effect on the cyclicality of
fiscal policy is not clear cut.
Most of the empirical work aimed at assessing the impact
of deficit and debt rules on the response of the fiscal stance223
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2 0 0 6to the cycle focus on the EU fiscal framework. As high-
lighted in section 2, the available studies based on the esti-
mation of fiscal reaction functions conclude that, account-
ing for the most relevant factors that affect the fiscal
stance, the introduction of the EU fiscal framework did
not lead to a more pro-cyclical response of fiscal policy to
cyclical conditions. Conversely, there is evidence that the
response of the fiscal stance to the output gap turned from
slightly pro-cyclical to broadly a-cyclical after the EU fis-
cal framework (1). Even more to the point, the evidence-
provided in section 3 of this report (Graph IV.8) shows
that the frequency of pro-cyclical episodes in bad times in
euro-area countries dropped after the introduction of the
SGP compared with previous periods. Evidence over a
large sample of EU and non-EU countries go in the same
direction. Manasse (2006) finds that countries where fis-
cal rules were in force exhibit on average a less pro-cycli-
cal behaviour of fiscal policy (2).
A more differentiated picture emerges from the analyses
that focus on borrowing constraints acting at lower lev-
els of government. Most of the research concerns the
impact of state-level borrowing constraints in the US on
the cyclical behaviour of State-level budgets. While
some studies do not find a significant impact, other
analyses show that stricter borrowing constraints are
associated with a less counter-cyclical response of local
budgets to cyclical conditions (3). In general, there are
indications that budget balances at lower level of gov-
ernment exhibit a less counter-cyclical behaviour com-
pared with the general government budget balance (4).
Overall, although the available studies do not support the
view that budget balance or debt rules had a strong pro-
cyclical impact, it would be simplistic to fully reject the
issue of a possible pro-cyclical bias in good times intro-
duced by budget balance rules on the basis of this evi-
dence. These results need to be interpreted with care,
given the major difficulty of controlling for all the fac-
tors that could drive the fiscal stance and of the issue of
measuring the different degree of enforcement of the
rules (countries with badly enforced rules may exhibit
big budgetary loosening in bad times).
It needs also to be remarked that the design of budget bal-
ance rules can be such that to limit or minimise the possible
pro-cyclical bias induced by the rule. First, budgetary tar-
gets could be specified in cyclically adjusted terms in order
to permit the operation of automatic stabilisers. In spite of
the known difficulties and uncertainties with the computa-
tion of cyclically-adjusted budget balances, deducting even
indicative estimates of the cyclical component of budgets
from budgetary targets could introduce some leeway in the
implementation of deficit rules and contribute to ease the
risk of pro-cyclical bias. Second, budget balance rules could
apply over medium-term time horizons rather than on an
annual basis, in such a way to allow some degree of varia-
tion in budgets according to cyclical patterns. The evidence
of a potentially more pro-cyclical impact of budget balance
and debt rules applied at lower levels of government could
be related to the fact that in this case the rules are applied
preponderantly on annual schemes while those applied at
general government or other sub-sectors more often extend
the time horizon beyond the yearly budgetary cycle and are
integrated into a multi-annual fiscal framework (see
Graph III.3 in Part III of this report) (5). Last but not least,
the risk of pro-cyclical corrections in bad times to respect
budget balance rules could be reduced if effective mecha-
nisms to foster budgetary prudence in good times are in
place. A symmetric functioning is key to any effective and
sustainable budgetary framework.
4.2.2. Expenditure rules
As opposed to budget balance rules, no concern for a pro-
cyclical bias is there for expenditure rules. At the opposite,
such arrangements can be effective in curbing the growth
of expenditure in good times, thus preventing the fiscal
stance from becoming pro-cyclical in good times. As
¥1∂ The same qualitative result on a sample of euro-area countries is obtained
in Gali and Perotti (2003) using 1992 as the start of the EU fiscal frame-
work (i.e., the signing of the Maastricht Treaty) and by European Commis-
sion (2004) using 1994 (the beginning of phase II of EMU) as the start of
the EU fiscal framework.
¥2∂ The sample in Manasse (2006) includes both developed and developing
countries. The dataset on fiscal rules used is the same as in Kopits and
Symanski (1998) and the type of fiscal rules taken into account are mostly
budget balance rules.
¥3∂ Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) show that the cross-section relation between
the cyclicality of State-level budgets and an index of stringency of borrow-
ing constraints is a weak one. Conversely, Sorensen et al. (2001) show that
US States characterised by strict borrowing constraints exhibit on average
more counter-cyclical variability in budgets. 
¥4∂ See, e.g., Sorensen et al. (2001) on the US, Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1995) compare the case of the US, Japan, Germany, France, Canada and
the Netherlands and find a pro-cyclical behaviour of overall local and state
level budget balances in non-federal countries. For evidence on the state
and local government cyclical variability of public finances in European
and other advanced and middle income countries see, e.g., Rodden and
Wibbels (2006). On Germany see Seitz (2000). 
¥5∂ In addition, two other factors needs to be considered. First, the enforcement
of budget balance rules tend to be stronger at lower levels of government
(see Graph III.5 in Part III of this report). Second, the intensity of a possible
pro-cyclical bias at lower levels of government depends on which expendi-
ture items are under the control of regional and local authorities (i.e. whether
cyclically sensitive or neutral items) and what the main sources of revenue
are (i.e. whether revenue consists mainly of transfers from central authorities
or own tax collection exposed to business cycle fluctuations).224
P a r t  I V
F i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  g o o d  t i m e sshown in section 3, cyclically-adjusted primary expendi-
tures as a ratio of GDP increase especially in periods of
positive output gap. Moreover, fiscal expansions in peri-
ods of positive output gap are mostly explained by the
behaviour of expenditures. While potentially effective in
limiting the risks of pro-cyclical behaviour in good times,
expenditure rules are compatible with the working of
automatic stabilisers on the revenue side in bad times. In
spite of wide agreement that expenditure rules could be
helpful in containing the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy
(e.g., Daban et al. (2003), Brunila (2002), European Com-
mission (2003, 2005)), systematic empirical analysis on
their effectiness to that purpose is scarce.
The effectiveness of expenditure rules in reducing the
risk of pro-cyclicality depends on their specific design.
A number of elements need to be considered in this
respect. First, how expenditure ceilings are defined.
Ceilings define as maximum expenditure ratios on GDP
may be less effective than ceilings defined in terms of
maximum expenditure growth rates. In the former case,
during good times expenditure could grow in nominal
terms without violating the ceiling, while this eventual-
ity is less likely in the latter case. As for the choice of
nominal or real growth rates, counter-cyclical stabilisa-
tion is enhanced when it is nominal growth to be capped.
In such a case indeed, if periods of GDP above potential
are characterised by demand-pull inflation, expenditure
adjustment in good times is stronger (1).
Second, which expenditure aggregate should be subject
to ceilings. Obviously, expenditure ceilings have a
higher chance of affecting the overall fiscal stance the
broader is the expenditure aggregate subject to the ceil-
ing. However, the exclusion of some categories could be
advisable. Interest expenditures, being outside the direct
control of fiscal authorities is one of such categories. The
exclusion of cyclical components like unemployment
subsidies permits the expenditure ceiling to be compati-
ble with the full operation of automatic stabilisers. Con-
versely the definition of separate ceilings for particular
type of expenditures characterised by a growing trend
and that are hardly compressible downward in the short
term (age-related expenditures in particular) could be
advisable to avoid that expenditure rules translate into
excessive compression of other expenditure categories.
Third, a medium term orientation of the expenditure rules
is likely to increase the correction of the pro-cyclical bias.
Expenditure caps need to be determined and implemented
over the medium-term to avoid a systematic revision of
the ceilings which follow ongoing cyclical developments.
However, it needs to be recalled once more that realistic
macroeconomic assumptions underlying expenditure ceil-
ings are key for the effectiveness of such instruments.
Needless to say, expenditure rules per se, not applying to
the revenue side, are not a guarantee that pro-cyclical
policies will not be implemented. However, appropri-
ately designed expenditure rules are potentially a very
effective ingredient of broader rules-based frameworks
for addressing the tendency for fiscal policy to behave
pro-cyclically in good times.
4.2.3. Revenue rules and rainy-day funds
Revenue rules fall under two broad categories. There are
rules defining caps on the tax burden or, conversely, min-
imum ceilings on revenues (2). The purpose of such rules
is, respectively, to prevent the tax burden to become too
high and to ensure an adequate government financing.
This first category of revenue rules may introduce a pro-
cyclical bias. If the rule sets a cap on revenues, pro-cycli-
cality may show up in good times (depending on how the
cap is defined, tax rates may need to be lowered when rev-
enues become more abundant), while the opposite holds
for rules that define minimum ceilings.
The second category of revenue rules deals with the use
of windfall revenues ensuing from better than expected
cyclical conditions or from ‘elasticity surprises’ related
for instance to asset price cycles or tax-rich growth. This
second category of revenue rules is potentially very
effective in dealing with the issue of pro-cyclicality in
good times. Rules of this type address in the most direct
way the issue to which fiscal authorities are faced when
better than expected budgetary outcomes materialise.
Pressures to cut taxes or increase expenditures become
strong once there is awareness of unexpected extra-
budgetary room. Defining ex ante which share of the
windfall revenue will be saved could be an effective
commitment device for fiscal authorities and could re-
address the bias for fiscal policy to become pro-cyclical
¥1∂ Expenditure ceilings in terms of growth rates could be made conditional
on prevailing and expected GDP growth rates and specified in terms of
yearly ceilings on real or nominal expenditure levels. This is what is
observed in the practice of some countries.
¥2∂ An example of revenue rules setting a cap on the tax burden is found in
Denmark. A rule fixing a minimum growth rate of nominal taxes equal to
GDP growth was in place in Belgium.225
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 6in good times. It is relevant to highlight that the concept
of good times that makes operational this type of rules
only partly overlaps with that defined in terms of the pre-
vailing cyclical conditions. The realisation of windfall
revenues is normally related with strong cyclical condi-
tions but does not need always to be so, given that elas-
ticity surprises may have a considerable quantitative
impact without being strictly related to GDP fluctua-
tions. The experience of countries that have been adopt-
ing revenue rules of this type is summarised in Box IV.2.
Since revenue rules are not very frequent, systematic
empirical analysis aimed at assessing their effectiveness
is not available.
Related to revenue arrangements to deal with windfall
gains, there is the setting up of so-called rainy-day
funds (see Box IV.3). The basic idea is that the accumu-
lation of resources in a fund during good times permits
to draw resources during bad times without the need to
run into pro-cyclical budgetary adjustment. The mech-
anism could be a very effective complement to fiscal
rules defined over cash variables. For instance, when
sub-national levels of government are subject to bor-
rowing constraints putting ceilings on debt, rainy-day
funds would help to avoid pro-cyclicality in good times
and this way, to permit a counter-cyclical fiscal stance
in bad times. When instead the rules affect budget bal-
ance defined in accrual terms, the effectiveness of
rainy-day funds is reduced: the accumulation and
decumulation of resources in the fund are recorded as
financial operations and do not affect the size of budget
balances.
It follows that drawing from the fund will not help to
improve budgetary figures in bad times. However, this
does not mean at all that the fund will be ineffective.
Moving resources in and out of the fund will still
impact debt in a stabilising way. Additionally, rainy-
day funds will in general fulfil a function akin to that of
revenue rules for stabilising purposes. They can work
as a commitment device for fiscal authorities to permit
that when better than expected budgetary outcomes
materialise a fraction of these resources is saved rather
than spent or dissipated via tax cuts.   
Box IV.2: Revenue rules to prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times in EU countries
The replies to the questionnaires submitted to the EPC Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances indicate that while
about half EU Member States have put in place expenditure rules (which, as discussed in section 4.2.2. could be a useful
instrument to avoid pro-cyclical developments in expenditure in good times) there are only few countries that operate rev-
enue rules explicitly aimed at preventing a pro-cyclical fiscal stance in good times.
Finland is characterised by a system of national fiscal rules aimed at the same time at containing deficits and at favouring an
appropriate fiscal stance over the cycle. A budget balance rule applied to central government fixes a maximum ceiling of
2.75 % of GDP and requires a balance position in periods or normal growth conditions, admitting however short-term devia-
tions related to cyclical conditions. The budget balance rule is complemented by an expenditure rule implemented over a
multi-annual framework. The exclusions of cyclically-sensitive items from the expenditure ceilings favours the free operation
of automatic stabilisers. A revenue rule stipulates that unemployment security contributions as well as earnings-related pen-
sion contributions are stabilised over the cycle with the help of so-called EMU-buffer funds, which work in a way akin to that
of rainy day funds (see Box IV.2). This revenue rule contains the risk of increased spending or tax cuts in good times.
In the Netherlands, ceilings on real expenditure levels defined for different sub-sector of the central government and set
for the length of a legislature limit the use by the national government of budgetary windfalls for additional expenditure in
good times. The expenditure rule in the Netherlands is complemented by a medium-term framework aimed at stabilising
revenues through the indication of yearly revenue targets. On top of this medium-term revenue framework, the Netherlands
adopted a rule defining ex ante which share of higher than expected revenues could be spent or redistributed to citizens via
tax cuts and which share should be used for the purpose of reducing the deficit.
A revenue rule to prevent dissipating budgetary windfalls arising in good times has been introduced in France in 2005,
taking effect in 2006. The introduction was motivated by the episode of the large revenue windfall of 2000 (‘la cagnotte’),
which was allocated to tax cuts. The recently introduced French revenue rule requires that in the budget law the government
defines how possible differences between actual and predicted revenues will be allocated. Which share of revenue wind-
falls will be used to reduce the deficit is thus set ex ante but on a year-by-year basis.226
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(Continued on the next page)
So-called rainy-day funds (alternatively referred to as extra-budgetary stabilisation funds) are an instrument specifically
designed to prevent pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. (1) Such funds are replenished in good times in order to become
available for spending in bad times. Until now, real-world experiences with rainy-day funds are abundant especially in US indi-
vidual States. In the EU, the only country having set up a fiscal rule with effects similar to those of rainy-day funds is Finland.
The principle underlying the working of rainy-day funds is relatively simple. In good times government revenues are more
abundant, and part of these extra revenues are used to accumulate financial assets in the fund. Conversely, when times are
bad, assets are decumulated. The setting up of rainy day funds has a clear stabilising impact on the gross debt. During good
times, there is less debt reduction because some resources are used to buy financial assets; during bad times, debt grows
less, because financial resources are obtained from the sales of the assets accumulated in the fund. While fully effective in
principle as a debt stabilisation tool, the impact on deficits is not equally effective. Budget balances are compiled net of
financial transactions, so that any accumulation or decumulation of financial assets in rainy day funds would not have any
direct stabilising impact on budget balances. (2) Surpluses in good times will not be smaller, deficits in bad times will
appear equally large with or without rainy-day funds. This is a basic reason why rainy-day funds are so common in contexts
where gross borrowing constraints are present (like in the US) while a similar widespread use is not observed in the case
of fiscal constraints operating on deficits defined in relation to net borrowing. Although the operation of rainy-day funds
does not have a direct impact on the stabilisation of deficits, their indirect effect could be relevant. In particular, they could
be helpful in preventing that in good times budgetary resources are depleted. The commitment to transfer of resources in
the fund in good times into a separate fund may contribute to discipline policymakers who might otherwise be inclined to
give away any budgetary windfalls in the form of higher expenditure or lower taxes. The decumulation of rainy day fund
assets in bad times would in any case permit to contain the growth of (gross) debt at given deficit.
For rainy-day funds to function properly in practice, several conditions will have to be met. First, the circumstances and
modalities under which reserves could be accumulated and withdrawn need to be clarified ex ante, monitorable, and
enforceable.2 This requires a non-ambiguous definition of good times, such that the accumulation of resources into the fund
cannot be denied on the basis of diverging views on what should be meant by good times. Clear provisions on the modal-
ities for the accumulation of assets in the fund are also needed, in order to ensure that the payments to the fund are not
delayed and that resources are invested in appropriate financial instruments. As for the rules governing the use of the assets
in the fund, a non-ambiguous definition of bad times is needed. An effective monitoring and enforcement process is key
to avoid that the funds are used for purposes different from debt stabilisation.
Second, the notion of good times used for the working of the fund should ideally be both easily made operational and useful
for the purpose of output stabilisation. Having a definition closely linked to the amount or revenues perceived by the gov-
ernment (expressed for instance in terms of a sufficiently positive difference with respect to projected revenues) is likely
to be more suited to ensure a smooth operation of the rainy day fund. The working would be similar to that of a revenue
rule aimed at avoiding pro-cyclical budgetary loosening, with the additional requirement of the accumulation of resources
in the fund. With such type of definition, however, it would not be guaranteed an effective impact on cyclical stabilisation
since extraordinary government revenues may not necessarily be related to the cyclical conditions of the economy but to
other reasons relating mainly to lags in revenue collection or changes in the elasticity of revenues with respect to output.
An alternative would be to define good times on the basis of indicators relating directly to cyclical conditions. This is the
practice followed in most US states. The problem with this definition is that revenues may not always be particularly abun-
dant in periods of strong cyclical conditions or could be only with lags.
¥1∂ Rainy-day funds have been discussed with a focus on the US, among others, by Kopits and Symanski (1998), Knight and Levinsohn (1999), Zahradnik
and Johnson (2002), Hemming and Kell (2000). Among the papers addressing the issue in the EU context see Wagner and Elder (2002), Buti et al.
(2003), Sapir et al. (2003), CESIFO (2003).
Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of defining a different notion of government budget balance net of accumulation/decumulation of assets
in the fund for analytical purposes. Moreover, it would not be inconceivable to carry out budgetary surveillance on such alternative notions of deficit.
In the EU practice, however, this may entail a revision of the EDP Protocol of the Treaty where the concept of government deficit used in EU budget-
ary surveillance is defined.
¥2∂ On deposit and withdrawal provisions for rainy day finds, see for instance Sobel and Holcombe(1996) and Wagner and Gropp. (2002).227
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An alternative avenue to address the pro-cyclical bias of
fiscal policy consists of the establishment of institutions
independent of the government with a role in fiscal pol-
icy-making. In recent years, a certain number of propos-
als have been put forward by the academia advocating
the creation of ‘independent fiscal authorities’ to address
the deficit bias and the pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy-
making. As discussed in Part III of the report, these inde-
pendent authorities would be delegated some tasks of
fiscal policy-making, with a view to define and monitor
budgetary targets not biased by the ‘common pool prob-
lem’ and the short-sightedness that often characterise
political bodies. In theory, such solution would permit to
maintain the advantages of discretionality, namely, the
possibility to adapt budgetary policy to the unforeseen
contingencies, getting rid of the problems that normally
come with it: deficit bias and unsatisfactory fiscal stabi-
lisation ensuing from pro-cyclical bias in good times.
Additionally, independent fiscal authorities are likely to
be less prone to a time-inconsistency issue stemming
from the difficulties that governments may have in keep-
ing their commitments. Even in case numerical rules are
in place, if enforcement is not strong enough govern-
ments may have an incentive to violate rules-based com-
mitments ex post if the political gain of doing so is high
enough, while such an incentive will not be there for
non-political bodies. These arguments apply also to
numerical rules to address the pro-cyclical bias, like the
definition of ex ante arrangements on the use of windfall
revenues or the establishment of rainy-day funds (1).
Although the establishment of independent fiscal
authorities is vividly debated, such proposals for the
time being have no real-world counterpart and are
unlikely to be implemented for a series or major rea-
sons, mainly relating to lack of guarantee of sufficient
democratic accountability.
A different type of independent national institutions with
a potential role in fiscal policy-making are so-called ‘fis-
cal councils’. As illustrated in Part III of the report, these
type institutions currently in operation in the EU and other
industrial countries mainly have the function of supplying
analytical inputs to fiscal policy-making, but may also
have a role in providing normative indications and
expressing a voice in the fiscal policy debate. Those coun-
cils that provide technical inputs generally prepare mac-
roeconomic forecasts to be used in budgetary planning or
that provide a counter-check to the official forecasts used
by the government. A further relevant analytical task per-
formed in relation with fiscal policy-making is the assess-
ment of the budgetary impact of policy measures.
The role of this type of councils in preventing a pro-cycli-
cal bias of fiscal policy in good times is only indirect, but
potentially relevant for a number of reasons. First, inde-
pendent high-quality macroeconomic forecast could help
to address the pro-cyclicality of expenditure related with
identification and implementation lags. As stressed previ-
ously, the issue of pro-cyclicality in good times is strongly
related with the behaviour of expenditures. Disposing of
high-quality and realistic growth forecast would contrib-
ute to limit expenditure growth in periods of positive
output gap, where growth forecast run the highest risk of
being excessively affected by recent periods of growth
above trend. Second, independent forecasts would
Box IV.3 (continued)
A further issue with the operation of rainy day funds is that there may be the risk that the accumulation of assets in good
times in the fund occurs via additional borrowing. In this case, governments could be able both to put assets in the fund
and spend budgetary windfalls at the same time. The reputational cost of such circumventing measures may not always be
a sufficient deterrent for governments, so that explicit provisions addressing this specific issue might be desirable.
Finally, the amount of resources moved in and out rainy-day funds need to be sufficiently large in order to have an impact on
the fiscal stance. An approach could be to determine accumulation thresholds that guarantee a significant impact on the fiscal
stance. However, the limitation of this approach is that the extra resources available related to strong cyclical conditions may
not large enough to reach the threshold. The alternative would be to define the minimum requirements for asset accumulation
as percentages of the cyclical component of the budget or of the difference between expected and realised revenues.
¥1∂ The establishment of independent fiscal authorities with a specific man-
date for fiscal stabilisation has been advocated, inter-alia, by Eichengreen
et al. (1999) for the US and Wren-Lewis (2002) and Calmfors (2003) for
the EU.228
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expenditure frameworks limiting putting a cap on the
growth of government outlays are among the instruments
that most directly deal with the issue of excessive expend-
iture growth in good times. However, as already pointed
out, the effectiveness of such arrangements crucially
depends on the quality of the surrounding macroeconomic
forecast. Related to that, a high-quality assessment of the
budgetary impact of policies can contribute to address a
possible optimistic bias in expenditure planning. Finally,
independent fiscal councils may feed the internal debate
on how to improve the existing arrangements to prevent
the pro-cyclical bias and may increase awareness among
the policy community, academia, and the public opinion
on existing problems with the design or the implemen-
tation of fiscal rules currently in place (e.g., the use of
revenue rules of rainy-day funds).
4.4. National fiscal rules and the stance 
of fiscal policy over the cycle
The aim of this section is to provide analysis on the link
between fiscal rules at national level and the issue of pro-
cyclicality. The analysis will proceed in three steps.
First, there will be an analysis of what are the percep-
tions by EU policy-makers on the impact of the fiscal
rules in place at national level on the pro-cyclicality of
fiscal policy. The information for this analysis is the one
provided by the replies to questionnaires submitted by
the European Commission to the Members of the Qual-
ity of Public Finances Working Group (QWG) of the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC). In a second step,
there will be an attempt to establish a link between fiscal
rule indexes, measuring the strength of fiscal rules at
national level (see Part III of this report for their con-
struction) with the observed patterns of public finances
cyclicality. A distinction will be made between the com-
plex of rules that affect the budget balance and expendi-
ture rules. Third, a synthetic index will be built at coun-
try level measuring the likely impact of the complex of
the existing national-level fiscal rules on the stabilisation
properties of fiscal policy. The index is constructed on
the a priori expectations on the effects of the different
type of rules on the basis of the arguments listed in the
previous section. This index will be put in relation with
country-level measures of the cyclicality of public
finances to check whether the ex ante expectations on the
impact of rules are confirmed by the data.
The questionnaire submitted to the QWG members
included explicit questions on the perception of Mem-
bers (experts from Finance Ministries) on whether or not
each of the rules in place in their country would entail a
pro-cyclical bias in the conduct of fiscal policy. The
replies to this question are synthetically reported in
Graph IV.14. The hystograms summarise the replies
over the sample according to the type of rules concerned:
budget balance, debt, expenditure or revenue rules. It
turns out that the respect of the rule may imply the con-
duct of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the majority of
cases relating to budget balance and debt rules. This
findings are consistent with the arguments spelled out
previously when discussing the potential implications of
different types of fiscal rules for the cyclical behaviour
of the fiscal stance. However, an interesting distinction
needs to be made between budget balance and debt rules.
While the vast majority of debt rules is perceived to be
pro-cyclical, the judgment is much more balanced in the
case of debt rules. This difference is mostly explained by
the fact that borrowing constraints apply at lower levels
of government and are specified on an annual basis,
while a substantial share of budget balance rules are
defined either ‘over the cycle’, or on a multi-annual
basis, or excluding cyclically-sensitive items.
The perception on expenditure rules fully confirm
expectations: none of them is perceived as leading to
pro-cyclical outcomes. Regarding revenue rules, the
majority is judged not to entail a pro-cyclical bias.
In order to perform an analysis on the link between
national fiscal rules and the stance of fiscal policy over
the cycle a necessary ingredient is a measure of the
strength of fiscal rules at the national level. To this pur-
pose, the ‘fiscal rules index’, and the ‘expenditure rule
index’ are put in relation with measures of the fiscal
stance (see Part III of this report).
The first index provides a synthetic measure of the
strength of all the fiscal rules in force in a given country
(deficit rules, debt rules, expenditure rules, revenue
rules) in a given period, taking into account their cover-
age in terms of government sectors concerned (e.g., only
sub-national levels of government or general govern-
ment), their statutory basis, the body in charge of moni-
toring and enforcing the rules, the type of enforcement
mechanism foreseen, and the media visibility of the
rules.
The ‘overall expenditure rule index’ provides analogous
information but regarding expenditure rules only.
Although these indexes vary both across countries and229
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exploited in the following analyses. This limitation
comes from the need to estimate the fiscal stance prevail-
ing in good and bad times over a sufficiently long time
period. The fiscal rule indexes are put in relation with
indicators of the fiscal stance. The overall fiscal rule
index is linked with the year-on-year change in the
CABP, while the overall expenditure rule index is put in
relation with the change in the primary cyclically-
adjusted expenditures.
Graph IV.15 shows the frequency of counter and pro-
cyclical fiscal policy episodes in good and bad times (as
measured by output being, respectively, above or below
potential) separately for countries with high and low
overall fiscal rules indexes. The breakdown of countries
Graph IV.14:  Fiscal rules and stabilisation: questionnaire replies
Graph IV.15:  Frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Weak and strong fiscal 
rule countries (22 EU countries, 1990-2005)
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period. Countries with an index value above the median
are classified as countries with strong overall fiscal
rules; countries with an index below the median as coun-
tries with weak rules. The graph indicates that the per-
centage of pro-cyclical fiscal policy episodes was
slightly higher in countries with strong overall fiscal
rules both in good and bad times.
More frequent episodes of fiscal tightening in periods with
output below potential in strong rule countries is consist-
ent with expectations, especially if these countries rely
strongly on deficit and debt rules to keep under control the
budgetary position of lower levels of government.
In order to disentangle the contribution to the stance of fis-
cal policy associated with the strength of expenditure
rules, the frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cycli-
cal behaviour of government expenditure was computed
separately for weak and strong expenditure rule countries,
defined, respectively, as countries with the average over-
all expenditure rule index below or above the median.
Graph IV.16 displays histograms on the change in cycli-
cally-adjusted expenditure as a percentage of GDP
(∆CAPE) shows that countries with strong expenditure
rules were less likely to run pro-cyclical expenditure poli-
cies. In line with expectations, the difference is considera-
ble especially in good times: countries with strong rules are
considerably less prone to raise expenditure when output is
above potential. As pointed out in section 3, the ratio of pri-
mary cyclically-adjusted expenditure on GDP tends to
raise especially in periods of positive output gap, possibly
due to identification and implementation lags: expendi-
tures are planned on the basis of growth expectations,
largely determined by current and recent growth develop-
ments. Expenditure frameworks putting a limit on the
yearly growth expenditures are likely to be effective espe-
cially when expenditures grow faster, namely, when the
output gap is positive. Regarding the lower frequency of
episodes of pro-cyclical behaviour of expenditure in good
times, a possible explanation could be related to the fact
that a lower growth of expenditure in good times reduces
the likelihood of expenditure retrenchments in bad times to
respect budgetary targets.
The sample used in the analyses covers all the countries
for which information on fiscal rules were obtained from
the questionnaires submitted to Member States within
the framework of the Quality of Public Finances Work-
ing Group attached to the Economic Policy Committee.
These countries are all EU countries with the exception
of Greece, Cyprus and Malta. The period considered is
1990-2005. The period chosen reflects the time frame
Graph IV.16:  Frequency of episodes of pro- and counter-cyclical behaviour of government expenditure. 
Weak and strong expenditure rule countries (22 EU countries, 1990-2005)
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includes all rules into force starting from 1990. The sam-
ple includes episodes of very large and rarely observed
changes in budgetary data, observed mostly in New
Member States. In order to avoid results being driven by
these ‘outliers’, the sample was trimmed in such a way
to exclude the observations exhibiting changes in the
CAPB and in the primary cyclically-adjusted expendi-
ture outside the 2.5 percent and the 97.5 percent percen-
tiles of the overall distribution.
4.5. Summary of results
National-level rules and institutions matter for the cycli-
cal behaviour of fiscal policy. In particular, a number of
points can be highlighted as follows.
• Whether budget balance rules introduce a pro-cycli-
cal bias in bad times depends crucially on the way the
rule is designed. Rules that exclude cyclical items, or
that are applied ‘over the cycle’ may contribute to
reduce the risk of a pro-cyclical bias. The extent to
which budget balance rules and borrowing constraints
applied at lower levels of government induce a pro-
cyclical behaviour depend also on the cyclical behav-
iour of the type of expenditures delegated to local
governments and on the source of their finances.
• Expenditure rules can be an effective tool to curb the
tendency for expenditures to grow faster during
good times. The effectiveness of such rules depends
on their design. Multi-year expenditure frameworks
capping the growth of relatively broad expenditure
aggregates on the basis of realistic macroeconomic
assumptions would be the most effective instrument.
• Revenue rules defining exante which share of reve-
nue windfall materialising in good times are to be
saved, or the establishment of ‘rainy-day funds’
could help governments to credibly commit not to
spend or give away via tax cuts better than expected
budgetary outcomes emerging during good times.
• ‘Fiscal councils’ providing analytical inputs, nota-
bly high-quality independent macro- economic fore-
casts and an assessment of the budgetary impact of
measures would improve the effectiveness of
national-level rules aimed at addressing the pro-
cyclical bias in good times.
• Analysis on the basis of questionnaires submitted
to the EPC Quality Working Group reveals that
countries with overall stronger fiscal rules
behaved slightly more pro-cyclically in bad times.
This confirms that a certain trade-off could
emerge between fiscal rules for fiscal discipline
and stabilisation in good times. However, the evi-
dence also shows that those countries with the
strongest expenditure rules were characterised by
a considerably less frequent pro-cyclical behav-
iour of expenditure in periods with positive output
gaps.232
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1. Belgium
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government accounts posted a small
surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP, close to the original target
of a balanced budget in the 2004 update of the stability
programme. Tax revenue remained relatively strong in
spite of a slowdown in economic growth. Nevertheless, in
order to reach the target the Belgian authorities had to step
up the recourse to one-off measures towards the end of the
year, from 0.4 percent of GDP as planned to over 0.5 per-
cent of GDP, notably payments by the national railways
(SNCB) and the Antwerp port authorities in connection
with the transfer of pension obligations to social security.
Moreover, a 2.5 percent-of-GDP debt assumption from
the national railways (SNCB) has been treated without
impact on the deficit, although Eurostat has made a reser-
vation to the recording of this transaction (1). The debt-
to-GDP ratio in 2005 — which now also includes the
debt assumed from the SNCB — further decreased by
1.4 points to 93.3 percent, which is lower than foreseen in
the 2004 update of the stability programme (95.5 percent).
However, this is largely the result of the upward revision
of GDP series by about 1.5 percent.
The 2006 budget was presented in October 2005 and
finally approved by Parliament on 15 December. The
budget aims at limiting real growth of federal primary
expenditure to 0.3 percent, strict expenditure control in
the social security sector and a broadening of the tax
base. Moreover, the government announced a significant
package of new one-off measures (0.6 percent of GDP),
such as real-estate sales and a fiscal regularisation proce-
dure, but also the securitisation of VAT arrears. The ini-
tial target of a balanced budget was confirmed in the lat-
est update of the stability programme (2), submitted on
5 December 2005. The Commission services’ 2006
spring forecast foresees a small deficit of 0.3 percent of
GDP mainly as a result of lower estimates for the pro-
ceeds of some new taxes (such as taxes on financial
investment funds and on unused production capacity in
the electricity sector) and less optimistic assumptions
regarding government expenditure. In the first months of
2006, tax revenue continued to increase strongly, but this
was offset by an unanticipated increase in interest
expenditure following recent interest rate rises. On the
whole, the structural balance as well as the structural pri-
mary balance are expected to deteriorate by 0.6 percent
of GDP, which can be considered as expansionary. 
As for 2007, a deficit of 0.9 percent of GDP is projected in
the Commission services’ 2006 spring forecast, on the basis
of a no-policy-change scenario. The further deterioration of
the general government balance is mainly due to the phas-
ing out of the abovementioned one-off measures. New
measures to reduce the tax burden on labour (0.2 percent of
GDP) will also reduce government revenue, but this will be
partly offset by anticipated reductions in spending by local
authorities (0.2 percent of GDP) after the 2006 local elec-
tions, following a similar pattern observed in the past.
In the latest update of the stability programme, Belgium
aims at a surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2007. However,
the government has not yet announced how it plans to reach
this target. The government projects to step up the surplus
to 0.5 percent of GDP in 2008 and to 0.7 percent in 2009.
According the to the 2006 spring forecast, the public
debt-to-GDP ratio maintains its downward trend, though
at a slightly lower pace than foreseen in the 2005 update
of the stability programme. By the end of 2006 it should
be reduced to below 90 percent of GDP, and to 87 per-
¥1∂ Eurostat considers that this transaction should result in a capital transfer
from government to SNCB, with a one-off impact on the government defi-
cit by the same amount. Belgium has informed Eurostat of its intention to
introduce legislation to retroactively annul this operation. The accounting
consequences of this are expected to be clarified before October 2006 (See
Eurostat News Release No 46/2006 of 24.4.2006).
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.235
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2 0 0 6cent in 2007. Due to a slightly better starting position in
2005, this still corresponds to the objective foreseen in
the latest update of the stability programme. According
to the stability programme, the debt should fall below 80
percent of GDP in 2009.
Budgetary coordination and the Belgian High 
Finance Council (1)
In the 1990s, Belgium was successful in reducing its high
deficits of around 8 percent of GDP to a balanced budget,
which has been largely maintained since 2000 (2). At the
same time it has brought the debt ratio down from its his-
torical highpoint of 137 percent of GDP in 1993 to about
93 percent in 2005. This fiscal consolidation was backed
by a strong political commitment to reduce the deficits
and debt in order to meet the criteria for euro-area mem-
bership, and subsequently the close-to-balance target of
the Stability and Growth Pact.
Fiscal decentralisation in Belgium had started as early as
1970. Since then the country has evolved from a strictly
unitary State into a rather complex federal structure of
regions (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and commu-
Table V.1
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Belgium (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 0.0 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.9
- Total revenues 49.4 50.1 49.3 48.5
 Of which: - current taxes 29.8 30.3 30.1 29.9
- social contributions 16.3 16.2 16.0 15.7
- Total expenditure 49.4 50.0 49.6 49.4
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
- social transfers in kind 14.3 14.4 14.3 14.4
- social transfers other than in kind 16.0 16.0 15.9 15.8
- interest expenditure 4.8 4.4 4.2 3.9
- gross fixed capital formation 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7
Primary balance 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.1
Tax burden 45.3 45.7 45.2 44.6
One-off and temporary measures 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 0.8 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.3
Structural primary balance 4.0 4.4 3.8 4.0
Government gross debt 94.7 93.3 89.8 87.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.6 1.2 2.3 2.1
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7
Primary balance 4.8 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1
Structural balance (4) n.a. 0.0 – 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9
Government gross debt 94.7 94.3 90.7 87.0 83.0 79.1
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.4 % in
2005, 0.6 % in 2006, 0.2 % in 2007, 0.1 % in 2008 and 0.0 % in 2009; all deﬁcit-reducing; the ﬁgures for the one-off measures from 2007 onwards were provided
by the Belgian authorities after the submission of the programme with the caveat that they ‘should be considered as assumptions and do not prejudge any decision
by the Belgian authorities’).
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Belgium.
¥1∂ See also: Gerrit Bethuyne, Federalisation and fiscal consolidation: the
Belgian experience, Country Focus, Volume II. Issue 16, September 2005,
European Commission – DG Ecfin, Brussels, 6 pp. 
¥2∂ For 2005, the caveat regarding the assumption of debt from the SNCB
mentioned above applies. 236
nities (the Flemish, French and German-speaking Com-
munities). Currently, the communities exercise powers
in fields directly relating to people, such as education,
culture, welfare and certain aspects of health policy.
Regional powers include town and country planning,
housing, the environment, public works and certain
aspects of agriculture, energy, transport, employment
and the economy. The regions also exercise the supervi-
sion over local authorities. Each region and community
has its own parliament and government. In Flanders, the
regional and community institutions have been merged
given the large overlap in population and territory con-
cerned. The French-speaking Community and the Wal-
loon Region on the other hand, which also show a large
territorial overlap (but much less in terms of population),
still have separate institutions.
Although the institutional reform started as early as
1970, it was not until 1989 that the current system
became fully operational with the adoption of the ‘Spe-
cial Financing Law’ and the creation of the ‘Public Sec-
tor Borrowing Requirements’ section within the High
Finance Council, a supervisory agency composed of rel-
atively independent high-level experts. This provided
the framework for the current system of budgetary con-
ventions, which are political agreements between the
federal and regional governments that set medium-term
targets and act like internal stability programmes.
Although before 1989 regional entities already had some
limited budgetary autonomy (about 3 percent of GDP by
1988), their funding solely consisted of transfers from
the federal government. From 1989 onwards, regions
and communities received a separate budget based on
the new Special Financing Law (1) and became responsi-
ble for their own treasury management. While in 1988
federal expenditure (excluding social security) was still
almost 30 percent of GDP, it is now down to 12 percent
(of which about one third can be attributed to the interest
payments on federal government debt). On the other
hand, regional expenditure is now over 11 percent of
GDP (about ä of total government expenditure – see
Graph V.1.).
The sources of funding attributed by the Special
Financing Law are different between regions and com-
munities. Currently, regions and communities are
mainly financed with a share of personal income tax
revenue and (for communities only) of VAT revenue
(see Graph V.2). Regions also derive funding from a
dozen types of taxes exclusively assigned to them,
including registration taxes (on real estate sales, mort-
gages and gifts), inheritance taxes and road taxes. They
can create new taxes, provided that the same tax base is
not already in use for a federal tax, but (except for the
Brussels Region, where they represent over 7 percent
of total revenue) these new taxes play only a marginal
role. The remaining sources of revenue for the regions
and communities are quite diverse, such as transfers
from the federal budget to the communities in relation
to foreign students and, for the Brussels region, a spe-
cific transfer to compensate for its function as the coun-
try’s capital. Finally, regions and communities can
issue debt, subject to notification to, and approval by,
the federal government.  
Despite the large transfer of revenue and expenditure to
regions and communities, since 1989 only a small part
(less than 4 percent of GDP) of the total government
debt (about 130 percent of GDP at that time) was trans-
ferred to the regional level. The rest remained at the
federal level for the most part (some 117 percent of
GDP), and at the local authority level (about 9 percent
of GDP). However, from the start, regions and commu-
nities also inherited a small part of the (substantial) fed-
Table V.2
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Belgium
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Final stage of the implementation of the 2001 tax reform 
(-0.4 % of GDP)
• Additional measures to reduce the tax burden on labour 
(-0.2 % of GDP)
• Real estate sales (0.2 % of GDP)
• Securitisation of VAT arrears (0.2 % of GDP)
• New measures to fight fiscal fraud (0.2 % of GDP)
• New taxes on insurance products and financial investment funds 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Introduction of a new fiscal regularisation procedure (0.1 % of GDP)
• Real growth limited to 0.3 % in federal primary expenditure and 
1.2 % in social security expenditure
• Reduced expenditure by regions and communities 
• (-0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ A separate arrangement was created earlier in 1983 for the (much smaller)
German-speaking Community. 237
eral deficits, which they had to finance themselves.
Their combined deficit peaked in 1992 at 1 percent of
GDP, but since then it generally followed a downward
trend. In 1997 the Flemish budget entered positive ter-
ritory and its surplus soon became larger than the defi-
cits of other regions and communities. As a result, the
regional debt level, which had continued to increase
until 1997 (at just over 7 percent of GDP), has since
fallen to less than 5 percent of GDP. At the same time,
the federal deficit has been brought down from over 7
percent of GDP in 1992 to less then 0.5 percent of GDP
in recent years.
This result required clear budgetary targets for all levels
of government and an efficient mechanism to enforce
them. The Belgian coordination mechanism is largely
based on a consensus between the different govern-
ments, laid down in ‘budgetary conventions’. These
political agreements set the medium-term budgetary tar-
gets and act as internal stability programmes. Until 1999
they were also integrated in the Belgian convergence
programme and since then have been integrated in the
Belgian stability programmes. Although the federal gov-
ernment (on recommendation by the High Finance
Council) can limit the borrowing capacity of a non-com-
pliant region or community, which puts the long-term
sustainability of public finances at risk, it has not been
considered necessary to use this sanctioning mechanism
so far.
On the contrary, regions and communities have demon-
strated a strong commitment to stick to the medium-term
targets set in the conventions and often performed better
than planned. The Belgian National Bank estimated that,
Graph V.1:  Government expenditure as % of GDP
Graph V.2:  Revenue sources for regions and communities in 2005
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budget balance usually exceeded the target: on average,
the difference between the actual outcome and the target
expressed as a percentage of total revenue was 2.4 per-
cent per annum for Flanders, 0.3 percent for the Walloon
Region and 5.2 percent for the Brussels Capital Region.
Only the French-speaking Community had an average
performance slightly below the target (by 0.4 percent of
its revenue).
From an institutional point of view, a key role in the
monitoring of public finances has been played by the
‘Public Sector Borrowing Requirements’ section of the
Belgian High Finance Council. It is composed of high-
level experts from ministries, the National Bank, the
Federal Planning Bureau and academia. Its members
have a renewable five-year mandate which is incompat-
ible with a political office to ensure its independence and
the chairman is an academic. Every year the High
Finance Council produces an analysis of the borrowing
requirements of the regional entities and the budgetary
policy to be adopted, including recommendations on the
budget balances of the various levels of government. It
also publishes an annual ex post evaluation of the imple-
mentation of the stability programme. Overall, the High
Finance Council’s recommendations and ex post evalua-
tion of the implementation of the stability programme
created a transparent system with clear objectives and
the opportunity to ‘name and shame’ authorities that did
not meet their targets. This imposed discipline and
helped policy-makers to resist pressures to increase
expenditure (1). Following the recommendations of the
High Finance Council, Belgium is planning to build up
surpluses, starting in 2007 (0.3 percent of GDP) and
increasing them by 0.2 percent points each year until
2012. Until now, the general government balanced
budget position since 2000 was mainly the result of sur-
pluses created by the regions and communities and in the
social security sector, which offset the deficits created by
the federal government and (to a much lesser extent)
local authorities. For the next few years, the Belgian
authorities project decreasing surpluses by regions and
communities, compensated by some improvement in the
budgetary position of the local authorities, whereas
social security is expected to maintain a balanced posi-
tion. Therefore the planned surpluses should result
mainly from efforts by the federal government. So far the
federal government’s budgetary position benefited sig-
nificantly from the reduction of the interest burden of the
debt, because of the continuous debt reduction and
favourable interest rate developments. Moreover, one-
off measures also regularly supported the federal budget.
However, in view of the recent upward trend in interest
rates and a depletion of the pool of potential one-off
measures, additional structural measures will be required
to reach the proposed targets.
¥1∂ However, in 2005 the ‘Public sector borrowing requirements’ section did
not publish its usual reports, because the Belgian authorities had not yet
replaced some of its members after their mandate expired. The High
Finance Council is expected to resume its normal activities in the course of
2006.239
2. Czech Republic
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit was 2.6 percent
of GDP, compared with the deficit target of 4.7 percent
of GDP set out in the November 2004 convergence pro-
gramme. Both higher-than-planned revenues and lower-
than-budgeted expenditures contributed to the better-
than-expected deficit. Like in 2004, low expenditures
reflected the possibility given to government depart-
ments to carry over unspent funds, rather than intentional
and durable spending cuts. Additional expenditure carry-
overs created in 2005 amounted to about 0.9 percent of
GDP, amounting cumulatively to some 1ã percent of
GDP. Public debt, which was recently revised down-
wards because of the reclassification of a state guarantee,
reached about 30â percent of GDP.
The State budget law for 2006 was approved by Parlia-
ment on 2 December 2005. The 2006 budget incorpo-
rates fiscal measures presented in the November 2005
convergence programme (1). On the revenue side, sev-
eral new measures are introduced to lower taxation of
personal income. On the expenditure side, there are no
new specific measures. The increase in budgetary expen-
ditures is budgeted to be lower than growth of nominal
GDP, leading to a fall in the expenditure ratio. The 2006
budget exceeds the legally binding nominal medium-
term expenditure ceilings set by the Czech authorities in
2004 (see below). Nevertheless, strong economic growth
is expected to ensure the achievement of the deficit tar-
get of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2006. If the expenditure
carryovers were spent on top of the budgeted expendi-
tures, the deficit could be even higher. The Commission
services are more optimistic about revenues in 2006 and
forecast a deficit of some 3ä percent of GDP. This fore-
cast already takes into account a debt cancellation of
about ä percent of GDP and is based on the assumption
that expenditure carryovers will remain constant in
2006, unlike in 2005. Mainly as a result of this assump-
tion, fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary in 2006
as the ratio of the structural primary balance to GDP is
projected to deteriorate significantly, by almost 2 per-
centage points.
The Commission services’ forecast for 2007 is a deficit
of 3â percent of GDP, based on the no-policy change
assumption and taking into account the recently
approved social spending package. The structural bal-
ance is foreseen to further worsen in 2007. The deficit
target for 2007 set in the November 2005 convergence
programme is 3.3 percent of GDP and for 2008 it is
2.7 percent of GDP.
The public-debt ratio is projected by the Commission
services to increase in 2006 to 31â percent of GDP and
to further grow in 2007.
New budgetary institutions and their impact 
on the budgetary process
The quality of the budgetary process in the Czech
Republic was affected by two major institutional innova-
tions introduced by the new law on budgetary rules of
mid-2004: the possibility to carry over unspent expendi-
tures and medium-term budgetary planning based on fis-
cal targeting. This section describes those two new insti-
tutional features of the Czech budgetary process and
assesses their effect. 
The possibility of expenditure carryovers
In 2004, the spending ministries were given the possibil-
ity to carry over unspent expenditures into the following
year. 
The main motivation of this measure was to avoid waste-
ful spending towards the end of the year. In 2004, expen-
ditures of about 1 percent of GDP were rolled over into
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/year/year20052006_en.htm.240
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increased and their cumulated size is currently estimated
at some 1ã percent of GDP.
The fiscal targeting mechanism
Fiscal targeting was set up to give a medium-term per-
spective to the process of budgetary planning and to con-
tribute to the reinforcement of aggregate fiscal discipline
and to deficit reduction. The mechanism of fiscal target-
ing is based on the following five steps:
1. The authorities decide about fiscal targets defined in
terms of the general government balance as a per-
centage of GDP. Currently, national fiscal targets
are those defined in the Council recommendation
under Article 104(7) of 5 July 2004 (3.8 percent of
GDP in 2006 and 3.3 percent of GDP in 2007). For
2008, the November 2005 update of the conver-
gence programme foresees a deficit target of 2.7 per-
cent of GDP.
2. The general government target is translated into the
central government target (i.e. for the State budget
and the State funds) also as a percentage of GDP.
Privatisation funds, social security funds and local
governments are not subject to fiscal targeting since
they are not under the direct control of the central
government. To translate the general government
Table V.3
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, The Czech Republic (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 2.9 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 3.4
- Total revenues 41.4 41.1 40.8 40.4
 Of which: - current taxes 21.4 21.4 21.5 21.3
- social contributions 15.0 15.2 15.2 15.1
- Total expenditure 44.3 43.7 44.1 43.9
 Of which: - collective consumption 11.1 11.2 10.7 10.3
- social transfers in kind 11.3 11.3 11.0 10.6
- social transfers other than in kind 11.8 11.6 11.7 12.8
- interest expenditure 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4
- gross fixed capital formation 4.9 4.5 6.5 6.8
Primary balance – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.8 – 2.0
Tax burden 36.7 37.0 37.2 36.9
One-off and temporary measures – 0.7 – 1.1 – 0.2 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 1.3 – 1.4 – 3.4 – 4.0
Structural primary balance – 0.1 – 0.2 – 2.0 – 2.6
Government gross debt 30.6 30.5 31.5 32.4
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 6.0 5.3 4.7
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 3.0 – 4.8 – 3.8 – 3.3 – 2.7
Primary balance – 1.8 – 3.5 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 1.2
Structural balance (4) – 1.9 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 3.4 – 3.0
Government gross debt (5) 36.8 37.4 37.1 37.9 37.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.4 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in November 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures are based on information from the
November 2005 convergence programme (0.5 % of GDP in 2004, 1.1 % in 2005, 0.2 % in 2006, 0 % in 2007 and 0 % in 2008; all deﬁcit-increasing).
(5) Public debt in the November 2005 update of the convergence programme included a State guarantee of some 6 % of GDP which was reclassiﬁed in the spring 2006
ﬁscal notiﬁcation.
Source: Commission services, convergence programme of the Czech Republic and the spring 2006 fiscal notification.241
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tions have to be made about the fiscal behaviour of
these sectors.
3. Central government revenues (in nominal levels) are
projected autonomously, usually using growth
assumption of the July quarterly forecast of the Min-
istry of Finance which are at the same time used for
the first draft of the next year budget.
4. The combination of the central government fiscal
target (step 2) and central government revenues
(step 3) results in the definition of the balance (in
nominal levels) and of the corresponding expendi-
ture ceiling (in nominal levels) for central govern-
ment.
5. The central government expenditure ceiling (as
defined in step 4) is divided into the expenditure
ceilings for the State budget and for the State funds.
Within these units, the expenditure ceilings are
translated into expenditure ceilings for individual
budgetary chapters and lines.
According to the fiscal targeting mechanism, the central
government should thus follow medium-term expendi-
ture ceilings defined in nominal levels. The main eco-
nomic rationale behind this was to create conditions for
an effective functioning of automatic fiscal stabilisers. If
the government sticks to the expenditure ceilings in case
of higher-than-expected GDP growth, the expenditure
ratio will decrease faster (or increase slower) than
expected and the budgetary outcome will automatically
be better-than-planned. At the same time, expenditure
ceilings defined in nominal levels should guarantee that
higher-than-expected revenues are not spent, but used
for a faster improvement in the budgetary balance. On
the contrary, in case of lower-than-expected economic
growth, automatic stabilisers would be effective only on
the revenue side and contained on the expenditure side
due to the ceilings. This would limit the potential wors-
ening of the budgetary balance. In case growth is lower
than expected and the government still wants to achieve
the original fiscal target, it has the possibility to present
a budget with expenditures below the adopted ceilings to
compensate for the revenue loss.
These steps are repeated every year when the budget is
prepared. The planning horizon is three years. In each
year (n), the expenditure ceilings for years n+2 and n+3
are adopted together with the central government budget
for year n+1. According to the law on budgetary rules,
the expenditure ceiling set in the previous year is binding
for the government when preparing the next year’s
budget. However, no sanctions are foreseen if the gov-
ernment exceeds them.
The ceilings were applied by the government on a volun-
tary basis in 2004 and 2005 and became legally binding
only for the 2006 budget. This means that, in 2005, when
the government prepared the 2006 budget and the
expenditure ceiling for 2007, the expenditure ceilings
which were adopted in 2004 had to be followed (1). Nev-
ertheless, the 2006 budget explicitly exceeded the bind-
ing expenditure ceilings as adopted in 2004, by a sub-
stantial margin of about 0.8 percent of GDP. It was not
consistent with the record of significant expenditure
under-execution in 2004 and 2005.
Assessment
The new budgetary rules (medium-term fiscal planning
based on nominal expenditure ceilings and the possibil-
ity of expenditure carryovers) introduced in mid-2004
contributed to the much better-than-expected budgetary
outcomes in 2004 and 2005. The November 2004 con-
vergence programme projected a general government
deficit of 5.2 percent of GDP in 2004. The final outcome
was 2.9 percent of GDP, much lower than expected. For
2005, the November 2005 update of the convergence
programme estimated a deficit of 4.8 percent of GDP and
the final outcome was only 2.6 percent of GDP.
The systematic overestimations of the outcome for the
general government deficit can be attributed to three fac-
tors:
1. Medium-term budgetary planning based on fiscal
targeting is subject to a high degree of uncertainty
on economic growth and tax revenues. This is par-
ticularly true for an economy at the end of the tran-
sition process, like the Czech Republic, which still
faces several structural problems. It seems that the
Ministry of Finance has applied cautious assump-
tions about economic growth and tax revenues
within the fiscal targeting framework. Both in 2004
and 2005, budgetary revenues were higher than
budgeted (by some â percent and 1 percent of GDP,
respectively). These positive tax developments
¥1∂ There are some exceptions which are mentioned in the law.242
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rate in both years.
2. There appears to be a systemic under-execution of
budgetary expenditures resulting in a sizeable
accumulation of deferred expenditures. Apart from
the already mentioned cautious approach to GDP
forecasting, there are two further reasons for the
under-execution of budgetary expenditures. On the
one hand, the spending ministries have difficulties to
execute expenditures, mostly due to new compre-
hensive rules on public procurement and to low
absorption of the EU structural funds. On the other
hand, the significant carryovers point to potential
over-budgeting of expenditures by spending minis-
tries.
3. The budgetary process, including the expenditure
ceilings, is on a cash basis (with some modifica-
tions) and there is still a high degree of uncertainty
about the ‘translation’ of cash results into accrual
accounting according to the ESA95 methodology.
Given this uncertainty, it seems that the Ministry of
Finance applies a ‘safety margin’ in its accrual-
based forecasts.
The experience with the functioning of these two budg-
etary rules also reveals two important shortcomings.
First, expenditure ceilings which aim at introducing a
medium-term perspective to the process of fiscal plan-
ning appear not to be fully compatible with the possibil-
ity of expenditure carryovers. The sizeable expenditure
carryovers distort fiscal targeting and thus undermine its
credibility (1).
Second, uncertainty about the spending or further
accumulation of expenditure carryovers erodes fiscal
policy control by the Ministry of Finance as the decision
about the extent and timing to use these carryovers is de
facto with spending ministries. This uncertainty also cre-
ates more general risks for management of macroeco-
nomic policy mix, in particular for the conduct of mone-
tary policy based on inflation targeting. Enhanced
budgetary planning and requiring a justification for
spending the funds, carried over from the past, may limit
their volume.
¥1∂ The credibility of the fiscal targeting mechanism was also weakened by
the explicit breach of the expenditure ceiling in the 2006 budget.
Table V.4
Main measures in the budget for 2006, The Czech Republic
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures
Personal tax relief (– 3/4 % of GDP)
• reduction of the tax rates for the two lowest brackets (from 15 % to 
12 % and from 20 % to 19 %, respectively)
• increase in the first income-tax bracket (by almost 11 %)
• replacement of deductible entries with tax credits
No new measures
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
Source: Commission services and the November 2005 convergence programme.243
3. Denmark
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government recorded a surplus of
4.9 percent of GDP (1). This was substantially higher
than the surplus of 2.2 percent of GDP foreseen in the
2004 update of the convergence programme. The
strength of public finances is partly explained by
stronger than expected economic growth: 3.1 percent,
compared with 2.5 percent expected in the 2004 conver-
gence programme. However, the main factors explaining
the stronger outcome were higher than expected reve-
nues from oil and gas exploitation in the North Sea and
from the pension yield tax, where elevated prices and
favourable financial market developments respectively
boosted tax bases. Against the background of the strong
surplus, the stock of government debt was reduced fur-
ther and the level of the general government debt ratio
fell to 35.9 percent of GDP.
The central government budget for 2006 was adopted on
14 December 2005. The new expenditure measures were
limited and focused mainly on initiatives in light of the
challenges from globalisation, i.e. research, innovation and
entrepreneurship. A few initiatives also aimed at the eld-
erly, families with children and vulnerable groups (see
Table V.6). On the revenue side, there were no quantita-
tively significant measures and the so-called tax freeze,
which was fully implemented in the context of the 2004
spring fiscal package, remains in force until further review.
The tax-freeze implies that no tax rate may be increased
and that some individual duties and taxes have been frozen
in nominal terms. As in the most recent update of the con-
vergence programme submitted to the Commission on 30
November 2005, a general government surplus of 3.1 per-
cent of GDP was projected outturn of a surplus of 3.6 per-
cent of GDP for 2005, is markedly higher than the 2006
surplus of 1.8 percent of GDP expected in the previous
2004 update. The upward revision to the surplus projection
is due partly to lower labour market-related expenditure
and, as for 2005, partly to higher revenues from the pen-
sion fund yield tax and North Sea oil and gas related activ-
ities. Taking account of the higher recorded outturn in
2005, and based on continued strong GDP growth and high
oil prices, the Commission services’ spring forecast esti-
mate a surplus of 3.9 percent of GDP in 2006. As measured
by the change in the structural primary balance, the fiscal
stance in the spring 2006 forecast appears to be easing.
However, the change in the structural primary balance
needs to be interpreted with caution as the sizable surplus
in 2005, as mentioned above, was partly due to exceptional
factors, not clearly linked to the economic cycle.
For 2007, the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast project a general government surplus of 4.0 percent
of GDP. This estimate is based on a no-policy change
assumption and, hence, only takes into account adopted
fiscal policy measures. As in 2006, the Commission
services’ surplus forecast is somewhat higher than the
projection provided by the government in the latest
update of the convergence programme. In the period
beyond 2007, the general government balance according
to the updated convergence programme is projected to
record surpluses between 2ã percent and 3ä percent of
GDP. This is somewhat higher than the medium-term
target interval for the general government balance that
has been defined by the government.
On the basis of expected continued general government
surpluses, the government debt ratio is expected to fall
further. According to the Commission services’ spring
2006 forecast, the debt ratio is foreseen to reach and then
fall well below 30 percent of GDP in 2006 and 2007
respectively. This broadly corresponds to the reduction
of the debt ratio foreseen in the 2005 updated conver-
gence programme.
¥1∂ All budgetary data quoted here exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of
2 March 2004 on the classification of funded pension schemes: see footnote
(1) to Table V.5. Budgetary developments 2004-2010, Denmark* ( % of
GDP).244
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Budgetary developments 2004-2010, Denmark (1) (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 2.7 4.9 3.9 4.0
- Total revenues 57.2 57.4 54.7 53.8
 Of which: - current taxes 47.4 48.5 46.5 46.0
- social contributions 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8
- Total expenditure 54.4 52.6 50.8 49.8
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5
- social transfers in kind 18.5 18.1 17.7 17.6
- social transfers other than in kind 16.9 16.2 16.0 15.8
- interest expenditure 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.5
- gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6
Primary balance 4.9 6.8 5.7 5.5
Tax burden 50.0 51.0 49.0 48.3
One-off and temporary measures 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Structural balance (3) 3.3 3.9 2.6 2.5
Structural primary balance 5.5 5.8 4.4 4.0
Government gross debt 42.6 35.8 30.0 26.5
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.9 3.1 3.2 2.3
Convergence programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010
General government balance 2.3 3.6 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.9
Primary balance 4.7 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.7
Structural balance (5) 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.3
Government gross debt 42.3 35.6 31.7 28.9 26.5 21.5
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.1 1.6 2.1
(1) The budgetary projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classiﬁcation of funded pension schemes, which needs to be imple-
mented by the time of the spring 2007 notiﬁcation. Including this impact the general government balance according to the updated convergence programme would
be 1.7 % of GDP in 2004, 4.0 % in 2005, 2.9 % in 2006 and 3.8 % in 2007, while government gross debt would be 43.8 % of GDP in 2004, 37.0 % in 2005, 31.2 %
in 2006 and 27.7 % in 2007.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2005.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.2 % of
GDP in 2004 and 2005, and 0.3 % in 2006 and 2007; all deﬁcit-reducing).
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Denmark.
Table V.6
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Denmark
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Globalisation — research, innovation education and improved 
conditions for the private sector (0.1 % of GDP)
• Improved child and elderly care, and more generous early pensions 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Improved healthcare and measures aimed at vulnerable groups, 
including improved food safety (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Danish Ministry of Finance.245
4. Germany
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit amounted to
3.3 percent of GDP, exceeding the target ratio of 2.9 per-
cent as set in the December 2004 update of the stability
programme. On the one hand, revenues turned out higher
than projected, despite the shortfall in growth. While the
previous programme had projected real growth at
1.7 percent of GDP for 2005, it actually turned out at
0.9 percent. However, the growth composition was more
tax-favourable than expected in autumn 2004 implying a
higher-than-projected tax-to-GDP ratio. The share of
‘other revenues’ in GDP was also higher than projected,
partly due to higher interest income received. On the
other hand, the expenditure share also turned out higher
than projected in the 2004 update of the stability pro-
gramme, largely on account of overspending on social
assistance. Notably with regard to the reforms of social
benefits implemented on 1.1.2005 (‘Hartz IV’), the pre-
vious year’s programme projected employment to rise
by 0.5 percent in 2005, while it actually decreased by
0.3 percent. Also, expenditure overruns by the public
health insurers contributed to the increase slippage. Gen-
eral government debt amounted to 67.7 percent of GDP
in 2005; the difference to the target as set in the 2004
update of the stability programme being due to the
upward revision of the deficit.
The draft federal budget for 2006 was presented on
22 February 2006 and is scheduled to be finally adopted
by 7 July 2006. On the revenue side, the main measures
concern the increase of some and the cutback of other tax
allowances on direct taxation while loopholes on tax-
saving investment funds are being removed. The fiscal
effects of these measures tend to cancel out. On the
expenditure side, the allocation for active labour market
policies (ALMPs) is increased at the federal level, but
reduced by the Federal Employment Agency. Subsidies
to new technologies and spending on road and railway
infrastructure are stepped up. The abolition of the sub-
sidy on owner-occupied housing will make a small con-
tribution to budgetary consolidation in 2006, with the
effect growing over time. The main budgetary effects,
however, will derive from action taken well before this
budget. As a consequence of the 2005 pension reform,
pension expenditure will rise only slightly. Given the
public sector wage agreements, negotiated increases in
working hours and the trend decline in personnel, the
public sector wage bill should contribute substantially to
consolidation in 2006. Finally, companies have to carry
forward their monthly social contributions from the mid-
dle of the following month to the end of the month when
the payment is due. This will lead to thirteen instead of
twelve cash payments in 2006, providing temporary cash
relief until 2007 of almost 1 percent of GDP. However,
since this does not affect the budget balance according to
ESA95 accrual accounting rules, the social security sys-
tem would record deficits in 2006 and 2007.
The February 2006 update of the stability programme (1)
sets the target for the 2006 general government deficit at
3.3 percent of GDP. The Commission services’ spring
2006 forecast projects the deficit at 3.1 percent of GDP,
mainly because domestic economic activity is expected
more dynamic than by the update. Fiscal policy is fore-
cast to be broadly neutral in 2006, with a slight improve-
ment in the structural balance, i.e. the budget balance net
of one-off and other temporary measures.
For 2007, the Commission services spring 2006 forecast,
considering those policy measures for which at least a
draft law exists, projects the general government deficit
at 2.5 percent of GDP. The increase in the central VAT
rate from 16 percent to 19 percent should add almost
1 percent of GDP to revenues.
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.246
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tion to lower the contribution rate to the unemployment
insurance from 6.5 percent to 4.5 percent and intends to
increase the pension contribution rate from 19.5 per-
cent to 19.9 percent, which might not be sufficient to
keep retirement finances in balance. Under current leg-
islation, public health insurers are projected to increase
contribution rates by â percentage point. Overall, the
revenue share in GDP is expected to remain broadly
constant compared with 2006, whereas the expenditure
share is projected to decline by â percentage point or
more, reflecting continuing wage restraint and reduc-
tions in labour-market-related spending. The projected
reduction in the deficit ratio corresponds to the target
set in the February 2006 update of the stability pro-
gramme which, going forward, foresees further deficit
reductions by about â percentage point annually to
reach 1â percent of GDP by 2009. 
With low nominal GDP growth, the Commission serv-
ices spring 2006 forecast projects the public debt ratio to
increase from 67.7 percent of GDP in 2005 to 69.2 per-
cent in 2007, despite dampening effects expected from
the above-entioned cash relief in the social systems and
from privatisations. The February 2006 update of the sta-
bility programme expects the debt ratio to fall to about
67 percent of GDP by 2009. According to this projec-
tion, the reduction in the primary deficit would contri-
bute to the reduction in the debt ratio from 2007 on. Yet,
only in the final year of the programme period, the budg-
etary consolidation would over-compensate the ‘snow-
ball effect’, i.e. the automatic increase in the debt-to-
Table V.7
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Germany (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.5
- Total revenues 43.2 43.4 43.1 43.0
 Of which: - current taxes 21.7 21.9 21.9 22.7
- social contributions 17.8 17.7 17.4 16.6
- Total expenditure 46.8 46.7 46.1 45.5
 Of which: - collective consumption 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6
- social transfers in kind 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.6
- social transfers other than in kind 19.1 19.2 18.9 18.4
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
- gross fixed capital formation 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Primary balance – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.3
Tax burden 39.0 39.0 38.7 38.8
One-off and temporary measures 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 3.5 – 3.1 – 3.0 – 2.3
Structural primary balance – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.5
Government gross debt 65.5 67.7 68.9 69.2
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.0
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 2 1/2 – 2 – 1 1/2
Primary balance – 0.8 – 0.5 – 1/2 1/2 1 1/4 1 1/2
Structural balance (4) – 3.4 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.1
Government gross debt 65.5 67 1/2 69 68 1/2 68 67
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.6 0.9 1 1/2 1 1 1/4 1 3/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in February 2006.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.1 % of
GDP in 2004 and 2005, both deﬁcit-reducing).
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Germany.247
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 6GDP ratio caused by interest expenditure that is not bal-
anced by nominal GDP growth. Throughout the pro-
gramme period, the update assumes ‘stock-flow adjust-
ments’ to contribute considerably to debt reduction.
Such adjustments are primarily due to sales of assets, for
example the KfW’s sale of its asset holdings on behalf of
the government, initial public offerings of publicly-
owned companies and the sales of building companies
owned by municipalities.
National budgetary coordination
The Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed
to the Treaty of Maastricht stipulates: ‘Member States
shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary
area enable them to meet their obligations in this area
from this Treaty.’
The excessive deficit situation, in which Germany has
been since 2003, has brought to the fore difficulties in
implementing corrective measures. Some of these diffi-
culties arose because of the way national budgetary pro-
cedures are institutionalised in Germany. 
In addition to the reasons for policy failure discussed in
part III of this report, any single budgetary authority has
an incentive to free-ride on budgetary consolidation by
another, given that the target is specified in terms of the
general government deficit.
The German Constitution grants full autonomy to budg-
etary authorities in Germany. This primarily concerns
the federal budget, which (netting out intra-government
transfers) accounts for 19 percent of total consolidated
expenditure but through which the social security
schemes (44â percent of expenditure) are controlled.
Constitutional autonomy also applies to each of the
budgets of the 16 Länder, which sum up to 21â percent
of total expenditure. Each Land is supposed to supervise
local budgets on its territory, which account for 15 per-
cent of general government expenditure.
Despite budgetary autonomy, the federal and the Länder
levels have to pass almost all tax legislation jointly by
finding majorities in both Bundestag and Bundesrat.
Moreover, all federal expenditure legislation that signif-
icantly impacts on the Länder budgets must be passed
jointly. This has repeatedly led to inaction when the two
levels could not find an agreement.
Recently, there have been initiatives to improve coordi-
nation in the federal system. First, in 2002, an expendi-
ture coordination mechanism was installed. Second, the
draft law to amend the Constitution, submitted to the
Bundestag in March 2006 (in the context of the reform
commission on the federal system, Föderalismuskom-
mission), contains a provision to allocate possible sanc-
tions arising from the Stability and Growth Pact across
levels of government. Third, the government coalition
envisages initiating a revision of the foundations of the
tax revenue sharing system in the course of this legisla-
tive period (1). Last, the forthcoming judgment by the
Constitutional Court on the budgetary distress of the
Land of Berlin might give rise to a reconsideration of
insolvency procedures in the federal system.
Apart from the legislative bodies, the coordination of
budgetary policy in Germany takes place in the Fiscal
¥1∂ A future reform of the fiscal relations between levels of government was
announced in the 2005 German National Reform Programme in the con-
text of the Lisbon Process.
Table V.8
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Germany
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• VAT deduction method (-0.05 % of GDP)
• Indirect taxes (see text) (-0.05 % of GDP)
• Public consumption (0.1 % of GDP)
• Monetary transfers (-0.05 % of GDP)
• Subsidies (0.1 % of GDP)
• Investment (0.05 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and various draft laws.248
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is attached to the federal government and does not have
its own office or staff. Chaired by the Federal Minister of
Finance, its members are the Federal Minister for the
Economy, the finance ministers of the Länder and repre-
sentatives of local government. The FPLR meets behind
closed doors. Consensual conclusions are usually pub-
lished in a tight-lipped press release.
In July 2002, an amendment to the Law on Budgetary
Principles (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG) entered
into force, with a view to implementing at national level
the commitments made by Germany in the context of the
Stability and Growth Pact. At the time, this meant the
general government account in balance by 2004 (see
2002 update of the stability programme).
The new Article 51a of the HGrG stresses the common
responsibility of the federal level and the Länder for
complying with budgetary discipline within the frame-
work of European economic and monetary union. Fed-
eral level and Länder are invited to reduce their net bor-
rowing with the aim of achieving balanced accounts. The
FPLR gives recommendations for budgetary discipline,
notably on a common expenditure line for the central and
Länder (including local authorities) governments. The
FPLR also assesses whether trends in the budgets of cen-
tral, Länder and local government are in line with the
provisions of Article 104 of the EC Treaty and the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. If necessary, the FPLR makes
recommendations on measures to be taken to restore
compliance with budgetary discipline.
In the FPLR, the levels of government agreed to imple-
ment the law as follows. In 2003 and 2004, the federal
level was to reduce expenditure by â percent on average
per year (in nominal terms), the Länder were to limit
joint expenditure growth to 1 percent on average per
year. The 2002 agreement was renewed on 16 June 2004,
relaxing the expenditure target for the federal level: its
expenditure growth should not exceed 1 percent annu-
ally on average in 2005 and 2006. The target for the
Länder level remained unchanged.
The agreement is neither detailed as regards data
requirements for monitoring, nor are progress reports
published. Table V.9 shows compliance with the targets
under the following assumptions. The federal level and
social security are combined, since the social security
schemes are controlled by the federal budget through
legislation and transfers. Data are in national accounts
terms in order to ensure coherence with the SGP, and
transfers within government are netted out because they
are a zero-sum game from the EU perspective.
Table V.9. shows that the federal level did not meet its tar-
get set for 2003-04, although both the federal budget and
the social security systems strongly reduced their expend-
iture in 2004. Yet, the FPLR did not publish a recommen-
dation. The Länder exceeded their target in 2003-04. For
the target set for 2005-06, the updated programme does
not provide enough detail to assess whether the target is
planned to be met by 2006. However, compliance with the
target would imply that the federal level (including social
security) would have to limit expenditure growth in 2006
to 0.4 percent. Under current budgetary plans, this is
unlikely. Being constrained by their constitutional budget-
ary requirements, the Länder, however, are under pressure
to strictly limit their expenditure growth in 2006. Still, for
general government, expenditure growth at 1 percent in
2006 would be consistent with the expenditure projection
provided in the stability programme update. However, the
FPLR would have to tighten the expenditure ceilings, if it
was to conclude a new agreement beyond 2006. Extrapo-
lating the expenditure growth at 1 percent annually
between 2007-09, would result in an expenditure share of
44 percent of GDP in 2009, which is â percentage point
higher than that envisaged in the stability programme.
The analysis suggests that the agreement on expenditure
growth has not performed well. Its targets are not well
defined, the monitoring is intransparent, and the sanc-
tioning device (recommendation by the Fiscal Planning
Council) not applied. Its relation to other devices for
budgetary policy at sub-sectors of government is not
clear, either.
For example, ‘golden rules’ apply to the federal and each
of the Länder budgets, anchored in the respective consti-
tutions. These golden rules stipulate that net borrowing
should not exceed gross investment (in cash terms
including loans granted), unless special economic cir-
cumstances would warrant it. The local level is subject to
stricter borrowing constraints and supervision by the
Länder; the social security schemes are subject to rules
that ensure balanced budgets (in cash terms and after
transfers from the federal budget).¥1∂ See also Public Finances in EMU 2003, Part V, Chapter 3.4.2.249
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the procedures of budgetary coordination. The Advisory
Council to the Federal Ministry of Finance (1) has sug-
gested transposing the indicator-based system of fiscal
surveillance used at the EU-level into the German fed-
eral structure with the following elements. When pre-
senting its draft budget, each budgetary authority would
have to publish its deficit projection in ESA95 terms. In
addition, each budgetary authority would publish a sta-
bility programme (2), to be assessed at the national level.
Thus, a strong monitoring organisation at the national
level exercising continuous and public control of the cur-
rent budgetary situation at sub-sectors of government in
ESA95 terms should be established, for example a Con-
ference of Finance Ministers with the ability to take
binding decisions, with permanent staff at its disposal
(unlike the FPLR). An impasse in decision-taking should
be prevented by creating a ‘default rule’ for allocating
maximum deficits across budgetary authorities ex ante,
which would be applied if no decision was taken. The
monitoring organisation would have instruments similar
to that of the EU (early warning, etc.). Ex post, a pre-
defined correction mechanism, set as the default rule in
case the Conference of Finance Ministers did not find an
agreement, would specify the contributions of each
budgetary authority to correct an excessive deficit.
Finally, an allocation of sanction payments from the
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) across national budg-
etary authorities is proposed.
The draft law of March 2006 that emerged from the Föder-
alismuskommission sets up such a sanction allocation to be
inserted into the German Constitution. It is foreseen that
65 percent of potential sanctions would be allocated to the
federal level (which roughly corresponds to the consoli-
dated share of the federal level and social security in total
government expenditure in 2005) and the remainder to the
Länder (supervising budgets at the local level).
Amongst them, the Länder would allocate their share in the
order of 35 percent according to inhabitants and in the
order of 65 percent according to the individual contribution
to the total budget deficit of the Länder. The idea behind
this is to establish a joint liability for sanctions in order to
create a common interest in consolidation measures,
which, as laid out above, often have to be decided jointly.
The draft law also lays out the statistical foundations for
this allocation rule. Since ESA95 national accounts do
not exist for individual Länder budgets (only for the
total), the draft law proposes an approximation to be
compatible with the Stability and Growth Pact.
Currently, budgets must be drafted in cash accounting in
Germany, which is one of the reasons why the conse-
quences of budget-drafting at the sub-sector level to
requirements of the SGP are absent from the public
debate in Germany. Thus, even without sanctions being
imminent, this proposal could lead to greater awareness
about the SGP at all levels of government.
However, this sanction allocation mechanism does not
solve the free-rider problem. For stronger incentives at
¥1∂ Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Stel-
lungnahme Verbesserungsvorschläge für die Umsetzung des Deutschen
Stabilitätspaktes, 4 July 2003, available at: www.bmf.bund.de
¥2∂ The federal government would possibly remain solely responsible for the
stability programme for general government to be submitted to the EU.
Table V.9
Agreements on expenditure growth for sub-sectors of government
2002 2003 2004 Target Result 2005 2006 (1) Target
 % of total 
expend. (1) (2)
Aver.
(1), (2)
Aver.
(1), (2) (3) (4)
Aver.
(3), (4)
Fed. + soc. sec. 63.0 2.2 – 1.3 – 0.5 0.5 1.6 (0.4) 1
L1/4nder + local 37.0 0.5 – 0.1 1 0.2 – 0.1 (2.1) 1
General govt. (2) 100 1.6 – 0.8 (0.06) 0.35 1.0 (1.0) (1)
NB: 
(1) Required to comply with the target.
(2) The agreement does not contain a target for general government. Numbers in brackets are implicit.
Source:  Federal Statistical Office, Commission services’ calculations.250
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tighten the golden rule provisions and to insert the
requirement of a structurally-balanced budget in the
medium-term into the respective constitutions (1). More-
over, for the envisaged second phase of the reform of the
federal system, which would aim at the reorganisation of
the fiscal relations between levels of government, more
revenue autonomy for budgetary authorities has been
proposed. For example, the federal level would levy
income taxes with a base rate, to which any Land could
introduce a surcharge. Such a surcharge could become
compulsory as a budgetary correction mechanism (2).
Compliance with such a pre-set correction mechanism
might further be made a premise for a fiscal bail-out of
any national budgetary authority in distress by other
national budgetary authorities (3). At present, there is no
bail-out procedure specified in German law; however, in
its decisions the Constitutional Court has defined some
principles for bail-outs. A future reform of the fiscal rela-
tions between levels of government that was announced
in the 2005 German National Reform Programme in the
context of the Lisbon Process could take into account
these elements.
¥1∂ Deutsche Bundesbank: Deficit-limiting budgetary rules and a national sta-
bility pact in Germany, Monthly Report April 2005.
¥2∂ Deutsche Bundesbank, op.cit.
¥3∂ Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen:
Gutachten Haushaltskrisen im Bundesstaat, April 2005, available at:
www.bmf.bund.de.251
5. Estonia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
Public finances in Estonia in 2005 were substantially
stronger than expected. The general government surplus
was 1.6 percent of GDP, compared to the target of bal-
anced general government accounts, as projected in the
December 2004 update of the convergence programme.
The main factors behind this outcome were higher-than-
expected revenues due to stronger-than-anticipated eco-
nomic activity and a considerable rise in employment,
which was partly also owed to a whitening of parts of the
‘informal’ economy and declaration of formerly grey
employment contracts, leading to a high surplus in the
social security accounts. In addition, further improve-
ments in tax collection and windfall gains from inflation
boosted revenues, while on the expenditure side the nom-
inal expenditure ceilings were respected. The level of the
debt ratio continued to decline and stood at 4.8 percent of
GDP in 2005, which is the lowest in the EU.
The budget for 2006 was adopted on 7 December 2005.
The main measures on the income side are a cut of the
flat income tax rate for both individuals and corporations
by 1 percentage point to 23 percent, combined with an
increase of the tax-free threshold, which both entered
into force on 1 January 2006. On the expenditure side,
EU co-financing requirements and increases to pensions
and parental leave entitlements are the main budgetary
measures. The target for the general government balance
in 2006 according to the December 2005 update of the
convergence programme was a surplus of 0.1 percent of
GDP (1). Against the background of expected continued
robust GDP growth, this target was raised by the govern-
ment on 17 March 2006 to 1.6 percent of GDP, in the
framework of the new official forecast by the Ministry of
Finance. This upward revision of the target for the
budget surplus responds to a relevant recommendation
by the Council in its opinion of 14 February 2006 on the
December 2005 convergence programme update, which
stated that it would be appropriate for Estonia to aim for
a higher budgetary surplus in 2006 and in the subsequent
years. The new target is broadly in line with the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast which projects a
surplus of 1.4 percent of GDP for 2006. As measured by
the change in the structural budget balance, the fiscal
stance in 2006 in the spring 2006 forecast is mildly
expansionary. Discrepancies with the structural balance
as calculated in the framework of the assessment of the
convergence programme are explained by the markedly
prudent growth and revenue assumptions in the pro-
gramme.
In 2007, the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast,
based on the customary no-policy-change assumption,
projects a general government surplus of 0.8 percent of
GDP. This is higher than the balanced budget projected
in the December 2005 update of the convergence pro-
gramme which is maintained also in the updated govern-
ment forecast of March 2006. The rationale for a more
optimistic assumption in the Commission services’ fore-
cast lies with Estonia’s track record of prudent forecast-
ing and repeated overachievement of fiscal targets over
the past few years.
Beyond 2007, the projected evolution of the general gov-
ernment balance in the convergence programme update
is one of balanced budgets. This reflects the official
medium-term objective of the Estonian budget policy.
Estonia’s public debt is forecast to decline further to
3.6 percent of GDP in 2006 and to 3 percent in 2007,
according to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast.   
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.252
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Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Estonia (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.8
- Total revenues 37.9 37.5 37.3 36.8
 Of which: - current taxes 21.3 21.4 20.9 20.4
- social contributions 11.2 11.0 10.6 10.4
- Total expenditure 36.4 35.9 35.8 35.9
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.4 8.1 7.9 7.8
- social transfers in kind 10.6 10.1 9.8 9.7
- social transfers other than in kind 10.0 9.6 9.5 9.6
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
 - gross fixed capital formation 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.1
Primary balance 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.0
Tax burden 32.5 32.6 31.8 31.2
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.5
Structural primary balance 2.0 1.7 1.3 0.7
Government gross debt 5.4 4.8 3.6 3.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.8 9.8 8.9 7.9
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 1.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Primary balance 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Structural balance (4) 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
Government gross debt 5.4 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.0 2.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.8 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in Dec 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Estonia.
Table V.11
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Estonia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Personal and corporate income tax: reduction of income tax rate 
from 24 % to 23 % (– 0.39 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax: increase of basic allowance from 20 400 EEK to 
24 000 EEK, combined with lowering of tax deduction limit by half 
(– 0.3 % of GDP)
• Unemployment insurance contribution: decrease of the 
contribution rates for both employers and employees, from 1 %/
0.5 % to 0.6 %/0.3 % respectively (– 0.13 % of GDP)
• Social tax: the monthly base rate for the minimum social tax liability 
was raised from 700 EEK to 1400 EEK (– 0.13 % of GDP)
• Increases in excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and fuel (incl. 
additional VAT) (+ 0.4 % of GDP) as of 1 July 2007 (3)
• Extension of parental subsidies by three months (0.13 % of GDP)
• Raise in pensions (0.91 % of GDP)
• Increases in health insurance costs (0.45 % of GDP)
• Modernisation of infrastructure (0.37 % of GDP)
• Increase of subsidies in agriculture and fisheries (0.25 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Estonian Ministry of Finance.253
6. Greece
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The government deficit in 2005 was 4.5 percent of
GDP (1). This compares with the figure of 3.7 percent of
GDP projected in the update of the Stability Programme
of Greece (2) submitted in March 2005. The difference is
mainly explained by statistical revisions carried out
since the EDP notification of September 2004. The devi-
ation is also due to the reimbursement penalty of EU
funds amounting to ä percent of GDP, following a Euro-
stat decision that specifies that the whole amount should
be booked in 2005 expenditures. The debt-to-GDP ratio
is moving downwards slowly, from an average of above
110â percent of GDP over the period 2000-2004 to
around 107â percent of GDP in 2005.
The budget for 2006 was adopted by Parliament on
22 December 2005. On the revenue side, the budget
envisages a reform in property taxation and a rise in
excises on fuel, while the authorities restated their com-
mitment to pursue their fight against tax evasion. The
budget also includes temporary revenues amounting to
0.6 percent of GDP (dividends, sale and extension of
concession rights and payments by the Hellenic Tele-
communications and Post Commission, revenues from
fines and licenses). On the expenditure side the main
measures aim at restraining both the wage bill and oper-
ational expenditures. The government has also adopted a
new framework law for public enterprises and entities
with a view to increasing their efficiency. New legisla-
tion regarding public-private partnerships is expected to
facilitate infrastructure investment without putting
immediate pressure on the government accounts.
According to the December 2005 update of the Stability
Programme of Greece, the target deficit for 2006 is
2.6 percent of GDP. The Commission services’ spring
2006 forecast project a deficit of just below 3 percent of
GDP. The difference with the Greek target is mainly due
to lower Commission’s GDP growth rate projections
coupled with more prudent tax revenue and government
consumption projections. Moreover, the Commission
services have included only half of the one-off opera-
tions amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP, as their account-
ing treatment requires clarification. However, the recent
announcement of a permanent increase in oil taxes
amounting to 0.1 percent of GDP, and the temporary
increase in corporate withholding taxes, amounting to
ä percent of GDP, have been considered in the Commis-
sion’s projection. The planned adjustment is mainly
expenditure-driven. The expenditure ratio is projected to
fall by ã percent points of GDP, of which less than half
is accounted for by primary current spending. Measures
to improve tax administration, coupled with the broaden-
ing of tax bases brought about by the fight against tax
fraud and evasion, should raise revenues by less than
ä percent of GDP. Overall, the structural deficit is pro-
jected to improve by about 1 percent of GDP in 2006.
Assuming unchanged policies, the deficit projection for
2007 would be around 3â percent of GDP. This shows
that structural measures will be necessary to keep the
deficit below 3 percent in a durable manner. The projec-
tion for 2007 takes account of further permanent
increase of oil taxes representing 0.1 percent of GDP and
compares with the target set in the December 2005
update of the Stability Programme of Greece of 2.3 per-
cent of GDP for 2007 (and 1.7 percent of GDP for 2008).
The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects a
general government debt-to-GDP ratio at slightly below
105 percent in 2006 and about 102 percent in 2007, which
is somewhat less favourable than the targets shown in the
updated stability programme (for 2007, the difference
¥1∂ Despite the recent improvement in the statistical processes and good coop-
eration between Eurostat and the Greek national authorities, issues remain
related to the Greek government accounts of a structural and systemic
nature. (See Eurostat News Release No 48/2006 of 24.4.2006.)
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/
main_en.htm.254
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M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t samounts to 1 percent of GDP). Increasing primary sur-
pluses, diminishing stock-flow adjustments, privatisa-
tions, and sustained nominal GDP growth are all contrib-
uting to a diminishing debt ratio. In 2005, factors other
than the deficit (i.e. the stock-flow adjustment) contrib-
uted to increasing the debt by 2.1 percent of GDP. Differ-
ences between cash and accrual accounting, including sta-
tistical discrepancies, were the main contributors to the
stock-flow adjustment, partially offset by a small reduc-
tion in government holdings of shares and liquidities. For
2006, the Greek authorities expect to reduce the stock-
flow adjustment to 1.6 percent of GDP.
Greece: Another twin deficit case?
The story of the Greek economy in the current decade
is one of buoyant growth and remarkable success in
terms of real convergence. Joining the single currency
represented a positive confidence shock for the Greek
economy. Since 1999, interest rates have steadily
declined to the current levels which, at close to 2 per-
cent, are the lowest the country has seen in recent times.
This has provided positive leverage for private invest-
ment and consumption.
However, during this cycle of buoyant growth, several
economic imbalances have either emerged or wors-
ened. Very high deficits in goods trade, above 15 per-
cent of GDP, are only partially compensated by
increasing surpluses in services (mainly tourism and
transportation) of around 9 percent of GDP. In paral-
lel, the cumulated surpluses of the incomes and cur-
rent transfers accounts account negatively for around
– 1 percent of GDP. As a result, the current account
Table V.12
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Greece (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 6.9 – 4.5 – 3.0 – 3.6
- Total revenues 42.0 41.8 41.9 41.3
 Of which: - current taxes 21.6 21.7 22.4 22.4
- social contributions 14.6 14.3 14.8 14.8
- Total expenditure 48.9 46.3 44.9 44.9
 Of which: - collective consumption 9.8 9.9 10.3 10.2
- social transfers in kind 6.7 6.4 5.6 5.7
- social transfers other than in kind 17.1 16.7 18.0 18.0
- interest expenditure 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.9
- gross fixed capital formation 4.2 3.5 3.1 3.1
Primary balance – 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.4
Tax burden 35.2 35.2 35.3 35.3
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 – 0.2 0.6 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 7.7 – 5.5 – 4.3 – 4.4
Structural primary balance – 2.3 – 0.1 0.5 0.6
Government gross debt 108.5 107.5 105.0 102.1
Pm  Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.4
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 6.6 – 4.3 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.7
Primary balance – 0.9 0.9 2.3 2.4 2.8
Structural balance (4) – 7.2 – 4.8 – 3.7 – 2.8 – 2.4
Government gross debt 109.3 107.9 104.8 101.1 96.8
Pm  Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.0 % of
GDP in 2004, -0.2 % in 2005, 0.5 % in 2006, 0.0 % in 2007 and 0 % in 2008; all deﬁcit-reducing, except in 2005).
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Greece.255
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most recent past, compared with a position close to the
surplus in the mid-nineties. Once the capital transfers
of around 1â percent to 2 percent of GDP are consid-
ered, the overall external deficit of the country in the
mid-2000 posts a deficit of around 7 percent of GDP,
which compares with a balanced situation recorded ten
years ago.
The persistence in the net borrowing position of
Greece vis-à-vis the rest of the world is mirrored by a
large and persistent deficit recorded by the govern-
ment in combination with a steady worsening of pri-
vate balances. 
While in the second half of the 1990s private surpluses
practically compensated government deficits of 5 to
10 percent of GDP, since the early 2000s, the increase
in spending on housing by Greek households coupled
with increasing borrowing by the corporate sector, have
pushed the combined net balance of the private sector
into deficit.
As a result, high government deficits are not financed
anymore by domestic saving and their developments
almost fully mirror the external borrowing of the coun-
try. Although part of the increase in government defi-
cits over the last five years has financed public works
and other major initiatives linked to the organisation of
the Olympic Games, infrastructure investment is not
the main source of the persistent Greek Government
deficit. As a matter of fact, public investment in Greece
hovered around 3â percent of GDP during the second
half of the 1990s while it did not go significantly fur-
ther than 4 percent in some of the years between 2000
and 2004, before returning to the current 3 percent of
GDP. Therefore, the external borrowing is largely
devoted to finance current public spending. This
includes not only high interest expenditure, because of
the persistently very large government debt, but also
other current expenditures, such as public consumption
and social payments. Although the Greek government
appears firmly committed to fiscal consolidation, fur-
ther focus on spending items which follow long-run
trends linked to population ageing seems necessary.
Specifically, ã of the total nominal adjustment pro-
jected for the period 2005-2008 is explained by higher
revenues, lower interest expenditure and miscellaneous
expenditures.
Unless decisive steps are taken to correct the source of
imbalances, especially those expenditure items that
put pressure on the public deficit in the long run, the
external deficit, which reflects lack of competitive-
ness, may eventually weigh on growth prospects, thus
harming Greece’s attractiveness as a place for produc-
tive investment. This requires a combination of fiscal
consolidation, a rise of domestic savings, and compre-
hensive structural reforms to support growth and job
creation.    
Table V.13
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Greece
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Dividends (0.3 % of GDP, one-off)
• Sale and extension of concession rights (0.24 % of GDP, one-off)
• Payments by the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission 
revenues from fines and licenses (0.06 % of GDP, one-off)
• Fighting against tax evasion and a reform in property taxation 
(0.4 % of GDP)
• A rise in excise taxes on fuel (0.08 % of GDP)
• An increase in the rate of income tax pre-payment for enterprises 
and banks (0.23 % of GDP)
• Refunding to pensioners of past contributions on behalf of the 
Solidarity Account of Social Security Funds (0.08 % of GDP)
• Elections for local government (0.03 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services and stability programme of Greece.256
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Composition of the Greek foreign net lending/borrowing
 % of GDP 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Trade balance – 12.2 – 13.2 – 13.5 – 14.8 – 15.6 – 18.3 – 16.0 – 16.3 – 16.7 – 17.7 – 16.2
Services balance 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.4 7.1 7.4 6.3 6.6 7.1 8.9 9.0
Net primary income 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.7 1.3 0.8 –  0.7 –  0.7 –  1.1 –  0.8 –  1.8
Net transfers 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 –  0.1
Current account balance –  0.9 –  2.4 –  2.1 –  3.5 –  5.7 –  8.8 –  9.2 –  9.7 – 10.0 –  9.5 –  9.2
Net capital transfers 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.5
Foreign net lending 
balance
–  0.1 –  1.0 –  0.4 –  1.4 –  4.0 –  6.2 –  8.0 –  8.6 –  8.6 –  7.7 –  7.7
Source: Ameco, for 2006 and 2007 Commission services spring 2006 forecasts.
Graph V.3:  Composition of the Greek foreign net lending/borrowing
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7. Spain
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government surplus was 1.1 percent
of GDP. This compares with a surplus of 0.1 percent of
GDP projected in the 2005 Budget Law, a surplus of
1 percent of GDP in the December 2005 updated stabil-
ity programme and a surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP in the
previous December 2004 updated stability programme.
The better-than-expected outturn is largely explained by
higher revenues, accounting for 0.9 percent of GDP. By
levels of government, the central government posted a
surplus of 0.4 percent of GDP, whereas regional and
local authorities registered a deficit of 0.2 percent and
0.1 percent respectively. The social security sector
achieved a surplus of 1.0 percent of GDP. Public debt
attained 43.2 percent of GDP.
In 2006, the Budget Law adopted by the government on
29 December 2005 projected a surplus in the general
government’s accounts of 0.2 percent of GDP. However,
the most recent update of the stability programme (1)
forecasts a surplus of 0.9 percent of GDP due to the
carry-over effect of higher-than-expected revenues in
2005. The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast is
broadly in line with the projections for 2006 of the latest
update of the stability programme. More in detail,
according to the 2006 Budget Law, central government
revenues are expected to increase by around 9 percent in
nominal terms. Direct taxes and social security contribu-
tions are expected to grow by 10 percent and 7â percent
respectively, due to strong job creation, while private
consumption growth should increase indirect tax reve-
nues by 5ä percent. Central government expenditures
are targeted to grow by around 8 percent. Particular
efforts are devoted to productivity-enhancing budgetary
measures on the expenditure side, which will concen-
trate on R & D, innovation, education and investment in
infrastructure. Specifically, the budget encompasses a
30 percent of R & D expenditure with a view to catching
up with the euro area average reaching a level of 1â per-
cent of GDP in 2007 and 2 percent in 2010. Expenditure
on education will increase by 17 percent on the previous
year. Most of this increase will translate into more and
higher grants for students. It is worth mentioning that the
central government only manages around 5 percent of
total education expenditure with the rest being managed
by regional governments. Finally, the budget gives pri-
ority to investment in infrastructure, with spending
planned to increase by 12â percent on the previous year.
Special attention will be paid to improving terrestrial
transport, notably motorways and the promotion of high-
speed railway network. Furthermore, the Budget Law
includes an additional transfer to the regions of around
0.05 percent of GDP to fund healthcare expenditure.
In 2007, the most recent update of the stability pro-
gramme targets a surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP for the
general government. This projection is slightly more
optimistic than the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, in which, under a no-policy change scenario,
the general government balance is expected to achieve a
surplus of 0.4 percent of GDP. In 2007 a reform of the
personal income tax is expected to come into force. The
reform was adopted by the government and is currently
discussed in parliament. It encompasses a broad range of
measures affecting personal income tax and, to a lesser
extent, the corporate tax. Specifically, for the personal
income tax, the top marginal rate is lowered by 2 per-
centage points, from 45 percent to 43 percent, the
number of tax brackets is reduced from 5 to 4 and per-
sonal savings will be taxed at a single flat rate of 18 per-
cent. The corporate tax should gradually ease from the
current rate of 35 percent to 30 percent by 2011.
In the case of small and medium enterprises the rate
would go down from 30 percent to 25 percent. The
reform would imply a reduction of tax revenues of
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.258
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GDP) in comparison with current legislation.
The reform seems compatible with the maintenance of a
balanced budget. In 2008, a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP
is forecast in the 2005 updated stability programme.
Concerning gross public debt, the 2005 updated stability
programme foresees a gradual decline towards 38 per-
cent of GDP in 2007. This is broadly in line with the pro-
jections in the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast.
Regional governments’ finances
In the early 1980s, half of the general government
expenditure was managed by the central government.
Around one third represented the social security system,
10 percent was managed by the local authorities and only
7 percent was controlled by the regions. The far-reaching
decentralisation process that has taken place in Spain
during the last 25 years has led to a redistribution of
spending from the central government to the regions.
In 2005, regional governments controlled 40 percent of
the general government expenditure, whereas the central
government only managed 20 percent. The share in total
expenditures of social security and of the local authori-
ties has remained broadly stable at around 30 percent and
10 percent respectively. In terms of GDP, regional
expenditures represented 5 percent of GDP in 1985,
whereas they accounted for 15 percent in 2005, with an
average annual growth in real terms at around 10 per-
cent, well above real GDP growth (see Graph V.4).
This increase has been the result of important transfers of
public services such as healthcare or education to the
regional governments. In parallel, revenues have been
Table V.15
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Spain (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 0.1 1.1 0.9 0.4
- Total revenues 38.7 39.3 39.3 38.8
 Of which: - current taxes 22.1 23.1 23.2 23.0
- social contributions 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8
- Total expenditure 38.8 38.2 38.3 38.5
 Of which: - collective consumption 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7
- social transfers (2) 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
- interest expenditure 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.7
Primary balance 1.9 2.9 2.6 1.9
Pm Tax burden 35.1 36.1 36.1 35.8
Government debt 46.4 43.2 40.0 37.9
Pm Cyclically-adjusted balance (5) 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.0
Pm Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 2.0 3.1 3.0 2.5
Pm Real GDP (3) 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.8
Stability programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
Primary balance 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.0
Government debt 46.6 43.1 40.3 38.0 36.0
Pm Real GDP (3) 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) In kind and other than in kind.
(3) Annual % change.
(4) Submitted in December 2005.
(5) Calculated using the HP ﬁlter.
Source: Commission services and Stability programme of Spain.259
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in order to allow the latter coping with their new respon-
sibilities.
Regional budgets
According to the General Law for Budgetary Stability
(GLBS, 2002), each regional government must present a
balance-or-in surplus budget. This requirement aims at
ensuring that increased fiscal decentralisation does not
come at the expenses of budgetary stability.
However, regional authorities have some margin of
manoeuvre during the execution of budgets, and deficits
may emerge. Specifically, in 2001, the deficit of regional
governments reached 0.6 percent of GDP. Then, follow-
ing a decreasing path, regions presented balanced
accounts in 2004. However, in 2005, a small deficit is
estimated to have come up again, attaining 0.2 percent of
GDP (see Graph V.5). 
Revenues of the regional governments can be divided
into two different categories: own resources and trans-
fers from the central government. Own resources repre-
sent so far around 60 percent of regional government
revenue, coming mainly from a share of personal income
tax and VAT, although for the latter, regional authorities
have no legislative capacity. The rest 40 percent are cur-
rent transfers from the central government.
From a historical perspective, three main periods can be
considered when referring to the financing of regions.
Between 1978 and 1992, transfers from the central gov-
ernment covered the effective costs of the services pro-
vided by regional governments. Between 1992 and 1996,
a certain degree of fiscal co-responsibility was intro-
duced by transferring 15 percent of the personal income
tax.
Since 1997, the transfer of the personal income tax has
been increased to 30 percent and, additionally, regions
have some legislative capacity. Specifically, regional
authorities may increase or decrease up to 10 percent the
personal income tax within the 30 percent under their
control and could also modify personal or family allow-
ances. Referring to indirect taxes, which include not only
the VAT, but also others such as taxes on hydrocarbons,
the share transferred to the regions accounts so far for
around 50 percent.
Regional expenditures encompass a wide variety of
areas, namely, healthcare, education, agriculture and
fisheries, tourism, and even a part of infrastructure
investments in the region. Health care and education rep-
resent more than half the budget of the regions (33 per-
cent and 23 percent respectively). Agriculture and fish-
eries account for around 8 percent, infrastructures
6 percent, security and social protection 5 percent and
general administration 5 percent. Furthermore, the
regions transfer part of their revenues (around 5 percent)
to the local layer. The remaining 15 percent includes var-
ious items such as social promotion, housing or industry.
The rapid increase in the regions’ spending is the conse-
quence of the transfer from the general government of all
those services over the last 25 years. However, regions
competences are not the same across the country and
some regional governments control more services than
others. Furthermore, transfers of competences did not
take place at the same time. For example, Catalonia
started managing healthcare in 1981, whereas the
Canary Islands did it in 1994 and Madrid region in 2002.
In the case of tertiary education, Valencia has managed
universities since 1985, whereas the region of Madrid
received the competence from the central government
ten years later, in 1995.    
Table V.16
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Spain
Revenue measures Expenditure measures
• The tax brackets of the personal income tax will be deflated
• Social security bonus aiming at encouraging non-fixed contracts in 
the labour market (reduction of 0.2 % of GDP)
• Increase in R & D spending (0.15 % of GDP)
• Increase in investment in transport infrastructure, namely roads and 
railways (0.15 % of GDP)
• Increase in social benefits (housing accessibility, minimal pensions, 
dependency) (0.25 % of GDP)
• Transfer to the regions for healthcare expenditure (0.05 % of GDP)
Source: Commission services and 2005 Budget Law260
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slightly decreasing path in terms of GDP. In 2001, it
accounted for around 6â percent of GDP, whereas in
2005, it is estimated to represent 6 percent.
Health and education
As mentioned above, these two items account for more
than half the regional expenditures. In 2005, most regional
governments took over the management of healthcare and
education spending. Thus, the central government only
controls so far around 8 percent of the total expenditure in
healthcare and around 5 percent in education and, there-
fore, the bulk of the expenditure in these two items comes
from the regional governments (1). 
Between 2001 and 2005, healthcare expenditure is esti-
mated to have grown at an average rate of around 10 per-
Graph V.4:  Evolution of regional expenditure (% of GDP and % of total government expenditure)
Graph V.5:  Deficit and debt of regional governments (in % of GDP)
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¥1∂ Data on the functional classification of regional governments’ expenditure
are published with a delay of around two years. Therefore, it is difficult to
assess the evolution of items such as healthcare and education in a timely
way. Specifically, the last functional classification release refers to the
year 2003. Estimates from 2004 onwards have been calculated by the
Commission Services on the basis of the regional budgets and the imple-
mentation data release based on the economic classification if available.261
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ment expenditure has also been growing at a similar
pace, its share in total regional expenditure has remained
rather stable at around 1/3. Specifically, in Andalusia,
healthcare expenditure represents 30 percent of the
regional government budget, whereas in Catalonia and
Valencia it approaches 40 percent.
As general government expenditure has been growing at
around 7â percent in nominal terms during the same
period, the share of healthcare in general government
expenditure has increased from around 12ã percent in
2001 to around 14ä percent in 2005. In the same vein,
with nominal GDP growing at around 7ã percent per
year in the same period, the share of health-related
expenditure rose from 5 percent to 5â percent of GDP
(see Graph V.6).
Education expenditure has been slightly less dynamic
than healthcare. Between 2001 and 2005, education
expenditure has been growing at an average rate of
around 8 percent in nominal terms. This would represent
a slight decline in the share of total regional expenditure
from 24 percent in 2000 to 22 percent in 2005, whereas
its share in general government expenditure would have
remained unchanged at around 8â percent. In terms of
GDP, education expenditure by regional governments
represents a rather stable 3â percent.
Whereas education expenditure has remained broadly
stable in terms of GDP, the healthcare bill has increased
its GDP share from 5 percent in 2001 to an estimated
5â percent in 2005. This rapid increase in healthcare
spending might explain in part the origin of regional def-
icits. Specifically, and in order to cope with growing
expenditures on this item, the central government
included in the 2006 Budget Law an additional transfer
to the regional governments of around 0.1 percent of
GDP.
Outlook
According to the Commission services spring 2006 fore-
cast, general government expenditure should grow by
around 8 percent in 2006 and 7 percent in 2007, slightly
above nominal GDP growth. This projection for total
public expenditure takes account for healthcare and edu-
cation dynamics. Specifically, in 2006, healthcare
regional expenditures are projected to grow by around
10 percent, whereas education should approach 8ä per-
cent, both well above nominal GDP.
In spite of such an increase, regional accounts are not
foreseen to depart significantly from a close-to-balance
position. This rapid increase in public expenditure by the
regions has been so far compatible with general govern-
ment surpluses in a context of a sustained GDP growth. 
Graph V.6:  Regional government expenditure in healthcare and education (in % of GDP)
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8. France
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
Following a decline from 4.2 percent to 3.7 percent of
GDP in 2004 (1), the general government deficit was fur-
ther reduced to 2.9 percent in 2005. The deficit reduction
of 0.8 percentage point, nearly entirely relied on excep-
tional factors, notably substantial one-off revenues
amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP (2). The 2005 deficit
outcome is at the target presented in the December 2004
update of the stability programme (3) despite lower
growth (1.4 percent against 2.5 percent anticipated).
This was possible thanks to stronger-than-expected tax
receipts notably linked to the strong performance of
housing and asset prices. As a result, the ratio of total
revenues to GDP increased by 1.4 percentage point to
51.0 percent of GDP, with the tax burden having risen by
a full percentage point to 44.1 percent of GDP. Also, the
deficit benefited from the implementation of the Eurostat
decision on the recording of military expenditure at the
time of their delivery, which led to a decrease in the 2005
deficit in France by 0.1 percentage point of GDP (4). On
the expenditure side, targets were respected at the State
level and for healthcare expenditures; nevertheless total
public expenditure overshot the official target, mainly
due to slippages in expenditures of local governments
and social security other than the health insurance
scheme. All in all, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio
increased by 0.7 percentage point of GDP to 53.9 per-
cent. The debt-to-GDP ratio surged to 66.8 percent,
increasing by more than 2 percentage points compared to
2004. At this level, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 1.8 percent-
age point higher than that foreseen in the December 2004
update of the stability programme despite the fact that
the deficit target was achieved. This larger increase in
the gross debt is mainly explained by (i) an accumulation
of financial assets, notably by the pension reserve fund
(Fonds de réserve des retraites) and (ii) an accumulation
of liquidity at the end of the year in connection with the
end-December 2005 change in the tax code that yielded
higher corporate tax receipts.
The budget for 2006 adopted by the Parliament in
December 2005 plans a deficit at 2.9 percent of GDP in
2006 thanks to a marked slowdown in public spending
through (i) a stabilisation of State expenditures in real
terms for the fourth year in a row; (ii) a deceleration in
healthcare expenditure growth (from 3.8 percent in 2005
to 2.5 percent in 2006), and (iii) a slowdown in local
authorities’ expenditures, but also thanks to the reliance
on one-off revenues of about ä percent of GDP (5).
The Commission services’ 2006 spring forecast antici-
pates a general government deficit at 3.0 percent of
GDP. This is slightly above the latest official target
announced by the Ministry of Finance at the time of the
1 April 2006 fiscal notification (2.8 percent of GDP) (6).
The difference is mainly due to (i) a more cautious mac-
roeconomic scenario (1.9 percent real GDP growth fore-
seen by the Commission services as against 2.0-2.5 per-
¥1∂ In 2004 the deficit was reduced by 0.1 percent of GDP thanks to a one-off
payment by EDF and Cogema (both government-owned companies) to the
general government for the decommissioning of an old nuclear power
plant.
¥2∂ One-off revenues are linked to the inclusion of the specific electricity and
gas companies’ pension schemes in social security (amounting to 0.5 per-
cent of GDP, of which one third was already paid and the remainder will
be effectively paid to government over several years) and exceptional rev-
enues from the December 2005 change in the corporate tax code which
brought forward revenue initially planned to be collected in 2006 (0.1 per-
cent of GDP).
¥3∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥4∂ Eurostat required Member States to apply the decision in relation to 2005,
but allowed them to choose whether or not to revise the data for 2004 and
earlier years. There was no retropolation in France, thus leading to a break
in the deficit series.
¥5∂ The forecast for 2006 incorporates one-off revenues of about ä percent of
GDP in connection with the transfer to social security of pension commit-
ments vis-à-vis the postal sector employees and the exceptional collection
of social contributions on specific saving plans that were to be collected at
a later stage.
¥6∂ The French authorities revised the planned deficit to 2.8 percent for 2006,
due to the favourable effect of the Eurostat decision on the recording of
military expenditures.263
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expenditures in the areas of healthcare and local govern-
ment. Concerning healthcare expenditure, while the
2004 healthcare reform has noticeably curbed expendi-
ture, the expected dynamics are forecast to be somewhat
higher than assumed by the government based on a pru-
dent assessment of some of the measures announced in
the 2006 budget bill for social security. The Commission
services’ 2006 deficit forecast implies no change in the
cyclically-adjusted balance and an improvement in the
structural balance (i.e. cyclically-adjusted balance
excluding one-off and temporary measures) by 0.4 per-
centage points of GDP (reflecting less recourse to one-
offs in 2006 compared to 2005).
The Commission services’ spring 2006 deficit forecast
for 2007, 3.1 percent of GDP, follows the conventional
assumption of unchanged policies. It thus takes only
account of already decided measures such as (i) the
income tax reform, (ii) the increase in the employment
premium and in the income tax allowance for children,
and (iii) lower tax rates on new capital expenditures,
which will, altogether, negatively impact the deficit by
about ä percent of GDP. On the other hand, it does not
include the new expenditure rules and ceilings for the
sub-sectors of the general government as announced in
the 2006 update of the stability programme, and notably
the new rule of a decrease in the State expenditure by
1 percent in volume terms (worth about -0.15 percent of
GDP), as details on their implementation are expected to
be presented by the Prime Minister in June (see below).
The spring 2006 forecast compares to the official deficit
target of 2.6 percent of GDP in 2007 from the January
Table V.17
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, France (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007   
General government balance – 3.7 – 2.9 – 3.0 – 3.1
- Total revenues 49.6 51.0 51.0 50.7
 Of which: - current taxes 26.3 27.0 27.0 26.7
 - social contributions 18.0 18.3 18.4 18.5
- Total expenditure 53.2 53.9 54.0 53.8
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3
 - social transfers in kind 15.4 15.5 15.5 15.3
 - social transfers other than in kind 17.6 17.9 18.0 18.0
 - interest expenditure 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
 - gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.4
Primary balance – 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.5
Tax burden 43.1 44.1 44.2 43.9
One-off and temporary measures 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 3.7 – 3.1 – 2.7 – 2.5
Structural primary balance – 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.1
Government gross debt 64.4 66.8 66.9 67.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 1.4 1.9 2.0
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.7 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 1.0
Primary balance – 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.6
Structural balance (4) – 3.5 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 0.6
Government gross debt 65.1 65.8 66.0 65.6 64.6 62.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 1.5– 2.0 2.0– 2.5 2 1/4 2 1/4 2 1/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in January 2006.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the Commission services’
2006 spring forecast (0.6 % of GDP in 2005 and 0.2 % in 2006; all deﬁcit-reducing).
Source: Commission services and January 2006 stability programme of France.264
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when implementing Eurostat decision on military expen-
ditures). 
The update also projects a continuous reduction in the
deficit in the coming years, yielding a deficit at 1.0 per-
cent of GDP in 2009.
According to the spring 2006 forecast, the debt-to-GDP
ratio is still expected to slightly increase over the fore-
cast horizon from 66.8 to 67.0 percent in 2007, but this
increase would be limited thanks to the allocation of
privatisation receipts to debt reduction. In 2006,
receipts are linked to the privatisation of motorway
companies; for 2007 the forecast includes EUR 7.5 bn
of receipts; i.e., the middle of the announced range pre-
sented in the stability programme. As noticed above,
the debt-to-GDP ratio overshot the stability programme
target in 2005. However, according to planned data
reported in April 2006, the French authorities keep
their intention of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio from
this year onwards.
New expenditure rules
In 1998, France introduced a new budgetary strategy
based on setting multi-annual objectives for increases in
general government expenditure (1). However, the strat-
egy aiming at consolidating public finances through a
structural decline in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio did
not lead to the expected results. Initial targets were
missed by a large margin (2) despite the fact that the State
expenditure target was respected (apart from one year).
State expenditures only represent about 30 percent of the
general government expenditure, with those of social
security and local government now accounting for about
45 percent and 20 percent of total expenditure, respec-
tively. The slippage in the general government expendi-
ture in 2005 by 0.6 percent in real terms occurred despite
the respect of the expenditure targets both at the State
and healthcare expenditure level. Slippages emanated
from local governments and social benefits other than
healthcare, the two sectors where so far no specific rules
have applied. Therefore, ensuring that the overall gen-
eral government target is reached requires that all sub-
sectors participate in the expenditure restraint effort.
In this context, the medium-term strategy of the most
recent update of the French stability programme (Janu-
ary 2006) moves in the right direction as the planned
reduction is based on new and enhanced definitions of
expenditure-growth ceilings for the different sub-sectors
of the general government. However, the establishment
of these new ceilings should be backed by the definition
of new rules and control mechanisms, as underlined by
the 14 March 2006 Council opinion on the stability pro-
gramme, which invited France to ‘strengthen the moni-
toring and enforcement of expenditure rules defined for
the sub-sectors of the general government so as to ensure
¥1∂ See ‘Expenditure rules à la française: an assessment after five years’, ECFIN
country focus, 2004 vol. 5 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
publications/country_focus/2004/cf5en.pdf)
¥2∂ The cumulated increase in real expenditure over the period 2000-2002
reached 6.8 percent, as against 3.5 percent targeted in 1998 in the initial
stability programme; over the period 2001-2003 real expenditure increased
by 7.4 percent, as against 4.0 percent targeted in 1999 in the first update;
over the period 2002-2004 the increase reached 7 percent, as against
4.5 percent targeted in 2000 in the second update.
Table V.18
Main measures in the budget for 2006, France
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increases in local taxes (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Lower tax rates on new capital expenditure (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Transfer of pension commitments vis-à-vis the postal sector 
employees to social security (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Exceptional collection of social contributions on specific saving 
plans (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Diverse tax reductions, notably on inheritance tax and tax on 
research projects (– 0.02 % of GDP)
• Increase in the employment premium (– 0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and 2006 Budget Bill and 2006 Social security Budget Bill.265
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ceilings’. Steps in this direction are expected to be taken
in June 2006 at the time of the budget preparation
(‘Débat d’orientation budgétaire’) when the Prime Min-
ister is expected to announce the results of the working
groups on the definition of new ceilings and rules for all
sub-sectors of the general government. These groups
were set up after the first National Public Finances Con-
ference held in January 2006 which gathered all public
finance managers, with the aim to raise accountability of
all levels for spending control. Such conference will be
held every year and a new organism, the ‘Conseil d’ori-
entation des finances publiques’, will ensure continuity
between the conferences. The move towards this new
strategy also followed the publication of the ‘Pébereau
report’(1) which advocated a return to balance of govern-
ment accounts by 2010.
While the details of the control mechanisms are not known
yet, as already mentioned, some ceilings have been defined
in the January 2006 update of the stability programme.
At the State level, the rule is to be progressively
enhanced from the current ‘zero real spending growth’
rule to a ‘zero nominal spending growth’ rule starting
from 2007 onwards. State expenditure would be reduced
by 1 percent in volume terms in 2007, 1.25 percent in
2008, and 1.5 percent in 2009, so that 0 percent nominal
growth applies from 2010. The programme explains that
this tighter control of State expenditure should be
attained thanks to a more effective public management
related to the full impact of the Constitutional Bylaw on
the Budget Act (Loi organique relative aux lois de
finances or LOLF) and to potential savings identified by
the audits conducted as part of the State modernisation
process. However, as ‘compulsory expenditures’ (pen-
sion and interest expenditures) represent a growing part
of the State budget, reducing State expenditure in value
terms is challenging and will require not only large re-
allocations of expenditures but also sizeable reductions
in some spending items. A recent paper published by the
Ministry of Finance (2), proposed some ways forward,
notably concerning civil servant wage policy. This
would be managed through a multi-annual framework
compatible with the expenditure norm, in which minis-
tries would be free to decide between wages and recruit-
ments within a defined envelope. The paper recognised
that some productivity gains could emerge from the
results of the ongoing audits notably as regards real
estate, technology and purchases policies. Following-up
on the conclusions from the ‘Pébereau report’, it is
acknowledged that some existing structures could be
rationalised for a better adequacy between responsible
entities and tasks (notably following the transfers of
tasks between the State and the local governments).
¥1∂ Report from an independent committee chaired by Mr Pébereau.
¥2∂ ‘Assurer la soutenabilité de long terme des finances publiques’, Notes
bleues de Bercy, number 304.
Graph V.7:  Central government expenditure (% nominal change)
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defined a national health insurance spending target
(ONDAM: Objectif national des dépenses d’assurance
maladie). The new rule aims at limiting the average real
increase in the overall social security sector expenditure
to about 1 percent per year in real terms from 2007 to
2009. As regards healthcare expenditures, the increase
would be limited to 2.2 percent per year in nominal terms
on average over the period. This would represent a clear
slowdown compared to recent trends, as healthcare nom-
inal expenditure increased by 6 percent on average over
the period 2000-2004. The slowdown is expected to
result from the effects of the reform of the health insur-
ance system implemented in the summer of 2004 and
new measures taken in the context of the 2006 Budget
Bill for social security. The expenditure restraint in this
sector should also be facilitated by the expected
improvement on the unemployment front. However, in
the spring 2006 forecast exercise, the Commission serv-
ices estimated — based on a prudent assessment of some
of the measures announced in the 2006 budget bill for
social security — that more measures were needed to
achieve this target as the expected dynamics (a nominal
annual increase in spending of 3.2 percent in 2006 and
2007) were forecast to be somewhat higher than
assumed by the government. It should be noted that, for
the social security as a whole, healthcare expenditure are
continuously growing in connection with population
ageing, new technologies, etc. In order to reach the ceil-
ing of annual expenditure growth by 1 percent in vol-
ume, it appears necessary to implement some new meas-
ures. Another interesting development could be the
extension of the tasks of the alert committee to the over-
all social security’s expenditure together with a strength-
ening of its powers. In its current function, this commit-
tee is responsible for warning the Parliament, the
government and the social security of a healthcare
expenditure overrun, in case the slippage is estimated to
be larger than 0.75 percent. Subsequently, the social
security agencies should propose corrective measures
which it will evaluate. Extending its role to the social
security’s expenditure would allow for better intra-
annual budgetary management.
At the local authorities’ level, for which no rule cur-
rently exists, the update of the stability programme
announced that local governments, ‘aware of the need to
take part in the debt-reduction effort’, will curb their
expenditures and let them only increase by 0.5 percent
per year in real terms, approaching the ‘zero real spend-
ing growth rule’ by 2009 (expenditure growth should
reach 1 percent in volume in 2007, 0.5 percent in 2008
and 0 percent in 2009). However, no specific measures
were spelled out. The programme anticipated that pur-
chases of goods and services and the wage bill of local
authorities will become relatively stable with the
expected deceleration in the increase in staff. However,
some of the transferred tasks, notably in the social area
have lead to a quite strong dynamics in expenditure
while transferred revenues are growing much slower,
thus leading to some tension between the State and the
local levels. The definition of ceilings and rules for local
Graph V.8:  Social security funds’ expenditure (% nominal change)
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2 0 0 6government expenditure, their endorsement and respect,
are going to be crucial at this level of the general govern-
ment as this is the level on which the Government has
less control. In this context, the implication of local gov-
ernment actors at the National Public Finances Confer-
ence was a positive signal.
Graph V.9:  Local government expenditure (% nominal change)
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9. Ireland
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government balance posted a surplus in
2005 of 1.0 percent of GDP. This compares with a tar-
geted deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP set in the December
2004 update of the stability programme. The signifi-
cantly better-than-expected outturn in 2005 owes
mainly to a tax overshooting, notably driven by buoy-
ant capital taxes and stamp duties. Some items of gen-
eral government expenditure turned out lower than
budgeted, in particular capital spending and interest
payments, but this was partly offset by one-off costs
(0.7 percent of GDP) following a February 2005 court
ruling on nursing home repayments. Government debt
represented 27.6 percent of GDP in 2005.
The budget for 2006 was unveiled on 7 December 2005
together with the updated stability programme for the
period 2006-08 (1). On the revenue side, the main
measures include an upward adjustment of the standard
tax band for personal income and some further relief
through an increase in the employees’ tax credit. On the
expenditure side, the social welfare package is some-
what more generous than in 2005. A significant rise in
capital spending is also foreseen for 2006 and 2007,
focusing in particular on improvements in transport
infrastructure (2). The original budget-day target for the
general government balance in 2006, a deficit of
0.6 percent of GDP, was revised to 0.3 percent of
GDP, (3) mainly on account of an upward revision of
the tax revenue projections. The Commission services’
spring 2006 forecasts project a somewhat better out-
come, with a surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP, in line with
the forecast of buoyant domestic demand and solid rev-
enue growth., The deterioration in the structural bal-
ance, i.e. the cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of
one-off and other temporary measures, by around ã
percent of GDP points to an expansionary fiscal stance
in 2006. However, this result is subject to the caveat
that calculations of cyclically-adjusted balances for Ire-
land are surrounded by a particularly high degree of
uncertainty linked to the difficulty of obtaining reliable
output gap estimates.
Given the non-indexed nature of the tax and social ben-
efit systems, the Commission services spring forecast’s
no-policy-change assumption for 2007 is made opera-
tional, in the absence of previously announced meas-
ures, by freezing average tax rates and adjusting social
transfer payments by the forecast CPI inflation rate
(with a small top-up). On these assumptions, the spring
forecast projects a deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP in
2007, again somewhat better than the target in the
December 2005 stability programme update (a deficit
of 0.8 percent of GDP). This target includes a contin-
gency provision against unforeseen developments of
0.4 percent of GDP. Overall, the public finances are
expected to remain strong in 2006 and 2007. Over the
medium term, however, there are some macroeconomic
risks to the outlook for the Irish economy, notably
related to developments in the housing sector and the
sensitivity to changes in the global economic environment.
These, if realised, have the potential for the general gov-
ernment balance to record a larger deficit than pro-
jected in the spring 2006 forecast.
The government debt ratio is projected to remain broadly
stable in 2006-2007 at around 27 percent of GDP. In the
absence of the accumulation of non-general government
assets in the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF),
established in 2001 to pre-fund future pension liabilities,
the gross debt ratio would be falling over the period to
end-2007 (see special topic below).
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ Further details on the main measures in the budget for 2006 are given in
the accompanying table below.
¥3∂ April 2006 reporting of government deficits and debt levels. 269
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of the National Pensions Reserve Fund
The establishment of the National Pensions Reserve
Fund (NPRF) in Ireland, in operation since 2001, has
been expected to facilitate the easing of age-related
expenditure in view of the ageing of the population.
The statute of the National Pensions Reserve Fund pro-
vides for a build-up of assets that will contribute to the
funding of the expected ageing-related general govern-
ment costs from 2025 onwards (1). The statutory contri-
bution to the NRPF has been set at 1 percent of GNP
annually, but the Irish Government may also make addi-
tional contributions where circumstances allow. At
inception, the government paid 5.6 percent of GDP to the
NPRF, including receipts from the privatisation of Tele-
com Éireann. The market value of the NPRF’s assets is
estimated by the December 2005 stability programme at
just above 9 percent of GDP at the end of 2005.
The NPFR is not a pension fund in the sense of a pension
scheme that collects social contributions and pays pen-
sions. The NPFR is a reserve fund, that is, an institution
that accumulates and manages assets which are econom-
ically and legally owned by the government, not by
future pensioners. Since the NPRF is part of the govern-
ment sector, payments to it by the Exchequer consolidate
and do not count as government expenditure and the
Table V.19
Budgetary developments 2004-2007, Ireland (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 1.5 1.0 0.1 – 0.4
- Total revenues 35.2 35.5 35.1 34.7
 Of which: - current taxes 25.3 25.6 25.4 25.4
- social contributions 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3
- Total expenditure 33.7 34.5 34.9 35.1
 Of which: - collective consumption 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6
- social transfers in kind 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.6
- social transfers other than in kind 9.0 9.9 9.8 9.7
- interest expenditure 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.7 4.0
Primary balance 2.7 2.2 1.3 0.8
Tax burden 30.3 30.7 30.5 30.5
One-off and temporary measures 0.7 – 0.3 0.1 0.0
Structural balance (2) 0.7 1.8 1 0.8
Structural primary balance 1.9 3.0 2.2 2.0
Government gross debt 29.4 27.6 27.2 27.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.1
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance 1.4 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.8 – 0.8
Primary balance 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.5
Structural balance (4) 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government gross debt 29.4 28.0 28.0 28.2 28.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures (provided by the Department of
Finance, Ireland (0.7 % of GDP in 2004 and 0.1 % in 2006; both surplus increasing; and 0.3 % in 2005, surplus decreasing).
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Ireland.
¥1∂ For details on the National Pensions Reserve Fund Act (2000), see
www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/ documents/news/june/mcc655pr.htm
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government balance. However, the NPRF’s accumula-
tion of non-government assets does add to the general
government gross debt ratio compared with the situation
where the build-up of NPRF assets consisted of claims
towards government paper. Therefore, the accumulation
of assets by the NPRF explains a large part of the dis-
crepancy between the deficit and debt figures (that is the
stock-flow adjustment in Ireland).
In order to understand the underlying debt dynamics and
the related impact of the NPRF, it is necessary to analyse
the different contributions to the changes in government
gross debt ratio. In recent years, the pace of debt reduction
in Ireland has been slower than implied by the primary
surplus and the interaction between interest expenditure
and GDP growth (so-called ‘snowball effect’), which both
contributed to lowering the debt ratio.
Their contributions were largely offset by sizeable stock-
flow adjustments (SFA), which mainly reflected the
acquisition of non-government instruments by the NPRF.
While the NPRF does not issue debt and therefore does
not directly contribute to increase government gross debt,
the accumulation of outside financial assets prevents a
quicker fall in the debt. The recent pattern is expected to
continue also in the years ahead, in the absence of which
the government debt-to-GDP ratio would be falling over
the programme period (see Graph V.10).
According to the NPRF’s statute, the drawdown from the
NPRF will not begin before 2025, in line with the decrease
of the proportion of persons of working age relative to
those over 65 years of age, though detailed legislation
governing the manner of the fund’s withdrawal has not yet
been enacted. Financing pension payments through draw-
down of the NPFR does not avoid an increase in govern-
ment expenditure and a corresponding deterioration in the
general government balance. However, it reduces the debt
issuance to finance such spending and the concomitant
increase in the gross debt (during the drawdown phase net
debt would then be expected to increase more quickly/fall
more slowly than gross debt).
The establishment of the NPRF is an important initiative
to address the budgetary impact of population ageing, by
pre-funding the expected future payments. Nevertheless,
as the long-term public finance projections included in
the stability programme update (1) reveal, the role of the
NPRF should not be overestimated.   
Total age-related expenditures are projected in the 2005
stability programme to increase by around 9 percentage
points of GDP between years 2005 and 2050. In 2050,
the NPRF’s fund assets are expected by the programme
(after partial drawdown, assumed to start after year
2025) at around 22 % of GDP, i.e. covering just around
2â years of the projected increase in age-related expen-
ditures at this time horizon. Moreover, in terms of fiscal
¥1∂ See December 2005 stability programme, Department of Finance, Ireland
(Chapter 6, Table 14).
Table V.20
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Ireland
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Personal income tax measures: a widening of the standard rate 
band and an increase in employee and personal tax credits 
(– 0.5 % of GDP)
• Termination of certain tax reliefs: a series of tax reliefs (in particular 
for some property based tax incentive schemes) has been abolished 
(around 0.1 % of GDP)
• Social welfare package: notably increase in social welfare benefit 
rates (0.7 % of GDP)
• Childcare package: a five-year programme to increase the provision 
of childcare (around 0.2 % of GDP)
• Capital expenditure – addition to available envelope for Exchequer-
funded capital spending (0.1 % of GDP) plus a carry-over from 
unspent allocations in 2005 (0.2 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Department of Finance, Ireland (the budget for 2006 — http://www.finance.gov.ie).271
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strategy of accumulating assets in the NPRF and of
reducing the government gross debt is related to the dif-
ference between the average interest rate of the govern-
ment debt and the potentially higher rate of return
(including capital gains) of the reserve fund. Indeed, in
order to fully meet the budgetary challenges posed by
population ageing, some further fiscal effort in Ireland
will be needed over the long run.
Table V.21
Ireland – general government gross debt dynamics 
(average 2000-2004, in % of GDP)
Change in debt ratio (1=2+3+4) – 3.7
— Primary balance (2) – 2.7
— ‘Snow-ball’ effect (3) – 2.2
— Stock-flow adjustment (4) 1.1
p.m. Gross debt ratio (in 2004) 29.4
Source: Commission services and Department of Finance, Ireland.
Graph V.10:  Ireland — general government debt net of the NPRF’s assets (in % of GDP)
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10. Italy
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit was 4.1 percent
of GDP, compared with a deficit target of 2.7 percent of
GDP set in the 2004 update of the stability programme.
Lower-than-expected economic growth explains one
percentage point of the difference. Another â of a per-
centage point is accounted for by the negative carry-over
effects from 2004 (1). Additional slippages in primary
expenditure were compensated by lower interest
expenditure and higher than expected revenue. The pos-
itive budgetary impact of one-offs and temporary meas-
ures is estimated at â percent of GDP, on a downward
trend since 2003. This is ä percent of GDP lower than
expected, as sales of real estate fell short of the budgeted
amount.
As a result of economic stagnation and the erosion of the
primary balance, the debt ratio rose for the first time in
ten years to 106.4 percent of GDP, from 103.8 percent in
2004. Debt-increasing financial transactions amounted
to around 1ä percent of GDP, of which â percent of
investment in liquid assets.
The 2006 budget and related legislation were adopted by
parliament on 22 December 2005. The legislation fore-
sees a number of growth-supporting measures including
a general reduction in social contributions. Corrective
measures comprise sizeable savings on central govern-
ment current and capital expenditure and on the health-
care sector, which is under the regions’ responsibility.
Additional substantial savings on regional and local gov-
ernment expenditure are to be achieved through a further
extensive revision of the ‘domestic stability pact’ intro-
duced in 1999. Expenditure cuts are supplemented by an
increase in revenues, mainly from higher taxes on com-
panies. New one-off measures consist of taxes on the re-
evaluation of corporate assets and a new tax amnesty
linked to a tax agreement with the self-employed and
small firms.
In the 2005 update of the stability programme submitted
on 23 December 2005, the general government deficit in
2006 was targeted at 3.5 percent of GDP, built on an eco-
nomic growth forecast of 1.5 percent and assuming the
full implementation of the 2006 and previous Budget
Laws. However, despite the better than expected 2005
deficit outturn (4.1 percent of GDP instead of 4.3 percent
in the update of the stability programme), on 5 April
2006, the Ministry of Economy and Finance revised the
official deficit forecast upward, to 3.8 percent of GDP.
With real GDP projected to grow at 1.3 percent, the new
deficit forecast mainly reflects higher expenditure. In the
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast, the pro-
jected budgetary outturn for 2006 is a deficit of 4.1 per-
cent of GDP, also based on an economic growth forecast
of 1.3 percent. The difference with the new official fore-
cast is largely due to the assessment of the size of savings
foreseen in the 2006 Budget Law, notably those resulting
from the planned substantial cuts on healthcare and other
government expenditure, in particular of local govern-
ment. On the revenue side, the Commission services’
projections are overall in line with those in the Budget
Law, except for the additional revenue to be realised by
regions having a structural deficit in healthcare accounts,
as the procedures necessary to trigger this increase have
not yet been fully implemented. The impact of one-off
measures (sales of real estate and revenues from taxes on
the revaluations of corporations’ assets and tax amnes-
ties) is expected to diminish further to ä percent of GDP.
According to the Commission services’ forecast, net of
cyclical factors and excluding one-off measures, both
the deficit and the primary balance are projected to
improve by slightly less than ä of a percentage point of
¥1∂ Statistical revisions released on 1 March 2006 increased the government
deficit by around 0.2 percent of GDP for all the years from 2002 to 2004.
Incorporating the effect of the upward revision of the nominal GDP level,
the deficit is now reported at 3.1 percent of GDP in 2001, 2.9 percent of
GDP in 2002 and 3.4 percent of GDP both in 2003 and 2004.273
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GDP structural adjustment targeted in the 2005 updated
stability programme.
The Commission services’ forecast for a 2007 deficit of
4.5 percent of GDP is based on the customary no-pol-
icy-change scenario and mainly reflects higher interest
expenditure and the expiry of one-off measures. Interest
expenditure is expected to increase as a percentage of
GDP, reversing the downward trend observed over the
past decade, as a result of the rising interest rates and
debt-to-GDP ratio. Beyond 2007, the 2005 updated sta-
bility programme targets the deficit to gradually decline
to 2.1 percent in 2008 and 1.5 percent of GDP in 2009.
In the Commission services’ forecast, the debt ratio in
2006 is projected to increase by 1 percentage point, to
attain 107â percent of GDP, which contrasts with the
decrease of half a percentage point of GDP planned in
the 2005 update of the stability programme. Apart
from the difference stemming from the higher deficit,
the Commission services’ forecast takes account of the
new official estimation of cash borrowing requirement
in 2006 released on 5 April 2006. Privatisation receipts
are assumed to amount to around ã of a percentage
point of GDP, as planned in the 2005 updated stability
programme. Based on the no-policy-change scenario,
the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase slightly
in 2007.
Table V.22
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Italy (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.4 – 4.1 – 4.1 – 4.5
- Total revenues 44.3 44.0 44.0 43.8
 Of which: - current taxes 27.4 27.6 27.9 27,8
- social contributions 12.7 12.9 12.7 12,7
- Total expenditure 47.7 48.1 48.1 48.4
 Of which: - final consumption 19.8 20.3 20.2 20,1
- social transfers other than in kind 16.9 17.1 17.3 17,3
- interest expenditure 4.7 4.6 4.5 4,8
- gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.4 2.5 2,5
1.3 0.4 0.5 0,2
Primary balance 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.2
Tax burden 40.7 40.6 40.7 40.5
One-off and temporary measures 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 4.6 – 3.9 – 3.8 – 3.8
Structural primary balance 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.0
Government gross debt (3) 103.8 106.4 107.4 107.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.1 0.0 1.3 1.2
Stability programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.2 – 4.3 – 3.5 – 2.8 – 2.1 – 1.5
Primary balance 1.8 0.6 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.2
Structural balance (5) – 4.3 – 4.0 – 3.2 – 2.3 – 1.7 – 1.2
Government gross debt 106.5 108.5 108.0 106.1 104.4 101.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) On 1 March 2006, the Italian statistical ofﬁce carried out a comprehensive revision of national accounts. The upward revision of nominal GDP (2ã %.in 204) has
substantially reduced the debt ratio.
(4) Submitted in December.
(5) 2005 Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme
(1.4 % of GDP in 2004, 0.5 % in 2005, 0.4 % in 2006; all deﬁcit-reducing).
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Italy.274
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In spite of several reforms (1), the process that leads to
the formulation of the Italian budget and the monitoring
of its execution are still based on numerous documents
that use different aggregation and accounting methods.
This situation, as well as delays in the presentation of
some planning and reporting documents, reduce the
transparency of the budgetary process and hamper the
monitoring of budgetary developments.
The budgetary process in Italy typically starts at the end
of June, with the publication of the Economic and Finan-
cial Planning Document (Documento di Programmazi-
one Economica e Finanziaria or DPEF), which covers
the following four years. The DPEF describes macroeco-
nomic and budgetary trends, the budgetary plans, and
any other envisaged major economic policy measures
that can be expected to have an impact on macroeco-
nomic and public finance developments. Since 1999, the
budgetary trends are projected on the basis of a scenario
based on ‘unchanged legislation’, which assumes that
future expenditure and revenues reflect only legislation
already approved by the Parliament. Unlike an
‘unchanged policy’ scenario (as in the Commission fore-
casts), which assumes a continuity of present trends for
all expenditure items which are not yet known in suffi-
cient detail, the unchanged legislation scenario tends to
underestimate expenditure. For instance, the compensa-
tion of public employees is determined by laws that
establish the parameters to be followed to compute the
total amount of public wages; however, these parameters
are affected by future renewals of public wages contracts
and thus will give rise to a different, normally greater,
budgetary impact compared to the one based on
unchanged parameters. Another example is investment
expenditure, where account is only taken of funding
needs for projects foreseen in current legislation; how-
ever, it can be expected that new funds will be allocated
to new projects by future legislation.
Concerning budgetary plans, the DPEF indicates the tar-
gets for the deficit and the debt but it does not quantify
policy targets for the different expenditure components
and the tax burden. Italy’s stability programme follows
the same approach. The parliament is called to endorse
the DPEF, although this does not become a law, but
remains a political act.
At the end of September, the government presents to par-
liament, for approval by 31 December, (i) a draft com-
prising a detailed annual and a less detailed multi-annual
State budget under unchanged legislation (Bilancio dello
Stato a legislazione vigente) and (ii) a draft Budget Law
(Disegno di legge finanziaria) including the corrective
measures judged necessary to reach the budgetary tar-
gets set in the DPEF. Possible accompanying bills to the
Budget Law (disegni di legge collegati alla finanziaria)
can be submitted by 15 November. A multi-annual State
budget based on plans is also transmitted to parliament,
but it is not voted. The information included in the
budget does not provide a comprehensive and clear pic-
ture of the Italian public finances. First, the budget is
structured in about one thousand budget forecasting
units (unità previsionali di base), which reflects the frag-
mented administration behind the various activities
rather than the policy targets. Second, the budget
includes only expenditure and revenue pertaining to the
State rather than the general government. The difference
between these two aggregates, especially in the light of
the process of decentralisation, is widening. Finally,
Table V.23
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Italy
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Cuts to social contributions (-0.1 % of GDP)
• Additional regional revenue to finance structural deficit in the 
healthcare accounts (0.1 % of GDP)
• Other additional revenue (0.6 % of GDP)
• Savings on intermediate consumption expenditure (0.4 % of GDP)
• Savings on healthcare expenditure (0.1 % of GDP)
• Cuts to transfers to the State-owned railway and road maintenance 
companies (0.2 % of GDP)
• Other savings on primary expenditure (0.2 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance.
¥1∂ In particular, Laws 468/1978, 362/1988, 94/1997, and 208/1999.275
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budget is not in line with the European System of
Accounts (ESA95). The only official document referring
to the general government that presents the assessment
of the budgetary implications of the Budget Law in line
with ESA95 is the ‘second section’ of the planning and
forecasting document (Relazione previsionale e pro-
grammatica — RPP), which in principle is presented to
the parliament together with the budget. In 2005, this key
document was made available only with a considerable
delay.
Together with a reshuffling of the budget, each year the
Budget Law envisages a correction meant to bridge the
gap between the target for the following year’s general
government balance and the trend deficit at unchanged
legislation as projected in the DPEF. This complex and
legalistic way of measuring the size of the correction is
very opaque, as it was highlighted by the stepwise pres-
entation of the 2006 Budget Law. The original draft
budget law and the accompanying legislation presented
to parliament on 4 October 2005 projected a correction
of around EUR 12 billion (0.8 percent of GDP), bridging
the gap between the unchanged legislation deficit esti-
mated at 4.7 percent of GDP and the deficit target of 3.8
percent of GDP set in DPEF. However, in late October,
i.e. almost one month after the government’s adoption of
the draft Budget Law and three months after the DPEF
publication, it became evident that an overestimation of
the planned sales of real assets in 2006 resulted in an
underestimation of the 2006 trend deficit. Although par-
tially offset by higher estimates of dividends from State-
owned companies, the downward revision of real estate
sales worsened the trend deficit projection by around
0.3 percent of GDP and triggered the adoption of corre-
sponding corrective measures. Subsequently, the gov-
ernment further increased the size of the correction in
order to target a lower structural deficit which would be
in line with the Council recommendation under Article
104(7) of the Treaty. In this last round of changes, the
projected revenue-to-GDP ratio was also revised signif-
icantly upwards with respect to the DPEF, without any
explicit explanation for the revision being given. (1)
Article 81 of the Italian Constitution establishes the prin-
ciple that all new legislation entailing higher expenditure
should indicate the means for its financing. A tradition-
ally loose interpretation of this provision has allowed
large deficits and the accumulation of a debt well above
100 percent of GDP. Even after the recent improvement
in the legislation (2) implementing this constitutional
principle, it should be noted that the financing of
increases in expenditure or decreases in revenue outside
the budget session is not presented in terms consistent
with ESA95. Hence, new measures approved during the
year may negatively affect the budget balance that con-
stitutes a reference for the Treaty provisions on fiscal
discipline.
Documents which would allow monitoring budgetary
developments in cash terms, namely the Report on the
estimated State cash borrowing requirement for the cur-
rent year and the Report on the outcomes of the cash
management of the State budget and of the Treasury
account (referred to as Relazione Trimestrale di Cassa)
are regularly presented well after the statutory deadlines.
This is an obstacle to the prompt identification of budg-
etary slippages. This problem is aggravated by the fact
that data related to the local and regional finances are
available with considerable delay. The establishment of
the Information System on the Operations of Govern-
ment Bodies (SIOPE), which collects online information
on budgetary transaction made by public administra-
tions, aims at addressing this shortcoming. A further
major improvement would be the adoption of ESA95 for
compiling budgetary data at all government levels.
To sum up, the present budgetary process in Italy is not
transparent enough, complex and does not allow for an
immediate translation of transactions in ESA95 terms. It
may be useful to consider ways to raise the efficiency of
the budgetary process and the accountability of the fiscal
authorities. 
¥1∂ This is not a criticism to the revised revenue projections. 
¥2∂ Law 468/1978 as amended by Law 246/2002. 276
11. Cyprus
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit in Cyprus was
2.4 percent of GDP. This is slightly better than the
expected deficit of 2.9 percent of GDP targeted in the
December 2005 update of the convergence programme,
which was submitted in December 2004. (1) In nominal
terms, the deficit outturn represents an improvement of
around 1ã percent of GDP compared with 2004. The bet-
ter-than-expected outcome was due to higher-than-
expected revenues from structural measures on the back
of high-tax content of growth, which was almost fully
based on domestic private consumption thus leading to
higher indirect tax revenues, and was accompanied by
sustained employment growth. The one-off impact on rev-
enues from tax amnesty amounted to almost one percent-
age point of GDP, a similar figure to that of 2004. Reve-
nues were also supported by the regularisation of dividend
income policy from semi-governmental organisation. The
deficit outcome might have been even better, since part of
such base-year effects and additional revenues were offset
by expenditure overruns. Although the cap on wages of
public sector employees was broadly respected and capital
expenditures actually fell in nominal terms, social trans-
fers increased at 13 percent of GDP.
The general government debt ratio attained around
70ä percent of GDP in 2005 compared with 71ã per-
cent a year earlier, slightly better than the 70â percent of
GDP target projected in the convergence programme.
This difference is mainly explained by the higher pri-
mary balance and growth.
The 2006 Budget Law, which was approved by the Parlia-
ment on 15 December 2005 and incorporated in the
December 2005 update of the convergence programme (2),
targets a nominal general government deficit of 1.9 per-
cent of GDP. It projects total revenues to fall by around
half a percentage point of GDP, mainly reflecting the
expiry of temporary revenues worth almost 1 percent of
GDP, which will be only partially compensated by new
one-off proceeds from the issuance of title deeds for
buildings with irregularities (0.3 percent of GDP). The
budget also contemplates an increase of the contribution
levels of the self-employed to social security funds
worth 0.1 percent of GDP. On the expenditure side, the
budget sets a ceiling on the nominal growth rate of cur-
rent expenditures of 2 percent, the containment of cur-
rent transfers and subsidies in line with inflation, and the
increase in the retirement age of public employees.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, the general government deficit for 2006 is pro-
jected just above 2 percent of GDP, or about ä of a per-
centage point of GDP higher than the official target. The
difference is mainly explained by a more optimistic
growth scenario in the official projections. According to
the 2005 update of the convergence programme, GDP is
projected to grow at 4.2 percent this year, while the
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast expects GDP
to increase by 3.8 percent. The primary surplus is pro-
jected to remain at 1 percent of GDP. The projected
improvement of the structural balance, i.e. the budget
balance net of cyclical factors and one-offs and other
temporary measures amounts to about ã of a percentage
point of GDP. 
In 2007, based on the customary no-policy-change
assumption, the Commission services project a general
government deficit of 2.0 percent of GDP. The 2005
update of the convergence programme targets a deficit of
1.8 percent of GDP, which then gradually declines to
0.6 percent of GDP in 2009.
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.277
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the debt-to-GDP ratio to continue its downward path
reaching 69 percent in 2006, down from 70.3 percent in the
previous year, and 67ã percent in 2007. According to the
2005 update of the convergence programme, the debt-to-
GDP ratio is projected to decline from 70.5 percent in 2005
to 64 percent in 2007, before gradually improve further and
reach 53.5 percent in 2009. The difference between the
Commission services’ forecast and the updated conver-
gence programme over 2006-2007, is mainly explained by
different projections of the primary balance and nominal
GDP growth. The Commission services’ forecasts do not
include the debt-reducing effects of the decumulation of
sinking funds, financial assets of the government in the
form of deposits in the Central Bank, which have been
used for the repayment of long-term loans.
Tax amnesty in Cyprus
In order to reduce the general government deficit ratio to
below the 3 percent reference value, the Cypriot govern-
ment adopted a series of measures in 2004 and 2005. The
aim was twofold. Namely, to enhance revenues through
‘the special settlement of tax liabilities law’ — a tax
amnesty — while at the same time discourage future tax
evasion, by (i) broadening the monitoring authority of
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue Department and
(ii) increasing the penalties for non-compliance.
The tax amnesty, which took effect in 2004-2005, aimed
at settling any existing tax liabilities of individuals and
corporations relating to undeclared income earned before
31 December 2002. Specifically, the law provided for the
Table V.24
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Cyprus (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 4.1 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 2.0
- Total revenues 39.7 42.3 41.8 41.8
 Of which: - current taxes 25.6 26.9 26.9 26.8
- social contributions 7.8 8.4 8.1 8.1
- Total expenditure 43.8 44.7 43.9 43.8
 Of which: - collective consumption 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.8
- social transfers in kind 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2
- social transfers other than in kind 12.2 12.9 11.4 11.4
- interest expenditure 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.0
- gross fixed capital formation 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.4
Primary balance – 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tax burden 34.1 36.3 35.2 35.2
One-off and temporary measures 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.3
Structural balance (2) – 4.9 – 3.0 – 2.2 – 2.3
Structural primary balance – 1.7 0.4 0.9 0.7
Government gross debt 71.7 70.3 69.1 67.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 4.1 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.6
Primary balance – 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.7
Structural balance (4) – 4.6 – 3.1 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.6
Government gross debt 71.3 70.5 67.0 64.0 56.9 53.5
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (1.0 % of
GDP in 2004, 0.9 % in 2005, 0.3 % in 2006, 0.3 % in 2007, and 0.3 % in 2008; all deﬁcit-reducing)
Source: Commission services and update of the convergence programme of Cyprus.278
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officially receive the special declaration forms submitted
by the taxpayers and collect the taxes due. The declara-
tions included undeclared income or profits that (i) had
been deposited with banks in Cyprus or abroad, or (ii) had
been converted to movable or immovable property in or
outside the country, or (iii) had been spent domestically or
abroad before 31 December 2002.
The law provided for a special tax charge of 5 percent for
any amounts declared until 6 December 2004 and of
6.5 percent for amounts declared thereafter, until the end
of December 2004. These deadlines however were
extended to 31 December 2004 and 28 February 2005,
respectively, in order to accommodate the delayed
response of the public. The tax amnesty did not include
value added tax.
The projected yield of the tax amnesty was around
â percent of GDP. However, the final amount collected
was more than 1â percent of GDP, of which ã of a per-
centage point was recorded in 2004. The direct impact of
the tax amnesty has been crucial in the fiscal consolida-
tion effort as it has contributed significantly to the reduc-
tion of the general government budget deficit from
6.3 percent of GDP in 2003 to 4.1 percent in 2004 and
2.4 percent in 2005.
A significant determinant of the success of the tax
amnesty in Cyprus was the firm commitment of the gov-
ernment and the fiscal authorities, alongside an exten-
sive public campaign. The broadness of the measure,
covering both physical and legal tax-payers, has also
been key in this respect.
Beyond the direct impact the Government expects the
tax amnesty to also have a more permanent positive
effect on the public finances. This is due to come through
the increase of the tax base and higher tax compliance of
the tax-payers. Legislation passed in 2005 and designed
to enforce better tax compliance, in conjunction with
efforts to enforce the collection capacity and efficiency
of the public service’s revenue collecting departments, is
expected to yield higher tax revenues. However, due to
the time lag between the enactment of the measures and
the response of tax revenues, it is still early to see the full
magnitude of this ‘more permanent effect’ in 2006 and
beyond.
Table V.25
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Cyprus
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Regularisation of dividend income policy for semi-governmental 
organisations (0.3 % of GDP);
• Issuance of title deeds for buildings with irregularities 
(0.3 % of GDP);
• Increase of Land and Survey department services fees 
(0.2 % of GDP);
• Improve the efficiency of the Revenue Collecting departments.
• Ceiling on the nominal growth rate of current expenditures of 2 % 
(– 0.8 % of GDP)
• Ceiling on the nominal growth rate of capital expenditures of 6 %
• Containment of current transfers and subsidies in line with inflation 
(– 0.1 % of GDP); 
• Increase in the retirement age of public sector employees 
(– 0.2 % of GDP);
• Adjustment of the contribution levels of self-employed to the Social 
Security Funds (– 0.1 % of GDP).
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and update of the convergence programme of Cyprus.279
12. Latvia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005 the general government recorded a surplus of
0.2 percent of GDP. This is significantly better than the
targeted deficit of 1.6 percent of GDP set in the December
2004 update of the convergence programme. It was also a
surprising outturn, given the estimated deficit of 1.5 per-
cent in the December 2005 convergence programme. The
better-than-expected outcome was mainly due to very
strong tax revenues coming from real GDP growth signif-
icantly higher than foreseen (10.2 percent instead of
6.7 percent in the 2005 budget law). In particular, receipts
of VAT and excise taxes were much stronger than
expected. The 2005 budget was amended in August 2005
and provided for additional spending of about 1â percent
of GDP. This increase provided for a capital injection into
a State-owned bank, an increase in the limit on local gov-
ernments’ borrowing and higher subsidies to farmers. In
nominal terms, both revenues and expenditure exceeded
the levels foreseen in the November 2005 convergence
programme, albeit the difference in the case of revenues
was much more significant. The debt-to-GDP ratio at end-
2005 fell to 11.9 percent.
The 2006 budget law was presented to Parliament on
29 September 2005 and adopted on 20 October. The
budget, in line with the November 2005 convergence
programme, targets a deficit of 1.5 percent of GDP. (1)
Compared to the 2005 budget, revenues are projected to
increase by 18.8 percent and expenditure by 17.5 per-
cent. About half of the budgeted expenditure increase is
allocated to higher public sector wages, increased pen-
sions and other benefits. The most significant budget
priorities also include expenditure underpinning con-
tinued integration into the EU and NATO, including a
contribution to the EU budget in 2006 about a third
higher than the year before. A counterpart to the latter,
however, is that Latvia is expected to receive financing
of about 4 percent of GDP from the EU as co-financing
for projects implemented in the country. Overall on the
revenue side, strong economic growth, improved tax-
collection and VAT increases implied by EU accession
are expected to provide the main financing. Further-
more, changes to the spending structure, including
administrative reform, are expected to result in some
efficiency savings; however, the impact is not expected
to be significant in the near future. In the Commission
services’ spring 2006 forecast, the projected outcome is
slightly better than the official deficit target, based on
higher growth assumptions (an 8.5 percent annual
growth rate rather than 7.5 percent) but with a more
cautious estimate of revenues from EU funds. These
projections imply an expansionary fiscal stance in
2006, an election year, as indicated by a 1.1 percent
point of GDP increase in the structural budget deficit.
However, this result is subject to the caveat that calcu-
lations of cyclically-adjusted balances for Latvia are
surrounded by a particularly high degree of uncertainty
linked to the difficulty of obtaining reliable output gap
estimates.
In 2007, based on a no-policy change assumption, the
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects the
general government deficit to remain broadly unchanged
at around 1 percent of GDP. This is slightly better than
the targets outlined in the November 2005 convergence
programme that aims at a slight reduction of the general
government budget deficit from 1.5 percent of GDP in
2006 to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2007 and 1.3 percent of
GDP in 2008.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected in the Commission
services’ forecast to drop just below 11 percent of GDP
at the end of 2007, a profile that is somewhat more opti-
mistic than in the November 2005 update of the conver-
gence programme projecting the debt-to-GDP ratio at
13.7 percent of GDP at the end of 2008.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.280
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Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Latvia (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 0.9 0.2 – 1.0 – 1.0
- Total revenues 34.9 36.4 36.1 36.1
 Of which: - current taxes 19.7 20.7 20.5 20.4
- social contributions 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.5
- Total expenditure 35.9 36.2 37.1 37.1
 Of which: - collective consumption 10.3 9.4 9.4 9.3
- social transfers 9.3 8.4 8.5 8.4
- social transfers other than in kind 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.6
- interest expenditure 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
- gross fixed capital formation 1.9 2.1 2.7 3.2
Primary balance – 0.2 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.4
Tax burden 28.6 29.2 28.9 28.7
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 0.8 – 0.1 – 1.2 – 0.8
Structural primary balance – 0.1 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.2
Government gross debt 14.6 11.9 11.3 10.9
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 8.5 10.2 8.5 7.6
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 1.0 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.3
Primary balance – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.6
Structural balance (4) – 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.0
Government gross debt 14.7 13.1 14.9 13.6 13.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 8.5 8.4 7.5 7.0 7.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in November 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.04 % of
GDP in 2004 and 0.02 % in 2005, all deﬁcit-increasing)
Source:  Commission services and convergence programme of Latvia.
Table V.27
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Latvia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase in the personal income tax-free threshold from LVL 26 
(EUR 37) per month to LVL 32 (EUR 45) per month and the setting of 
income tax rebates for dependents at LVL 22 (EUR 31) per month 
(– 0.2 % of GDP);
• Increase in excise duties on oil and tobacco products and beer 
(0.1 % of GDP).
• Financing for EU structural funds and other financial instruments 
(4.0 % of GDP);
• Reform of the National Armed Forces and NATO integration-related 
requirements (0.4 % of GDP);
• Modernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system 
(0.3 % of GDP);
• Increased teachers’ wages (0.3 % of GDP);
• Other measures to improve social conditions including pension 
indexation, increase in minimum wage (0.9 % of GDP).
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and the explanations to the 2006 budget law.281
13. Lithuania
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit was 0.5 percent of GDP in
2005. This compares with a deficit target of 2.1 percent of
GDP in the 2004 update of Lithuania’s convergence
programme (1). The more favourable result stems from a
good budgetary performance at all levels of general gov-
ernment, which are estimated to have recorded higher-
than-planned revenues while expenditure plans were
broadly achieved. This was possible due to higher-than-
foreseen economic activity and improvements in tax col-
lection and enforcement. In contrast to previous practice,
substantial additional expenditure through supplementary
budgets in the second half of the year was avoided. Good
times were thus used to step up the budgetary consolida-
tion effort in 2005. The debt ratio decreased further to
below 19 percent in 2005, thanks to an improvement in the
primary balance and a positive snow-ball effect.
The budget for 2006 was approved on 8 December 2005.
The general government deficit target confirmed in the
most recent update of the convergence programme (2) is
1.4 percent of GDP in ESA 95 terms. The budget con-
tains important new measures on the revenue side. They
include the introduction of a new ‘social tax’, effective
from January 2006, which is a de facto increase in the
corporate tax rate by 4 percentage points, and a decrease
of the personal income tax rate from 33 percent to
27 percent with effect as of July 2006. The costs of the
pension reform which started in 2004 are estimated to
account for 0.7 percent of GDP in 2006. The direct
impact of the tax reform, which is included in the budget
for 2006, is likely to be broadly neutral in 2006. On the
expenditure side, the budget includes a significant
increase in social transfers in kind and public invest-
ment. This compares with an estimated deficit of 0.6 per-
cent of GDP in the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast. The main reason explaining the difference is
the better-than-expected deficit outturn in 2005, which
was not anticipated by the authorities at the moment pre-
senting the programme. If the better outcome is carried
over to 2006 and the budget is strictly implemented, the
deficit is likely to be significantly lower than planned. It
is also noted that the authorities’ revenue forecast is con-
servative given the higher-than-expected revenue base
achieved in 2005. Under a no-policy change assumption,
the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast expects
the fiscal stance to remain broadly neutral in 2006, when
the primary structural deficit, i.e. the primary deficit net
of cyclical and one-off and other temporary measures, is
forecast to remain unchanged at 0.3 percent of GDP.
The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects
a deterioration of the general government deficit in 2007
to 0.9 percent of GDP. This is derived under a no-policy
change assumption and includes the impact of the tax
reform, namely a planned decrease of 1 percentage point
of the ‘social tax’ in the beginning of 2007 and the loss
of personal income tax revenue resulting from the tax cut
due to take effect in July 2006. The main reason for the
deterioration is explained by the negative impact of the
tax reform, together with the increasing costs of the pen-
sion reform. The most recent update of the convergence
programme foresees the deficit to remain broadly stable
at 1.3 percent of GDP in 2007.
This deficit target does not take into account of the bet-
ter-than-expected budgetary outcome in 2005 and the
expected outcome in 2006 if the budget is strictly imple-
mented. Beyond 2007, the authorities project the deficit
to decrease to 1 percent of GDP.
¥1∂ Following a decision by Eurostat in May 2005 on the classification of pay-
ments related to the compensation for lost rouble savings in the early years
of transition and the restitution of real estate property confiscated in Soviet
times, the deficit target set in the previous update (2.5 percent of GDP) has
been adjusted to exclude payments related to these liabilities to allow for a
meaningful comparison.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.282
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the general government debt ratio to remain low at about
19-20 percent in 2006-2007. The authorities foresee the
debt ratio to remain around the same level in 2008.
Table V.28
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Lithuania (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance (2) – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.9
- Total revenues 31.9 33.1 32.0 30.7
 Of which: - current taxes 19.8 20.3 20.2 19.7
- social contributions 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.2
- Total expenditure 33.4 33.7 32.6 31.7
 Of which: - collective consumption 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.8
- social transfers in kind 10.5 9.7 9.4 9.2
- social transfers other than in kind 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.8
- interest expenditure 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.3
Primary balance – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.2
Tax burden 28.4 28.8 28.5 27.9
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) – 2.0 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.0
Structural primary balance – 1.1 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3
Government gross debt 19.5 18.7 18.9 19.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.2
Convergence programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.0
Primary balance – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.2
Structural balance (5) – 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 1.2
Government gross debt 19.5 19.2 19.9 19.8 18.9
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.0 7.0 6.0 5.3 6.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) The costs of the ongoing pension reform (introduction of a second pillar) are included in the deﬁcit. The costs are estimated at 0.3 % of GDP in 2004, 0.5 % in
2005, 0.7 % in 2006, 0.8 % in 2007 and 0.8 % in 2008.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2005.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. There are no one-off and other temporary measures taken from the pro-
gramme. 
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Lithuania.
Table V.29
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Lithuania
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Social tax (0.6 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax cut (– 0.7 % of GDP)
• Pension reform (– 0.7 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services and convergence programme.283
14. Luxembourg
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The 2004 update of Luxembourg’s stability programme
projected the general government deficit to decrease
from an estimated 1.4 percent of GDP in 2004 to 1.0 per-
cent in 2005. However, according to the latest available
data, the deficit actually rose from a revised 1.1 percent
of GDP in 2004 to 1.9 percent in 2005 (1). General gov-
ernment total spending increased by 1.1 percentage point
of GDP instead of 0.8 as planned, while total revenues
rose by 0.3 percentage points of GDP instead of 1.2, in
particular because of large unexpected VAT refunds.
The debt-to-GDP ratio was 6.2 percent in 2005 com-
pared to 6.6 percent in 2004.
The 2006 budget was adopted by Parliament on
14 December, 2005. It targets a general government def-
icit of 1.8 percent of GDP in 2006, down from the
2.3 percent level estimated at that moment for 2005. The
latest update of the stability programme, submitted on
28 November 2005 (2), contains the same projections.
To date, the deficit target for 2006 has not been adapted
despite the recent downward revision of the deficit for
2005 from 2.3 percent of GDP to 1.9 percent (according
to the April 2006 reporting, the deficit is now planned to
decline to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2006, compared to
1.8 percent in the stability programme, but this is only
due to an upward revision in the projected 2006 GDP
level). The planned consolidation is supposed to occur
exclusively on the expenditure side since the budget
projects revenues to rise by 6â percent (a rather low fig-
ure by Luxembourg standards), implying a 0.2 percent-
age points decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. A 1 per-
centage point of GDP fall in indirect taxes is projected to
be partly compensated by a 0.4 percentage point of GDP
rise in direct taxes (which are expected to be boosted by
buoyant profits in the financial sector and by the intro-
duction of a withholding tax on savings income) and by
a 0.4 percentage point of GDP increase in other reve-
nues. On the other hand, public expenditure is planned to
decline by 0.7 percentage points of GDP in 2006, with
more than half of this decrease coming from a decline in
social transfers, thanks to the effects of reforms initiated
in recent years in the fields of disability and health
expenditure. The budget and the stability programme
update state the government’s intention to prevent the
rise in current expenditure from exceeding the increase
in nominal GDP. On the other hand, government invest-
ment is projected to remain at the high level reached in
2005 (5.5 percent of GDP).
The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast foresees
the deficit to decline to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2006,
which, given the revision in the 2005 figures, represents
a more limited reduction than planned in the budget and
the stability programme update. Government revenues
are expected to decrease by 0.2 percentage points of
GDP (the same figure as in the budget) and expenditure
by 0.3 point (compared to 0.7 point in the budget and the
stability programme update). The fiscal stance in 2006 as
assessed in the Commission services’ forecast may be
described as neutral since the structural balance is fore-
cast to remain constant at 1.1 percent of GDP. On the
contrary, the structural balance calculated by the Com-
mission services on the basis of the data in the stability
programme should improve by 0.3 percentage point of
GDP in 2006 because the programme projects a signifi-
cantly bigger improvement in the headline deficit.
In 2007, the spring 2006 forecast of the Commission
services projects the general government deficit to
decline to about 1â percent of GDP.   
This forecast was made under a no-policy change
assumption but it incorporates some additional meas-
¥1∂ The 2005 update of the stability programme estimated it at 2.3 percent of
GDP, a figure subsequently revised to1.9 percent
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.284
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Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Luxembourg (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 1.1 – 1.9 – 1.8 – 1.5
- Total revenues 42.1 42.4 42.2 42.3
 Of which: - current taxes 26.8 27.3 27.3 27.4
- social contributions 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.8
- Total expenditure 43.2 44.3 44.0 43.8
 Of which: - collective consumption 6.7 7.1 7.1 7.0
- social transfers in kind 10.2 10.4 10.3 10.2
- social transfers other than in kind 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.8
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
- gross fixed capital formation 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.8
Primary balance – 1.0 – 1.8 – 1.7 – 1.4
Tax burden 37.9 38.5 38.5 38.7
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 0.5 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.0
Structural primary balance – 0.3 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 0.9
Government gross debt 6.6 6.2 7.9 8.2
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.5
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 1.2 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.2
Primary balance – 0.9 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 0.7 + 0.1
Structural balance (4) – 0.3 – 1.5 – 1.2 – 0.6 + 0.1
Government gross debt 6.6 6.4 9.6 9.9 10.2
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.9
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in November 2005
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Luxembourg
Table V.31
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Luxembourg
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• introduction of a withholding tax on income from savings of 
residents and non residents (0.3 % of GDP)
• the (by definition non-recurrent) costs related to Luxembourg’s 
presidency of the EU in the first half of 2005 are estimated at 0.2 % 
of GDP
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, 2005 stability programme of Luxembourg and STATEC, La situation économique au Luxembourg. Evolution récente et perspectives. 
Note de conjoncture No  3, 2005.285
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2 0 0 6ures, announced by the Luxembourg authorities at the
end of April, especially increases in the personal income
tax, corporate tax and social contributions as well as the
abolition of the special 12 percent VAT rate on certain
services, which will be replaced by the normal 15 per-
cent rate. Other measures, more specifically targeted at
curbing government expenditure, were announced on
May 2, too late to be incorporated in the spring forecast.
The 2005 update of the stability programme projects the
general government deficit to decline more significantly,
from 1.8 percent of GDP in 2006 to 1.0 percent in 2007
and 0.2 percent in 2008.
According to the spring 2006 forecast, the debt-to-GDP
ratio should rise from 6.2 percent in 2005 to 7.9 percent
in 2006 and 8.2 percent in 2007 as the authorities intend
to issue new bonds in order to finance projects in the
fields of roads and railways infrastructure, while taking
advantage of the currently low interest rates  (1).
¥1∂ Although the central government has been recording deficits since 2002,
these deficits have been financed with the reserves accumulated during the
surplus years and no new debt has been issued since 1998.286
15. Hungary
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit increased by
0.7 percentage point of GDP, reaching 6.1 percent of
GDP (1). This is substantially higher than the original
deficit target of 3.8 percent of GDP in the 2004 update of
the convergence programme, despite some corrective
measures taken in the first half of the year. The sizeable
deviation is due to a significant revenue shortfall, com-
pared to overly optimistic budget assumptions, and an
expenditure overrun due to the underestimation of open-
ceiling expenditures. The Hungarian authorities had
originally intended to reduce the deficit through the sale
of motorways to Private-Public-Partnerships (PPPs), for
an amount of 1.9 percent of GDP. However, Eurostat
clarified that this could not be counted as a deficit-reduc-
ing measure. The debt-to-GDP ratio in 2005 increased to
58.4 percent of GDP from 57.1 percent of GDP in the
previous year.
The 2006 budget, adopted by parliament on 19 Decem-
ber 2005, aims at a 1 percentage point reduction of pub-
lic investment expenditure (through recourse to PPP
projects in motorway construction). Moreover, the
budget assumes a 0.4 percentage point decline in the
interest burden mainly linked to a continued trend of
interest rate decline. On the revenue side the main meas-
ures are cuts in the upper VAT rate and in personal
income taxes. The initial target in the 2006 budget was a
deficit of 4.7 percent of GDP. The government has since
acknowledged that the correct reporting of the purchase
of military aircraft under a financial lease contract will
add 0.3 percent of GDP to the deficit in 2006 (and
0.2 percent of GDP in 2007). The Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast projects a deficit of 6.7 percent of
GDP. Expenditures are expected to be higher than offi-
cially estimated. In particular, substantial expenditure
overruns are expected in the areas of pension payments,
health expenditures, and operational and wage costs at
all levels of government. Interest expenditure is also
expected to be higher than budgeted in view of the
slightly higher debt level and the projected rise in inter-
est rates. Data for the first quarter appear to confirm all
these assumptions. In the absence of a decision from
Eurostat, the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast
assumes that investment in new motorways built in PPPs
(over 1 percent of GDP) is recorded as private invest-
ment rather than as government expenditure. Although
the PPPs would improve the budget balance by reducing
public investment expenditure, they would also generate
implicit liabilities for the government. The structural pri-
mary balance is expected to deteriorate by 0.5 percent of
GDP in 2006, indicating an expansionary stance of fiscal
policy.
In 2007, the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast
projects a further worsening in the government deficit to
7 percent of GDP, based on the no-policy-change
assumption. This is considerably higher than the deficit
target of 3.3 percent of GDP in the 2005 update of the
convergence programme (submitted on 1 December
2005) (2), subsequently revised to 3.5 percent of GDP.
The forecast includes the next steps of the 5-year tax cut
strategy, which was approved by Parliament on
7 November 2005. This would lead to revenue losses of
around 1 percent of GDP in 2007, only partly compen-
sated by a slowdown in expenditure growth (3).
For 2008, the convergence programme update plans a
sizeable reduction in the deficit to 1.9 percent of GDP.
¥1∂ All the fiscal numbers exclude the costs of the pension reform as explained
in the first comment of Table V.32. Budgetary developments 2004-2008,
Hungary* ( % of GDP).
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥3∂ Under the adopted no-policy-change assumption, all expenditures except
interest outlays and social transfers other than in kind are assumed to
remain constant in real terms at 2006 levels.287
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2 0 0 6According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio will increase in 2006 to
59.9 percent and exceed the 60 percent threshold in
2007, as opposed to the slight decline targeted in the
updated convergence programme. The difference is
explained by the systematically higher deficit forecasts
in the spring forecast. The Commission services’ projec-
tions take into account to a large extent privatisation
operations announced by the government.
This would lead to revenue losses of around 1 percent of
GDP in 2007, only partly compensated by a slowdown in
expenditure growth (1). For 2008, the convergence pro-
gramme update plans a sizeable reduction in the deficit
to 1.9 percent of GDP.
Table V.32
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Hungary (1) (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 5.4 – 6.1 – 6.7 – 7.0
- Total revenues 44.1 44.5 43.1 42.2
 Of which: - current taxes 25.4 24.8 23.8 23.4
- social contributions 13.6 14.1 13.8 13.1
- Total expenditure 49.5 50.6 49.8 49.2
 Of which: - collective consumption 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.2
- social transfers in kind 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.0
- social transfers other than in kind 14.1 14.8 15.4 15.3
- interest expenditure 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.7
- gross fixed capital formation 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.6
Primary balance – 1.2 – 2.3 – 3.0 – 3.3
Tax burden 39.0 38.9 37.7 36.6
One-off and temporary measures (3) 0.3 0.5 0.1 – 0.2
Structural balance (4) – 5.5 – 6.3 – 6.7 – 6.9
Structural primary balance – 1.3 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.2
Government gross debt 57.1 58.4 59.9 62.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.2
Convergence programme (5) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 5.4 – 6.1 – 4.7 – 3.3 – 1.9
Primary balance – 1.1 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.3 0.8
Structural balance (6) – 4.8 – 5.7 – 4.5 – 3.2 – 2.1
Government gross debt 57.2 57.7 58.4 57.9 56.2
Pm  Real GDP growth (%) 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1
(1) The budgetary projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classiﬁcation of funded pension schemes, which needs to be imple-
mented by the time of the spring 2007 notiﬁcation. Including this impact the general government balance would be – 6.6 % of GDP in 2004, – 7.5 % in 2005, – 8.2
in 2006, and – 8.6 % in 2007, while government gross debt would be 60.2 % of GDP in 2004, 62.4 % in 2005, 65.3 % in 2006, and 69 % in 2007.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(3) The planned PPP operations, included in the Commission services’ spring 2006 forecasts as expenditure-reducing (pending a Eurostat decision on the matter), are
not considered as one-off measures.
(4) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(5) Submitted in December 2005
(6) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.1 %
GDP in 2007, deﬁcit-reducing)
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Hungary
¥1∂ Under the adopted no-policy-change assumption, all expenditures except
interest outlays and social transfers other than in kind are assumed to
remain constant in real terms at 2006 levels.288
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Main measures in the budget for 2006, Hungary
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• 5 % cut in the upper level of VAT rate (-1 % of GDP)
• 2 % cut in the higher rate of personal income tax, an increase of the 
lower tax bracket by HUF 50 000, cancellation of some exemptions 
(-0.1 % of GDP)
• 100 % of local business tax deducible from corporate tax base, and 
a decrease of the rate of corporate tax to 10 % for micro companies 
(up to HUF 5 million annual revenue) (-0.1 of GDP)
• Abolition of the lump sum health insurance contribution (effective 
from 01/11/2006) (-0.05 % of GDP)
• Increase in registration and excise duties to partly compensate VAT 
revenues losses (+ 0.2 % of GDP)
• Introduction of luxury tax (property tax on real estate worth more 
than HUF 100 million) (negligible)
• 1 percentage point of GDP decrease in public investment 
expenditures
• 0.4 percentage point of GDP expected decline in interest 
expenditures
• setting an ‘emergency’ budget reserve against a possible departure 
from the 2006 target (0.3 % of GDP)
• unused appropriations frozen at their end-2005 level
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Hungary289
16. Malta
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit for 2005 is estimated at
3.3 percent of GDP, which is below the target of 3.7 per-
cent set out in the updated convergence programme sub-
mitted on 7 December 2004. This deviation is explained
by lower-than-planned expenditure of about 1 percentage
point which more than offset a shortfall of around â of a
percentage point in revenues. While the lower expenditure
was attributable to an improvement in the primary deficit,
the shortfall in revenues was mainly due to a lower yield
from social contributions. Relative to GDP, general gov-
ernment debt stood at slightly below 75 percent in 2005,
which is higher than the target of 72 percent set out in the
updated convergence programme. The difference is
mainly explained by the downward revision of the higher-
than-expected nominal GDP for 2005.
The 2006 budget was approved by the Maltese Parliament
on 18 November 2005. The main revenue-raising meas-
ures include a reform of taxes on the transfer of immova-
ble property, further tightening of rules to prevent tax
fraud and the sale of government property. On the expend-
iture side, measures include support to the main sectors of
the economy and others intended to mitigate the impact of
higher oil prices on public finances. On the revenue side,
the measures announced in the budget are projected to
lower the deficit ratio for 2006 by around â a percentage
point of GDP, while the remaining ä percentage point is
envisaged to be achieved from lower expenditure. The
Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects the
deficit to fall to slightly below 3 percent of GDP in 2006,
compared to the official budget target of around 2ã per-
cent presented in the latest update of the convergence
programme (1). The projected improvement in the deficit-
to-GDP ratio is a result of tax buoyancy mirroring the
domestically-led composition of growth and capital trans-
fers. In structural terms i.e. net of cyclical factors and one-
off and other temporary measures, the primary balance is
expected to improve to around 1 percent of GDP, from a
â percent of GDP in 2005.
On a no-policy change basis, which takes into account
the reduction in public investment linked with the Mater
Dei Hospital but excludes one-off revenue operations
(sale of land estimated at ã percent of GDP), the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects a
rebound in the general government deficit to almost
3ä percent of GDP in 2007. The latest updated of the
convergence programme foresees a general government
deficit target of around 2ä percent of GDP for 2007. For
2008, the programme projects a further improvement in
the deficit-to-GDP ratio to 1ä percent.
The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast projects
an improvement in the general government debt level for
2006 to 74 percent of GDP, from slightly below 75 per-
cent the previous year. In 2007, the debt ratio is projected
to remain unchanged. These projections do not take into
account possible privatisation proceeds planned by the
government (estimated at around 7 percent of GDP).
According to the latest updated of the convergence pro-
gramme the debt-to-GDP ratio is envisaged to decline
from around 76ã percent of GDP in 2005 to slightly
below 69 percent in 2007. The general government debt
target for 2008 is set at around 67ä percent of GDP.
From public to private: some considerations 
on privatisation in Malta
Similar to the experience observed in most countries, Malta
has been pursuing economic reforms with varying degrees
of intensity during the past years. Privatisation has occupied
an important place in this reform process, especially since
the late 1980s. Through privatisation, resources held-up by
the public are released to the private sector, potentially
enhancing economic efficiency. Moreover, by enabling
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.290
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subsidies and other transfers to public enterprises, privatisa-
tion can contribute to improve fiscal performance. Privati-
sation receipts may also be employed to reduce, or contain
the rise in, public debt with favourable consequences on the
budget through lower interest expenditure.
Public enterprises in Malta consist of public corporations
and state-owned enterprises (1) which operate in various
activities including energy, communications, banking,
transport and shipyards. Originally, the underlying
rationale behind State involvement was to bridge the gap
left by the failure of private operators to invest in activi-
ties which were essential to Malta’s development needs.
Most State-owned enterprises were therefore given a
statutory monopoly to operate which guaranteed a return
on their initial investment.
Privatisation in Malta has moved at varying speeds and
two distinct phases can be identified. In the first phase,
spanning the late 1980s to mid-1990s, government’s
objective was to sell off or liquidate a number of (small
mostly manufacturing) enterprises, while shares in other
public enterprises operating in services activities (bank-
ing and communications) were partly sold to the general
public.
Table V.34
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Malta (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 5.1 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 3.2
- Total revenues 43.4 44.2 42.4 40.2
 Of which: - current taxes 27.4 27.5 27.4 27.3
- social contributions 8.5 8.9 8.7 8.6
- Total expenditure 48.5 47.5 45.3 43.4
 Of which: - collective consumption 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.8
- social transfers in kind 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.3
- social transfers other than in kind 13.4 13.3 13.3 13.4
- interest expenditure 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7
- gross fixed capital formation 4.5 5.5 4.6 4.1
Primary balance – 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.5
Tax burden 34.6 35.4 35.1 35.0
One-off and temporary measures 0.7 1.0 1.0 0
Structural balance (2) – 4.6 – 3.4 – 3.2 – 2.6
Structural primary balance – 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.1
Government gross debt 76.2 74.7 74.0 74.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) – 1.5 2.5 1.7 1.9
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 5.1 – 3.9 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 1.2
Primary balance – 1.0 0.3 1.4 1.5 2.4
Structural balance (4) – 5.1 – 3.8 – 2.3 – 1.4 0.3
Government gross debt 76.7 76.7 70.8 68.9 67.3
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 2.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in January 2006.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.7 % of
GDP in 2004, 1.0 % in 2005, 1.0 % in 2006, 1.0 % in 2007, 0.1 % in 2008; all deﬁcit-reducing).
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Malta.
¥1∂ The difference between public corporations and State-owned enterprises is
that the former are established and governed by ad hoc legislation. More-
over, apart from being entirely government-owned, their financial esti-
mates are scrutinised each year by parliament whilst government has the
right to establish budgets or demand payments out of their profits. State-
owned enterprises, refer to entities set-up under the general company laws
and having at least 50 percent of the capital held by government. In their
case, government policy usually flows through board appointees. 291
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vatisation underwent a major shift of focus. High-quality
assets were now the main target, while the involvement
of strategic partners was being sought, thereby ensuring
that transactions transcend financial considerations.
Government’s stated objective of privatisation in the lat-
ter phase was directed to the enhancement of the econ-
omy’s long-term performance.
Privatisation since 1999 included public companies oper-
ating in the banking sector (1999) and airport and postal
services (2002). While the former sector was characterised
by a number of operators, airport and postal services oper-
ated in a monopolistic environment. Moreover, the bank-
ing sector has for a long time operated within a strong reg-
ulatory and legislative framework, while in the case of the
post office a regulator and new legislation were introduced
in 2003. Given its important spill-over effects over the
whole economy, an assessment of the banking sector’s per-
formance allows to apprehend the efficiency gains follow-
ing privatisation. In 1999, Mid-Med Bank, a major local
bank, was sold to an established international financial
player, in the process transforming the market in important
ways. In the aftermath of privatisation, the sector under-
went substantial restructuring as competition in the market
intensified and, spurred by the inward transfer of knowl-
edge, a number of innovative products and delivery chan-
nels were introduced by banks. Indeed, privatisation paid
off in terms of increased productivity and improved the
resilience of the sector. Following exceptional results in
2000, the profitability of the banking sector suffered a sub-
stantial drop in the subsequent year but increased steadily
thereafter regaining more than it had lost. In addition, after
increasing in the year following privatisation, private sec-
tor employment in the banking sector declined.
The second privatisation phase came amid deteriorat-
ing public finances. While privatisation proceeds do
not directly affect the government deficit, privatisation
may have two opposing effects on the government pri-
mary balance. To the extent that privatisation leads to
lower subsidies and other transfers to public enter-
prises, the primary balance should improve. On the
other hand, privatisation may lead to a reduction in
non-tax revenue as government will no longer receive
the dividends that used to be paid by public enterprises
out of their yearly profits. Historically, expenditure
flows from the budget to public enterprises (in the form
of subsidies and advances) have been substantially
larger than the contribution of the entities to the budget.
Since 1999, improvements in the government primary
balance-to-GDP ratio were generally concentrated in
the year when privatisation took place but deteriorated
thereafter which seems to suggest that privatisation had
a marginal impact on current budgetary operations.
One explanation for this is that the privatised compa-
nies were profitable and as a result the net effect was a
reduction in government revenues. This may however
change in the subsequent years as the privatised com-
panies restructure and grow thereby increasing their
contribution to tax revenues. It should however be
underlined that the aspect of improving budgetary out-
comes in the case of Malta is being addressed through
restructuring and by reducing transfers and subsidies to
inefficient public entities.
In conclusion, it appears that, in the case of Malta, pri-
vatisation has been more conducive to achieving the
stated objective of enhancing efficiency than in support-
ing fiscal performance. In terms of factors such as serv-
ice expansion and operating efficiency, a marked
improvement after privatisation has been registered, at
least in the case of the banking sector. The extent to
which privatisation resulted in better budgetary out-
comes was limited, although the proceeds derived from
the sale of assets contained the growth in debt.
Table V.35
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Malta
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Prevention against tax fraud (0.2 % of GDP)
• Sale of land (1 % of GDP)
• Reform of taxes on the transfer of immovable property 
• Support to economic sectors (0.6 % of GDP)
• Water & electricity surcharge
• Reform in student maintenance grant
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and update convergence programme of Malta.292
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17. Netherlands
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit in 2005 was 0.3 per-
cent of GDP. The official target for the deficit, as indi-
cated in the December 2005 update of the stability
programme (1), was 2.6 percent of GDP. The much
better outturn is almost entirely located at the central
government level, which recorded to a 0.1 percent sur-
plus in 2005 instead of a targeted deficit of 2.2 per-
cent. Remarkably, despite the fact that economic
growth turned out somewhat lower than expected, the
better outcome is largely the result of higher revenues,
with total taxes (excluding gas related revenues) and
social contributions turning out 1.4 percent of GDP
higher than projected. Additional items are higher gas
receipts, as well as lower deficits of local govern-
ments. An upward revision in the GDP series also
contributed to reduce the deficit ratio. These addi-
tional factors explain 0.9 percent of GDP. The debt
ratio increased in 2005 by 0.3 percent points to
52.9 percent of GDP. One factor explaining this
increase was the purchase of the company in charge of
gas transport, a financial transaction that amounted to
0.6 percent of GDP. In the previous update of the sta-
bility programme, the debt ratio was expected to turn
out much higher, at 58.1 percent of GDP. The differ-
ence is due to the upward revision of GDP as well as
the lower deficit.
The budget for 2006 was presented on 20 September
2005 and adopted on 6 October 2005. It targeted a gen-
eral government deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP. The main
thrust of the budget is the intention to use the budgetary
leeway created by the recent years’ policies to increase
expenditures and reduce the tax burden, for a total
amount of 0.3 percent of GDP. In the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2006 forecast, the budget deficit for 2006 is
expected to turn out better, at 1.2 percent of GDP, as
higher oil and gas prices lead to higher revenues and
2005 data have created a better starting position.
In the Spring note on budgetary implementation,
adopted by government on 12 May, the target for 2006
has been revised to a deficit of 1.0 percent, due to higher
outturns of tax revenues and social premiums in the first
months. The Spring note specifies some supplementary
measures that aim to support purchasing power and
counteract the negative financial consequences the
healthcare reform has had for specific social groups.
Based on the spring forecast, the fiscal stance in 2006 as
measured by the change in the structural balance (i.e. the
cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-offs) is expan-
sionary. The structural balance is forecast to deteriorate
from a surplus of 1 percent of GDP in 2005 to a deficit
of some ä percent of GDP in 2006, as the better-than-
expected tax receipts in 2005 will not be fully retained in
2006 and expenditure ceilings are forecast to again be
fully utilised. Out of this 1ä percentage points deteriora-
tion, half a percentage point is connected to the advanc-
ing of profit taxes by companies that took advantage of
above-market interest rates in 2005 on taxes to be
refunded. On the basis of the data in the stability pro-
gramme, the Commission services’ recalculations
showed a much smaller deterioration of the structural
balance in 2006, of 0.7 percentage point of GDP. The
main reason why the deterioration in 2006 is now esti-
mated to be significantly larger is the better budgetary
outcome in 2005, which resulted in an upward revision
of the structural balance in 2005 vis-à-vis the previous
estimate.
In the Commission’ services spring 2006 forecast,
based on the assumption of no-policy change, the gen-
eral government deficit is expected to improve in 2007
to 0.7 percent of GDP on the back of strong economic
growth. This forecast is 0.5 percent of GDP better than
the target set in the last update of the stability pro-
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.294
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2005 and 2006), mainly because of the improved start-
ing position. Further factors include lower interest
expenditure, as well as gas revenues that are likely to
turn out higher because of the increase in oil and gas
prices. Furthermore, in line with a slightly higher eco-
nomic growth, tax receipts are also expected to turn out
above plans in the stability programme. For 2008, the
stability programme foresees a small improvement in
the general government deficit from the projected
1.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 1.1 percent of GDP.
The public debt ratio is expected to fall in 2006 to
51.2 percent of GDP and to decrease further to 50.3 per-
cent of GDP in 2007, mainly because of strong nominal
GDP growth in both years.
Table V.36
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, The Netherlands (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 1.9 – 0.3 – 1.2 – 0.7
- Total revenues 44.5 45.4 46.5 46.4
 Of which: - current taxes 23.0 24.4 23.7 23.7
- social contributions 15.0 14.3 15.7 15.4
- Total expenditure 46.4 45.7 47.7 47.1
 Of which: - collective consumption 10.6 10.4 10.2 10.1
- social transfers in kind 13.7 13.6 15.3 15.2
- social transfers other than in kind 11.5 11.2 11.7 11.4
- interest expenditure 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3
- gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
Primary balance 0.7 2.3 1.2 1.6
Tax burden 37.8 38.5 38.8 38.6
One-off and temporary measures 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 1.4 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.2
Structural primary balance 1.2 3.5 2.3 2.4
Government gross debt 52.6 52.9 51.2 50.3
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.7 1.1 2.6 2.6
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance (4) – 2.1 (– 1.9) – 1.2 (– 0.3) – 1.5 (– 1.0) – 1.2 – 1.1
Primary balance 0.6 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.5
Structural balance (5) – 1.3 0.0 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.6
Government gross debt 53.1 54.4 54.5 53.9 53.1
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.7 3/4 21/2 21/2 21/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Figures for 2004 and 2005 have been revised in the most recent April notiﬁcation. The 2006 target has been revised in the Spring note on budgetary imple-
mentation 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. There are no one-off or other temporary measures in the programme.
Source: Commission services, stability programme of the Netherlands, April notification, Spring note on budgetary implementation 2006.295
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Main measures in the budget for 2006, The Netherlands
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increasing the number of students &
Abolishing tuition fees for 16 &17 year olds 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Reductions in environmental levies (3)
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Security & infectious diseases preparation 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Investment in infrastructure (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) This partly reﬂects measures that are not in the budget for 2006 but were speciﬁed in the Spring note.
Source: Commission services, Miljoenennota 2006, Spring note on budgetary implementation, 12 May 2006.296
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit amounted to
1.5 percent of GDP, which was 0.4 percentage point
lower than the government’s initial expectation, pre-
sented in the update of the stability programme submit-
ted in November 2004. The budget was affected by the
second step of the tax reform started one year earlier,
which ex ante was expected to burden the budget in 2005
by 0.8 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, tax revenue turned
out to be higher than anticipated, mainly owing to higher
proceeds from VAT and corporate tax. At the same time,
the planned expenditure was also exceeded (e.g. on edu-
cation and family benefits), though by a smaller margin.
The debt-to-GDP ratio went down by almost ã percent-
age point to 62.9 percent, somewhat bigger improvement
than planned in the previous update.
The budget for 2006 was prepared together with the
2005 budget, but for formal reasons it was only adopted
on 7 April 2005. As in the two previous years, the 2006
budget will bear the consequences of the 2004/2005 tax
reform, which according to the Ministry of Finance is to
result in a 1.4 percent of GDP revenue loss. The cost
could turn out even higher as the loss not fully realised
in 2005 might be deferred to 2006. One of the question
marks on the revenue side is the impact of the recently
introduced comprehensive taxation of holding compa-
nies (Gruppenbesteuerung), which is difficult to forecast
and could diminish tax revenues by more than the
planned EUR 100 million (0.04 percent of GDP). The
budget will be additionally burdened with the cost of the
regional employment and growth initiative of August
2005 and a package of measures aimed at combating
youth unemployment and helping women re-enter the
job market that the government adopted in September
2005 (about 0.16 percent of GDP in total). On the other
hand, implementation of the second stage of the admin-
istrative reform, agreed on by the different levels of gov-
ernment in November 2005, should result in expenditure
savings of around 0.1 percent of GDP. According to the
most recent update of the stability programme, submit-
ted in November 2005, the general government deficit
will amount to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2006. This is
0.2 percentage point lower than the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2006 forecast. The difference is mainly due
to the government’s more optimistic predictions as to
revenue from direct taxes. In addition, the 2006 (as well
as 2007) outturn could be negatively affected by an up to
EUR 900 million (0.36 percent of GDP) state guarantee,
valid till 1 July 2007, given to BAWAG (Austria’s
fourth-largest bank, currently in financial distress).
However, at the moment it is rather unlikely that the
guarantee will be called. The fiscal stance in 2006 is
expected to be expansionary, as the structural primary
surplus goes down by some ã percentage point of GDP
according the spring forecast, while the stability pro-
gramme projected an improvement. This is explained by
(i) the base effect of a more favourable outturn in 2005,
(ii) the slightly higher 2006 deficit predicted by Com-
mission services and (iii) a substantial upward revision
of GDP growth compared to the stability programme.
In 2007, on a no-policy-change assumption, the Com-
mission services expect that the deficit will decline to
1.4 percent of GDP, which is considerably higher than
the 0.8 percent of GDP target presented in the latest
update of the stability programme. The latter foresees a
balanced budget for 2008.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall from 62.4 per-
cent in 2006 to 61.6 percent in 2007.
Reform of the budgetary law
Following international examples of best practice, the
Austrian authorities started preparing a reform package
which aims at creating a modern, objective-driven budg-
etary law. In practical terms, a draft constitutional
amendment has been put together which would consti-297
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additional legal steps would be elaborated. The planned
reform would only concern the federal government and
not the sub-national governments. Solely the expendi-
ture side would be affected by the reform.
The first element of the envisaged budgetary legislation
reform package is the introduction of a medium term
budgetary framework. According to the new rules, the
Parliament will be obliged to adopt a four-year plan con-
cerning expenditure limits in the main budgetary catego-
ries (such as justice and security, education, research and
culture, etc.) and then roll it forward by one year every
spring. Expenditure ceilings will be divided into fixed
and flexible ones. The latter will concern areas that are
significantly affected by cyclical fluctuations such as
unemployment benefits, pensions, family transfers, etc.
Such a law would give a national dimension to multi-
annual budgetary planning, which at the moment is
mainly driven by the requirements of the European Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. The initial plan was for the new
law to come into force on 1 January 2007.
The other part of the package is the idea to change the
budgetary law so that it would be driven by outputs and
not inputs as is currently the case. According to the pro-
posed amendments, economic stability and sustainabil-
ity of public finances should be an over-arching goal of
budgetary policy. Performance budgeting, transparency,
efficiency and accurate presentation of the financial sit-
uation by the federal government shall be guiding prin-
ciples in the budgetary process. The provisions concern-
Table V.38
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Austria (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.9 – 1.4
- Total revenues 48.8 48.0 46.6 46.8
 Of which: - current taxes 27.8 27.1 25.8 26.2
- social contributions 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.9
- Total expenditure 49.9 49.5 48.6 48.2
 Of which: - collective consumption 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.7
- social transfers in kind 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1
- social transfers other than in kind 18.9 18.7 18.5 18.5
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6
- gross fixed capital formation 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Primary balance 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.3
Tax burden 42.7 41.9 40.6 40.9
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 0.8 – 1.0 – 1.7 – 1.2
Structural primary balance 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.4
Government gross debt 63.6 62.9 62.4 61.6
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.2
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 1.0 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.0
Primary balance 2.1 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.7
Structural balance (4) – 0.9 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.2
Government gross debt 63.6 63.4 63.1 61.6 59.5
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in November 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Austria.298
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on 1 January 2011.
According to the Austrian authorities’ estimate, once
implemented the reform could contribute to expenditure
reduction in the range of 5 percent of the federal govern-
ment budget expenditure.
However, while the principle of such reform is uncontro-
versial, the original schedule for its adoption has not
been respected. Initially all the political parties repre-
sented in the Parliament had agreed to adopt the new law
before summer 2005. Then, for political reasons, this
decision was reversed. Later on the political parties were
debating for a long time which parliamentary committee
should handle the issue. Finally a compromise was
found, but first discussion in the parliamentary commit-
tees planned for the beginning of May 2006 has been
postponed. Therefore, it seems less and less likely that
the first element of the reform package — the medium
term budgetary framework — will come into force on
1 January 2007 as initially planned.
Table V.39
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Austria
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• The 2004/2005 tax reform (-1.4 % of GDP) • Package of measures aimed at reducing unemployment and 
regional employment and growth initiative (0.2 % of GDP)
• The second stage of the administrative reform (-0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Austrian Ministry of Finance.299
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit was 2.5 percent
of GDP, compared to 3.9 percent targeted in the Decem-
ber 2004 convergence programme. This significant dif-
ference is mainly due to one-off factors: a new formula
transforming cash data into accrual data, an upward revi-
sion of GDP by the statistical office and lower absorp-
tion of EU funds, which resulted in lower investment
expenditure. In addition, the record-high corporate prof-
its resulted in a large increase of corporate income tax
revenues. Nevertheless, the debt ratio increased to
42.5 percent of GDP in 2005, as targeted in the conver-
gence programme which points to higher-than-expected
negative stock-flow adjustment.
The amended 2006 budget was adopted on 1 February
2006. The new government had decided to increase
social expenditure by almost 0.1 percent of GDP. The
Parliament adopted additional social expenditure and
subsidies by over 0.1 percent of GDP. As a result, the
Ministry of Finance revised its target for general govern-
ment deficit from 2.6 percent of GDP (presented in Jan-
uary 2006 convergence programme) (1) to 2.8 percent
(April 2006 fiscal notification). According to the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast, the general gov-
ernment deficit will reach 3 percent of GDP. This fore-
cast reflects the high uncertainty concerning the
execution of the 2006 budget. Furthermore, the projected
acceleration of GDP growth, revenues from indirect
taxes are likely to be lower than in the rather very opti-
mistic outlook presented in the budget. Numerous
expenditure-increasing initiatives have already been pre-
sented in the coalition agreement which was signed in
April 2006. The expected fiscal stance is expansionary
as the structural primary balance will deteriorate by
0.5 percent of GDP, more than implied by the figures
presented in the January 2006 convergence programme.
Based on the no-policy-change assumption, the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast expects the gen-
eral government deficit to stabilise at 3 percent of GDP
in 2007, against the background of slightly accelerating
economic growth. This projection contrasts with the
consolidation path set out in the January 2006 Conver-
gence Programme which targeted a deficit of 2.2 percent
of GDP in 2007 (and 1.9 percent of GDP in 2008). The
Commission services’ forecast includes the revenue-
reducing reforms in social contributions, personal
income tax and value added tax announced on 31 March
2006. In particular, the cuts in contributions to the disa-
bility and sickness funds (estimated at more than 0.6 per-
cent of GDP), pro-family tax reliefs and the indexation
of brackets of personal income tax (overall estimated at
about 0.4 percent of GDP) will weigh on the 2007
budget. The revenue losses are expected to be partially
offset by increased revenues from higher excise duties
on fuel and cigarettes and the removal of private con-
struction and renovation tax reliefs (about 0.6 percent of
GDP together).
The Commission services project the debt-to-GDP ratio
to increase by more than 4 percentage points between
2005 and 2007, reaching 46.7 percent of GDP in 2007.
The large increase of the ratio in 2006 (3 percentage
points) is largely due to stock-flow adjustment, distrib-
uted equally across net accumulation of financial assets,
valuation effects and the difference between cash and
accrual balance.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.300
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Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Poland (1) (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.9 – 2.5 – 3.0 – 3.0
- Total revenues 38.6 40.8 41.6 40.7
 Of which: - current taxes 19.2 20.9 21.4 21.9
- social contributions 13.4 13.8 14.2 13.6
- Total expenditure 42.5 43.3 44.6 43.7
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.2 8.7 8.0 7.9
- social transfers in kind 9.7 10.0 9.5 9.3
- social transfers other than in kind 16.1 15.9 16.3 15.8
- interest expenditure 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.6
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.1 4.0 4.1
Primary balance – 1.3 – 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4
Tax burden 32.7 34.8 35.6 35.5
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) – 4.2 – 2.6 – 3.3 – 3.5
Structural primary balance – 1.6 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.9
Government gross debt 41.9 42.5 45.5 46.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.3 3.2 4.5 4.6
Convergence programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 3.8 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 1.9
Primary balance – 1.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.3 0.6
Structural balance (5) – 4.1 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 2.1
Government gross debt 41.9 42.5 45.0 45.3 45.4
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.3 3.3 4.3 4.6 5.0
(1) The budgetary projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classiﬁcation of funded pension schemes, which needs to be imple-
mented by the time of the spring 2007 notiﬁcation. Including this impact the general government balance according to the updated convergence programme would
be 1.8 % of GDP in 2004, 4.7 % in 2005, 4.6 % in 2006, 4.1 % in 2007 and 3.7 % in 2008, while government gross debt would be 45.9 % of GDP in 2004, 47.9 %
in 2005, 51.2 % in 2006, 52.1 % in 2007 and 52.6 % in 2008.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Poland.
Table V.41
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Poland
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Retroactive indexation of personal income tax brackets (3) 
(– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increased social expenditure (child benefits, longer paid maternity 
leaves, children nutrition) and subsidies to fuel in agriculture 
(0.2 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) Proposed by the Ministry of Finance on 31 March 2001.
Source: Commission services, amended 2006 budget bill and the proposals of changes in taxes and social contributions announced by the Ministry of Finance 
on 31 March 2001.301
20. Portugal
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2005, the general government deficit amounted to
6 percent of GDP. This outturn compares with a target
deficit of 2.8 percent of GDP set in the December 2004
update of the stability programme and with a target of
6.2 percent of GDP presented in the June 2005 update of
the stability programme of Portugal (1). The latter
revealed a substantial change in the budgetary strategy
of the Portuguese authorities as decided in the aftermath
of the general elections and a new government taking
office in March 2005. The sharp rise in the government
deficit in 2005 was largely due to the government deci-
sion of no longer implementing sizeable deficit-reducing
one-off measures and a considerable upward revision of
government expenditure growth (2). In 2005, govern-
ment debt continued on an upward trend, reaching
63.9 percent of GDP.
The budget for 2006 was adopted on 30 November 2005,
with a target of 4.6 percent of GDP for the 2006 general
government deficit is, which has been confirmed in the
December 2005 stability programme update (3). The
planned deficit reduction vis-à-vis the 2005 outturn is
based on measures raising the tax burden and curbing
primary expenditure growth. According to the budget,
some two-thirds of the fiscal adjustment relies on addi-
tional revenues and the rest on expenditure restraint as
the result of various corrective measures that have been
introduced since mid-2005. The most sizeable discre-
tionary measures supporting the 2006 fiscal target are
the hike in the VAT standard rate from 19 to 21 percent,
changes to health and pensions schemes, in particular for
government employees, and changes in the public
administration functioning. The Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast projects a deficit of 5 percent of
GDP, with the difference vis-à-vis the official deficit tar-
get being essentially due to a less benign assessment of
current expenditure growth. In 2006, the fiscal stance, as
measured by the change in the structural balance, i.e. the
budget balance net of one-off and other temporary meas-
ures, is expected to be restrictive: the Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2006 forecast projects a reduction of the
structural deficit by slightly over 1 percent of GDP. This
is somewhat less than the expected improvement of
1â percent of GDP in the December 2005 stability pro-
gramme. In both cases, the improvement in the structural
primary balance will be marginally better.
For 2007, under the customary no-policy change
assumption, the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast projects the general government deficit to remain
broadly unchanged at 4.9 percent of GDP. This repre-
sents the persistence of large fiscal imbalances amidst a
continued expansion of expenditure against a backdrop
of weak economic growth. At the same time, the budget-
ary impact of public-private partnerships established in
previous years will be felt more clearly as from 2007.
The 2007 government deficit target in the December
2005 update of the stability programme is 3.7 percent of
GDP, with the improvement compared with 2006 owing
to a slightly higher tax burden and a more substantial
expenditure restraint.
The difference between the official target and the Com-
mission services’ spring 2006 forecast is largely due to
the latter being based on a no-policy-change assumption,
but also being more sceptical on the dynamism of social
transfers being contained.
Beyond 2007, the December 2005 stability programme
projects the general government balance to decline
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ Compared with the June 2005 programme, the nominal general govern-
ment balances have ‘mechanically’ been revised down by some ä percent-
age point of GDP entirely due to significant upward revisions of the GDP
series.
¥3∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.302
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1â percent of GDP in 2009, mainly helped by expendi-
ture restraint.
In all, the stability programme reveals an ambitious fis-
cal consolidation strategy which has to be underpinned
by a thorough implementation of a broad range of effec-
tive corrective measures.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, the government debt ratio is projected to be
68.4 percent of GDP in 2006 and 70.6 percent of GDP in
2007. In all, it represents the continuation of the upward
trend which has been rooted in high primary deficits, low
nominal GDP growth and sizeable debt-increasing
stock-flow adjustments. The December update of the
stability programme projects the debt ratio to peak at
slightly over 69 percent of GDP in 2007 and to decline
thereafter to just above 66 percent of GDP in 2009.
According to the programme, the drivers of the declining
debt ratio in those years will be the return to primary sur-
pluses, the acceleration of nominal GDP growth and the
end of stock-flow adjustments, helped also by privatisa-
tion proceeds.
Table V.42
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Portugal (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.2 – 6.0 – 5.0 – 4.9
- Total revenues 43.2 41.8 43.0 43.1
 Of which: - current taxes 23.0 23.9 24.9 25.2
- social contributions 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.3
- Total expenditure 46.4 47.8 48.0 48.0
 Of which: - final government consumption 20.6 21.1 20.9 20.8
- social transfers other than in kind 14.2 14.8 15.3 15.5
- interest expenditure 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.1
- gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.8
Primary balance – 0.5 – 3.3 – 2.1 – 1.8
Tax burden 34.5 35.4 36.3 36.6
One-off and temporary measures 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Structural balance (2) – 4.8 – 5.2 – 4.1 – 3.9
Structural primary balance – 2.2 – 2.5 – 1.2 – 0.8
Government gross debt 58.7 63.9 68.4 70.6
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.1 0.3 0.9 1.1
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.0 – 6.0 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 1.5
Primary balance – 0.3 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 0.6 1.5
Structural balance (4) n.a. – 5.0 – 3.4 – 2.6 – 1.8 – 1.2
Government gross debt 59.4 65.5 68.7 69.3 68.4 66.2
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.2 0.5 1.1 1.8 2.4 3.0
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. There are no one-offs and other temporary measures in the programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Portugal.303
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Main measures in the budget for 2006, Portugal
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures
• Increase in excise taxes on petrol and tobacco products 
(+ 0.15 % and + 0.1 % of GDP, respectively).
• Creation of an additional personal income tax bracket for incomes 
over EUR 60 000/year with a marginal tax rate of 42 % (present top 
rate at 40 %); and lower allowances for income from pensions.
• Increase in the VAT standard rate from 19 to 21 % (+ 0.5 % of GDP; 
NB: implemented in July 2005 will have its full effect in 2006 for the 
first time).
• Freeze of nominal transfers to regional and local governments from 
central government, and of local government compensation of 
employees at their 2005 nominal level. At the same time, the debt 
of regional and local governments cannot exceed its end-2005 level.
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
Source: Commission services, 2006 budget, and December 2005 stability programme update.304
21. Slovenia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit declined to 1.8 percent of
GDP in 2005, by 0.3 of a percentage point more than tar-
geted in the January 2005 update of the convergence pro-
gramme. The outcome was in line with the supplementary
budget, adopted in June 2005, following the upward revi-
sion of revenue projections as well as the upward realign-
ment of expenditures according to the priorities of the new
government. The revenues came in higher than expected
as the tax collection based on the new personal and corpo-
rate income tax regimes, effective since 1 January 2005,
had been underestimated. At the same time, higher indi-
rect taxes compensated the loss on the excise duties,
incurred after the unexpected oil price hikes had prompted
the government to lower the rate of excise taxes on oil to
the minimum level allowed so as to contain inflationary
pressures. General government expenditure increased less
than anticipated against a backdrop of restrictive employ-
ment and wage policies in the public sector and rationali-
sation of government goods and services purchases. Like
in 2004, the deficit reduction was facilitated by favourable
cyclical conditions as the negative output gap is slowly
closing. At the end of 2005, the general government debt
accounted for about 29 percent of GDP.
Due to the October 2004 parliamentary elections, the 2006
budget could not be adopted in 2004, compliant with the
budgetary procedure of simultaneously presenting two
consequent budgets on a rolling basis. The parliament
passed the initial Budget Bill and the accompanying
Budget Implementation Act for 2006 together with a 2007
budget only on 12 December 2005. In 2006, the deficit
ratio is projected to remain unchanged compared with the
previous year against the background of counteracting
revenue and expenditure measures. On the revenue side,
the modifications mainly concern further simplification of
the direct tax regime following adjustments to the per-
sonal income tax and corporate income tax, as adopted at
the end of November 2005 and in force from 1 January
2006. Furthermore, in the framework of a gradual elimi-
nation of the payroll tax by 2009 its rate is lowered by
20 percent. On the expenditure side, cost effectiveness
and flexibility will continue to be pursued through meas-
ures related to restrictive employment and wage policies
in the public sector. However, the decision to index pen-
sions to wages will keep the share of mandatory spending
well above 80 percent of total outlays. As the effects of the
anticipated structural reforms and the relevant features of
the EU financial perspectives 2007-2013 have not yet
been included in the budget, the bill is expected to be
amended. According to the second update of the conver-
gence programme (1), submitted in December 2005, the
target for the general government deficit was 1.7 percent
of GDP but became 1.8 percent with the April 2006 EDP
notification, which is broadly in line with the Commission
services’ spring 2006 forecast of 1.9 percent of GDP.
Based on the limited policy efforts on the side of expend-
iture, the projections imply some fiscal loosening in 2006.
The Commission services spring 2006 forecasts anticipate
the primary structural balance to turn negative this year.
The broadly positive economic trends are expected to
endure in 2007. However, the Commission services fore-
cast that the general government deficit would improve
only slightly, to 1.6 percent of GDP, against the commit-
ment of the new government to gradually abolish the
payroll tax.
Following the no-policy change assumption, this fore-
cast does not include the effect of a possible increase in
the VAT rates to offset the loss in revenue due to the
phasing out of the payroll tax. The updated conver-
gence programme of December 2005 envisaged a
steady fiscal consolidation in the period 2005-2008,
with the general government deficit projected to
decrease from 1.7 percent to 1 percent of GDP.
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.305
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measures, leading to a drop in the share of revenue as
a percentage of GDP by 1.8 percentage points, and
measures on the expenditure side, resulting in a
decline in the expenditure ratio by 2.5 percentage
points of GDP.
The Commission services spring 2006 forecast projects
the general government debt to stay below 30 percent in
2006-2007. However, the Commission services’ projec-
tion of an explosive path of the debt ratio beyond 2020
puts Slovenia at a high risk as regards the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances. 
Table V.44
Budgetary developments 2004-2007, Slovenia (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.6
- Total revenues 45.3 45.5 45.5 45.3
 Of which: - current taxes 24.7 24.8 25.0 25.0
- social contributions 15.0 15.2 15.0 14.8
- Total expenditure 47.6 47.3 47.3 47.0
 Of which: - collective consumption 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.5
- social transfers in kind 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.6
- social transfers other than in kind 16.9 16.9 16.8 16.9
- interest expenditure 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4
- gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3
Primary balance – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2
Tax burden 39.7 39.8 39.8 39.6
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Structural balance (2) – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.7
Structural primary balance 0.0 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.3
Government gross debt 29.5 29.1 29.9 29.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.1
Convergence programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 1.4 – 1.0
Primary balance – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.2
Structural balance (4) – 1.4 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 1.0
Government gross debt 29.5 29.0 29.6 29.8 29.4
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in December 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme. 
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Slovenia.
Table V.45
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Slovenia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Lowering the rate of payroll tax by 20 % (– 0.3 % of GDP)
• Simplification of the personal income tax (0.1 % of GDP)
• Simplification of the corporate income tax (0.2 % of GDP)
• Indexation of pensions to wages (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and the 2006 Budget Bill.306
22. Slovakia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit for 2005 amounted to
2.9 percent of GDP which is 0.5 percentage point below
the deficit target presented in the 2005 budget. Tax reve-
nues were 1 percent of GDP and overall public revenues
even 1.2 percent of GDP higher than foreseen in the
budget, mostly due to higher-than-expected economic
growth. However, two unplanned one-off/temporary
effects (penalty to the national oil refinery company for
abusing a monopoly position and accumulation of stocks
of cigarettes and alcohol at the end of 2005 resulting in
extra VAT and excise duties) account for 0.4 percentage
points of the additional revenues. Moreover, interest
expenditure was 0.5 percent of GDP lower than planned,
while expenditures amounting to 0.8 percent of GDP were
deferred into 2006. These positive developments were
partly outweighed by deficit increasing debt cancellations
of 0.9 percent of GDP and some other smaller expenditure
increases amounting to 1.1 percent of GDP which were
not foreseen in the 2005 budget. Gross public debt
decreased sharply to around 34â percent of GDP in 2005
as a part of the privatisation revenues from previous years
has been used to pay-off some of the country’s debt.
The 2006 budget was approved by parliament on
13 December 2005. The budget targets a nominal gen-
eral government deficit of 2.9 percent of GDP. Planned
increases in public expenditure largely offset favourable
revenue growth as well as declining interest payments,
preventing a more significant fiscal consolidation. Major
spending increases are planned in the area of education,
environmental protection, research and development
(i.e. the priority areas identified in the National Reform
Programme) while only modest increases are foreseen
for public transport, justice and interior affairs. On the
revenue side, the main measures consist in restrictions
on child tax allowances and increases in taxes on ciga-
rettes and alcohol as well as some administrative fees.
However, the accumulation of stocks of cigarettes and
alcohol at the end of 2005 which was not anticipated in
the budget could have a deficit increasing impact of
some 0.3 percent of GDP due to lower than expected
imports and sales of these goods in the first half of
2006. The Commission services’ spring 2006 forecast
expects the 2006 deficit at 2.7 percent of GDP as it
anticipates higher GDP and employment growth and
lower interest expenditure than the 2006 budget.
Expenditure increases in the election year are projected
to result in an expansionary fiscal stance with the struc-
tural primary balance deteriorating from 0.1 percent of
GDP in 2005 to – 0.6 percent of GDP in 2006.
Under the customary no-policy-change assumption, the
general government deficit net of the pension reform cost
is expected to fall to around 2 percent of GDP in 2007 as
a result of accelerating growth. The December 2005 con-
vergence programme (1) foresees the general government
deficit net of the pension reform cost at 1.6 percent and
1.3 percent of GDP in 2007 and 2008 respectively.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast the debt ratio is projected to slightly increase over the
forecast period, but should remain below 40 percent of
GDP. Moreover, anticipated significant privatisation rev-
enues in 2006 create room for further debt reductions.
Evaluation of the introduction of the flat tax 
rate in Slovakia
In 2004 Slovakia introduced a comprehensive tax reform
which consisted of 5 key measures: (2)
(1) The introduction of a flat tax rate of 19 percent on per-
sonal and corporate income. As there still is a level of
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ Supplementary measures included:
(1) An increase in consumption taxes slightly above the minimum levels
required by the EU;
(2) An increase in the level of the tax-free personal income;
(3) The introduction of child tax bonuses.307
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some extent progressive. Before, the corporate tax
rate was 25 percent and the personal income tax rates
ranged from 10 percent to 38 percent;
(2) The harmonisation of the VAT rates at 19 percent,
from 2 rates before, namely 20 percent and 14 percent;
(3) The cancellation of the tax on dividends;
(4) The abolition of inheritance and gift taxes as well as
of taxes on transfers of property estates;
(5) The elimination of almost all tax exemptions, deduc-
tions and special tax regimes.
The reform decreased direct taxes while it increased
indirect taxes. When preparing the 2004 budget the Min-
istry of Finance overestimated the loss in direct taxes and
the gain in indirect taxes. As shown in Table V.46, the
direct tax revenues in 2004 were lower than in the
absence of any reform, but they turned out to be higher
than foreseen. The opposite result applies to indirect
taxes. All in all, and in line with expectations, the tax
reform was not revenue neutral as it led to a revenue
shortfall of 0.5 percent of GDP.
Overall tax revenues in 2004 were actually 0.5 percent of
GDP higher than foreseen in the budget but as nominal
GDP also ended up 2.5 percent higher than anticipated
the tax revenues share of GDP turned out to be broadly
in line with the budget. The Financial Policy Institute of
the Slovak Ministry of Finance attributes the differences
between actual and expected tax revenues to five factors.
Table V.46
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Slovakia (1) (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.1
- Total revenues 35.9 33.9 33.0 32.5
 Of which: - current taxes 18.3 18.3 17.7 17.7
- social contributions 12.1 11.1 10.8 10.5
- Total expenditure 38.9 36.8 35.7 34.6
 Of which: - collective consumption 12.4 10.4 9.8 9.4
- social transfers in kind 7.5 8.3 8.2 8.1
- social transfers other than in kind 10.2 10.7 10.0 9.5
- interest expenditure 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.7
- gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.5
Primary balance – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.4
Tax burden 30.4 29.6 28.9 28.5
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 – 0.8 0.0 0.1
Structural balance (3) – 2.3 – 1.6 – 2.4 – 2.2
Structural primary balance – 0.1 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.5
Government gross debt 41.6 34.5 34.3 34.7
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 6.0 6.1 6.5
Convergence programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance – 3.2 – 4.1 – 2.9 – 1.6 – 1.3
Primary balance – 1.0 – 2.3 – 1.0 0.4 0.7
Structural balance (5) – 2.6 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 1.7 – 1.5
Government gross debt 42.6 33.7 35.5 35.2 36.2
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 5.1 5.4 6.1 5.6
(1) The general government balance projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classiﬁcation of funded pension schemes, which
needs to be implemented by the time of the spring 2007 notiﬁcation. Including this impact the general government balance according to the updated convergence
programme would be -3.2 % of GDP in 2004, -4.9 % in 2005, -4.2 % in 2006, -3.0 % in 2007 and -2.7 % in 2009.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2005.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.0 % of
GDP in 2004, -0.8 % in 2005, 0.0 % in 2006, 0.1 % in 2007, 0.0 % in 2008). 
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Slovakia.308
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the difference between actual and planned revenues. A
higher-than-expected wage growth more than compensated
for a slower employment growth and thus led to an increase
in income tax revenues. Similarly, a higher household con-
sumption growth had a positive impact on VAT revenues.
Second, taxes, not directly connected to the reform, contrib-
uted positively as local taxes, set independently by munici-
palities, increased, while property taxes were positively
affected by the deferred payments from the previous years.
Thirdly, the largest negative effect was due to a fall-out
in VAT revenues. The growth of VAT revenues dropped
suddenly after the entry of Slovakia into the EU on May
1, 2004, although household consumption grew stronger
in 2004 than in 2003. This fall in VAT revenues is attrib-
uted to the adjustment to a new tax collection system.
Fourth, the advanced payment of taxes on dividends
anticipated in the 2004 budget did not take place.
Finally, there are some residual factors which are diffi-
cult to quantify. They include effects like a higher will-
ingness to pay taxes induced by the reform and an
increase in the tax base resulting from the elimination of
the majority of tax exemptions, deductions and special
tax regimes. The size of this category is estimated at
some 1 percent of GDP.
It is still too early to analyse the macroeconomic impact
of the reform. Although, the short term fiscal impact of
the tax reform was negative (Table V.48. Impact of the
tax reform on public finance, preliminary results for
2004) it is expected to have a positive effect over the
longer run as the reformed system should stimulate both
work and investment and thus growth.   
Table V.47
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Slovakia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increases in consumption taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and in 
some administration fees (0.13 % of GDP)
• Increased child tax bonus (– 0.09 % of GDP)
• Abolition of child social contribution bonus (0.09 % of GDP)
• Increased expenditure on education (0.27 % of GDP)
• Increased expenditure on defence (0.16 % of GDP)
• Increased State aid to FDIs (0.12 % of GDP)
• Increases in heath expenditure (0.12 % of GDP)
• Increased agriculture subsidies (0.12 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services and the Ministry of Finance (The 2006 budget).
Table V.48
Impact of the tax reform on public finance, preliminary results for 2004
% of GDP (ESA 95)
Pro memori:
Actual revenues
in 2003
2004 budget Actual revenues in 2004 
Potential 
revenues in case 
of no reform
Difference
between reality 
and 2004 budget
Difference
between no 
reform and 
reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(2) (3)-(4)
Individual income tax 3.3 2.1 2.6 3.5 0.6 – 0.8
Corporate income tax 2.8 1.8 2.5 3.1 0.7 – 0.6
Advanced tax payments 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.2
Value-added tax 6.7 8.8 7.9 7.1 – 0.9 0.8
Consumption taxes 3.1 3.3 3.4 3 0 0.3
Property taxes 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0
Local taxes 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0
Other 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0
Together 18.1 17.9 18.0 18.4 0 (1) – 0.5 (1)
(1) Discrepancies caused by rounding
Source: The Ministry of Finance309
23. Finland
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The outcome for the general government balance in
2005 was a surplus of 2.6 % of GDP, which is markedly
higher than the surplus target of 1.8 percent of GDP set
in the update of the Stability Programme presented in
November 2004 (1). The improvement in the balance
was due to higher revenues and lower spending. A
sharp increase in employment and buoyant consumer
spending gave a boost to tax revenues. At the same time
expenditure was lower-than-predicted, mainly due to
lower spending on social transfers. The debt ratio
declined to 41.1 percent of GDP from 44.3 percent of
GDP in the previous year. Besides the 2005 surplus, the
exceptionally large decline in the debt was due to the
reduction of central government financial assets
(deposits with banks and shares) that had been accumu-
lated in previous years.
The State budget for 2006 was approved by the Parlia-
ment in December 2005. Notably, the budget includes
income tax cuts amounting to 0.5 percent of GDP, which
are part of a larger tax cut package over 3 years to sup-
plement the centralised wage agreement for 2004-2007.
Spending is contained within the central government
expenditure ceilings. The Finnish Ministry of Finance
expects in its latest semi-annual economic survey of
April 2006 that the general government surplus will
reach 2â percent of GDP in 2006, a marked upward
revision compared with the 1â percent of GDP foreseen
in the Stability Programme of November 2005. Based on
the Finnish Government’s medium-term spending
guidelines of spring 2006 (covering the period 2007-
2011), the upward revision originates from improve-
ments in the central government finances. Local govern-
ment finances are seen to remain in deficit, and social
security should maintain the same strong surplus as pre-
dicted before. The Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast predicts the general government surplus to reach
2.8 percent of GDP in 2006, an almost 1 percentage point
upward revision compared with the previous autumn
2005 forecast exercise. Lower-than-predicted spending
on social transfers in 2005 will carry over into 2006,
while revenues are growing strongly, benefiting also
from exceptionally large dividends of EUR 0.4 billion
(0.3 percent of GDP). The fiscal stance is broadly neu-
tral. In spite of the small improvement in the general
government balance, the structural balance falls slightly
by 0.4 percentage points. This is due to a closure of the
negative output gap, which follows the temporary slow-
down in GDP growth in 2005 caused by a production
stoppage in the paper industry due to a labour dispute.
For 2007, the Commission services’ spring 2006 fore-
cast predicts the general government surplus to reach
2.5 percent of GDP, under the customary no-policy
change assumption. This is almost one percentage point
higher than the target set in the Stability Programme of
November 2005, but is in line with the latest projec-
tions by the Ministry of Finance included in the Spend-
ing Limits Guidelines for 2007-2011. Revenue collec-
tion is assumed to remain solid, while expenditure
ceilings are expected to restrain central government
spending. The income tax cuts will be worth 0.3 per-
cent of GDP, somewhat less than in 2006. On the other
hand, unlike in 2006, revenues will no longer benefit
from exceptionally large dividends. For 2008-2009, the
Stability Programme of November 2005 projects the
general government surplus to stay at around 1â per-
cent of GDP.
The latest mid-term projections by the Finnish Ministry
of Finance, included in the Spending Limits for 2007-
2011, raises the general government surplus projections
to 2 â % of GDP beyond 2007.
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.310
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forecast, the debt ratio will decline steadily from
41.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to 38.3 percent of GDP by
2007, which is broadly in line with the latest projection
in the Finnish Ministry of Finance Economic Survey of
April 2006.
Table V.49
Budgetary developments 2004-2009, Finland (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.5
- Total revenues 52.4 53.1 52.7 52.1
 Of which: - current taxes 31.3 31.8 31.2 30.9
- social contributions 11.8 12.2 12.4 12.3
- Total expenditure 50.1 50.5 49.9 49.6
 Of which: - collective consumption 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.7
- social transfers in kind 14.3 14.7 14.8 14.8
- social transfers other than in kind 16.6 16.6 16.4 16.2
- interest expenditure 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
- gross fixed capital formation 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
Primary balance 3.8 4.1 4.2 3.9
Tax burden 43.8 44.6 44.2 43.9
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Structural balance (2) 2.5 3.2 2.8 2.7
Structural primary balance 4.0 4.7 4.2 4.0
Government gross debt 44.3 41.1 39.7 38.3
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 2.1 3.6 2.9
Stability programme (3) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
Primary balance 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8
Structural balance (4) 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0
Government gross debt 44.9 42.7 41.7 41.1 40.6 40.1
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.6 2.3 2.1
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(2) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(3) Submitted in Nov 2005.
(4) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Finland.
Table V.50
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Finland
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Income tax cuts worth EUR 850 million (-0.5 % of GDP)
• A 2 % inflation adjustment across the central government income 
tax scale, reducing tax revenues by EUR 150 million (-0.1 % of GDP)
• Tax deductibility of health contributions levied on wage and 
corporate income, worth EUR 100 million (-0.1 % of GDP)
• New transport infrastructure projects, of which EUR 233 million is 
spent between 2006 and 2007 (0.1 % of GDP for 2 years)
• Increasing funding for research and product development by 
EUR 83 million 0.05 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services and Finnish Ministry of Finance central government budget 2006.311
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government recorded a budget surplus of
2.9 percent of GDP in 2005. The surplus was much bet-
ter than the 0.6 percent of GDP target given in the 2004
convergence programme update. It was also unexpect-
edly high given the 1.4 percent surplus estimate given in
the 2005 updated convergence programme (1). The bet-
ter than expected outcome was mainly due to significant
additional inflows of tax revenues; in particular, there
were temporary revenues of corporate taxes (amounting
to a cumulative 1 percent of GDP over 2004-2005 and
classified as one off for the calculation of structural
budget balances (2)). Also other taxes, such as VAT
grew stronger than previously forecasted. Expenditures
developed in line with expectations and observance of
the central government nominal expenditure ceilings
was achieved with a margin. While the revenue ratio
increased, partly due to the temporary items, the expend-
iture ratio fell. The general government gross debt ratio
continued to fall, dropping to 50.3 percent of GDP.
The 2006 Budget Bill was adopted by the government on
16 September 2005. The updated convergence pro-
gramme for the period 2005-2008, drawing fully on the
budget, was submitted to the Commission on 24 Novem-
ber 2005. These plans have been complemented by the
annual Spring Budget Bill presented on 18 April 2006. On
the revenue side, the main measure for 2006 is the com-
pletion of the last step in the income tax reform initiated in
2000. On the expenditure side, the main elements relate to
a substantial expansion of active labour market measures
with additional places in programmes equal to 1.2 percent
of the workforce. In the Spring Budget Bill, the govern-
ment forecast the 2006 surplus to be 2.1 percent of GDP.
This is similar to the figure in the Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast. It implies a substantial upward revi-
sion as compared to the 1.6 percent surplus forecast in the
2006 Budget Bill and the 2005 updated convergence pro-
gramme. The main reason behind this improvement is an
upward shift in forecast revenues given the much
improved tax situation in 2005 over and beyond the tem-
porary elements. The upward revision also implies that the
surplus would be broadly in line with the national objec-
tive of a 2 percent surplus over the cycle as the average
nominal balance over the 2000-2006 period would be
2 percent of GDP. The structural balance is around 2 per-
cent of GDP, also supporting such an assessment. How-
ever, the fiscal stance in 2006, an election year, remains
expansionary as indicated by the narrowing of the struc-
tural budget balance (thus taking into account the fall out
of one off tax receipts in 2005) by 0.6 percentage points of
GDP compared with 2005. In 2007, the Commission serv-
ices forecast that, on the basis of current policies, the
budget surplus will improve marginally to 2.3 percent of
GDP, close to the forecast in the Spring Budget Bill.
While GDP growth is expected to return towards potential
rates, the situation in the labour market is expected to con-
tinue to improve, leading to lower expenditures. It is
worth noting that according to the government figures
there would remain a 0.4 percent of GDP contingency
margin under the expenditure ceilings in 2007. Based on
historical experience it can be expected that part of this
margin will be used for further expenditures initiatives in
the upcoming 2007 Budget Bill, thus tending to reduce the
surplus. For 2008, the convergence programme targets a
general government surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP.
The general government debt ratio is projected to con-
tinue to decline in 2006-07, to close to 45 percent of
GDP. Differently from previous years, also the nominal
level of debt is projected to decline, reflecting the
improved situation in central government finances. The
pace of reduction of the debt ratio is therefore relatively
quick despite the pension system surplus of 2 percent of
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥2∂ See Box 1 in the Commission assessment of the 2005 Swedish conver-
gence programme for a detailed explanation (see foot-note 1).312
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assets, thus not contributing to reduce gross debt.
Divergences between budget plans and outcomes: 
prudence or surprises?
In Sweden, a framework of national rules guides budget-
ary policy. The framework has three components. First,
since 1997, there are multi-annual nominal expenditure
ceilings for central government expenditures. Second,
since 2000, there is a budget balance requirement at local
government level. Third, also since 2000, there is a gen-
eral government surplus objective of 2 percent of GDP
on average over the cycle.
In comparison with the requirements of the SGP, this
national framework is clearly more demanding, as has
been recognised in successive Council Opinions on Swed-
ish budget plans. Nevertheless, each year since the 2002
convergence programme plans, the Council has also noted
that Sweden did not seem to be in line with its national
2 percent of GDP surplus objective and stressed the impor-
tance of its achievement for preparing to meet the budget-
ary costs of ageing. For example, in the most recent Opin-
ion (January 2006), the Council recognised that while the
budgetary position in 2005 seemed to be broadly in line
with the objective, the expansionary stance for 2006 re-
introduced a divergence from the objective, putting at risk
its achievement in 2008, the end year of the programme.
Table V.51
Budgetary developments 2004-2008, Sweden (1) (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance 1.8 2.9 2.2 2.3
- Total revenues 58.3 59.1 58.2 57.7
 Of which: - current taxes 36.3 36.9 36.3 36.1
- social contributions 14.6 14.7 14.5 14.4
- Total expenditure 56.5 56.2 55.9 55.5
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9
- social transfers in kind 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.2
- social transfers other than in kind 17.8 17.4 17.2 16.9
- interest expenditure 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8
- gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Primary balance 3.4 4.5 4.0 4.1
Tax burden 50.6 51.2 50.4 50.1
One-off and temporary measures 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) 1.3 2.6 2.0 2.3
Structural primary balance 2.9 4.2 3.8 4.1
Government gross debt 50.5 50.3 47.6 44.8
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.7 2.7 3.4 3.0
Convergence programme (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government balance 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.7
Primary balance 3.2 3.2 2.5 3.0 3.6
Structural balance (5) 1.1 1.6 0.9 1.1 1.7
Government gross debt 51.1 50.9 49.4 47.8 46.0
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.3
(1) The budgetary projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classiﬁcation of funded pension schemes, which needs to be imple-
mented by the time of the spring 2007 notiﬁcation. Including this impact the general government balance according to the updated convergence programme would
be 0.8 % of GDP in 2004,1.9 % in 2005, 1.2 % in 2006, 1.3 % in 2007, while government gross debt would be 51.0 % of GDP in 2004, 50.8 % in 2005, 48.1 % in
2006, 55.3 % in 2007.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2005.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.6 % of
GDP in 2004, 0.4 % in 2005; all deﬁcit-reducing)
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Sweden.313
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2 0 0 6However, while it is not fully straightforward to assess
compliance with the national 2 percent surplus
objective (1), the upward revision of 2005-2007 balances
in the Spring Budget Bill as outlined above and con-
firmed in the Commission forecast now appear to imply
budget positions broadly in line with the objective, not
only for these years but also on average since 2000.
A question that thus arises in this context is how for
some years ex ante budget plans have not been in line
with the objective but now, ex post, appear to be so? Is
this due to general prudence, incorrect assessments or
genuine surprises? A starting point is to look more
closely at the budgetary plans as outlined in successive
convergence programmes.
Comparing plans with first outcomes
Table V.53 below compares the forecasts (differences in
percent of GDP for real GDP growth, net lending, reve-
nues, primary expenditures and interest expenditures)
made in the convergence programme of year t for the
coming budgetary year t+1 with the outcomes as meas-
ured in the programme of year t+1 (still a forecast at this
point but made towards the end of the year) and year t+2.
The choice of time frame is explained in the context of
the following year’s budget polices being set taking
account of the perceived situation at the time of the
budget formulation. It follows that ‘divergences’
between plans and first outcomes would generally not be
explained by new policy measures as most such meas-
ures would be included in the initial budget. Of course,
final data from the most recent national accounts may
show larger differences to initially planned figures, but
in these cases it is more difficult to control for changes
in accounting rules. However, the figures should still be
interpreted with caution as they do not control for possi-
ble methodological changes to the accounting rules
within the time-frame (2).
Looking at the net lending figures, three periods stand
out: 2000-2001 with better than planned outcomes,
2002-2003 with worse than planned outcomes and 2004-
2005 again with positive developments. It is interesting
to see that in most cases the divergence between plans
and outcomes increases when more final data is availa-
ble towards the end of t+1.
Very broadly, different factors can help explain these
‘divergences’ each year: In 2000, the reason was mainly
economic growth, in that the upswing was substantially
more powerful than forecast, leading both to higher rev-
enues and lower expenditures. In 2001, the growth
upswing was abruptly halted as external demand faltered
and household consumption grew more weakly than
expected (developments that were further reinforced by
the September 11 events). Nevertheless, tax payments
grew more than expected due to high household sector
capital gains and corporate profits in 2000, taxes which
were paid and accounted for in 2001. In addition,
employment grew more strongly than expected. In 2002
and 2003 the net lending surprises were on the negative
side. Explanatory factors were a continuously weaker
cycle than foreseen and the downturn of the ICT sector.
Nevertheless, the budgetary impact and persistence of
the very expansionary budget for 2002 (an election year)
were underestimated.
¥1∂ See Fischer, J. (2005).
¥2∂ However, changes in figures between accounting standards from ESA79 to
ESA95 have been taken into account.
Table V.52
Main measures in the budget for 2006, Sweden
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Second half of the fourth and last step of the income tax reform 
(0.3 % of GDP)
• Further steps in ‘green tax swap’ (neutral budget impact, volume 
0.1 % of GDP)
• Increased volume of active labour market measures (0.3 % of GDP)
• Increase in child allowance (0.1 % of GDP)
• Higher education (0.1 % of GDP)
• Additional support to local government (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source:  Commission services, 2006 Budget Bill, Spring Budget Bill 2006.314
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driven by a surprisingly strong export performance. The
budget balance outcome measured at the end of 2004
was better than expected in 2003 but by a small margin.
This was explained by the low tax content of the export-
driven growth and weak labour market developments.
According to the current CP, the surplus will be even
higher, now largely explained by the one-off corporate
tax revenues from the liquidation of corporate tax alloca-
tion funds. For 2005, corporate tax developments,
largely dependent on the 2004 profit levels and also to
some extent on the liquidation of the tax periodisation
funds, are again explanatory factors. In addition, for the
later years, the lower interest expenditure, as a conse-
quence of persistently low inflation, has contributed to
higher net lending than expected.
In order to disentangle the various factors behind better-
than-expected outturns, it is useful to compare govern-
ment expenditure and tax revenue developments in nom-
inal terms. First, central government expenditures in
nominal terms have remained under control in line with
the set ceilings. It is true that planned contingency mar-
gins under the ceilings have tended to melt away at the
time of budget execution but even so the ceilings have
been respected (see Fischer, op. cit.).
At local level consumption growth has at times followed
a pro-cyclical pattern (see the section on Sweden in Pub-
lic Finances in EMU, 2005 and Fischer, op. cit.). Rather,
there has been more volatility on the revenue side, as
would be expected given the higher degree of automatic-
ity and link to the cycle. However, it is in particular those
taxes that show a relatively weak link to the cycle such
as capital taxes that have accounted for many of the sur-
prises over the last few years. As mentioned above, in
2001, capital tax revenues increased rapidly despite
weak growth developments.
In 2004-2005 capital taxes have again surprised on the
upside. Capital taxes account for about 12 % of general
government tax revenues (1). Taxes on capital include
both corporate income taxes and household taxes on cap-
ital gains. Corporate earnings do not always fluctuate
linearly with the cycle and corporate tax behaviour
includes a strategic element. Household capital gains
depend not only on fluctuations in asset prices but also
on how expectations influence the realisation of profits.
As mentioned above, the temporary fluctuations in cor-
porate income taxes in 2004-2005 amounted to a cumu-
lative 1 percent of GDP. Thus, fluctuations can be very
large for individual years even if the overall share in
taxes is relatively small compared to the proportionately
more important taxes such as taxes on those on labour.
Concluding remarks
The Swedish budgetary framework has continued to per-
form well. Differently from the assessments made over
the last few years, it now appears that budgetary policies
conform with the national objective of a 2 percent sur-
plus on average over the cycle. It is noteworthy that as
late as in the Swedish convergence programme pre-
sented in November 2005, the government defended a
‘planned departure’ from the objective via an expansion-
¥1∂ See ‘Sweden Economy’, Annex 1 to the Swedish Spring 2006 Budget Bill.
Table V.53
Convergence Programme (CP) plans versus outcomes (% of GDP)
 % of GDP Forecast year (t+1): 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Difference late forecast 
for t+1 in CP t+1 and
outturn in CP t+2 from 
forecast made 
in CPt for:
CP of year t+1 and t+2 CP
2000
CP
2001
CP
2001
CP
2002
CP
2002
CP
2003
CP
2003
CP
2004
CP
2004
CP
2005
CP
2005
n.a.
GDP 0.9 0.6 – 1.8 – 2.3 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.9 1.5 1.6 – 0.6 n.a.
Net lending 1.3 2.0 1.1 1.3 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 1.3 – 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.8 n.a.
Revenues 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.5 1.2 n.a.
Primary exp. – 0.4 – 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.6 2.0 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.9 0.7 n.a.
Interest exp. – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 n.a.
NB:  The table shows the difference between the planned ﬁgures for year t+1 in the CP of year t with the comparable ﬁgures in the CP of year t+1 and t+2. For example,
the budget balance outcome for 2000 as reported in the CP submitted in the end of 2001 was 2.0 % of GDP better than the ﬁgure planned for 2000 in the CP of 1999.
Source: Swedish convergence programmes and Commission technical assessments 1998-2005315
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2 0 0 6ary budget by referring to the weak situation in the
labour market. However, only some months later, the
budgetary situation and forecast already look decisively
stronger. A key reason behind this relatively rapid
change of assessment is the improved situation on the tax
revenue side.
Indeed, the analysis above has illustrated that there is a
large potential for ‘surprises’ when drawing up budget-
ary plans on the basis of forecasts (1). Of course, a key
uncertainty in the current outlook is to what extent the
better general picture is of a permanent nature and not
only a temporary improvement (i.e. beyond the purely
one-off items). Such a ‘negative surprise’ could of
course change the assessment of the strength of the cur-
rent position. Overall, it appears that forecast uncertain-
ties are relatively larger in small open economies with
large public sectors. In most cases in the EU, negative
deviations from budget targets tend to be explained by
difficulties in adhering to nominal expenditure plans (2).
However, in a country like Sweden, with a credible
framework guiding the expenditure side of the budget,
most budget surprises (in nominal terms) stem from the
revenue side and apparently in particular from taxes on
capital. In order not to be caught out in budgetary plan-
ning by the inherent uncertainty of forecasting, the
Swedish case illustrates the value-added of supporting a
budget balance objective with a clear medium-term
expenditure framework.
¥1∂ See Boije and Fischer (2006). ¥2∂ See Moulin and Wiertz (2006).316
25. United Kingdom
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The preliminary outturn for the general government
balance in the 2005/06 financial year (1), as reported in
the Commission services spring forecasts is a deficit of
3.1 percent of GDP, worse than the deficit of 2.8 per-
cent of GDP projected in the 2004 update of the conver-
gence programme (submitted by the UK on 17 Decem-
ber 2004) (2). Compared with the 2004/05 outturn of a
deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP, this marks a moderate
improvement, achieved despite a marked slowdown in
economic growth from 2.8 percent in 2004/05 to an
estimated 1.9 percent in 2005/06, albeit with a quicken-
ing in the latter part of the year. This consolidation
appears to be mainly due to a strong recovery in corpo-
ration tax receipts, boosted by buoyant performance in
the financial services sector (reflecting a rising stock
market) and by rising oil prices, which in the short term
have a positive fiscal impact by boosting profitability
of companies operating in the UK continental shelf.
High oil prices might also have amplified the positive
impact of a one-off change to the payment profile of
North Sea corporation tax (estimated in the March 2005
Budget to be about 0.1 percent of GDP for oil prices
assumed to be about 25 percent lower than those actu-
ally recorded in 2005 (3)). Despite the economic slow-
down, income tax and social security receipts also grew
relatively strongly.
The general government gross debt ratio is estimated to
have risen to around 42 percent of GDP at the end of
March 2006, compared with 40.2 percent at the end of
the previous financial year.
The 2006 Budget was presented on 23 March 2006, set-
ting out a number of small discretionary changes that have
a broadly neutral impact on the overall fiscal position.
Among these are a further set of measures to improve tax
compliance. More sizable measures to be implemented
from the 2006/07 financial year had already been
announced in the December 2005 Pre-Budget Report,
most notably an increase in corporation tax on oil compa-
nies yielding around 0.2 percent of GDP. The 2006
Budget projects a general government deficit in 2006/07
of 3.0 percent of GDP, an upward revision over the pro-
jection of 2.8 percent of GDP in the 2005 convergence
programme (4). The national authorities explain this revi-
sion as reflecting a temporary drop in oil production,
which should partly offset the impact of rising oil prices
on corporation tax receipts. The Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast also projects the deficit at 3.0 percent
of GDP in 2006//07. As in the Budget projections, the
small improvement is driven by a further recovery on the
revenue side, partly due to an expected improvement in
economic conditions, partly by fiscal drag and partly by
further underlying growth in corporation tax receipts, sup-
ported by the continued rise in oil prices (the Commission
services’ forecast assumes higher oil prices than the
national authorities, taking into account more recent mar-
ket developments) and, in the short term, by continuing
profitability of the financial services sector.
The improvement in the fiscal balance is partly offset by an
increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. As the nominal
balance improves slightly while the negative output gap is
estimated to widen, the fiscal stance is estimated to become
mildly tighter: the primary structural balance is estimated
to improve from a deficit of 1.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to¥1∂ The financial year runs from April to March.¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.
¥3∂ As noted in the 2005 Public Finance Report, this one-off measure (as orig-
inally estimated) was entirely offset by a one-off increase in entitlements
for pensioners, and thus was originally estimated not to have an impact on
the structural balance.
¥4∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm.317
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2 0 0 6a deficit of 0.7 percent of GDP in 2006 (1). However, the
structural improvement might be partly due to favourable
developments in factors such as oil and asset prices, which
are not captured by the conventional cyclical adjustment
methodology and by the definition of structural deficit, but
might still be subject to marked fluctuations. Under a no-
policy change assumption, the Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast projects for 2007/08 a general govern-
ment deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP, compared with the
2005 convergence programme projection of 2.4 percent of
GDP (confirmed in the March 2006 Budget).
The difference is mainly explained by a more moderate
increase in non-oil corporation tax receipts assumed by
the Commission services.
Beyond 2007/08, the 2006 Budget projects a steady
improvement of the general government balance, reach-
Table V.54
Budgetary developments 2004/05-2010/11, United Kingdom (% of GDP)
Outturn and forecast (1) 2004 2005 2006 2007
General government balance (2) – 3.3 (– 3.3) – 3.5 (– 3.1) – 3.0 (– 3.0) – 2.8 (– 2.7)
- Total revenues 39.9 (40.3) 41.3 (41.9) 42.2 (42.3) 42.7 (42.6)
 Of which: - current taxes 28.2 29.0 29.8 30.2
- social contributions 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.6
- Total expenditure 43.2 (43.6) 44.8 (44.9) 45.2 (45.3) 45.5 (45.3)
 Of which: - collective consumption 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5
- social transfers in kind 12.8 13.1 13.5 13.6
- social transfers other than in kind 13.1 13.2 13.0 12.8
- interest expenditure 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1
- gross fixed capital formation 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Primary balance – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.7
Tax burden 36.5 37.6 38.3 38.8
One-off and temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) – 3.5 – 3.3 – 2.7 – 2.5
Structural primary balance – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.5
Government gross debt 40.8 (40.2) 42.8 (42.0) 44.1 (43.3) 44.7 (43.8)
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.1 1.8 2.4 2.8
Convergence programme (4) 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
General government balance – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.5
Primary balance (5) – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5
Structural balance (6) – 3.5 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.3
Government gross debt (7) 40.9 43.3 44.4 44.8 44.7 44.6 44.4
Pm Real GDP growth (%) 23/4 13/4 21/4 3 23/4 21/4 21/4
(1) Commission services’ spring 2006 economic forecasts. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the deﬁnitions used in the
excessive deﬁcit procedure. Figures in brackets are on a ﬁnancial year basis (so that the ﬁgure in the 2005 column refers to the 2005/06 ﬁnancial year). The UK
ﬁnancial year begins in April; the excessive deﬁcit procedure applies to the United Kingdom on a ﬁnancial year basis. Outturns for deﬁcit and debt in 2005/06 are
based on preliminary data.
(1) The increase in the expenditure and revenue ratio between 2005/06 and 2006/07 is partly due to the reclassiﬁcation of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
into central government, which, while having a neutral effect on the aggregate balance, increases both total revenue and total expenditure by around 0.2 % of GDP.
(2) Actual general government balance data reported here apply the Eurostat decision of 14 July 2000 on the allocation of UMTS receipts. The UK has not generally
applied this decision in domestic publication of its deﬁcit data, which results in the deﬁcit on a Eurostat basis being up to 0.1 % points of GDP per annum higher
than reported in UK national accounts from 2001/02 onwards.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2005.
(5)  The UK authorities provide primary balances on an ESA deﬁnition (i.e. excluding gross rather than net interest payments) only up to 2007/08. Figures shown after-
wards are those recalculated by the Commission services, based on the reported budget balance and information from the UK authorities.
(6)  Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. 
(7)  Growth scenario used in the public ﬁnances projection.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of the United Kingdom.
¥1∂ The output gap is calculated on a calendar year basis, and thus it is not pos-
sible to have an estimate of the structural balances on a financial year basis
strictly based on the commonly agreed methodology. However, given the
milder improvement of the nominal balances on a financial year basis, the
structural improvement between financial years would be smaller. An
approximation suggests that the cyclically-adjusted primary balance would
improve from a deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2005/06 to a deficit of 0.6
percent of GDP in 2006/07.318
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with the 2005 convergence programme, the fiscal con-
solidation is driven most notably by a significant reduc-
tion of the expenditure ratio (as planned year-on-year
expenditure growth slows sharply) but also by an
increase in the revenue ratio.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2006
forecast, the debt to GDP ratio is expected to rise over
the forecast period, from an estimated 42 percent of GDP
in 2005/06 to 43ã percent of GDP in 2007/08.
Reviewing the methodology for measuring 
government output and productivity
Measuring government output and productivity is con-
ceptually challenging. There is no obvious way to quan-
tify the volume of government output for (a) collective
services such as defence or public administration, due to
the difficulty of identifying the exact nature of the out-
put; or (b) services supplied to individuals, such as
health or education, where placing a value on services
provided meets the difficulty of there being typically no
market transaction.
In early experience in producing national accounts in the
United Kingdom, some direct measures of the volume of
government output were employed; however, the results
were considered unsatisfactory. Therefore, in national
accounts published from the early 1960s up to 1997,
measurement of the output of the government sector
adopted the convention that the volume of such output
was represented by the volume of the inputs, with the lat-
ter constructed by deflating inputs by appropriate labour
cost and price series. The convention that output equals
input was, however, subject to the weakness of being
unable to provide information on changes in government
sector productivity, which by construction was zero.
Starting with the national accounts published in 1998
(including series backdated to the 1980s), the United
Kingdom Office for National Statistics (ONS) has
moved towards the replacement of the output=input
approach by once more employing direct measurements
of the volume of government output (1). Direct output
indicators have been developed for areas covering
around two-thirds of general government final consump-
tion. In education, for example, output has been based on
pupil enrolments. In addition, some rudimentary allow-
ances for quality improvements have also been incorpo-
rated in certain instances: in education, the output series
based on pupil enrolment has been augmented by
0.25 percent p.a., reflecting the trend of secondary
school examination results achieved in the mid-1990s.
Incorporating direct output measurement, by separating
output from input measurement, has enabled estimates to
be calculated of changes in government sector produc-
tivity. Based on the revised methodology, measured pro-
ductivity increased from 1995 to 1998 but subsequently
declined (Graph V.12) (2).
However, these ‘first generation’ direct measures of gov-
ernment output revealed the need for further improvements.
A principal concern was that the measurement of output did
not necessarily adequately reflect changes in its quality.
In December 2003 the government therefore commis-
sioned an independent review of the measurement of gov-
ernment output in the national accounts. The review, led by
Table V.55
Main measures in the 2005 Pre-Budget Report and the 2006 Budget, United Kingdom
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase in corporation tax paid by oil companies (0.2 % of GDP)
• Specific countermeasures to prevent tax avoidance and evasion 
(aggregate: 0.1 % of GDP)
• Deferral of previously planned inflation-based increase in main road 
fuel duties to 1 September 2006 (– 0.06 % of GDP)
• Increased winter fuel payments (transfers to pensions) 
(0.05 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission service, UK convergence programme and UK Budget.
¥1∂ Some of these measurements are discussed in some detail in Eurostat
(2001), Handbook of Price and Volume Measures of National Accounts
and in OECD (2001), Measuring Productivity: OECD Manual Measure-
ment of Aggregate and Industry-level Productivity Growth .
¥2∂ Data series are reconstructed with the methodology used since 1998. Cur-
rently, no updated data are available.319
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2 0 0 6Sir Tony Atkinson (1), and of which the final report was
published in January 2005 (2), develops 54 recommenda-
tions for improving the measurement of government out-
put and productivity. A first major recommendation is that
the range of output categories considered should be wid-
ened (e.g. in healthcare, the proposed number of treatment
categories covered increases from 1 732 to 1 929) or
replaced (e.g. pupil attendance is proposed as a better esti-
mate of the number of pupils taught in schools than pupil
enrolment). Secondly, the Atkinson Review emphasises
the need to better take into account quality improvements.
For example, in education, class size or a teacher/pupil
ratio could be used for measuring quality, based on the
assumption that the smaller the ratio the better should be
the quality of learning; however, the recommendation is
conditional on clear evidence of such relationships being
established in each case. Thirdly, improved measures of
inputs and deflators are also proposed, such as taking into
account full capital services, and adopting a disaggregated
approach to calculating fixed capital depreciation.
A more radical departure from the conventional
approach is represented by the recommendation that
government outputs such as health, education and justice
become more valuable as the economy grows and assets
increase (thus, for example, for increasingly rich prop-
erty-owners, the benefits of effective law enforcement
increase). The review therefore proposes further adjust-
ments to government output measures, in addition to
quality, to represent this increased relative value: based
on whole economy real earnings growth, an increase of
around 1.5 percent p.a. The review recognises, however,
that its suggestion is subject to wider discussion, with so
far no other country employing such an approach.
Some of the more incremental changes advocated in
the Atkinson Review were already incorporated in the
UK national accounts published in 2005 (see
Graph V.13) (3). In addition, in July 2005 the ONS
launched its UK Centre for the Measurement of Gov-
ernment Activity (UKCeMGA) to carry forward the
Atkinson Review recommendations. UKCeMGA has
already released work on new or revised output series
and productivity analyses in some key areas such as
education (October 2005) and health (February 2006):
these two sectors together representing around 29 per-
cent of total government expenditure.
The 2005 national accounts imply that productivity in
education fell between 1995 and 2004 (4). However, the
experimental estimates of October 2005 — following
the recommendations of the Atkinson Review to adjust
Graph V.12:  Indicative Index of Productivity 1995-2002, 1995=100
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¥1∂ Warden of Nuffield College Oxford.
¥2∂ Atkinson Review: Final report. Measurement of Government Output and
Productivity for the National Accounts, January 2005.
¥3∂ ONS UK Centre for the Measurement of Government Activity
(UKCeMGA), Annual Report 2005-06. 
¥4∂ Economic Trends 626, January 2006.320
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which real earnings have risen — show that productivity
growth in education ranged from – 2 to ± 2 percent p.a.
over the period considered.
In February 2006 UKCeMGA reported similar experi-
mental estimates of productivity in the National Health
Service (NHS) (1). According to the 2005 national
accounts, NHS productivity growth is estimated to have
fallen by an annual average of between 0.6 percent and
1.3 percent p.a. between 1995 and 2004 (with the range
generated by different assumptions for calculating input
volumes: see note to graph). Estimates including output
quality changes show instead that NHS productivity
changed between minus 0.5 percent and plus 0.2 percent
p.a. during the same period. Allowing in addition for an
estimate of the increased value of healthcare, in line with
the Atkinson Review’s recommendations, produces a
third range of plus 0.9 percent to plus 1.6 percent.
Measurements of government productivity also impact on
the GDP growth rate, all the more as government expend-
iture as a share of UK GDP has increased in recent years.
Over the period 1995-2003, the real GDP growth rate
would have been about 0.25 percent a year higher had the
former input/output convention been retained (2).
However, the new data approaches advocated in the
Atkinson report and published by the ONS have also
attracted criticism (3). It could be, for instance, that the
existing national accounts measurement approach,
which shows falling public sector productivity, may be
capturing the reality. The major input in public services
is labour and, in many instances, it may be difficult to
raise productivity because of the nature of the service.
Alternatively, there may be lag effects at work, such that
the output gains from higher public spending take time
to come through. To the extent that measurement meth-
ods need revision, however, it should be recognised that
some of the adjustments recommended by the Atkinson
Review have a strong judgmental component, and thus
will need time to determine whether they can be
absorbed in a methodological approach that is generally
accepted and internationally comparable.
¥1∂ Economic Trends 628, March 2006.
¥2∂ The Atkinson Review notes that this would have halved the measured gap
between GDP growth in the UK and the USA, which continues to use an
input-based measure.
¥3∂ See for example, ‘Health-service productivity: take your pick’, The Econ-
omist, 2 March 2006.
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Regulation (EC) No  1466/97 of 7 July 1997
Consolidated version of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997
on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies
(OJ L 209, 2.8.1997 p. 1–5)
as amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/05 of 27 June 2005
(OJ L 174, 7.7.2005 p. 1– 4)
Amending provisions are in bold and italics
This document has no official character and is meant purely as a documentation tool325
Recitals of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 103 (5) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 189c of the Treaty (2),
(1) Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact is based on
the objective of sound government finances as a
means of strengthening the conditions for price sta-
bility and for strong sustainable growth conducive to
employment creation;
(2) Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact consists of
this Regulation which aims to strengthen the surveil-
lance of budgetary positions and the surveillance
and coordination of economic policies, of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (3) which aims to
speed up and to clarify the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure and of the Resolution of
the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact (4), in which, in accordance
with Article D of the Treaty on European Union,
firm political guidelines are issued in order to
implement the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict
and timely manner and in particular to adhere to the
medium term objective of budgetary positions of
close to balance or in surplus, to which all Member
States are committed, and to take the corrective
budgetary action they deem necessary to meet the
objectives of their stability and convergence
programmes, whenever they have information
indicating actual or expected significant divergence
from the medium-term budgetary objective;
(3) Whereas in stage three of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) the Member States are, according to
Article 104c of the Treaty, under a clear Treaty obli-
gation to avoid excessive general government defi-
cits; whereas under Article 5 of Protocol (No 11) on
certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Treaty,
Article 104c(1) does not apply to the United King-
dom unless it moves to the third stage; whereas the
obligation under Article 109e(4) to endeavour to
avoid excessive deficits will continue to apply to the
United Kingdom;
(4) Whereas adherence to the medium-term objective of
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus
will allow Member States to deal with normal cycli-
cal fluctuations while keeping the government defi-
cit within the 3 percent of GDP reference value;
(5) Whereas it is appropriate to complement the multi-
lateral surveillance procedure of Article 103(3) and
(4) with an early warning system, under which the
Council will alert a Member State at an early stage
to the need to take the necessary budgetary correc-
tive action in order to prevent a government deficit
becoming excessive;
(6) Whereas the multilateral surveillance procedure of
Article 103(3) and (4) should furthermore continue
to monitor the full range of economic developments
in each of the Member States and in the Community
as well as the consistency of economic policies with
the broad economic guidelines referred to in Article
103 (2); whereas for the monitoring of these devel-
opments, the presentation of information in the form
of stability and convergence programmes is appro-
priate;
(7) Whereas there is a need to build upon the useful
experience gained during the first two stages of eco-
nomic and monetary union with convergence pro-
grammes;
(8) Whereas the Member States adopting the single cur-
rency, hereafter referred to as ‘participating Member
States’, will, in accordance with Article 109j, have
achieved a high degree of sustainable convergence
and in particular a sustainable government financial
position; whereas the maintenance of sound budget-
ary positions in these Member States will be neces-
sary to support price stability and to strengthen the
conditions for the sustained growth of output and
employment; whereas it is necessary that participat-
ing Member States submit medium-term pro-
grammes, hereafter referred to as ‘stability pro-
grammes’; whereas it is necessary to define the
principal contents of such programmes;
(9) Whereas the Member States not adopting the single
currency, hereafter referred to as ‘non-participating
Member States’, will need to pursue policies aimed at
a high degree of sustainable convergence; whereas it
is necessary that these Member States submit
medium-term programmes, hereafter referred to as
‘convergence programmes’; whereas it is necessary
¥1∂ OJ No 368, 6.12.1996, p. 9.
¥2∂ Opinion of the European Parliament of 28 November 1996 (OJ No C 380,
16.12.1996, p. 28), Council Common Position of 14 April 1997 (OJ
No C 146, 30.5.1997, p. 26) and Decision of the European Parliament of
29 May 1997 (OJ No  C 182, 16.6.1997).
¥3∂ See p. 6 of this Official Journal.
¥4∂ OJ No C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.326
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programmes;
(10)Whereas in its Resolution of 16 June 1997 on the
establishment of an exchange-rate mechanism in the
third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, the
European Council issued firm political guidelines in
accordance with which an exchange-rate mecha-
nism is established in the third stage of EMU, here-
after referred to as ‘ERM2’; whereas the currencies
of non-participating Member States joining ERM2
will have a central rate vis-à-vis the euro, thereby
providing a reference point for judging the adequacy
of their policies; whereas the ERM2 will also help to
protect them and the Member States adopting the
euro from unwarranted pressures in the foreign-
exchange markets; whereas, so as to enable appro-
priate surveillance in the Council, non-participating
Member States not joining ERM2 will nevertheless
present policies in their convergence programmes
oriented to stability thus avoiding real exchange rate
misalignments and excessive nominal exchange rate
fluctuations;
(11)Whereas lasting convergence of economic funda-
mentals is a prerequisite for sustainable exchange
rate stability;
(12)Whereas it is necessary to lay down a timetable for
the submission of stability programmes and conver-
gence programmes and their updates;
(13)Whereas in the interest of transparency and
informed public debate it is necessary that Member
States make public their stability programmes and
their convergence programmes;
(14)Whereas the Council, when examining and monitor-
ing the stability programmes and the convergence
programmes and in particular their medium-term
budgetary objective or the targeted adjustment path
towards this objective, should take into account the
relevant cyclical and structural characteristics of the
economy of each Member State;
(15)Whereas in this context particular attention should
be given to significant divergences of budgetary
positions from the budgetary objectives of being
close to balance or in surplus; whereas it is appropri-
ate for the Council to give an early warning in order
to prevent a government deficit in a Member State
becoming excessive; whereas in the event of persist-
ent budgetary slippage it will be appropriate for the
Council to reinforce its recommendation and make it
public; whereas for non-participating Member
States the Council may make recommendations on
action to be taken to give effect to their convergence
programmes;
(16)Whereas both convergence and stability pro-
grammes lead to the fulfilment of the conditions of
economic convergence referred to in Article 104c.327
Recitals of Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/05 of 27 June 2005
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 99(5) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Central
Bank (1),
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 252 of the Treaty (2),
Whereas:
(1) The Stability and Growth Pact initially consisted of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July
1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor-
dination of economic policies (3), Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarify-
ing the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure (4) and the Resolution of 17 June 1997
on the Stability and Growth Pact (5). The Stability
and Growth Pact has proven its usefulness in
anchoring fiscal discipline, thereby contributing to
a high degree of macroeconomic stability with low
inflation and low interest rates, which is necessary
to induce sustainable growth and employment cre-
ation.
(2) On 20 March 2005 the Council adopted a report
entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact’ which aims to enhance the
governance and the national ownership of the fis-
cal framework by strengthening the economic
underpinnings and the effectiveness of the Pact,
both in its preventive and corrective arms, to safe-
guard the sustainability of public finances in the
long run, to promote growth and to avoid imposing
excessive burdens on future generations. The
report was endorsed by the European Council in its
conclusions of 23 March 2005 (6), which stated
that the report updates and complements the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, of which it is now an inte-
gral part.
(3) According to the 20 March 2005 Ecofin report
endorsed by the Spring 2005 European Council,
the Member States, the Council and the Commis-
sion reaffirm their commitment to implement the
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in an
effective and timely manner, through peer support
and peer pressure, and to act in close and construc-
tive cooperation in the process of economic and fis-
cal surveillance, in order to guarantee certainty
and effectiveness in the rules of the Pact.
(4) Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 needs to be amended
in order to allow the full application of the agreed
improvement of the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact.
(5) The Stability and Growth Pact lays down the obli-
gation for Member States to adhere to the medium
term objective for their budgetary positions of
‘close to balance or in surplus’ (CTBOIS). In the
light of the economic and budgetary heterogeneity
in the Union, the medium-term budgetary objective
should be differentiated for individual Member
States, to take into account the diversity of eco-
nomic and budgetary positions and developments
as well as of fiscal risk to the sustainability of pub-
lic finances, also in the face of prospective demo-
graphic changes. The medium-term budgetary
objective may diverge from CTBOIS for individual
Member States. For euro area and ERM II Mem-
ber States, there would thus be a defined range for
the country-specific medium-term budgetary
objectives, in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-
off and temporary measures.
(6) A more symmetrical approach to fiscal policy over
the cycle through enhanced budgetary discipline in
economic good times should be achieved, with the
objective to avoid pro-cyclical policies and to grad-
ually reach the medium-term budgetary objective.
Adherence to the medium-term budgetary objective
should allow Member States to deal with normal
cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government
deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value and
ensure rapid progress towards fiscal sustainability.
Taking this into account, it should allow room for
budgetary manoeuvre, in particular for public
investment.
(7) Member States that have not yet reached their
medium-term budgetary objective should take steps
to achieve it over the cycle. In order to reach their
medium-term budgetary objective, Member States
of the euro zone or of ERM II should pursue a
minimum annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted
¥1∂ OJ C 144, 14.6.2005, p.17.
¥2∂ Opinion of the European Parliament of 9 June 2005 (not yet published in
the Official Journal), Council Common Position of 21 June 2005 (not yet
published in the Official Journal) and Decision of the European Parliament
of 23 June 2005 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
¥3∂ OJ L 209, 2.81997, p.1.
¥4∂ OJ L 209, 2.81997, p.6.
¥5∂ OJ L 236, 2.81997, p.1.
¥6∂ Annex 2 of conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005.328
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ures.
(8) In order to enhance the growth oriented nature of
the Pact, major structural reforms which have
direct long-term cost-saving effects, including by
raising potential growth, and therefore a verifiable
impact on the long-term sustainability of public
finances, should be taken into account when defin-
ing the adjustment path to the medium-term budg-
etary objective for countries that have not yet
reached this objective and in allowing a temporary
deviation from this objective for countries that
have already reached it. In order not to hamper
structural reforms that unequivocally improve the
long-term sustainability of public finances, special
attention should be paid to pension reforms intro-
ducing a multi-pillar system that includes a man-
datory, fully funded pillar, because these reforms
entail a short-term deterioration of public finances
during the implementation period.
(9) Deadlines set for the examination of stability and
convergence programmes by the Council should be
extended in order to allow for a thorough assess-
ment of stability and convergence programmes.329
Consolidated Articles of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997,
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/05 of 27 June 2005
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
SECTION 1
PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
This Regulation sets out the rules covering the content,
the submission, the examination and the monitoring of
stability programmes and convergence programmes as
part of multilateral surveillance by the Council so as to
prevent, at an early stage, the occurrence of excessive
general government deficits and to promote the surveil-
lance and coordination of economic policies.
Article 2
For the purpose of this Regulation ‘participating Mem-
ber States’ shall mean those Member States which adopt
the single currency in accordance with the Treaty and
‘non-participating Member States’ shall mean those
which have not adopted the single currency.
SECTION 1A
MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETARY OBJECTIVES
Article 2a
Each Member State shall have a differentiated
medium-term objective for its budgetary position.
These country-specific medium-term budgetary objec-
tives may diverge from the requirement of a close to
balance or in surplus position. They shall provide a
safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP govern-
ment deficit ratio; they shall ensure rapid progress
towards sustainability and, taking this into account,
they shall allow room for budgetary manoeuvre, con-
sidering in particular the needs for public investment.
Taking these factors into account, for Member States
that have adopted the euro and for ERM-II Member
States the country-specific medium-term budgetary
objectives shall be specified within a defined range
between –1 % of GDP and balance or surplus, in cycli-
cally adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary
measures.
A Member State’s medium-term budgetary objective
can be revised when a major structural reform is imple-
mented and in any case every four years.
SECTION 2
STABILITY PROGRAMMES
Article 3
1. Each participating Member State shall submit to the
Council and Commission information necessary for the
purpose of multilateral surveillance at regular intervals
under Article 99 of the Treaty in the form of a stability
programme, which provides an essential basis for price
stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to
employment creation.
2. A stability programme shall present the following
information:
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the
adjustment path towards this objective for the general
government surplus/deficit and the expected path of the
general government debt ratio;
(b) the main assumptions about expected economic
developments and important economic variables which
are relevant to the realisation of the stability programme
such as government investment expenditure, real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth, employment and infla-
tion;
(c) a detailed and quantitative assessment of the budg-
etary and other economic policy measures being taken
and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the pro-
gramme, comprising a detailed cost-benefit analysis of
major structural reforms which have direct long-term
cost-saving effects, including by raising potential
growth;
(d) an analysis of how changes in the main economic
assumptions would affect the budgetary and debt posi-
tion;
(e) if applicable, the reasons for a deviation from the
required adjustment path towards the medium term
budgetary objective.
3. The information about paths for the general govern-
ment surplus/deficit ratio and debt ratio and the main
economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a) and
(b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover, as well as
the current and preceding year, at least the following
three years.330
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1. Stability programmes shall be submitted before
1 March 1999. Thereafter, updated programmes shall be
submitted annually. A Member State adopting the single
currency at a later stage shall submit a stability pro-
gramme within six months of the Council Decision on its
participation in the single currency.
2. Member States shall make public their stability pro-
grammes and updated programmes.
Article 5
1. Based on assessments by the Commission and the
Committee set up by Article 114 of the Treaty, the
Council shall, within the framework of multilateral
surveillance under Article 99 of the Treaty, examine
the medium-term budgetary objective presented by the
Member State concerned, assess whether the economic
assumptions on which the programme is based are
plausible, whether the adjustment path towards the
medium-term budgetary objective is appropriate and
whether the measures being taken and/or proposed to
respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve
the medium-term objective over the cycle.
The Council, when assessing the adjustment path
toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall
examine if the Member State concerned pursues the
annual improvement of its cyclically-adjusted balance,
net of one-off and other temporary measures, required
to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with
0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark. The Council shall take
into account whether a higher adjustment effort is
made in economic good times, whereas the effort may
be more limited in economic bad times.
When defining the adjustment path to the medium-
term budgetary objective for Member States that have
not yet reached this objective and in allowing a tempo-
rary deviation from this objective for Member States
that have already reached it, under the condition that
an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit
reference value is preserved and that the budgetary
position is expected to return to the medium-term budg-
etary objective within the programme period, the Coun-
cil shall take into account the implementation of major
structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-
saving effects, including by raising potential growth,
and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances.
Special attention shall be paid to pension reforms
introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a man-
datory, fully funded pillar. Member States implement-
ing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the
adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objec-
tive or from the objective itself, with the deviation
reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly man-
aged pillar, under the condition that the deviation
remains temporary and that an appropriate safety mar-
gin with respect to the deficit reference value is pre-
served.
The Council shall furthermore examine whether the con-
tents of the stability programme facilitate the closer
coordination of economic policies and whether the eco-
nomic policies of the Member State concerned are con-
sistent with the broad economic policy guidelines.
2. The Council shall carry out the examination of the sta-
bility programme referred to in paragraph 1 within at
most three months of the submission of the programme.
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the Committee set up by Article
114, shall deliver an opinion on the programme. Where
the Council, in accordance with Article 99, considers
that the objectives and contents of a programme should
be strengthened, the Council shall, in its opinion, invite
the Member State concerned to adjust its programme.
3. Updated stability programmes shall be examined by
the Committee set up by Article 114 on the basis of
assessments by the Commission; if necessary, updated
programmes may also be examined by the Council in
accordance with the procedure set out in paragraphs 1
and 2 of this Article.
Article 6
1. As part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with
Article 99 (3), the Council shall monitor the implemen-
tation of stability programmes, on the basis of informa-
tion provided by participating Member States and of
assessments by the Commission and the Committee set
up by Article 114, in particular with a view to identifying
actual or expected significant divergence of the budget-
ary position from the medium-term budgetary objective,
or the adjustment path towards it, as set in the pro-
gramme for the government surplus/deficit.331
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divergence of the budgetary position from the medium-
term budgetary objective, or the adjustment path towards
it, it shall, with a view to giving early warning in order to
prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, address,
in accordance with Article 99 (4), a recommendation to
the Member State concerned to take the necessary
adjustment measures.
3. In the event that the Council in its subsequent moni-
toring judges that the divergence of the budgetary posi-
tion from the medium-term budgetary objective, or the
adjustment path towards it, is persisting or worsening,
the Council shall, in accordance with Article 99 (4),
make a recommendation to the Member State concerned
to take prompt corrective measures and may, as provides
in that Article, make its recommendation public.
SECTION 3
CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES
Article 7
1. Each non-participating Member State shall submit to
the Council and the Commission information necessary
for the purpose of multilateral surveillance of regular
intervals under Article 99 in the form of a convergence
programme, which provides an essential basis for price
stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to
employment creation.
2. A convergence programme shall present the following
information in particular on variables related to conver-
gence:
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the
adjustment path towards this objective for the general
government surplus/deficit and the expected path of the
general government debt ratio; the medium-term mon-
etary policy objectives; the relationship of those objec-
tives to price and exchange rate stability;
(b) the main assumptions about expected economic
developments and important economic variables which
are relevant to the realisation of the convergence pro-
gramme, such as government investment expenditure,
real GDP growth, employment and inflation;
(c) a detailed and quantitative assessment of the budg-
etary and other economic policy measures being taken
and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the pro-
gramme, comprising a detailed cost-benefit analysis of
major structural reforms which have direct long-term
cost-saving effects, including by raising potential growth;
(d) an analysis of how changes in the main economic
assumptions would affect the budgetary and debt posi-
tion;
(e) if applicable, the reasons for a deviation from the
required adjustment path towards the medium term
budgetary objective.
3. The information about paths for the general government
surplus/deficit ratio, debt ratio and the main economic
assumptions referred to in paragraph 2 (a) and (b) shall be
on an annual basis and shall cover, as well as the current
and preceding year, at least the following three years.
Article 8
1. Convergence programmes shall be submitted before 1
March 1999. Thereafter, updated programmes shall be
submitted annually.
2. Member States shall make public their convergence
programmes and updated programmes.
Article 9
1. Based on assessments by the Commission and the
Committee set up by Article 114 of the Treaty, the
Council shall, within the framework of multilateral
surveillance under Article 99 of the Treaty, examine
the medium-term budgetary objective presented by the
Member State concerned, assess whether the economic
assumptions on which the programme is based are
plausible, whether the adjustment path towards the
medium-term budgetary objective is appropriate and
whether the measures being taken and/or proposed to
respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve
the medium-term objective over the cycle.
The Council, when assessing the adjustment path
toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall
take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is
made in economic good times, whereas the effort may
be more limited in economic bad times. For ERM-II
Member States, the Council shall examine if the Mem-
ber State concerned pursues the annual improvement
of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and332
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medium-term budgetary objective, with 0.5 % of GDP
as a benchmark. 
When defining the adjustment path to the medium-
term budgetary objective for Member States that have
not yet reached this objective and in allowing a tempo-
rary deviation from this objective for Member States
that have already reached it, under the condition that
an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit
reference value is preserved and that the budgetary
position is expected to return to the medium-term budg-
etary objective within the programme period, the Coun-
cil shall take into account the implementation of major
structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-
saving effects, including by raising potential growth,
and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances.
Special attention shall be paid to pension reforms intro-
ducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory,
fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such
reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment
path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from
the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net
cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under
the condition that the deviation remains temporary and
that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the def-
icit reference value is preserved.
The Council shall furthermore examine whether the con-
tents of the convergence programme facilitate the closer
coordination of economic policies and whether the eco-
nomic policies of the Member State concerned are con-
sistent with the broad economic policy guidelines.
2. The Council shall carry out the examination of the con-
vergence programme referred to in paragraph 1 within at
most three months of the submission of the programme.
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission
and after consulting the Committee set up by Article 114,
shall deliver an opinion on the programme. Where the
Council, in accordance with Article 99, considers that the
objectives and contents of a programme should be
strengthened, the Council shall, in its opinion, invite the
Member State concerned to adjust its programme.
3. Updated convergence programmes shall be examined
by the Committee set up by Article 114 on the basis of
assessments by the Commission; if necessary, updated
programmes may also be examined by the Council in
accordance with the procedure set out in paragraphs 1
and 2 of this Article.
Article 10
1. As part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with
Article 99 (3), the Council shall monitor the implemen-
tation of convergence programmes on the basis of infor-
mation provided by non-participating Member States in
accordance with Article 7 (2) (a) of this Regulation and
of assessments by the Commission and the Committee
set up by Article 114 of the Treaty, in particular with a
view to identifying actual or expected significant diver-
gence of the budgetary position from the medium-term
budgetary objective, or the adjustment path towards it, as
set in the programme for the government surplus/deficit.
In addition, the Council shall monitor the economic pol-
icies of non-participating Member States in the light of
convergence programme objectives with a view to
ensure that their policies are geared to stability and thus
to avoid real exchange rate misalignments and excessive
nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
2. In the event that the Council identifies significant
divergence of the budgetary position from the medium-
term budgetary objective, or the adjustment path towards
it, it shall, with a view to given early warning in order to
prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, address in
accordance with Article 99 (4), a recommendation to the
Member State concerned to take the necessary adjust-
ment measures.
3. In the event that the Council in its subsequent moni-
toring judges that the divergence of the budgetary posi-
tion from the medium-term budgetary objective, or the
adjustment path towards it, is persisting or worsening,
the Council shall, in accordance with Article 99 (4),
make a recommendation to the Member State concerned
to take prompt corrective measures and may, as provided
in that Article, make its recommendation public.
SECTION 4
COMMON PROVISIONS
Article 11
As part of the multilateral surveillance described in this
Regulation, the Council shall carry out the overall
assessment described in Article 99 (3).333
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In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article
99 (4) the President of the Council and the Commission
shall include in their report to the European Parliament
the results of the multilateral surveillance carried out
under this Regulation.
Article 13
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 July 1998.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 7 July 1997.
For the Council
The President
J.-C. JUNCKER
Important note:
Amendments introduced by Regulation (EC) No 1055/05 of 27 June 2005 entered into force on 27 July 2005334
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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular the second subparagraph
of Article 104 (14) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Monetary
Institute,
(1) Whereas it is necessary to speed up and to clarify the
excessive deficit procedure set out in Article 104c of
the Treaty in order to deter excessive general gov-
ernment deficits and, if they occur, to further their
prompt correction; whereas the provisions of this
Regulation, which are to the above effect and
adopted under Article 104c (14) second subpara-
graph, constitute, together with those of Protocol
(No 5) to the Treaty, a new integrated set of rules for
the application of Article 104c;
(2) Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact is based on
the objective of sound government finances as a
means of strengthening the conditions for price sta-
bility and for strong sustainable growth conducive to
employment creation;
(3) Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact consists of
this Regulation, of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97 (3) which aims to strengthen the surveil-
lance of budgetary positions and the surveillance
and coordination of economic policies and of the
Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997
on the Stability and Growth Pact (4), in which, in
accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty on European
Union, firm political guidelines are issued in order
to implement the Stability and Growth Pact in a
strict and timely manner and in particular to adhere
to the medium term objective for budgetary posi-
tions of close to balance or in surplus, to which all
Member States are committed, and to take the cor-
rective budgetary action they deem necessary to
meet the objectives of their stability and conver-
gence programmes, whenever they have informa-
tion indicating actual or expected significant diver-
gence from the medium-term budgetary objective;
(4) Whereas in stage three of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) the Member States are, according to
Article 104c of the Treaty, under a clear Treaty obli-
gation to avoid excessive government deficits;
whereas under Article 5 of Protocol (No 11) to the
Treaty, paragraphs 1, 9 and 11 of Article 104c do not
apply to the United Kingdom unless it moves to the
third stage; whereas the obligation under Article
109e (4) to endeavour to avoid excessive deficits
will continue to apply to the United Kingdom;
(5) Whereas Denmark, referring to paragraph 1 of Pro-
tocol (No 12) to the Treaty has notified, in the con-
text of the Edinburgh decision of 12 December
1992, that it will not participate in the third stage;
whereas, therefore, in accordance with paragraph 2
of the said Protocol, paragraphs 9 and 11 of Article
104c shall not apply to Denmark;
(6) Whereas in stage three of EMU Member States
remain responsible for their national budgetary pol-
icies, subject to the provisions of the Treaty;
whereas the Member States will take the necessary
measures in order to meet their responsibilities in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty;
(7) Whereas adherence to the medium-term objective of
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus to
which all Member States are committed, contributes
to the creation of the appropriate conditions for price
stability and for sustained growth conducive to
employment creation in all Member States and will
allow them to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations
while keeping the government deficit within the 3 %
of GDP reference value;
(8) Whereas for EMU to function properly, it is neces-
sary that convergence of economic and budgetary
performances of Member States which have adopted
the single currency, hereafter referred to as ‘partici-
pating Member States’, proves stable and durable;
¥1∂ OJ No C 368, 6.12.1996, p.12.
¥2∂ OJ No C 380, 16.12.1996, p. 29.
¥3∂ See p. 1 of this Official Journal.
¥4∂ OJ No C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.336
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three of EMU to safeguard price stability;
(9) Whereas according to Article 109k (3) Articles 104c
(9) and (11) only apply to participating Member States;
(10)Whereas it is necessary to define the concept of an
exceptional and temporary excess over the reference
value as referred to in Article 104c (2) (a); whereas
the Council should in this context, inter alia, take
account of the pluriannual budgetary forecasts pro-
vided by the Commission;
(11)Whereas a Commission report in accordance with
Article 104c (3) is also to take into account whether
the government deficit exceeds government invest-
ment expenditure and take into account all other rel-
evant factors, including the medium-term economic
and budgetary position of the Member State;
(12)Whereas there is a need to establish deadlines for the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure in
order to ensure its expeditious and effective implemen-
tation; whereas it is necessary in this context to take
account of the fact that the budgetary year of the United
Kingdom does not coincide with the calendar year;
(13)Whereas there is a need to specify how the sanctions
provided for in Article 104c could be imposed in
order to ensure the effective implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure;
(14)Whereas reinforced surveillance under the Council
Regulation (EC) No  1466/97 together with the
Commission’s monitoring of budgetary positions in
accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 104c should
facilitate the effective and rapid implementation of
the excessive deficit procedure;
(15)Whereas in the light of the above, in the event that a
participating Member State fails to take effective
action to correct an excessive deficit, an overall max-
imum period of ten months from the reporting date of
the figures indicating the existence of an excessive
deficit until the decision to impose sanctions, if nec-
essary, seems both feasible and appropriate in order to
exert pressure on the participating Member State con-
cerned to take such action; in this event, and if the
procedure starts in March, this would lead to sanc-
tions being imposed within the calendar year in which
the procedure had been started;
(16)Whereas the Council recommendation for the cor-
rection of an excessive deficit or the later steps of the
excessive deficit procedure, should have been antic-
ipated by the Member State concerned, which would
have had an early warning; whereas the seriousness
of an excessive deficit in stage three should call for
urgent action from all those involved;
(17)Whereas it is appropriate to hold the excessive deficit
procedure in abeyance if the Member State concerned
takes appropriate action in response to a recommen-
dation under Article 104c (7) or a notice issued under
Article 104c (9) in order to provide an incentive to
Member States to act accordingly; whereas the time
period during which the procedure would be held in
abeyance should not be included in the maximum
period of ten months between the reporting date indi-
cating the existence of an excessive deficit and the
imposition of sanctions; whereas it is appropriate to
resume the procedure immediately if the envisaged
action is not being implemented or if the implemented
action is proving to be inadequate;
(18)Whereas, in order to ensure that the excessive deficit
procedure has a sufficient deterrent effect, a non-
interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate size
should be required from the participating Member
State concerned, whenever the Council decides to
impose a sanction;
(19)Whereas the definition of sanctions on a prescribed
scale is conducive to legal certainty; whereas it is
appropriate to relate the amount of the deposit to the
GDP of the participating Member State concerned;
(20)Whereas, whenever the imposition of a non-interest-
bearing deposit does not induce the participating
Member State concerned to correct its excessive
deficit in due time, it is appropriate to intensify the
sanctions; whereas it is then appropriate to trans-
form the deposit into a fine;
(21)Whereas appropriate action by the participating
Member State concerned in order to correct its
excessive deficit is the first step towards abrogation
of sanctions; whereas significant progress in cor-
recting the excessive deficit should allow for the lift-
ing of sanctions in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Article 104c; whereas the abrogation of all outstand-
ing sanctions should only occur once the excessive
deficit has been totally corrected;337
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November 1993 on the application of the Protocol
on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the
Treaty establishing the European Community (5) (1)
contains detailed rules for the reporting of budgetary
data by Member States;
(23)Whereas, according to Article 109f (8), where the
Treaty provides for a consultative role for the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), references to the ECB
shall be read as referring to the European Monetary
Institute before the establishment of the ECB.¥1∂ OJ No L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7.338
Recitals of Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/05 of 27 June 2005
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular the second subpara-
graph of Article 104 (14) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central
Bank (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European
Parliament (2),
Whereas:
(1) The Stability and Growth Pact initially consisted of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July
1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor-
dination of economic policies (3), Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying
the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure (4) and the Resolution of 17 June 1997 on
the Stability and Growth Pact (5). The Stability and
Growth Pact has proven its usefulness in anchoring
fiscal discipline, thereby contributing to a high degree
of macroeconomic stability with low inflation and low
interest rates, which is necessary to induce
sustainable growth and employment creation.
(2) On 20 March 2005 the Council adopted a report
entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact’ which aims to enhance
the governance and the national ownership of the
fiscal framework by strengthening the economic
underpinnings and the effectiveness of the Pact,
both in its preventive and corrective arms, to
safeguard the sustainability of public finances in the
long run, to promote growth and to avoid imposing
excessive burdens on future generations. The report
was endorsed by the European Council in its
conclusions of 23 March 2005 (6), which stated that
the report updates and complements the Stability
and Growth Pact, of which it is now an integral part.
(3) According to the 20 March 2005 Ecofin report
endorsed by the Spring 2005 European Council,
the Member States, the Council and the Commis-
sion reaffirm their commitment to implement the
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in an
effective and timely manner, through peer support
and peer pressure, and to act in close and construc-
tive cooperation in the process of economic and fis-
cal surveillance, in order to guarantee certainty
and effectiveness in the rules of the Pact.
(4) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 needs to be amended
in order to allow the full application of the agreed
improvement of the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact.
(5) The guiding principle for the application of the
excessive deficit procedure is the prompt correc-
tion of an excessive deficit. The procedure should
remain simple, transparent and equitable.
(6) The concept of exceptional excess over the refer-
ence value resulting from a severe economic down-
turn should be revised. In doing so, due account
should be taken of the economic heterogeneity in
the European Union.
(7) The Commission should always prepare a report
on the basis of Article 104(3) of the Treaty. In its
report, it should examine whether the exceptions
provided for in Article 104(2) apply. The Commis-
sion report under Article 104(3) should appropri-
ately reflect developments in the medium-term eco-
nomic position and in the medium-term budgetary
position. Furthermore, due consideration should
be given to any other factors which, in the opinion
of the Member State concerned, are relevant in
order to comprehensively assess in qualitative
terms the excess over the reference value.
(8) Careful consideration should be given in all budg-
etary assessments in the framework of the exces-
sive deficit procedure to an excess close to the ref-
erence value which reflects the implementation of
pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system
that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar,
because the implementation of those reforms leads
to a short-term deterioration of the budgetary posi-
tion, while the long-term sustainability of public
finances clearly improves. In particular, when
assessing under Article 104(12) whether the exces-
sive deficit has been corrected, the Commission
and the Council should assess developments in
EDP deficit figures while also considering the net
cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar.
(9) The procedural deadlines for Council decisions in
the excessive deficit procedure should be extended
in order to allow the Member State concerned to
¥1∂ OJ C 144, 14.6.2005, p. 16.
¥2∂ Opinion of 9 June 2005 (not yet published in the Official Journal).
¥3∂ OJ L 209, 2.8.97, p. 1.
¥4∂ OJ L 209, 2.8.97, p. 6.
¥5∂ OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
¥6∂ Annex 2 of conclusions of the European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005. 339
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ary procedure and to develop a more coherent
package of measures. In particular, the deadline
for the Council to decide on the existence of an
excessive deficit in accordance with Article 104 (6)
of the Treaty should be set, as a rule, to four
months after the reporting dates established in
Article 4(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC)
No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the applica-
tion of the Protocol on the excessive deficit proce-
dure annexed to the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community (1). This would address the cases
in which the budgetary statistical data has not been
validated by the Commission (Eurostat) shortly
after the reporting dates established in Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93.
(10)In order to ensure a prompt correction of excessive
deficits, it is necessary for Member States that are
in a situation of excessive deficit to take effective
action and to achieve an annual minimum fiscal
improvement in their cyclically adjusted balance,
net of one-off and temporary measures. As a
benchmark, countries in excessive deficit will be
required to achieve an annual minimum fiscal
effort in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off
and temporary measures.
(11)Maximum time periods within which Member
States are to take effective action and measures
should be extended to allow better framing of the
action in the national budgetary procedures and
the development of more articulated packages of
measures.
(12)If the Member State concerned has taken effective
action in response to a recommendation under
Article 104 (7) or a notice issued under Article 104
(9) and unexpected adverse economic events with
major negative consequences for government
finances prevent the correction of the excessive
deficit within the time limit set by the Council, it
should be possible for the Council to issue a revised
recommendation under Article 104 (7) or a revised
notice under Article 104 (9).
(13)The current overall maximum period of 10 months
from the reporting dates established in Article 4 (2)
and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 until the
decision to impose sanctions would be inconsistent
with the amended deadlines in each step of the pro-
cedure and the possibility to issue revised recom-
mendations under Article 104 (7) or revised notices
under Article 104 (9). The overall maximum period
should therefore be adjusted in accordance with
these amendments.
(14)The provisions applicable to the implementation of
the excessive deficit procedure in the case of the
United Kingdom, which are set out in the Annex to
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, also need to be mod-
ified to reflect those changes.
¥1∂ OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7. Regulation as last amended by Regulation
(EC) No 351/2002 (OJ L 55, 26.2.2002, p.23).340
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997,
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/05 of 27 June 2005
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
SECTION 1
DEFINITIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
Article 1
1. This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up
and clarify the excessive deficit procedure, having as its
objective to deter excessive general government deficits
and, if they occur, to further their prompt correction.
2. For the purpose of this Regulation ‘participating
Member States’ shall mean those Member States which
adopt the single currency in accordance with the Treaty
and ‘non-participating Member States’ shall mean those
which have not adopted the single currency.
Article 2
1. The excess of a government deficit over the reference
value shall be considered exceptional and temporary, in
accordance with Article 104(2) (a), second indent, when
resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the
Member State concerned and which has a major impact
on the financial position of the general government, or
when resulting from a severe economic downturn.
In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be
considered temporary if budgetary forecasts as provided
by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall
below the reference value following the end of the unu-
sual event or the severe economic downturn.
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing
and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit
in accordance with Article 104 (3) to (6) of the Treaty,
may consider an excess over the reference value result-
ing from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in
the sense of the second indent of Article 104 (2) (a) of
the Treaty if the excess over the reference value results
from a negative annual GDP volume growth rate or
from an accumulated loss of output during a protracted
period of very low annual GDP volume growth relative
to its potential.
3. The Commission, when preparing a report under
Article 104 (3) of the Treaty shall take into account all
relevant factors as indicated in that Article. The report
shall appropriately reflect developments in the
medium-term economic position (in particular poten-
tial growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, the imple-
mentation of policies in the context of the Lisbon
agenda and policies to foster research and development
and innovation) and developments in the medium-term
budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation
efforts in ‘good times’, debt sustainability, public
investment and the overall quality of public finances).
Furthermore, the Commission shall give due consider-
ation to any other factors which, in the opinion of the
Member State concerned, are relevant in order to com-
prehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over
the reference value and which the Member State has
put forward to the Commission and to the Council. In
that context, special consideration shall be given to
budgetary efforts towards increasing or maintaining at
a high level financial contributions to fostering inter-
national solidarity and to achieving European policy
goals, notably the unification of Europe if it has a det-
rimental effect on the growth and fiscal burden of a
Member State. A balanced overall assessment shall
encompass all these factors.
4. If the double condition of the overarching principle
– that, before the relevant factors mentioned in para-
graph 3 are taken into account, the general govern-
ment deficit remains close to the reference value and its
excess over the reference value is temporary – is fully
met, these factors shall also be taken into account in
the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an
excessive deficit, foreseen in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of
article 104 of the Treaty. The balanced overall assess-
ment to be made by the Council shall encompass all
these factors.
5. The Commission and the Council, in all budgetary
assessments in the framework of the excessive deficit
procedure, shall give due consideration to the imple-
mentation of pension reforms introducing a multi-
pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded
pillar.
6. If the Council has decided, on the basis of Article 104
(6) of the Treaty, that an excessive deficit exists in a
Member State, the Commission and the Council shall
take into account the relevant factors mentioned in
paragraph 3 also in the subsequent procedural steps of
Article 104 of the Treaty, including as specified in Arti-
cles 3(5) and 5(2). However those relevant factors shall
not be taken into account for the decision of the Coun-
cil under Article 104 (12) of the Treaty on the abroga-
tion of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6
to 9 and 11 of Article 104 of the Treaty.
7. In the case of Member States where the deficit
exceeds the reference value, while remaining close to
it, and where this excess reflects the implementation of
a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that
includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Commis-341
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reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing
developments in EDP deficit figures. For that purpose,
consideration shall be given to the net cost of the
reform on a linear degressive basis for a transitory
period of five years. This net cost shall be taken into
account also for the decision of the Council under Arti-
cle 104 (12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or
all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of
Article 104 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined sub-
stantially and continuously and has reached a level
that comes close to the reference value.
SECTION 2
SPEEDING UP THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT 
PROCEDURE
Article 3
1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission
of a report issued in accordance with Article 104 (3), the
Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an
opinion in accordance with Article 104 (4).
2. Taking fully into account the opinion referred to in
paragraph 1, the Commission, if it considers that an
excessive deficit exists, shall address an opinion and a
recommendation to the Council in accordance with Arti-
cle 104 (5) and (6).
3. The Council shall decide on the existence of an
excessive deficit in accordance with Article 104 (6) of
the Treaty, as a rule within four months of the report-
ing dates established in Article 4 (2) and (3) of Regula-
tion (EC) No 3605/93. When it decides that an exces-
sive deficit exists, the Council shall at the same time
make recommendations to the Member State con-
cerned in accordance with Article 104 (7) of the Treaty.
4. The Council recommendation made in accordance
with Article 104 (7) of the Treaty shall establish a dead-
line of six months at most for effective action to be
taken by the Member State concerned. The Council
recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the
correction of the excessive deficit, which should be
completed in the year following its identification unless
there are special circumstances. In the recommenda-
tion, the Council shall request that the Member State
achieves a minimum annual improvement of at least
0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted
balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in
order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit
within the deadline set in the recommendation.
5. If effective action has been taken in compliance with
a recommendation under Article 104 (7) of the Treaty
and unexpected adverse economic events with major
unfavourable consequences for government finances
occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the
Council may decide, on a recommendation from the
Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under
Article 104 (7) of the Treaty. The revised recommenda-
tion, taking into account the relevant factors men-
tioned in Article 2 (3) of this Regulation, may notably
extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive
deficit by one year. The Council shall assess the exist-
ence of unexpected adverse economic events with
major unfavourable consequences for government
finances against the economic forecasts in its recom-
mendation.
Article 4
1. Any Council decision to make public its recommenda-
tions, where it is established that no effective action has
been taken in accordance with Article 104 (8), shall be
taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in
accordance with Article 3(4) of this Regulation.
2. The Council, when considering whether effective
action has been taken in response to its recommenda-
tions made in accordance with Article 104 (7), shall base
its decision on publicly announced decisions by the Gov-
ernment of the Member State concerned.
Article 5
1. Any Council decision to give notice to the participat-
ing Member State concerned to take measures for the
deficit reduction in accordance with Article 104 (9) of
the Treaty shall be taken within two months of the
Council decision establishing that no effective action
has been taken in accordance with Article 104 (8) of the
Treaty. In the notice, the Council shall request that the
Member State achieves a minimum annual improve-
ment of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its
cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and tempo-
rary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the
excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice.342
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a notice under Article 104 (9) of the Treaty and unex-
pected adverse economic events with major unfavoura-
ble consequences for government finances occur after
the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on
a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a
revised notice under Article 104 (9) of the Treaty. The
revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors
mentioned in Article 2 (3) of this Regulation, may nota-
bly extend the deadline for the correction of the exces-
sive deficit by one year. The Council shall assess the
existence of unexpected adverse economic events with
major unfavourable consequences for government
finances against the economic forecasts in its notice.
Article 6
Where the conditions to apply Article 104 (11) are met,
the Council shall impose sanctions in accordance with
Article 104 (11). Any such decision shall be taken no
later than four months after the Council decision giving
notice to the participating Member State concerned to
take measures in accordance with Article 104 (9).
Article 7
If a participating Member State fails to act in compli-
ance with the successive decisions of the Council in
accordance with Article 104 (7) and (9) of the Treaty,
the decision of the Council to impose sanctions, in
accordance with Article 104 (11) of the Treaty, shall be
taken as a rule within sixteen months of the reporting
dates established in Article 4 (2) and (3) of Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93. In case Article 3 (5) or 5 (2) above is
applied, the sixteen-month deadline is amended
accordingly. An expedited procedure shall be used in
the case of a deliberately planned deficit which the
Council decides is excessive.
Article 8
Any Council decision to intensify sanctions, in accord-
ance with Article 104 (11), other than the conversion of
deposits into fines under Article 14 of this Regulation,
shall be taken no later than two months after the report-
ing dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. Any
Council decision to abrogate some or all of its decisions
in accordance with Article 104 (12) shall be taken as
soon as possible and in any case no later than two months
after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No 3605/93.
SECTION 3
ABEYANCE AND MONITORING
Article 9
1. The excessive deficit procedure shall be held in abey-
ance:
— if the Member State concerned acts in compliance with rec-
ommendations made in accordance with Article 104 (7),
— if the participating Member State concerned acts in compli-
ance with notices given in accordance with Article 104 (9).
2. The period during which the procedure is held in
abeyance shall be included neither in the period
referred to in Article 6 nor in the period referred to in
Article 7 of this regulation.
3. Following the expiry of the period referred to in the
first sentence of Article 3 (4) and following the expiry
of the period referred to in the second sentence of Arti-
cle 6 of this Regulation, the Commission shall inform
the Council if it considers that the measures taken seem
sufficient to ensure adequate progress towards the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit within the time limits set
by the Council, provided that they are fully imple-
mented and that economic developments are in line
with forecasts. The Commission statement shall be
made public.
Article 10
1. The Commission and the Council shall monitor the
implementation of action taken:
— by the Member State concerned in response to recommen-
dations made under Article 104 (7),
— by the participating Member State concerned in response to
notices given under Article 104 (9).
2. If action by a participating Member State is not being
implemented or, in the Council’s view, is proving to be
inadequate, the Council shall immediately take a deci-
sion under Article 104 (9) or Article 104 (11) respec-
tively.
3. If actual data pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 3605/93
indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected343
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specified either in recommendations issued under Arti-
cle 104 (7) or notices issued under Article 104 (9), the
Council shall immediately take a decision under Article
104 (9) or Article 104 (11) respectively.
SECTION 4
SANCTIONS
Article 11
Whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to a
participating Member State in accordance with Article
104 (11), a non-interest-bearing deposit shall, as a rule,
be required. The Council may decide to supplement this
deposit by the measures provided for in the first and sec-
ond indents of Article 104 (11).
Article 12
1. When the excessive deficit results from non-compli-
ance with the criterion relating to the government deficit
ration in Article 104 (2) (a), the amount of the first
deposit shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0.2 %
of GDP, and a variable component equal to one tenth of
the difference between the deficit as a percentage of
GDP in the preceding year and the reference value of
3 % of GDP.
2. Each following year, until the decision on the exist-
ence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council
shall assess whether the participating Member State con-
cerned has taken effective action in response to the
Council notice in accordance with Article 104 (9). In this
annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accord-
ance with Article 104 (11), and without prejudice to Arti-
cle 13 of this Regulation, to intensify the sanctions,
unless the participating Member State concerned has
complied with the Council notice. If an additional
deposit is decided, it shall be equal to one tenth of the
difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in
the preceding year and the reference value of 3 % of
GDP.
3. Any single deposit referred to in paragraphs 1 and
2 shall not exceed the upper limit of 0.5 % of GDP.
Article 13
A deposit shall, as a rule, be converted by the Council, in
accordance with Article 104 (11), into a fine if two years
after the decision to require the participating Member
State concerned to make a deposit, the excessive deficit
has in the view of the Council not been corrected.
Article 14
1. In accordance with Article 104 (12), the Council shall
abrogate the sanctions referred to in the first and second
indents of Article 104 (11) depending on the significance
of the progress made by the participating Member State
concerned in correcting the excessive deficit.
Article 15
In accordance with Article 104 (12), the Council shall
abrogate all outstanding sanctions if the decision on the
existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines
imposed in accordance with Article 13 of this Regulation
will not be reimbursed to the participating Member State
concerned.
Article 16
Deposits referred to in Articles 11 and 12 of this Regula-
tion shall be lodged with the Commission. Interest on the
deposits, and the fines referred to in Article 13 of this
Regulation constitute other revenue referred to in Article
20l of the Treaty and shall be distributed among partici-
pating Member States without a deficit that is excessive
as determined in accordance with Article 104 (6) in pro-
portion to their share in the total GNP of the eligible
Member States.
SECTION 5
TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 17
For the purpose of this Regulation and for as long as the
United Kingdom has a budgetary year which is not a cal-
endar year, the provisions of sections 2, 3 and 4 of this
Regulation shall be applied to the United Kingdom in
accordance with the Annex.344
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This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1999.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 7 July 1997.
For the Council
The President
J.-C. JUNCKER
Important note:
Amendments introduced by Regulation No 1056/05 of 27 June 2005 entered into force on 27 July 2005345
Annex
Time limits applicable to the United Kingdom
1. In order to ensure equal treatment of all Member States, the Council, when taking decisions in Sections 2, 3 and 
4 of this Regulation, shall have regard to the different budgetary year of the United Kingdom, with a view to taking 
decisions with regard to the United Kingdom at a point in its budgetary year similar to that at which decisions have 
been or will be taken in the case of other Member States.
2. The provisions specified in Column I shall be substituted by the provisions specified in Column II.
Column I Column II
‘as a rule, within four months of the reporting dates established in Article 4 (2) and 
(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93’
(Article 3(3))
‘as a rule, within six months after the end of the budgetary year in which the deﬁcit 
occurred’
‘The year following its identiﬁcation’
(Article 3 (4)) ‘the budgetary year following its identiﬁcation’
‘as a rule, within sixteen months of reporting dates established in Article 4(2) and 
(3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93’
(Article 7)
‘as a rule, within eighteen months from the end of the budgetary year in which the 
deﬁcit occurred’
‘the preceding year’
(Article 12 (1)) ‘the preceding budgetary year’346
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This Opinion updates and replaces the opinion of the
Economic and Financial Committee on the content and
format of the Stability and Convergence Programmes,
endorsed by the Ecofin Council on 10 July 2001.
The Stability and Growth Pact fully entered into force on
1 January 1999 and consists of a rules-based framework
with both preventive and corrective elements. It initially
consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7
July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordina-
tion of economic policies, Council Regulation (EC)
No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the imple-
mentation of the excessive deficit procedure and the
Resolution of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth
Pact. On 20 March 2005 the Council adopted a report
entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact’. The report was endorsed by the Euro-
pean Council in its conclusions of 22 March 2005, which
stated that the report updates and complements the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, of which it is now an integral
part. On 27 June 2005 the Pact was complemented by
two additional Regulations amending the Regulations
1466/97 and 1467/97.
The Stability and Growth Pact is an essential part of the
macroeconomic framework of the Economic and Mone-
tary Union, which contributes to achieving macroeco-
nomic stability in the EU and safeguarding the sustaina-
bility of public finances. A rules-based system is the best
guarantee for commitments to be enforced and for all
Member States to be treated equally. The two nominal
anchors of the Stability and Growth Pact — the 3 % of
GDP reference value for the deficit ratio and the 60 % of
GDP reference value for the debt ratio — and the
medium-term budgetary objectives are the centrepiece
of multilateral surveillance.
Member States, the Commission and the Council are
committed to deliver on their respective responsibilities,
applying the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in
an effective and timely manner. In addition, since effec-
tiveness of peer support and peer pressure is an integral
part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Council and the
Commission are expected to motivate and make public
their positions and decisions at all appropriate stages of
the procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact. Member
States are expected to regularly inform the national Par-
liaments of developments in the procedures.
In order to enhance ownership of the EU budgetary
framework, national budgetary rules should be comple-
mentary to the Stability and Growth Pact. Without preju-
dice to the balance between national and Community
competences, their implementation could be discussed at
European level in the context of the Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes. In the same vein, governance
arrangements at national level should complement the
EU framework. National institutions could play a more
prominent role in budgetary surveillance to enhance
enforcement through national public opinion and com-
plement the economic and policy analysis at EU level. In
particular, Member States could establish an economic
council of wise people who would advise on the main
macroeconomic projections.
These Guidelines for the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact consist of 2 sections. The first section
elaborates on the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact. The second section consists of guidelines
on the content and format of the stability and conver-
gence programmes.349
Section I
Specifications on the implementation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact
A. The preventive arm of the stability and 
growth pact
1. The medium term budgetary objective (MTO)
Definition of the MTO
The MTO is defined in cyclically adjusted terms, net of
one-off and other temporary measures. The reference
method for the estimation of potential output is the one
adopted by the Council on 12 July 2002 (1). One-off and
temporary measures are measures having a transitory
budgetary effect that does not lead to a sustained change
in the intertemporal budgetary position (2).
The MTO pursues a triple aim:
(i) providing a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of
GDP deficit limit. This safety margin is assessed for
each Member State taking into account past output
volatility and the budgetary sensitivity to output
fluctuations.
(ii) ensuring rapid progress towards sustainability.
This is assessed against the need to ensure the con-
vergence of debt ratios towards prudent levels tak-
ing into account the economic and budgetary impact
of ageing populations.
(iii) taking (i) and (ii) into account, allowing room for
budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into
account the needs for public investment.
The MTOs are differentiated for individual Member
States to take into account the diversity of economic and
budgetary positions and developments as well as of fis-
cal risk to the sustainability of public finances, also in
face of prospective demographic changes. The country-
specific MTOs may diverge from the requirement of a
close to balance or in surplus position.
Until criteria and modalities for taking into account
implicit liabilities are appropriately established and
agreed by the Council, the country-specific MTOs are
set taking into account the current government debt ratio
and potential growth, while preserving sufficient margin
below the reference value of -3 % of GDP (3). In this
transition period, the country-specific MTOs for euro
area and ERM II Member States would be in a range
between -1 % of GDP for low debt / high potential
growth countries and balance or surplus for high debt /
low potential growth countries.
Potential growth should be assessed in a long-term per-
spective on the basis of the projections produced by the
Working Group on Ageing attached to the Economic
Policy Committee.
Member States may present more ambitious MTOs than
implied by these criteria if they feel their circumstances
call for it.
For Member States outside of the euro area and not par-
ticipating in ERM II, country-specific MTOs would be
defined with a view to ensuring the respect of the triple
aim mentioned above.
Procedure for defining and revising the MTOs
In order to ensure a consistent application of the princi-
ples mentioned above for defining the country-specific
MTOs, regular methodological discussions take place in
the Economic and Financial Committee.
Taking into account the results of these discussions,
Member States present their MTO in their Stability or
Convergence programme. The MTOs are examined by
the Commission and the Council in the context of the
assessment of the Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes. In accordance with Article 99(3) of the Treaty
and Article 5(2) of Regulation 1466/97, where the Coun-
cil considers that the MTO presented in a Stability or
Convergence programme should be strengthened, it
shall, in its opinion, invite the Member State concerned
to adjust its programme.
The MTOs could be revised when a major reform is
implemented and in any case every four years, in order
to reflect developments in government debt, potential
growth and fiscal sustainability.
2. The adjustment path toward the medium-term 
budgetary objective and deviations from it
Fiscal behaviour over the cycle and adjustment path 
toward the MTO
Member States should achieve a more symmetrical
approach to fiscal policy over the cycle through
enhanced budgetary discipline in periods of economic
¥1∂ Due to data problems, a different method may be used for the estimation of
potential output in the case of recently acceded Member States (RAMS).
The method used should be agreed by the Economic Policy Committee on
the basis of a proposal of the Output Gap Working Group.
¥2∂ Examples of one-off and temporary measures are the sales of non-financial
assets; receipts of auctions of publicly owned licenses; short-term emer-
gency costs emerging from natural disasters; tax amnesties; revenues
resulting from the transfers of pension obligations.
¥3∂ The Council Report on ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact’ of 20 March 2005 and endorsed on 22 March 2005 by the
Heads of State and Government stated that ‘by the end of 2006, the Com-
mission should report on progress achieved towards the methodology for
completing the analysis by incorporating implicit liabilities’.350
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cies and to gradually reach their medium term objective,
thus creating the necessary room to accommodate eco-
nomic downturns and reduce government debt at a satis-
factory pace, thereby contributing to the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances. The presumption is to use
unexpected extra revenues for deficit and debt reduction.
Member States that have already reached their MTO
could let automatic stabilisers play freely over the cycle.
They should in particular avoid pro-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies in ‘good times’.
Member States that have not yet reached their MTO
should take steps to achieve it over the cycle. Their
adjustment effort should be higher in good times; it
could be more limited in bad times. In order to reach
their MTO, Member States of the euro zone or of ERM-
II should pursue an annual adjustment in cyclically
adjusted terms, net of one-offs and other temporary
measures, of 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark.
Member States that do not follow the required adjust-
ment path will explain the reasons for the deviation in the
annual update of their Stability/Convergence Pro-
gramme.
Based on the principles mentioned above and on the
explanations provided by Member States, the Commis-
sion and the Council, in their assessments of the Stability
or Convergence Programmes, examine whether the
adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary
objective is appropriate. In particular, they examine
whether a sufficient adjustment effort is made in eco-
nomic good times, and take into account that the effort
may be more limited in economic bad times.
In case the Council considers that the adjustment path
towards the MTO should be strengthened, it shall, in
accordance with Article 99(3) of the Treaty and Article
5(2) of Regulation 1466/97, invite the Member State
concerned to adjust its programme.
Definition of economic ‘good times’
Economic ‘good times’ should be identified as periods
where output exceeds its potential level, taking into
account tax elasticities.
Given the uncertainty surrounding output gap levels’
estimates, the change in the output gap could also be
considered, especially when the output gap is estimated
to be close to zero. For instance, periods where the out-
put gap is slightly negative but moving rapidly towards
positive values could be considered as ‘good times’.
Symmetrically, periods where the output gap is slightly
positive but moving rapidly towards negative values
could not be considered as ‘good times’.
The identification of periods of economic ‘good times’
should be made after an overall economic assessment.
The reference for the estimation of potential output is the
methodology adopted by the Council on 12 July
2002 (1). The reference to ‘tax elasticities’ should be
understood as the overall elasticity of taxes to GDP,
resulting from the influence of economic factors (fiscal
leads and lags, supply and demand composition of
growth), abstracting from the implementation of discre-
tionary measures.
Structural reforms
In order to enhance the growth oriented nature of the
Pact, structural reforms will be taken into account when
defining the adjustment path to the medium-term objec-
tive for countries that have not yet reached this objective
and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objec-
tive for countries that have already reached it.
Only major reforms that have a verifiable positive
impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances
will be taken into account. This includes reforms with
direct long-term cost-saving effects and reforms raising
potential growth. For instance, major health, pension and
labour market reforms will be considered.
Special attention will be paid to pension reforms intro-
ducing a multi-pillar system that includes a fully funded
pillar, which have a direct negative impact on the general
government deficit (as defined in Article 1 of Regulation
3605/93). This impact stems from the fact that revenue,
which used to be recorded as government revenue, is
diverted to a pension fund, which is fully-funded and
classified in a sector other than general government, and
that some pensions and other social benefits, which used
to be government expenditure, will be, after the reform,
paid by the pension scheme (2). In this specific case, the
allowed deviation from the MTO should reflect the net
¥1∂ See footnote 1.351
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vided the deviation remains temporary and an appropri-
ate safety margin to the reference value is preserved. The
net cost of the reform is measured as its direct impact on
the general government deficit.
Only adopted reforms should be considered, provided
that sufficient, detailed information is provided in the
Stability and Convergence Programmes (see Section II).
The budgetary effects of the reforms over time are
assessed by the Commission and the Council in a pru-
dent way, making due allowance for the margin of uncer-
tainties associated to such an exercise.
Major structural reforms as identified above will be
taken into account when defining the adjustment path to
the medium-term objective for countries that have not
yet reached this objective and in allowing a temporary
deviation from this objective for countries that have
already reached it, with the clear understanding that:
(i) a safety margin to ensure the respect of the 3 % of
GDP reference value for the deficit is guaranteed.
This safety margin will be assessed for each Mem-
ber State taking into account past output volatility
and the budgetary sensitivity to output fluctuations;
(ii) the budgetary position is expected to return to the
MTO within the period covered by the Stability or
Convergence Programme. For this purpose, the
period under consideration will be limited to — at
most — the four years following the year of the
presentation of the programme.
In case a temporary deviation from the medium-term
objective or the adjustment path toward it is allowed, this
should be specified in the Council Opinion on the Stabil-
ity/Convergence Programme.
3. Commission policy advice and early warning
The Commission will issue policy advice to encourage
Member States to stick to their adjustment path. Such pol-
icy advice, given in accordance with Article 211, second
indent, of the Treaty, will be replaced by warnings in
accordance with Article III-179 (4) of the Constitution as
soon as it becomes applicable. The Commission policy
advice and warnings are made public. The Commission
continues to have the possibility to propose recommenda-
tions for the Council to issue an early warning, in accord-
ance with Article 99 (4) of the Treaty and Article 6(2),
6(3), 10(2) and 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.
B. The excessive deficit procedure
1. Preparation of a Commission report under Article 
104(3) in case of non-compliance with the deficit 
criterion
The Commission will always prepare a report under
Article 104 (3) of the Treaty when a reported or planned
deficit exceeds 3 % of GDP. The Commission may, in
accordance with Article 104 (3), also prepare a report
notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under
the criteria laid down in Article 104 (2)(a) of the Treaty
if it is of the opinion that there is a risk of an excessive
deficit in a Member State.
The Commission shall examine in its report if one or
more of the exceptions foreseen in Article 104(2)(a)
apply. In particular, the Commission shall consider
whether the deficit ratio has declined substantially and
continuously and reached a level that comes close to the
reference value.
The Commission shall also consider whether the excess
over the reference value is only exceptional and tempo-
rary and whether the ratio remains close to the reference
value. In order to be considered as exceptional, the
excess has to result from an unusual event outside the
control of the Member State concerned and with a major
impact on the financial position of the general govern-
ment, or it has to result from a ‘severe economic down-
turn’. The Commission and the Council may consider an
excess over the reference value resulting from a ‘severe
economic downturn’ as exceptional in the sense of the
second indent of Article 104(2) (a) of the Treaty if the
excess over the reference value results from a negative
annual GDP volume growth rate or from an accumulated
loss of output during a protracted period of very low
annual GDP volume growth relative to its potential. The
indicator for assessing accumulated loss of output is the
output gap, as calculated according to the method agreed
by the Council on 12 July 2002 (1). The excess over the
reference value shall be considered as temporary if the
forecasts provided by the Commission indicate that the
¥2∂ For more information on the classification of pension schemes, see Euro-
stat decision on the ‘Classification of funded pension schemes in case of
government responsibility or guarantee’ of 2 March 2004. ¥1∂ See footnote 1.352
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end of the unusual event or the severe economic down-
turn.
The Commission report under Article 104 (3) shall also
take into account whether the government deficit
exceeds government investment expenditure and take
into account all other relevant factors.
The Commission report should appropriately reflect
developments in the medium-term economic position (in
particular potential growth, prevailing cyclical condi-
tions, the implementation of policies in the context of the
Lisbon agenda and policies to foster R & D and innova-
tion) and in the medium-term budgetary position (in par-
ticular, fiscal consolidation efforts in ‘good times’, debt
sustainability, public investment and the overall quality
of public finances). Furthermore, due consideration will
be given to any other factors which, in the opinion of the
Member State concerned, are relevant in order to com-
prehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over
the reference value. To this end, the Member State con-
cerned may put forward to the Council and to the Com-
mission the specific factors that it considers relevant, in
due time for the preparation of the report under Article
104 (3) and as a rule within one month of the reporting
dates established in Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93. The Member State shall provide the
information necessary for the Commission and the
Council to make a comprehensive assessment of the
budgetary impact of these factors. In that context, special
consideration will be given to budgetary efforts towards
increasing or maintaining at a high level financial contri-
butions to fostering international solidarity and to
achieving European policy goals, notably the unification
of Europe if it has a detrimental effect on the growth and
fiscal burden of a Member State. A balanced overall
assessment has to encompass all these factors.
The Commission report will give due consideration to
the implementation of pension reforms introducing a
multi-pillar system that includes a fully funded pillar, if
these reforms have a direct negative impact on the gen-
eral government deficit (as defined in Article 1 of Regu-
lation 3605/93. This impact stems from the fact that rev-
enue, which used to be recorded as government revenue,
is diverted to a pension fund, which is fully-funded and
classified in a sector other than general government, and
that some pensions and other social benefits, which used
to be government expenditure will be, after the reform,
paid by the pension scheme. In particular, the Commis-
sion report will examine the net cost of the reform to the
publicly managed pillar. The net cost of the reform is
measured as its direct impact on the general government
deficit.
2. Increasing the focus on debt and sustainability
In line with the provisions of the Treaty, the Commission
has to examine compliance with budgetary discipline on
the basis of both the deficit and the debt criteria. The
Council has agreed that there should be increased focus
on debt and sustainability, and reaffirmed the need to
reduce government debt to below 60 % of GDP at a sat-
isfactory pace, taking into account macroeconomic con-
ditions. The higher the debt to GDP ratios of Member
States, the greater must be their efforts to reduce them
rapidly.
The debt surveillance framework and the excessive def-
icit procedure should be strengthened by applying the
concept of ‘sufficiently diminishing and approaching the
reference value at a satisfactory pace’ for the debt ratio
in qualitative terms, by taking into account macroeco-
nomic conditions and debt dynamics, including the pur-
suit of appropriate levels of primary surpluses as well as
other measures to reduce gross debt and debt manage-
ment strategies and the relationship between the evolu-
tion of the deficit and the evolution of the general gov-
ernment gross debt.
The Commission will always prepare a report on the
basis of Article 104(3) of the Treaty, in which it shall
examine if one or more of the exceptions foreseen
respectively in Article 104(2)(a) and (b) apply.
For countries in which the debt ratio is above the refer-
ence value, the Council will formulate recommendations
on the debt dynamics in its opinions on the Stability and
Convergence Programmes.
3. The decision on the existence of an excessive deficit
If the double condition of the overarching principle —
that, before the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3)
of Regulation 1467/97 are taken into account, the gen-
eral government deficit remains close to the reference
value and its excess over the reference value is tempo-
rary — is fully met, the relevant factors assessed in the
Commission report under Article 104(3) will also be
taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on
the existence of an excessive deficit, foreseen in para-
graphs (4), (5) and (6) of Article 104 of the Treaty. The353
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in accordance with Article 104(6) shall encompass all
these factors.
In the case of Member States where the deficit exceeds
the reference value, while remaining close to it, and
where this excess reflects the direct impact on the gen-
eral government deficit (as defined in Article 1 of Regu-
lation 3605/93) stemming from the implementation of a
pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that
includes a fully funded pillar, the Commission and the
Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the
publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in
EDP deficit figures. This impact stems from the fact that
revenue, which used to be recorded as government reve-
nue, is diverted to a pension fund, which is fully-funded
and classified in a sector other than general government,
and that some pensions and other social benefits, which
used to be government expenditure, will be, after the
reform, paid by the pension scheme. Consideration to the
net cost of the reform will be given for the initial five
years after a Member State has introduced a fully-funded
system, or five years after 2004 for Member States that
have already introduced such a system. Furthermore, it
will also be regressive, i.e. during a period of five years,
consideration will be given to 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 per-
cent of the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed
pillar. The net cost of the reform is measured as its direct
impact on the general government deficit.
The Council shall decide on the existence of an excessive
deficit in accordance with Article 104 (6) of the Treaty, on
the basis of a Commission recommendation, as a rule
within four months of the reporting dates established in
Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. The
Council may decide later in the cases in which the budg-
etary statistical data have not been validated by the Com-
mission (Eurostat) shortly after the reporting dates estab-
lished in Regulation (EC) No 3605/93.
4. The correction of an excessive deficit
Minimum fiscal effort for countries in excessive deficit 
and initial deadline for its correction
The Council recommendations under Article 104 (7) and
notices under Article 104 (9), based on recommenda-
tions of the Commission, will request that the Member
State concerned achieves a minimum annual improve-
ment in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and
temporary measures of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a bench-
mark, in order to correct the excessive deficit within the
deadline set in the recommendation.
As a rule, the initial deadline for correcting an excessive
deficit should be the year after its identification and thus,
normally, the second year after its occurrence. This
deadline should be set taking into account the minimum
adjustment, in cyclically adjusted terms net of one-off
and other temporary measures, requested by the Council.
If this effort seems sufficient to correct the excessive
deficit in the year following its identification, the initial
deadline needs not to be set beyond that year.
In case of special circumstances, the initial deadline for
correcting an excessive deficit would be set, as a rule,
one year later, i.e. the second year after its identification
and thus normally the third year after its occurrence. The
determination of the existence of such circumstances
will take into account a balanced overall assessment of
the factors mentioned in the report under Article 104(3).
Longer deadlines could be set for new and future Mem-
ber States, i.e. in the case of Members States being
placed in excessive deficit immediately following their
accession. Longer deadlines could also be set for Mem-
ber States implementing pension reforms introducing a
multi-pillar system that includes a fully funded pillar.
Clarifying the conditions for abeyance
Following the expiry of the six month period following
the adoption of a recommendation under Article 104(7)
or the four months period following the adoption of a
notice under Article 104(9), the Commission shall assess
whether the Member State concerned has acted in com-
pliance with the recommendation or notice. This assess-
ment should consider whether the Member State con-
cerned has publicly announced or taken measures that
seem sufficient to ensure adequate progress towards the
correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits
set by the Council.
In case it appears that the Member State concerned has
not acted in compliance with the recommendation or
notice, the following step of the procedure provided by
Article 104 of the Treaty, as clarified by Regulation (EC)
No 1467/97, shall be activated.
If the Commission considers that the Member State has
acted in compliance with the recommendation or notice,
it shall inform the Council accordingly, and the pro-354
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that action by the Member State concerned is not being
implemented or is proving to be inadequate and if the
possibility of repeating the same step does not apply, the
following step of the procedure provided by Article 104
of the Treaty, as clarified by Regulation (EC) No 1467/
97, shall be immediately activated. When considering
whether the following step of the procedure should be
activated, the Commission and the Council should take
into account whether the measures required in the rec-
ommendation or notice are fully implemented and
whether other budgetary variables under the control of
the government are developing in line with what was
assumed in the recommendation or notice.
In the specific case of recommendations or notices
which have set a deadline for the correction of the exces-
sive deficit more than one year after its identification, the
assessment made by the Commission after the expiry of
the six month period following the adoption of a recom-
mendation under Article 104(7) or the four month period
following a notice under Article 104(9) should mainly
focus on the measures taken in order to ensure an ade-
quate fiscal adjustment in the year following the identi-
fication of the excessive deficit. The Commission
should, during the period of abeyance, assess whether
the measures already announced or taken are being ade-
quately implemented and whether additional measures
are announced and implemented in order to ensure ade-
quate progress toward the correction of the excessive
deficit within the time limits set by the Council.
Clarifying the concept of effective action and repetition 
of steps in the excessive deficit procedure
If effective action has been taken in compliance with a
recommendation under Article 104(7) (or notice under
Article 104(9)) of the Treaty and unexpected adverse eco-
nomic events with major unfavourable consequences for
government finances occur after the adoption of that rec-
ommendation or notice, the Council may decide, on a rec-
ommendation from the Commission and before taking
into account the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3)
of Regulation 1467/97, to adopt a revised recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7) (or notice under Article 104(9))
of the Treaty. The revised recom-mendation (or notice),
then taking into account the relevant factors mentioned in
Article 2 (3) of Regulation 1467/97, may notably extend
the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by
one year.
A Member State should be considered to have taken
‘effective action’ if it has acted in compliance with the
recommendation or notice, regarding both the imple-
mentation of the measures required therein and budget-
ary execution. The assessment should in particular take
into account whether the Member State concerned has
achieved the annual improvement of its cyclically
adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary
measures, initially recommended by the Council. In case
the observed adjustment proves to be lower than recom-
mended, a careful analysis of the reasons for the shortfall
would be made.
The occurrence of unexpected adverse economic events
with major unfavourable budgetary effects shall be
assessed against the economic forecast underlying the
Council recommendation or notice.
5. Abrogation of Council decisions in the context 
of the EDP for Member States having implemented 
multi-pillar pension reforms
Abrogation of Council decisions under paragraphs (6) to
(9) and (11) of Article 104 of the Treaty is possible only
if the general government deficit has declined substan-
tially and continuously and has reached a level that
comes close to the reference value.
The Commission and the Council, when considering
under Article 104 (12) whether some or all of the Coun-
cil decisions under Article 104 (6) to (9) and (11) should
be abrogated, consider carefully an excess close to the
deficit reference value which reflects the implementa-
tion of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar sys-
tem that includes a fully-funded pillar.
Consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given
for the initial five years after a Member State has intro-
duced a fully-funded system, or five years after 2004 for
Member States that have already introduced such a
system (1). Furthermore, it will also be regressive, i.e.
during a period of five years, consideration will be given
to 100, 80, 60, 40 and 20 percent of the net cost of the
reform to the publicly managed pillar. The net cost of the
reform is measured as its direct impact on the general
government deficit (as defined in Article 1 of Regulation
¥1∂ Up to the March 2007 notification, these provisions do not apply to Mem-
ber States that benefit from the special treatment granted by Eurostat for
the implementation of the 2 March 2004 decision on the classification of
second-pillar funded pension schemes. See Eurostat News Releases
No 30/2004 of 2 March 2004 and No 117/2004 of 23 September 2004.355
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which used to be recorded as government revenue, is
diverted to a pension fund, which is fully-funded and
classified in a sector other than general government, and
that some pensions and other social benefits, which used
to be government expenditure, will be, after the reform,
paid by the pension scheme.
This implies in particular that for those Member States
that already have implemented such reforms, it will be
considered for 100 % in 2005, 80 % in 2006, 60 % in
2007, 40 % in 2008 and 20 % in 2009. For reforms imple-
mented after 2005, the net impact of such reforms will be
considered accordingly. For example, in the case of a
Member State that would implement such a reform in
2007, the net budgetary impact of the reform will be con-
sidered for 100 % in 2007, 80 % in 2008, 60 % in 2009,
40 % in 2010 and 20 % in 2011. The Member State shall
provide the information necessary for the Commission to
assess the net budgetary impact of the reform. 356
SECTION II
Guidelines on the format and content 
of Stability and Convergence Programmes
The Stability and Growth Pact requires Member States
to submit Stability or Convergence Programmes and
updates thereof, which are at the basis of the Council’s
surveillance of budgetary positions and its surveillance
and coordination of economic policies. The Council
may, on a recommendation from the Commission, and
after consulting the Economic and Financial Committee,
deliver an opinion on each of the updated programmes
and, if it considers that its objectives and contents should
be strengthened, invite the Member State concerned to
adjust its programme.
Member States are expected to take the corrective action
they deem necessary to meet the objectives of their Sta-
bility or Convergence Programmes, whenever they have
information indicating actual or expected significant
divergence from those objectives.
In view of the fundamental role of the Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes in the process of multilateral sur-
veillance, it is important that their information content is
suitable and allows for comparison across Member
States. Whilst acknowledging that the programmes are
the responsibility of national authorities and that the pos-
sibilities and practices differ across countries, Council
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 as amended by Council
Regulation (EC) No 1055/05 sets out the essential ele-
ments of these programmes.
The experience gathered during the first years of imple-
mentation of the Pact with the Stability and Convergence
Programmes shows that guidelines on the content and
format of the programmes not only assist the Member
States in drawing up their programmes, but also facilitate
their examination by the Commission, the Economic and
Financial Committee and the Council.
The guidelines set out below should be considered as a
code of good practice and checklist to be used by Mem-
ber States in preparing Stability or Convergence Pro-
grammes. Member States are expected to follow the
guidelines as far as possible, and to justify any departure
from them.
1. Status of the programme and of the measures
Each programme mentions its status in the context of
national procedures, notably with respect to the national
Parliament. The programme also indicates whether the
Council opinion on the previous programme has been
presented to the national Parliament.
The state of implementation of the measures (enacted
versus planned) presented in the programme should be
specified.
2. Content of Stability and Convergence Programmes
In order to facilitate comparison across countries, Mem-
ber States are expected, as far as possible, to follow the
model structure for the programmes in Annex 1. The
standardisation of the format and content of the pro-
grammes along the lines set below will substantially
improve the conditions for equality of treatment.
The quantitative information should be presented fol-
lowing a standardised set of tables (Annex 2). Member
States should endeavour to supply all the information in
these tables. The tables could be complemented by fur-
ther information wherever deemed useful by Member
States.
In addition to the guidelines set out below, the pro-
grammes should provide information on the consistency
with the broad economic policy guidelines of the budg-
etary objectives and the measures to achieve them, as
well as on the measures to enhance the quality of public
finances and to achieve long-term sustainability.
Objectives
Member States will present in their Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes budgetary targets for the general
government balance in relation to the MTO, and the pro-
jected path for the debt ratio. Convergence programmes
shall also present the medium-term monetary policy
objectives and their relationship to price and exchange
rate stability.
Member States, when preparing the first update of their
Stability or Convergence Programme after a new gov-
ernment has taken office, are invited to show continuity
with respect to the budgetary targets endorsed by the
Council on the basis of the previous update of the Stabil-
ity/Convergence Programme and — with an outlook for
the whole legislature — to provide information on the
means and instruments envisaged to reach these targets
by setting out its budgetary strategy.
To permit a fuller understanding of the path of the govern-
ment balance and of the budgetary strategy in general,
information should be provided on expenditure and reve-
nue ratios and on their components separately identified,
as well as on one-off and other temporary measures (1). To
¥1∂ Countries that benefit, over a transition period up to the March 2007 notifi-
cation, from the special treatment granted by Eurostat for the implementa-
tion of the 2 March 2004 decision on the classification of second-pillar
funded pension schemes, should present in their programmes detailed
information on the impact on the general government balance as well as on
the revenue and expenditure side separately and, if possible, on the debt
ratio.357
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information should be provided, to the extent possible,
on components of the stock-flow adjustment, such as pri-
vatisation receipts and other financial operations.
The budget balances should be broken down by subsec-
tor of general government (central government, State
government for Member States with federal or quasi-
federal institutional arrangements, local government
and, social security).
Assumptions and data
Stability and Convergence programmes should be based
on realistic and cautious macroeconomic forecasts. The
Commission forecasts can provide an important contri-
bution for the coordination of economic and fiscal poli-
cies. Member States are free to base their Stability/
Convergence Programmes on their own projections.
However, significant divergences between the national
and the Commission services’ forecasts should be
explained in some detail. This explanation will serve as
a reference when forecast errors are assessed ex post.
The programmes should present the main assumptions
about expected economic developments and important
economic variables that are relevant to the realisation of
their budgetary plans, such as government investment
expenditure, real GDP growth, employment and infla-
tion. The assumptions on real GDP growth should be
underpinned by an indication of the expected demand
contributions to growth. The possible upside and down-
side risks to the outlook should be brought out.
Furthermore, the programmes should provide sufficient
information about GDP developments to allow an analy-
sis of the cyclical position of the economy and the
sources of potential growth. The outlook for sectoral bal-
ances and, especially for countries with a high external
deficit, the external balance should be analysed.
As regards external macroeconomic developments, euro
area Member States and Member States participating in
ERM II in particular should use the ‘common external
assumptions’ on the main extra-EU variables if provided
by the Commission in due time or, for comparability rea-
sons, present sensitivity analysis based on the common
assumptions for these variables when the differences are
significant. The assumptions are to be provided in due
time by the Commission services (after consultation with
national experts), on the basis of the final table in Annex
2, for discussion by the EFC.
Assumptions about interest rates and exchange rates, if
not presented in the programme, should be provided to
the Commission services to allow for the technical
assessment of the programmes.
In order to facilitate the assessment, the concepts used
shall be in line with the standards established at Euro-
pean level, notably in the context of the European system
of accounts (ESA). The programmes should ensure the
formal and substantial consistency of the required infor-
mation on budgetary aggregates and economic assump-
tions with ESA concepts. This information may be com-
plemented by a presentation of specific accounting
concepts that are of particular importance to the country
concerned.
Measures, structural reforms and long-term 
sustainability
The programmes should describe the budgetary and
other economic policy measures being taken or proposed
to achieve the objectives of the programme, and, in the
case of the main budgetary measures, an assessment of
their quantitative effects on the general government bal-
ance. Measures having significant ‘one-off’ effects
should be explicitly identified. The further forward the
year of the programme, the less detailed the information
could be. However, budgetary targets should be backed
by an indication of the broad measures necessary to
achieve them.
Structural reforms should be specifically analysed when
they are envisaged to contribute to the achievement of
the objectives of the programme. In particular, given the
relevance of ‘major structural reforms’ in defining the
adjustment path to the medium-term objective for Mem-
ber States that have not yet reached it and allowing a
temporary deviation from the MTO for Member States
that have already reached it (see Section I), the pro-
grammes should include comprehensive information on
the budgetary and economic effects of such reforms.
Programmes should notably include a detailed quantita-
tive cost-benefit analysis of the short-term costs — if any
— and of the long-term benefits of the reforms from the
budgetary point of view. They should also analyse the
projected impact of the reforms on economic growth
over time while explaining the used methodology.358
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improving the quality of public finances on both the rev-
enue and expenditure side (e.g. tax reform, value-for-
money initiatives, measures to improve tax collection
efficiency and expenditure control).
The programmes could further include information on
the implementation of existing national budgetary rules
(expenditure rules, etc.) as well as on other institutional
features of the public finances, in particular budgetary
procedures and public finance statistical governance.
Finally, the programmes should outline the countries
strategies to ensure the sustainability of public finances,
especially in light of the economic and budgetary impact
of ageing populations.
The Working Group on Ageing (AWG) attached to the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is responsible for
producing common budgetary projections on: public
spending on pensions; healthcare; long-term care; edu-
cation; unemployment transfers; and where possible and
relevant, age-related revenues, such as pension contribu-
tions. These common projections will provide the basis
for the assessment by the Commission and the Council
of sustainability of the Member States’ public finances
within the context of the SGP. They should be included
in the programmes.
The programmes should include all the necessary addi-
tional information, both of qualitative and quantitative
nature, so as to enable the Commission and the Council
to assess the sustainability of Member States of public
finances based on current policies. To this end, informa-
tion included in programmes should focus on new rele-
vant information that is not fully reflected in the latest
common EPC projections. For example, Member States
might want to include information on the latest demo-
graphic trends and major policy changes in pension and
healthcare systems. Programmes should clearly distin-
guish between measures that have been enacted and
measures that are envisaged.
Given the uncertainty surrounding long-term projec-
tions, the assessment by the Commission and the Coun-
cil should include stress tests that provide an indication
of the risks to public finance sustainability in the event
of adverse demographic, economic or budgetary devel-
opments.
In addition to the requirements mentioned above, Mem-
ber States may present different projections, based on
national calculations. In such a case, Member States
should explain in detail the underlying assumptions of
these projections, the used methodology, the policies
implemented or planned to meet the assumptions, and
the divergences between the national projections and the
common projections produced by the Working Group on
Ageing attached to the Economic Policy Committee.
These national projections and their assumptions,
including their plausibility, will enter the basis for the
assessment by the Commission and the Council of sus-
tainability of the Member States’ public finances within
the context of the SGP.
Sensitivity analysis
Given the inevitability of forecast errors, Stability and
Convergence Programmes include comprehensive sensi-
tivity analyses and/or develop alternative scenarios, in
order to enable the Commission and the Council to con-
sider the complete range of possible fiscal outcomes.
In particular, the programmes shall provide an analysis of
how changes in the main economic assumptions would
affect the budgetary and debt position and indicate the
underlying assumptions about how revenues and expendi-
tures are projected to react to variations in economic vari-
ables. This should include the impact of different interest
rate assumptions and, for non-participating Member
States, of different exchange rate assumptions, on the
budgetary and debt position. Countries that do not use the
common external assumptions should endeavour to pro-
vide a sensitivity analysis also on main extra-EU variables
when the differences are significant.
In the case of ‘major structural reforms’ (see section I),
the programmes shall also provide an analysis of how
changes in the assumptions would affect the effects on
the budget and potential growth.
Time horizon
The information about paths for the general government
surplus/deficit ratio, the expenditure and revenue ratios
and their components as well as for debt ratio and the
main economic assumptions should be on an annual
basis and should cover, as well as the current and preced-
ing year, at least the three following years (Article 3(3)
and Article 7(3)), leaving it open to Member States to
cover a longer period if they so wish.359
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ary implications of ageing should cover the same period
as the EPC projections.
Updating of programmes
In order to promote the efficiency of the budgetary and
economic surveillance and achieve a better interaction
between different procedures, submissions of SCP
updates should take place shortly after national govern-
ments have presented their budget proposals to parlia-
ments, but not earlier than mid-October and not later
than the 1 of December (1) (2). (3). This should increase
the comparability of the programmes, the consistency of
the assessments and the equality of treatment. The EFC
and the ECOFIN should examine the SCP updates in a
maximum of three sessions. The whole process should
be completed before the end of March each year.
Annual updates of Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes should show how developments have com-
pared with the budgetary targets in the previous pro-
gramme or update. When applicable, they should explain
in detail the reasons for the deviations from these targets.
When substantial deviations occur, the update should
mention whether measures are taken to rectify the situa-
tion, and provide information on these measures.
¥1∂ In the case of the UK, which has a different fiscal year, submission should
be as close as possible to the presentation of the autumn pre-Budget report.
¥2∂ Austria and Portugal cannot comply at this stage with this schedule, but
they will submit their Stability Programmes no later than 15 December.
¥3∂ Ireland will be regarded as meeting this commitment by submitting its Sta-
bility Programme update on its annual Budget day, which traditionally
takes place on the first Wednesday of December.360
Annex 1
Model structure for the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes
1. Overall policy framework and objectives
2. Economic outlook
(on the basis of Tables 1a-1d, 5 and 8)
• World economy/technical assumptions
• Cyclical developments and current prospects
• Medium-term scenario
• Sectoral balances
• Growth implications of ‘major structural reforms’
3. General government balance and debt
(on the basis of Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5)
• Policy strategy
• Medium-term objectives
• Actual balances and implications of budget for next year
• Structural balance (cyclical component of the deficit, one-off and temporary measures), fiscal stance
• Debt levels and developments, analysis of below-the-line operations and stock-flow adjustments
• Budgetary implications of ‘major structural reforms’
4. Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous update
(on the basis of Table 6)
• Alternative scenarios and risks
• Sensitivity of budgetary projections to different scenarios and assumptions
• Comparison with previous update361
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(on the basis of Tables 2 and 3)
• Policy strategy
• Developments on the expenditure side
• Developments on the revenue side
6. Sustainability of public finances
(on the basis of Table 7)
• Policy strategy
• Long-term budgetary prospects, including the implications of ageing populations
7. Institutional features of public finances
• Implementation of national budgetary rules
• Budgetary procedures, inclluding public finance statistical governance
• Other institutional developments in relation to public finances362
Annex 2
Tables to be contained in the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and their updates
Provision of data on variables in bold characters is a requirement.
Provision of data on other variables is optional but highly desirable.           
         
Table 1a.
Macroeconomic prospects
ESA Code
Year
X-1 Year X-1
Year
X
Year
X+1 Year X+2
Year
X+3
Level rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change
1. Real GDP B1*g
2. Nominal GDP B1*g
Components of real GDP
3. Private consumption expenditure P.3
4. Government consumption expenditure P.3
5. Gross fixed capital formation P.51
6. Changes in inventories and net acquisition 
of valuables (% of GDP)
P.52 + P.53
7. Exports of goods and services P.6
8. Imports of goods and services P.7
Contributions to real GDP growth
9. Final domestic demand -
10. Changes in inventories and net acquisition 
of valuables 
P.52 + P.53 -
11. External balance of goods and services B.11 -363
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Price developments
ESA Code
Year
X-1 Year X-1
Year
X
Year
X+1 Year X+2
Year
X+3
Level rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change
1. GDP deflator
2. Private consumption deflator
3. HICP (1)
4. Public consumption deflator
5. Investment deflator 
6. Export price deflator (goods and services)
7. Import price deflator (goods and services)
(1) Optional for Stability Programmes.
Table 1c.
Labour market developments
ESA Code
Year
X-1 Year X-1
Year
X
Year
X+1 Year X+2
Year
X+3
Level rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change rate of change
1. Employment, persons (1) 
2. Employment, hours worked (2)
3. Unemployment rate (%) (3)
4. Labour productivity, persons  (4)
5. Labour productivity, hours worked (5)
6. Compensation of employees D.1
(1) Occupied population, domestic concept national accounts deﬁnition.
(2) National accounts deﬁnition.
(3) Harmonised deﬁnition, Eurostat; levels.
(4) Real GDP per person employed.
(5) Real GDP per hour worked.
Table 1d.
Sectoral balances
% of GDP ESA Code YearX-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
1. Net lending/borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world B.9 optional optional
of which:
— Balance on goods and services
— Balance of primary incomes and transfers
— Capital account
2. Net lending/borrowing of the private sector B.9/EDP B.9
3. Net lending/borrowing of general government B.9
4. Statistical discrepancy optional optional optional optional364
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General government budgetary prospects
ESA code
Year
X-1
Year
X-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
Level  % of GDP  % of GDP  % of GDP  % of GDP  % of GDP
Net lending (EDP B.9) by sub-sector
1. General government S.13
2. Central government S.1311
3. State government S.1312
4. Local government S.1313
5. Social security funds S.1314
General government (S13)
6. Total revenue TR
7. Total expenditure TE (1)
8. Net lending/borrowing EDP B.9
9. Interest expenditure (incl. FISIM) EDP D.41 
incl. FISIM
pm: 9a. FISIM 
10. Primary balance (2)
Selected components of revenue
11. Total taxes (11=11a+11b+11c)
11a. Taxes on production and imports D.2 optional optional
11b. Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. D.5 optional optional
11c. Capital taxes D.91 optional optional
12. Social contributions D.61 optional optional
13. Property income D.4 optional optional
14. Other (14=15-(11+12+13)) optional optional
15=6. Total revenue TR
p.m.: Tax burden (D.2+D.5+D.61+D.91-
D.995) (3)
Selected components of expenditure
16. Collective consumption P.32
17. Total social transfers D.62
+
D.63
17a. Social transfers in kind P.31
=D.63
17b. Social transfers other than in kind D.62
18.=9. Interest expenditure (incl. FISIM) EDP D.41 
incl. FISIM
19. Subsidies D.3
20. Gross fixed capital formation P.51
21. Other (21=22-(16+17+18+19+20))
22=7. Total expenditure TE (4)
Pm: compensation of employees D.1
(1) Adjusted for the net ﬂow of swap-related ﬂows, so that TR-TE=EDP B.9.
(2) The primary balance is calculated as (EDP B.9, item 8) plus (EDP D.41 + FISIM recorded as intermediate consumption, item 9).
(3) Including those collected by the EU and including an adjustment for uncollected taxes and social contributions (D.995), if appropriate.
(4) Adjusted for the net ﬂow of swap-related ﬂows, so that TR-TE=EDP B.9.365
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General government expenditure by function
% of GDP COFOG Code Year X-2 YearX +3
1. General public services 1
2. Defence 2
3. Public order and safety 3
4. Economic affairs 4
5. Environmental protection 5
6. Housing and community amenities 6
7. Health 7
8. Recreation, culture and religion 8
9. Education 9
10. Social protection 10
11. Total expenditure ( = item 7=26 in Table 2) TE (1)
(1) Adjusted for the net ﬂow of swap-related ﬂows, so that TR-TE=EDP B.9.
Table 4.
General government debt developments
% of GDP YearX-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
1. Gross debt (1)
2. Change in gross debt ratio
Contributions to changes in gross debt 
3. Primary balance (2)
4. Interest expenditure (incl. FISIM) (3)
5. Stock-flow adjustment
of which:
— Differences between cash and accruals (4)
— Net accumulation of financial assets (5)
of which:
— privatisation proceeds
- Valuation effects and other (6)
p.m. implicit interest rate on debt (7)
Other relevant variables
6. Liquid financial assets (8) 
7. Net financial debt (7=1-6)
(1) As deﬁned in Regulation 3605/93 (not an ESA concept).
(2) Cf. item 10 in Table 2.
(3) Cf. item 9 in Table 2.
(4) The differences concerning interest expenditure, other expenditure and revenue could be distinguished when relevant.
(5) Liquid assets, assets on third countries, government controlled enterprises and the difference between quoted and non-quoted assets could be distinguished when
relevant.
(6) Changes due to exchange rate movements, and operation in secondary market could be distinguished when relevant.
(7) Proxied by interest expenditure (incl. FISIM recorded as consumption) divided by the debt level of the previous year. 
(8) AF1, AF2, AF3 (consolidated at market value), AF5 (if quoted in stock exchange; including mutual fund shares). 366
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Table 5.
Cyclical developments
% of GDP ESA Code YearX-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
1. Real GDP growth (%)
2. Net lending of general government EDP B.9
3. Interest expenditure (incl. FISIM recorded as consumption) EDPD.41+FISIM
4. Potential GDP growth (%) (1)
contributions:
— labour
— capital
— total factor productivity
5. Output gap
6. Cyclical budgetary component
7. Cyclically-adjusted balance (2-6)
8. Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (7-3)
(1) Until an agreement on the Production Function Method is reached, Member States can use their own ﬁgures (SP)
Table 6.
Divergence from previous update
ESA Code YearX-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
Real GDP growth (%)
Previous update
Current update
Difference
General government net lending (% of GDP) EDP B.9
Previous update
Current update
Difference
General government gross debt (% of GDP)
Previous update
Current update
Difference367
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Long-term sustainability of public finances
% of GDP 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2050
Total expenditure
Of which: age-related expenditures
 Pension expenditure
Social security pension
Old-age and early pensions
Other pensions (disability, survivors)
Occupational pensions (if in general government)
Health care
Long-term care (this was earlier included in the healthcare) 
Education expenditure
Other age-related expenditures
Interest expenditure
Total revenue
 Of which: property income
of which: from pensions contributions 
(or social contributions if appropriate)
Pension reserve fund assets
Of which: consolidated public pension fund assets 
(assets other than government liabilities)
Assumptions
Labour productivity growth
Real GDP growth
Participation rate males (aged 20-64)
Participation rates females (aged 20-64)
Total participation rates (aged 20-64)
Unemployment rate
Population aged 65+ over total population
Table 8.
Basic assumptions
This table should preferably be included in the programme itself; if not, these assumptions should be 
transmitted to the Council and the Commission together with the programme.
Year
X-1
Year
X
Year
X+1
Year
X+2
Year
X+3
Short-term interest rate (1) (annual average)
Long-term interest rate (annual average)
USD/EUR exchange rate (annual average) (euro area and ERM II countries)
Nominal effective exchange rate 
(for countries not in euro area or ERM II) exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro 
(annual average) 
World excluding EU, GDP growth
EU GDP growth 
Growth of relevant foreign markets
World import volumes, excluding EU
Oil prices, (Brent, USD/barrel)
(1) If necessary, purely technical assumptions.368
4. Glossary
Accession Countries Countries in the process for acces-
sion to the European Union. They include Bulgaria and
Romania.
Automatic stabilisers Various features of the tax and
spending regime which react automatically to the eco-
nomic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the
budget balance tends to improve in years of high growth,
and deteriorate during economic slowdowns.
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) Annual
guidelines for the economic and budgetary policies of
the Member States. They are prepared by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council of Ministers responsible
for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin).
Budget balance The balance between total public
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a posi-
tive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance
indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State
budgetary positions, the EU uses general government
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, primary
budget balance, and primary structural balance.
Budgetary rules Rules and procedures through which
policy-makers decide on the size and the allocation of
public expenditure as well as on its financing through
taxation and borrowing.
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget bal-
ance in percentage of GDP brought about by a change in
the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on
average.
Candidate countries Countries that wish to accede to
the EU. Besides the accession countries, they include
Croatia and Turkey.
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement con-
tained in the Stability and Growth Pact, according to
which Member States should, over the medium term,
achieve an overall budget balance close to balance or in
surplus.
Code of Conduct on the format and content of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes Policy document
endorsed by the Ecofin Council in July 2001 setting
down the information requirements and key definitions
to be followed by Member States in preparing their sta-
bility or convergence programmes.
Convergence Programmes Medium term budgetary
and monetary strategies presented by each of those
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. They
are updated annually, according to the provisions of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Prior to the third phase of
EMU, convergence programmes were issued on a volun-
tary basis and used by the Commission in its assessment
of the progress made in preparing for the euro. See also
Stability programmes.
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due
to changes in interest rates and exchange rates triggered
by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy.
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the
change in the Budget balance that follows automatically
from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the
reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in
the Output gap. See Automatic stabilisers, Tax smooth-
ing and Structural budget balance.
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance See Structural
budget balance.
Demand and supply shocks Disturbances that affect the
economy on the demand side (e.g. changes in private
consumption or exports) or on the supply side (e.g.
changes in commodity prices or technological innova-
tions). They can impact on the economy either on a tem-
porary or permanent basis.369
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 6Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of people who
receive government transfers, especially pensions, rela-
tive to those who are available to provide the revenue to
pay for those transfers.
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on personal or
corporate incomes and property.
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget bal-
ance and in its components under the control of govern-
ment aiming at stabilising the economy. It is usually
measured as the residual of the change in the balance
after the exclusion of the budgetary impact of automatic
stabilisers. See also fiscal stance.
Early-warning mechanism Part of the preventive ele-
ments of the SGP, and is activated when there is signifi-
cant divergence from the budgetary targets set down in a
stability or convergence programme.
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly
the Monetary Committee, renamed the Economic and
Financial Committee as of January 1999. Its main task is
to prepare and discuss (Ecofin) Council decisions with
regard to economic and financial matters.
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior
officials whose main task is to prepare discussions of the
(Ecofin) Council on structural policies. It plays a large
role in the preparation of the BEPGs, and it is active on
policies related to labour markets, methods to calculate
cyclically-adjusted budget balances and ageing popula-
tions.
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of tax
revenue (labour income, capital income, consumption)
to their respective tax bases.
ESA95 / ESA79 European accounting standards for the
reporting of economic data by the Member States to the
EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced the earlier ESA79
standard with regard to the comparison and analysis of
national public finance data.
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) A procedure
according to which the Commission and the Council
monitor the development of national budget balances
and public debt in order to assess the risk of an excessive
deficit in each Member State. Its application has been
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also stability programmes and Stability and Growth
Pact.
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a
subset of) public expenditure.
Fiscal consolidation A continuous improvement in the
budget balance, either specified by the amount of the
improvement or the period over which the improvement
continues.
Fiscal decentralisation The transfer of authority and
responsibility for public functions from the central gov-
ernment to intermediate and local governments or to the
market.
Fiscal federalism A subfield of public finance that
investigates the fiscal relations across levels of govern-
ment.
Fiscal impulse The estimated effect of fiscal policy on
GDP. It is not a model-free measure and it is usually cal-
culated by simulating an econometric model. The esti-
mates presented in the present report are obtained by
using the Commission services’ model QUEST.
Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy,
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal per-
formance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, debt, or a major component thereof. See also
budgetary rule, expenditure rules.
Fiscal stance A measure of the discretionary fiscal pol-
icy component. In this report, it is defined as the change
in the primary structural budget balance relative to the
preceding period. When the change is positive (negative)
the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive).
General government As used by the EU in its process
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general
government sector covers national government, regional
and local government, as well as social security funds.
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to and
from the EU Budget.
Government budget constraint A basic condition
applying to the public finances, according to which
total public expenditure in any one year must be
financed by taxation, government borrowing, or
changes in the monetary base. In the context of EMU,370
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money issuance is prohibited. See also Stock-flow
adjustment, sustainability.
Government contingent liabilities Obligations for the
government that are subject to the realisation of specific
uncertain and discrete future events. For instance, the
guarantees granted by governments to the debt of private
corporations bonds issued by enterprise are contingent
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to hon-
our its own obligations.
Government implicit liabilities Government obli-
gations that are very likely to arise in the future in spite
of the absence of backing contracts or law. The govern-
ment may have a potential future obligation as a result of
legitimate expectations generated by past practice or as a
result of the pressure by interest groups. Most implicit
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the occur-
rence of uncertain future events.
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter A statistical technique
used to calculate trend GDP and output gaps by filtering
actual GDP.
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the pro-
duction stage, and not on the income and property aris-
ing from economic production processes. Prominent
examples of indirect taxation are value added tax (VAT),
excise duties, import levies, energy and other environ-
mental taxes.
Interest burden General government interest payments
on public debt as a share of GDP.
Maastricht reference values for public debt and defi-
cits Respectively, a 60 percent general government debt/
GDP ratio and a 3 percent general government deficit/
GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined in a protocol to
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. See also
Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of total
debt in terms of when it is due to be paid back. Interest
rate changes affect the budget balance directly to the
extent that the general government sector has debt with
a relatively short maturity structure. Long maturities
reduce the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes
in the prevailing interest rate. See also Public debt.
Minimal benchmarks Values indicating a budgetary
position that would provide a cyclical safety margin for
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely during eco-
nomic slowdowns without leading to excessive deficits.
The minimal benchmarks are estimated by the European
Commission. They do not cater for other risks such as
unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate
shocks and should not be confused with the ‘close-to-
balance or in surplus’ medium-term requirement of the
Pact.
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) An indicator com-
bining the change in real short-term interest rate and in
the real effective exchange rate to gauge the degree of
easing or tightening of monetary policy.
Mundell-Fleming model Macroeconomic model of an
open economy which embodies the main Keynesian
hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity preference). In spite
of its shortcomings, it remains useful in short-term eco-
nomic policy analysis.
NAIRU Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemploy-
ment.
Non-Keynesian effects Supply-side and expectations
effects which reverse the sign of traditional Keynesian
multipliers. Hence, if non-Keynesian effects dominate,
fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.
Old age dependency ratio Population aged over 65 as a
percentage of working age population (usually defined
as persons aged between 15 and 64).
Output gap The difference between actual output and
estimated potential output at any particular point in time.
See also Cyclical component of budget balance.
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG) Pension sys-
tem in which current pension expenditures are financed
by the contributions of current employees.
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs) Annual
programmes submitted by candidate countries which set
the framework for economic policies The PEPs consist
of a review of recent economic developments, a detailed
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public
finance issues and an outline of the structural reform
agenda.371
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2 0 0 6Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework (PFSF)
provides the framework for budgetary surveillance of
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It closely
approximates the policy coordination and surveillance
mechanisms at EU level.
Policy-mix The overall stance of fiscal and monetary
policy. The policy-mix may consist of various combina-
tions of expansionary and restrictive policies, with a
given fiscal stance being either supported or offset by
monetary policy.
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of
interest payments on general government debt.
Primary structural budget balance The structural (or
cyclically-adjusted) budget balance net of interest pay-
ments.
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which ampli-
fies the economic cycle by increasing the structural pri-
mary deficit during an economic upturn, or by decreas-
ing it in a downturn. It can be contrasted with
(discretionary) counter-cyclical policy that has the oppo-
site effects. A neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance unchanged over the economic
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See also
Tax-smoothing.
Production function approach A means to estimate the
potential level of output of an economy on taking inputs
on labour and capital as well as trend factor productivity
into account. This is used to estimate the output gap that
is a key input in the estimation of cyclical budget com-
ponent.
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general
government sector. It includes the total nominal value of
all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State,
except that part of the debt which is owed to other public
institutions in the same Member State.
Public goods Those goods and services that are con-
sumed jointly by several economic agents and for which
there is no effective pricing mechanism that would allow
private provision through the market.
Public investment The component of total public
expenditure through which governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) Agreements that
transfer to the private sector investment projects that tra-
ditionally have been executed or financed by the public
sector. To qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a
public function, involve the general government as the
principal purchaser, be financed from non-public
sources and engage a corporation outside the general
government as the principal operator that provides sig-
nificant inputs in the design and conception of the
project and bears a relevant amount of the risk.
Quality of public finances The part of the EU fiscal
framework that relates to the identification of strategic
priorities and the effective and efficient use of resources
in reaching them.
Quasi-fiscal activities Activities promoting public pol-
icy goals carried out by non-government units.
QUEST The DG ECFIN’s macroeconomic model of the
EU Member States plus the US and Japan.
Recently acceded Member States Countries that
became members of the EU in May 2004 and include
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive theoret-
ical assumptions on the consumer’s behaviour (inter alia
infinite horizon for decision-making), the impact of fis-
cal policy does not depend on whether it is financed by
tax increases or by a widening deficit. The basic reason-
ing behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and was
revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s.
Securitisation Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with the
intention of paying interest and capital out of the pro-
ceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or from future
revenue flows.
Sensitivity analysis An econometric or statistical simu-
lation designed to test the robustness of an estimated
economic relationship or projection, given various
changes in the underlying assumptions.
Significant divergence A sizeable excess of budget bal-
ance over the targets in the stability or convergence pro-
grammes, that triggers the Early warning procedure of
the SGP.372
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debt accumulation or decumulation arising from a posi-
tive or negative differential between the interest rate paid
on public debt and the growth rate of the national econ-
omy. See also Government budget constraint.
Social Security Contributions (SSC) Mandatory con-
tributions paid by employers and employees to a social
insurance scheme to cover for pension, healthcare and
other welfare provisions.
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997,
the SGP clarifies the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
regarding the surveillance of Member State budgetary
policies and the monitoring of budget deficits during the
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two Council
Regulations setting out legally binding provisions to be
followed by the European Institutions and the Member
States and two Resolutions of the European Council in
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure.
Stability Programmes Medium term budgetary strate-
gies presented by those Member States that have already
adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according
to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also Convergence Programmes.
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment
(also known as the debt-deficit adjustment) ensures con-
sistency between the net borrowing (flow) and the vari-
ation in the stock of gross debt. It includes the accumu-
lation of financial assets, changes in the value of debt
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining statisti-
cal adjustments.
Structural budget balance The actual budget balance
adjusted for its cyclical component. The structural bal-
ance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the
budget balance, when taking into account the automatic
effect on the budget of the economic cycle. It is referred
to also as the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. See
also Primary structural budget balance.
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and
debt that ensure that the latter does not grow without
bound. While conceptually intuitive, an agreed opera-
tional definition of sustainability has proven difficult to
achieve.
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances. They measure the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over a given projection period to achieve a predeter-
mined level of debt at the end of that projection period.
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be kept
stable in order to minimise the distortionary effects of
taxation, while leaving it for the automatic stabilisers to
smooth the economic cycle. It is also referred to as neu-
tral discretionary fiscal policy. See also Cyclical compo-
nent of fiscal policy.
UMTS Third generation of technical support for mobile
phone communications. Sale of UMTS licences gave
rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 2001.
Wagner’s law Theory according to which public spend-
ing – since it comprises ‘luxury goods’ with high elastic-
ity to income – would tend to rise as a share of GDP as
per-capita income increases.
Welfare State Range of policies designed to provide
insurance against unemployment, sickness and risks
associated with old age.373
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Table A.1.1
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Belgium
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.0  12.9  12.7  12.7  13.0  13.2  13.3  13.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  16.8  17.1  17.1  16.7  16.8  17.1  16.9  16.6
3. Social contributions  16.3  16.0  16.6  16.6  16.3  16.2  16.0  15.7
4. Of which actual social contributions  14.1  13.9  14.4  14.4  14.1  14.0  13.9  13.6
5. Other current resources  2.6  3.0  3.0  2.9  2.6  2.8  2.7 2.6
6. Total current resources  48.6  49.0  49.4  48.9  48.6  49.3  48.8  48.1
7. Government consumption expenditure  22.9  21.3  22.5  23.0  22.9  23.1  23.1  23.1
8. Of which compensation of employees  12.0  11.5  12.2  12.3  12.0  12.2  12.1  12.0
9. Collective consumption  8.7  8.3  8.8  8.8  8.7  8.7  8.7 8.7
10. Social benefits in kind  14.3  13.0  13.7  14.2  14.3  14.4  14.3  14.4
11. Social transfers other than in kind  16.0  15.2  15.8  16.1  16.0  16.0  15.9  15.8
12. Interest payments  4.8  6.6  5.8  5.3  4.8  4.4  4.2 3.9
13. Subsidies  1.2  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.6  1.8 1.9
14. Other current expenditure  2.3  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3 2.3
15. Total current expenditure  47.2  46.3  47.4  48.1  47.2  47.4  47.2  47.0
16. Gross savings  1.3  2.6  1.9  0.7  1.3  1.8  1.5 1.0
17. Capital transfers received  0.9  0.5  0.5  2.4  0.9  0.9  0.5 0.5
18. Total resources  49.4  49.1  49.8  51.2  49.4  50.1  49.3  48.5
19. Gross fixed capital formation  1.6  2.0  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.8  1.7 1.7
20. Other capital expenditure  0.7  1.1  0.9  1.5  0.7  0.9  0.8 0.8
21. Total expenditure  49.5  49.1  49.8  51.1  49.5  50.1  49.7  49.5
22. Tax burden  46.7  46.9  47.0  46.6  46.7  47.3  47.0  46.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  -0.3  -0.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.384
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Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Germany (1) 
ESA 95 definitions (2)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  11.1  11.9  11.7  11.8  11.7  11.8  11.9  12.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.1 12.5 11.1 10.8 10.6 10.2 10.1 10.2
3. Social contributions 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.5 18.6 18.2 18.0 17.8
4. Of which actual social contributions 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.5 17.2 17.0 16.8
5. Other current resources 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.5
6. Total current resources 44.8 46.1 44.5 44.2 44.1 42.9 42.7 42.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.8 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.2 18.7 18.5 18.2
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.0 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.4
9. Collective consumption 8.4 7.9 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3
10. Social benefits in kind 11.4 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.3 11.0 11.0 10.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 18.1 18.7 18.8 19.4 19.7 19.4 19.3 18.8
12. Interest payments 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
13. Subsidies 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure 44.9 44.5 44.3 45.0 45.2 44.2 43.5 42.8
16. Gross savings -0.1 1.6 0.2 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -0.9 -0.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
18. Total resources 46.1 47.1 45.5 45.1 45.0 43.8 43.6 43.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 -1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
21. Total expenditure 49.4 45.7 48.3 48.7 48.8 47.5 47.0 46.2
22. Tax burden 42.2 43.8 42.0 41.5 41.6 40.7 40.4 40.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -3.3 1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -3.8 -3.7 -3.3 -2.8
(1) From 1991 including former East Germany.
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
 Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
 Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
 Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
 Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
 Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
 Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
 Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.385
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Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Greece 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.5  13.3  13.1  13.1  13.3  13.4  13.5  13.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  7.4  12.7  11.8  11.5  11.4  11.6  11.6  11.4
3. Social contributions  12.6  15.9  15.7  15.8  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.3
4. Of which actual social contributions  10.5  14.8  14.6  14.7  14.5  14.5  14.4  14.2
5. Other current resources  4.5  3.4  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4 3.4
6. Total current resources  38.1  45.2  44.2  43.8  43.6  44.1  44.1  43.9
7. Government consumption expenditure  15.3  19.6  20.2  20.5  20.3  20.4  20.4  20.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  11.3  10.4  10.4  10.5  10.4  10.4  10.3  10.2
9. Collective consumption  9.4  8.0  :  :  :  :  :  : 
10. Social benefits in kind  5.9  11.6  :  :  :  :  :  : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind  15.1  16.2  16.5  16.7  16.6  16.7  16.7  16.5
12. Interest payments  12.7  3.9  3.5  3.3  3.1  3.0  2.9 3.0
13. Subsidies  0.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure  1.3  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.1
15. Total current expenditure  44.9  43.0  43.5  43.8  43.3  43.3  43.3  43.0
16. Gross savings  -6.8  2.2  0.7  -0.1  0.3  0.7  0.7 0.9
17. Capital transfers received  1.6  0.5  0.5  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6 0.5
18. Total resources  40.9  46.3  45.1  45.1  44.7  45.2  45.0  44.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.2  2.5  2.4  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.5 2.5
20. Other capital expenditure  1.7  0.2  1.3  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.2 1.2
21. Total expenditure  51.0  46.3  47.7  48.2  47.5  47.6  47.4  47.2
22. Tax burden  34.4  42.5  41.0  40.8  40.5  41.0  40.9  40.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -10.2  0.0  -2.5  -3.0  -2.8  -2.4  -2.4  -2.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
 Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
 Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
 Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
 Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
 Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
 Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
 Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.386
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Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Spain 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  9.9  11.4  11.2  11.5  11.9  12.1  12.2  12.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  9.9  10.2  10.4  10.1  10.2  11.0  11.0  10.9
3. Social contributions  12.7  12.9  13.0  13.0  13.0  13.0  12.9  12.8
4. Of which actual social contributions  11.8  12.0  12.1  12.2  12.2  12.1  12.1  12.0
5. Other current resources  4.0  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.1  3.1  3.1 3.0
6. Total current resources  36.6  37.8  38.0  38.0  38.3  39.2  39.2  38.9
7. Government consumption expenditure  17.7  17.2  17.2  17.4  17.8  17.8  17.9  18.0
8. Of which compensation of employees  11.0  10.3  10.0  10.1  10.1  9.9  9.8 9.7
9. Collective consumption  7.8  7.4  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.5  7.6 7.7
10. Social benefits in kind  9.9  9.8  9.9  10.0  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind  13.6  12.0  11.8  11.7  11.7  11.6  11.7  11.8
12. Interest payments  5.1  3.2  2.7  2.4  2.0  1.8  1.6 1.5
13. Subsidies  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9 0.9
14. Other current expenditure  0.9  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.7 1.7
15. Total current expenditure  38.4  34.8  34.1  34.0  34.1  33.8  33.9  34.0
16. Gross savings  -1.8  3.0  3.9  3.9  4.2  5.3  5.3 4.9
17. Capital transfers received  1.4  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.6 0.4
18. Total resources  37.6  38.1  38.4  38.3  38.7  39.3  39.3  38.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.6  3.2  3.5  3.6  3.4  3.6  3.6 3.7
20. Other capital expenditure  2.4  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.7  1.3  1.3 1.3
21. Total expenditure  44.1  39.0  38.7  38.3  38.8  38.2  38.3  38.5
22. Tax burden  33.3  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.4  36.4  36.5  36.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -6.5  -0.9  -0.3  0.0  -0.1  1.1  0.9 0.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.387
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.5
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 France 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  15.2  15.2  14.9  15.0  15.3  15.6  15.6  15.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  8.1  12.0  11.3  10.9  11.1  11.4  11.4  11.0
3. Social contributions  20.3  17.9  18.0  18.1  18.0  18.3  18.4  18.5
4. Of which actual social contributions  18.6  16.1  16.2  16.3  16.2  16.4  16.5  16.6
5. Other current resources  4.4  3.7  4.0  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.9 4.0
6. Total current resources  48.0  48.9  48.2  47.7  48.1  49.1  49.4  49.2
7. Government consumption expenditure  23.6  22.9  23.4  23.7  23.7  23.8  23.8  23.6
8. Of which compensation of employees  13.6  13.3  13.5  13.5  13.3  13.3  13.2  13.0
9. Collective consumption  9.2  8.6  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.3  8.4 8.3
10. Social benefits in kind  14.5  14.3  15.0  15.4  15.4  15.5  15.5  15.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind  17.9  17.1  17.3  17.5  17.6  17.9  18.0  18.0
12. Interest payments  3.5  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.6 2.6
13. Subsidies  1.6  1.5  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.4 1.3
14. Other current expenditure  2.2  2.3  2.6  2.8  2.8  3.0  3.0 3.0
15. Total current expenditure  48.9  46.7  47.9  48.4  48.3  48.7  48.9  48.6
16. Gross savings  -0.8  2.2  0.3  -0.8  -0.2  0.3  0.5 0.6
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.6  1.0  0.8 0.8
18. Total resources  49.0  50.2  49.5  49.2  49.6  51.0  51.0  50.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.2  3.1  2.9  3.1  3.1  3.3  3.3 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure  1.7  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0 1.1
21. Total expenditure  54.5  51.6  52.6  53.4  53.2  53.9  54.1  53.8
22. Tax burden  44.4  45.7  44.7  44.3  44.5  45.5  45.6  45.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -5.5  -1.5  -3.2  -4.2  -3.7  -2.9  -3.0  -3.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.388
A
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EXTable A.1.6
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Ireland 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.4  13.1  12.0  12.3  13.0  13.4  13.4  13.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  13.5  13.3  11.5  11.8  12.3  12.2  12.0  12.0
3. Social contributions  6.7  5.6  5.7  5.8  6.1  6.2  6.3 6.3
4. Of which actual social contributions  4.9  4.4  4.4  4.4  4.6  4.7  4.7 4.7
5. Other current resources  2.8  2.1  2.1  1.9  2.0  2.0  1.9 1.9
6. Total current resources  36.4  34.1  31.2  31.8  33.3  33.9  33.6  33.6
7. Government consumption expenditure  16.3  13.8  15.0  15.3  15.6  15.9  16.2  16.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.1  8.0  8.6  9.0  9.3  9.9  10.1  10.1
9. Collective consumption  6.5  5.2  5.3  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6 5.6
10. Social benefits in kind  9.9  8.6  9.7  10.0  10.3  10.4  10.6  10.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  11.7  8.0  8.7  9.0  9.0  9.9  9.8 9.7
12. Interest payments  5.3  2.0  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 1.2
13. Subsidies  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 0.7
14. Other current expenditure  2.1  1.9  2.2  2.0  2.3  2.4  2.3 2.3
15. Total current expenditure  36.4  26.4  27.9  28.1  28.7  30.0  30.1  30.1
16. Gross savings  0.0  7.7  3.4  3.7  4.6  3.9  3.5 3.5
17. Capital transfers received  1.8  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.1  0.9 0.6
18. Total resources  39.0  35.9  33.0  33.6  35.2  35.5  35.1  34.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.3  3.5  4.2  3.8  3.6  3.4  3.7 4.0
20. Other capital expenditure  1.6  1.1  0.7  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5 0.5
21. Total expenditure  41.1  31.5  33.4  33.4  33.7  34.5  34.9  35.1
22. Tax burden  34.7  32.7  29.6  30.3  31.6  32.1  31.9  31.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -2.1  4.4  -0.4  0.2  1.5  1.0  0.1  -0.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.389
A
N
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EXTable A.1.7
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Italy 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  11.8  14.7  14.3  14.0  14.1  14.2  14.2  14.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  14.5  14.4  13.9  13.4  13.3  13.3  13.6  13.5
3. Social contributions  14.4  12.4  12.5  12.6  12.7  12.9  12.7  12.7
4. Of which actual social contributions  12.7  12.1  12.2  12.4  12.5  12.6  12.5  12.5
5. Other current resources  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.6  3.5  3.5 3.5
6. Total current resources  43.7  44.6  44.1  43.4  43.7  44.0  44.1  44.0
7. Government consumption expenditure  17.4  17.9  19.2  19.7  19.8  20.3  20.2  20.1
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.9  10.4  10.6  10.8  10.8  11.0  11.0  10.9
9. Collective consumption  7.1  6.9  :  :  :  :  :  : 
10. Social benefits in kind  10.3  11.0  :  :  :  :  :  : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind  16.3  16.4  16.5  16.8  16.9  17.1  17.3  17.3
12. Interest payments  11.2  6.3  5.5  5.1  4.7  4.6  4.5 4.8
13. Subsidies  1.4  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9 0.9
14. Other current expenditure  1.0  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7 1.7
15. Total current expenditure  47.4  43.2  43.8  44.2  44.1  44.5  44.6  44.7
16. Gross savings  -3.7  1.4  0.2  -0.9  -0.4  -0.6  -0.5  -0.8
17. Capital transfers received  0.8  0.4  0.4  1.7  0.8  0.4  0.4 0.3
18. Total resources  44.6  45.3  44.4  44.8  44.3  44.0  44.0  43.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.1  2.3  1.7  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.5 2.5
20. Other capital expenditure  2.4  0.2  1.9  1.8  1.5  1.7  1.4 1.6
21. Total expenditure  52.0  46.0  47.4  48.3  47.8  48.2  48.1  48.4
22. Tax burden  41.3  42.1  41.0  40.3  40.4  40.7  40.8  40.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -7.4  -0.7  -2.9  -3.4  -3.4  -4.1  -4.1  -4.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.390
A
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EXTable A.1.8
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Luxembourg
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  11.0  13.5  12.5  12.3  13.6  13.6  13.3  13.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  15.3  14.9  15.2  14.7  13.2  13.7  14.0  14.4
3. Social contributions  10.9  10.9  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.8  11.7  11.8
4. Of which actual social contributions  9.8  10.1  10.9  10.8  10.7  10.9  10.8  10.9
5. Other current resources  4.8  4.3  3.9  3.5  3.5  3.1  3.0 2.9
6. Total current resources  42.0  43.6  43.4  42.2  42.0  42.2  42.0  42.1
7. Government consumption expenditure  15.9  15.1  16.3  16.5  16.9  17.5  17.4  17.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  8.5  7.5  8.0  8.1  8.3  8.2  8.1 8.0
9. Collective consumption  6.8  6.3  6.6  6.7  6.7  7.1  7.1 7.0
10. Social benefits in kind  9.2  8.9  9.6  9.8  10.2  10.4  10.3  10.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind  14.4  13.1  14.6  15.0  15.0  15.0  14.9  14.8
12. Interest payments  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 0.1
13. Subsidies  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.6 1.6
14. Other current expenditure  2.4  2.9  2.8  3.1  3.7  3.6  3.5 3.5
15. Total current expenditure  34.7  33.0  35.5  36.3  37.3  37.9  37.6  37.4
16. Gross savings  7.3  10.5  7.9  5.9  4.7  4.3  4.4 4.7
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3 0.3
18. Total resources  42.1  43.5  43.4  42.2  42.1  42.4  42.2  42.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.8  3.8  4.8  4.6  4.4  4.7  4.7 4.8
20. Other capital expenditure  1.3  1.0  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.8  1.7 1.7
21. Total expenditure  39.8  37.7  41.4  42.1  43.2  44.3  44.0  43.8
22. Tax burden  38.1  39.8  39.7  38.9  38.7  39.3  39.2  39.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  2.3  5.9  2.0  0.2  -1.1  -1.9  -1.8  -1.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.391
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.9
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 The Netherlands
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  10.3  11.6  12.1  12.2  12.5  12.7  12.7  12.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  11.9  11.6  11.4  10.7  10.5  11.7  11.0  11.1
3. Social contributions  16.5  16.4  14.3  14.8  15.0  14.3  15.7  15.4
4. Of which actual social contributions  15.4  15.4  13.3  13.8  14.0  13.3  14.6  14.4
5. Other current resources  5.7  4.6  4.9  4.8  4.9  5.2  5.3 5.4
6. Total current resources  44.4  44.2  42.7  42.4  42.9  43.8  44.7  44.6
7. Government consumption expenditure  23.0  21.8  23.7  24.4  24.3  24.0  25.5  25.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.3  9.6  9.8  10.1  10.0  9.9  9.6 9.5
9. Collective consumption  11.1  10.2  10.6  10.8  10.6  10.4  10.2  10.1
10. Social benefits in kind  12.0  11.5  13.1  13.6  13.7  13.6  15.3  15.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind  14.7  11.3  11.2  11.5  11.5  11.2  11.7  11.4
12. Interest payments  5.6  3.7  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.3 2.3
13. Subsidies  1.0  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure  1.1  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.9  2.0  1.8 1.7
15. Total current expenditure  45.5  39.8  40.9  41.6  41.6  40.9  42.5  41.9
16. Gross savings  -1.1  4.4  1.8  0.7  1.3  2.9  2.1 2.6
17. Capital transfers received  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 0.4
18. Total resources  45.3  45.6  44.2  43.9  44.5  45.4  46.5  46.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.8  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.1  3.0  2.9 2.8
20. Other capital expenditure  0.4  -0.3  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.8 1.0
21. Total expenditure  49.3  43.4  46.2  47.1  46.6  45.7  47.7  47.1
22. Tax burden  39.8  40.5  38.4  38.1  38.5  39.1  39.4  39.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -4.0  2.1  -2.0  -3.1  -1.9  -0.3  -1.2  -0.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.392
A
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EXTable A.1.10
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Austria 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.9  14.4  14.3  14.7  14.5  14.5  14.3  14.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  11.6  13.1  15.0  14.0  13.5  13.4  12.8  11.5
3. Social contributions  17.1  16.6  16.5  16.3  16.3  16.1  16.1  16.0
4. Of which actual social contributions  14.9  14.7  14.7  14.6  14.6  14.5  14.5  14.5
5. Other current resources  4.9  3.2  4.0  3.8  3.8  3.6  3.6  3.6
6. Total current resources  47.5  47.2  49.7  48.8  48.0  47.5  46.7  45.4
7. Government consumption expenditure  20.1  18.4  18.2  18.2  18.2  18.0  18.0  17.9
8. Of which compensation of employees  12.5  10.9  9.7  9.6  9.6  9.3  9.2  9.1
9. Collective consumption  8.1  7.3  7.3  7.1  7.2  6.9  7.0  6.8
10. Social benefits in kind  12.0  11.1  10.9  11.0  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind  19.5  18.5  18.6  19.0  19.2  18.9  18.7  18.5
12. Interest payments  3.8  3.5  3.4  3.1  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.7
13. Subsidies  2.8  2.8  3.0  2.9  3.2  3.0  2.9  2.7
14. Other current expenditure  2.2  2.2  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.5  2.3
15. Total current expenditure  48.4  45.4  46.2  46.0  46.3  45.2  44.8  44.0
16. Gross savings  -1.0  1.6  3.4  2.7  1.6  2.2  1.8  1.3
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
18. Total resources  50.3  49.8  50.7  50.0  49.2  48.8  48.0  46.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.0  1.5  1.1  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1
20. Other capital expenditure  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.5  2.5  2.4
21. Total expenditure  56.0  51.4  50.8  50.7  50.9  50.0  49.6  48.7
22. Tax burden  43.5  44.7  46.4  45.5  44.7  44.2  43.4  42.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -5.6  -1.5  0.0  -0.5  -1.5  -1.1  -1.5  -1.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.393
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EXTable A.1.11
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Portugal 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  12.9  13.5  14.2  14.8  14.3  15.3  16.0  16.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  8.4  9.8  9.3  8.7  8.7  8.6  8.9 9.1
3. Social contributions  10.4  11.2  11.7  12.3  12.4  12.5  12.4  12.3
4. Of which actual social contributions  9.6  10.3  10.8  11.2  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3
5. Other current resources  3.9  3.3  3.6  3.5  3.7  3.5  3.7 3.7
6. Total current resources  35.7  37.8  38.8  39.3  39.1  39.9  41.0  41.3
7. Government consumption expenditure  17.7  19.3  20.0  20.4  20.6  21.1  20.9  20.8
8. Of which compensation of employees  12.9  14.2  14.7  14.3  14.4  14.5  14.2  14.0
9. Collective consumption  7.2  7.7  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.3  8.2 8.2
10. Social benefits in kind  10.4  11.6  12.1  12.4  12.5  12.8  12.7  12.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  11.2  11.7  12.6  13.8  14.2  14.8  15.3  15.5
12. Interest payments  5.9  3.0  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.7  2.9 3.1
13. Subsidies  1.3  1.2  1.5  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.5 1.5
14. Other current expenditure  1.6  1.9  2.0  1.9  2.3  2.5  2.5 2.4
15. Total current expenditure  37.6  37.2  39.1  40.7  41.3  42.8  43.1  43.3
16. Gross savings  -2.0  0.6  -0.3  -1.4  -2.2  -2.8  -2.1  -2.0
17. Capital transfers received  1.8  1.4  1.7  2.7  3.6  1.4  1.4 1.3
18. Total resources  37.6  40.2  41.4  42.9  43.2  41.8  43.0  43.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.5  3.8  3.5  3.1  3.0  3.1  2.9 2.8
20. Other capital expenditure  1.5  1.2  0.7  1.1  1.5  1.5  1.4 1.2
21. Total expenditure  42.8  43.1  44.3  45.9  46.4  47.8  48.0  48.0
22. Tax burden  32.7  35.1  35.5  36.1  35.6  36.6  37.4  37.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -5.2  -2.9  -2.9  -2.9  -3.2  -6.0  -5.0  -4.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.394
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.12
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Finland 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.5  13.6  13.4  13.9  13.8  14.0  14.0  14.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  17.2  21.3  18.8  17.7  17.6  17.8  17.2  17.0
3. Social contributions  14.7  12.2  12.0  11.9  11.8  12.2  12.4  12.3
4. Of which actual social contributions  14.4  12.2  12.0  11.9  11.8  12.2  12.4  12.3
5. Other current resources  7.2  6.0  5.9  5.8  5.9  5.9  6.1 5.9
6. Total current resources  52.5  53.2  50.1  49.4  49.1  49.9  49.7  49.1
7. Government consumption expenditure  22.7  20.5  21.0  21.7  21.9  22.5  22.5  22.5
8. Of which compensation of employees  15.1  13.1  13.2  13.6  13.6  13.8  13.8  13.7
9. Collective consumption  8.5  7.5  7.4  7.6  7.6  7.8  7.7 7.7
10. Social benefits in kind  14.3  13.1  13.6  14.1  14.3  14.7  14.8  14.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind  21.9  16.4  16.3  16.7  16.6  16.6  16.4  16.2
12. Interest payments  4.0  2.8  2.1  1.7  1.5  1.5  1.4 1.3
13. Subsidies  2.7  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 1.3
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8
15. Total current expenditure  53.3  43.7  43.3  44.2  44.0  44.8  44.4  44.2
16. Gross savings  -0.7  9.5  6.8  5.0  4.9  5.0  5.1 4.8
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3 0.3
18. Total resources  55.3  55.8  52.9  52.4  52.4  53.1  52.7  52.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.7  2.5  2.7  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.7 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure  2.9  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1 0.1
21. Total expenditure  61.4  48.8  48.8  50.0  50.3  50.7  50.1  49.8
22. Tax burden  46.0  47.6  44.4  43.9  43.5  44.3  43.8  43.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -6.2  7.0  4.1  2.5  2.3  2.6  2.8 2.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.395
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.13
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Czech Republic 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  12.1  11.4  10.9  11.1  11.7  12.0  11.9  11.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  9.5  8.3  9.2  9.6  9.7  9.5  9.5 9.5
3. Social contributions  14.2  14.3  15.0  15.1  15.0  15.2  15.2  15.1
4. Of which actual social contributions  14.2  14.3  15.0  15.1  15.0  15.2  15.2  15.1
5. Other current resourses  6.8  6.6  6.3  6.3  6.2  5.9  6.1 6.0
6. Total current resources  42.7  40.7  41.4  42.0  42.7  42.5  42.8  42.4
7. Government consumption expenditure  21.5  21.8  22.5  23.4  22.4  22.4  21.7  20.8
8. Of which compensation of employees  7.3  7.1  7.8  8.3  8.0  8.1  8.0 7.9
9. Collective consumption  10.4  11.4  11.1  11.8  11.1  11.2  10.7  10.3
10. Social benefits in kind  11.0  10.5  11.4  11.5  11.3  11.3  11.0  10.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  10.6  12.1  12.5  12.2  11.8  11.6  11.7  12.8
12. Interest payments  1.1  0.9  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.4 1.4
13. Subsidies  2.8  2.8  2.3  2.6  2.1  1.9  2.7 2.7
14. Other current expenditure  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.5 1.4
15. Total current expenditure  37.0  38.5  39.4  40.6  38.7  38.5  39.0  39.1
16. Gross savings  5.7  2.2  2.0  1.4  4.1  4.1  4.0 3.3
17. Capital transfers received  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.2 0.2
18. Total resources  40.5  38.0  39.9  40.7  41.4  41.1  40.8  40.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation  5.0  2.9  3.9  4.5  4.9  4.5  6.5 6.8
20. Other capital expenditure  14.4  3.0  5.1  3.7  2.4  2.4  0.9 0.1
21. Total expenditure  53.8  41.6  46.7  47.3  44.3  43.7  44.1  43.9
22. Tax burden  35.8  34.1  35.1  35.7  36.7  37.0  37.1  36.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -13.2  -3.6  -6.8  -6.6  -2.9  -2.6  -3.2  -3.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.396
A
N
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EXTable A.1.14
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GPD)
 Denmark 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  16.8  17.0  17.4  17.1  17.4  17.6  17.2  16.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  30.7  30.3  29.1  29.1  30.0  30.9  29.4  29.0
3. Social contributions  2.9  3.6  3.1  3.2  3.1  2.9  2.9 2.8
4. Of which actual social contributions  1.9  2.8  2.2  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0 2.0
5. Other current resources  5.2  4.2  4.1  4.2  4.5  4.1  3.8 3.6
6. Total current resources  55.6  55.0  53.7  53.6  54.9  55.5  53.2  52.3
7. Government consumption expenditure  25.2  25.1  26.2  26.3  26.5  25.8  25.3  25.0
8. Of which compensation of employees  17.2  17.1  17.8  17.9  17.8  17.3  17.0  16.8
9. Collective consumption  8.2  8.0  8.0  8.0  8.0  7.7  7.6 7.5
10. Social benefits in kind  17.0  17.2  18.2  18.4  18.5  18.1  17.7  17.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  19.5  16.2  16.4  17.0  16.9  16.2  16.0  15.8
12. Interest payments  5.9  3.6  2.9  2.5  2.2  1.9  1.8 1.5
13. Subsidies  2.7  2.4  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3 2.2
14. Other current expenditure  2.4  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.4 2.3
15. Total current expenditure  55.7  50.1  50.8  50.9  50.6  48.9  47.7  46.8
16. Gross savings  -0.1  4.8  2.8  2.5  4.1  6.4  5.3 5.3
17. Capital transfers received  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.5 0.5
18. Total resources  57.2  56.8  55.7  55.6  57.2  57.4  54.7  53.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  1.8  1.7  1.8  1.6  1.9  1.7  1.7 1.6
20. Other capital expenditure  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.3 0.3
21. Total expenditure  59.2  53.6  54.7  54.8  54.6  52.7  50.9  50.0
22. Tax burden  50.6  51.0  49.7  49.6  50.7  51.6  49.6  49.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -2.0  3.3  1.2  1.0  2.7  4.9  3.9 4.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.397
A
N
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EXTable A.1.15
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Estonia
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  13.9  12.9  13.1  13.0  12.8  14.0  13.7  13.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  10.9  8.1  7.9  8.6  8.5  7.4  7.2 7.1
3. Social contributions  13.1  11.6  11.6  11.4  11.2  11.0  10.6  10.4
4. Of which actual social contributions  13.1  11.6  11.5  11.3  11.1  10.9  10.5  10.3
5. Other current resourses  8.9  4.1  4.4  4.2  4.3  3.5  3.1 2.9
6. Total current resources  46.8  36.7  36.9  37.2  36.7  35.9  34.6  33.7
7. Government consumption expenditure  27.4  20.2  19.2  19.4  19.0  18.2  17.7  17.5
8. Of which compensation of employees  11.7  11.0  10.1  10.5  10.3  9.8  9.5 9.2
9. Collective consumption  12.0  9.4  8.8  8.7  8.4  8.1  7.9 7.8
10. Social benefits in kind  15.4  10.8  10.4  10.7  10.6  10.1  9.8 9.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind  10.0  9.8  9.2  9.4  10.0  9.6  9.5 9.6
12. Interest payments  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2
13. Subsidies  0.7  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.5  1.0  0.8 0.7
14. Other current expenditure  1.4  0.9  0.7  0.8  1.3  1.8  1.1 1.2
15. Total current expenditure  39.7  32.3  30.2  30.7  32.0  30.9  29.3  29.1
16. Gross savings  7.1  4.6  6.7  6.5  4.8  5.0  5.2 4.6
17. Capital transfers received  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.8  0.2  0.7  1.4 1.5
18. Total resources  44.0  37.9  37.8  39.1  37.9  37.5  37.3  36.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  5.0  3.9  4.7  4.3  3.0  4.0  4.0 4.1
20. Other capital expenditure  1.8  1.4  1.2  0.7  0.5  0.1  1.1 1.2
21. Total expenditure  43.6  38.3  36.8  36.7  36.4  35.9  35.8  35.9
22. Tax burden  37.9  32.6  32.5  33.0  32.6  32.7  31.6  31.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  0.4  -0.4  1.0  2.4  1.5  1.6  1.4 0.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.398
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.16
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Cyprus
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  :  12.7  13.4  16.5  17.4  17.5  17.4  17.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  :  11.1  11.2  9.7  8.2  9.4  9.5 9.5
3. Social contributions  :  6.7  6.8  7.1  7.8  8.4  8.1 8.1
4. Of which actual social contributions  :  6.7  6.8  7.1  7.8  8.4  8.1 8.1
5. Other current resourses  :  3.2  2.9  4.0  3.7  4.2  4.7 4.7
6. Total current resources  :  33.7  34.4  37.2  37.1  39.5  39.6  39.6
7. Government consumption expenditure  :  16.4  18.4  19.9  18.2  18.3  18.0  18.0
8. Of which compensation of employees  :  13.8  13.9  15.7  15.1  14.9  14.5  14.4
9. Collective consumption  :  8.4  10.1  10.9  9.9  10.0  9.8 9.8
10. Social benefits in kind  :  8.0  8.3  9.0  8.2  8.3  8.2 8.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind  :  9.1  10.3  11.4  12.2  12.9  11.4  11.4
12. Interest payments  :  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.1 3.0
13. Subsidies  :  1.4  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.7  0.7 0.7
14. Other current expenditure  :  2.3  2.4  3.5  3.0  3.8  4.8 4.8
15. Total current expenditure  :  32.6  35.3  39.5  37.8  39.1  38.0  37.9
16. Gross savings  :  1.1  -0.9  -2.3  -0.6  0.4  1.6 1.7
17. Capital transfers received  :  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.8  1.0  0.3 0.3
18. Total resources  :  35.3  36.1  39.1  39.7  42.3  41.8  41.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  :  3.0  3.0  3.4  4.1  3.2  3.4 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure  :  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.2  0.7  0.6 0.6
21. Total expenditure  :  37.7  40.6  45.3  43.8  44.7  43.9  43.8
22. Tax burden  :  30.5  31.4  33.2  33.4  35.3  34.9  34.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  :  -2.4  -4.5  -6.3  -4.1  -2.4  -2.1  -2.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.399
A
N
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EXTable A.1.17
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Lithuania 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  12.3  12.6  12.4  11.8  11.1  11.2  11.2  11.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  8.8  8.4  7.5  8.0  8.7  9.1  9.0 8.7
3. Social contributions  7.6  9.4  8.7  8.6  8.7  8.6  8.3 8.2
4. Of which actual social contributions  7.6  9.3  8.6  8.5  8.4  8.3  8.1 8.0
5. Other current resourses  6.3  5.8  3.9  3.2  2.9  3.1  3.1 2.9
6. Total current resources  34.9  36.1  32.6  31.5  31.5  32.0  31.6  30.8
7. Government consumption expenditure  21.9  21.7  19.4  18.4  18.0  16.8  16.3  16.0
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.1  12.7  11.4  10.8  10.8  10.4  10.1  10.0
9. Collective consumption  9.9  9.0  7.8  7.6  7.5  7.1  6.9 6.8
10. Social benefits in kind  12.0  12.7  11.6  10.8  10.5  9.7  9.4 9.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind  8.6  10.6  9.3  9.1  9.1  9.0  8.8 8.7
12. Interest payments  0.4  1.7  1.3  1.2  0.9  0.8  0.7 0.7
13. Subsidies  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.7 0.7
14. Other current expenditure  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  1.1  2.3  2.7 2.7
15. Total current expenditure  32.0  35.1  30.9  29.8  29.6  29.6  29.3  28.8
16. Gross savings  2.9  1.0  1.6  1.8  1.8  2.4  2.3 2.0
17. Capital transfers received  :  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.8 0.8
18. Total resources  34.2  35.8  32.9  31.9  31.9  33.1  32.0  30.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.4  2.4  2.9  3.0  3.4  3.5  3.5 3.5
20. Other capital expenditure  :  2.3  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2 0.2
21. Total expenditure  36.1  39.3  34.3  33.2  33.4  33.7  32.6  31.7
22. Tax burden  28.6  30.3  28.6  28.3  28.7  29.1  28.7  28.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -1.9  -3.6  -1.4  -1.2  -1.5  -0.5  -0.6  -0.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.400
A
N
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EXTable A.1.18
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Latvia
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  14.1  12.3  11.2  12.1  11.8  12.6  12.4  12.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  7.1  7.3  7.7  7.5  7.9  8.0  8.1 8.1
3. Social contributions  12.0  10.1  9.5  9.1  8.9  8.7  8.6 8.5
4. Of which actual social contributions  12.0  9.9  9.3  8.9  8.7  8.5  8.4 8.3
5. Other current resourses  6.3  7.4  6.6  6.0  5.7  4.9  4.6 4.4
6. Total current resources  39.5  37.1  35.0  34.7  34.3  34.4  33.7  33.3
7. Government consumption expenditure  24.1  20.8  21.0  21.4  19.6  17.8  17.9  17.6
8. Of which compensation of employees  11.2  10.8  10.5  10.7  10.5  10.2  10.0 9.9
9. Collective consumption  11.8  10.3  10.6  11.2  10.3  9.4  9.4 9.3
10. Social benefits in kind  12.3  10.5  10.3  10.3  9.3  8.4  8.5 8.4
11. Social transfers other than in kind  12.7  12.4  10.1  9.4  9.2  8.8  8.7 8.6
12. Interest payments  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 0.6
13. Subsidies  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.6 0.6
14. Other current expenditure  0.1  1.7  1.5  0.7  1.3  2.5  2.4 2.3
15. Total current expenditure  39.3  36.8  34.0  33.1  31.5  30.2  30.3  29.7
16. Gross savings  0.2  0.2  1.0  1.6  2.8  4.2  3.5 3.6
17. Capital transfers received  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.1  0.5  1.3  1.6 2.0
18. Total resources  36.8  34.7  33.4  33.5  34.9  36.4  36.1  36.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation  1.9  1.3  1.3  1.5  1.9  2.1  2.7 3.2
20. Other capital expenditure  0.8  2.4  2.3  1.4  2.4  3.2  3.3 3.4
21. Total expenditure  38.8  37.5  35.6  34.6  35.9  36.2  37.1  37.1
22. Tax burden  33.2  29.7  28.4  28.7  28.8  29.4  29.0  28.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -2.0  -2.8  -2.3  -1.2  -0.9  0.2  -1.0  -1.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.401
A
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EXTable A.1.19
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Hungary 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  17.7  16.3  15.1  15.8  16.2  15.6  14.8  14.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  9.3  9.8  10.3  9.7  9.2  9.2  9.1 9.0
3. Social contributions  15.5  13.2  13.7  13.6  13.6  14.1  13.8  13.1
4. Of which actual social contributions  :  13.1  13.7  13.5  13.5  14.0  13.7  13.0
5. Other current resourses  :  6.0  5.7  5.6  6.1  6.3  6.1 5.8
6. Total current resources  :  45.3  44.8  44.6  45.1  45.2  43.7  42.3
7. Government consumption expenditure  23.4  21.4  23.4  24.6  23.8  23.7  23.6  23.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  12.1  10.7  12.4  13.3  12.8  12.7  12.7  12.5
9. Collective consumption  10.9  10.1  10.9  11.2  10.7  10.5  10.4  10.2
10. Social benefits in kind  12.5  11.2  12.4  13.4  13.1  13.1  13.2  13.0
11. Social transfers other than in kind  15.7  12.7  13.5  14.0  14.1  14.8  15.4  15.3
12. Interest payments  :  5.4  3.9  3.9  4.2  3.8  3.7 3.7
13. Subsidies  2.1  1.7  1.8  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.5 1.5
14. Other current expenditure  :  1.6  2.0  1.9  2.3  3.1  3.2 3.2
15. Total current expenditure  :  42.7  44.6  45.9  46.1  46.9  47.4  46.9
16. Gross savings  :  2.5  0.2  -1.2  -1.0  -1.8  -3.8  -4.6
17. Capital transfers received  :  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.9 1.3
18. Total resources  :  44.3  43.7  43.4  44.1  44.5  43.1  42.2
19. Gross fixed capital formation  :  3.3  5.0  3.5  3.6  3.4  2.7 2.6
20. Other capital expenditure  :  2.7  4.1  2.1  1.3  1.7  1.2 1.1
21. Total expenditure  :  46.7  52.0  49.8  49.5  50.6  49.8  49.2
22. Tax burden  42.5  39.3  39.1  39.0  39.0  38.9  37.6  36.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  :  -2.3  -8.4  -6.4  -5.4  -6.1  -6.7  -7.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.402
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.20
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Malta 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  :  12.6  13.4  11.4  13.3  17.5  13.2  15.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  :  9.2  11.2  7.9  12.1  9.4  10.0  11.9
3. Social contributions  :  7.6  6.8  7.5  8.2  8.4  8.4  8.7
4. Of which actual social contributions  :  6.4  6.8  6.1  6.7  8.4  6.9  7.1
5. Other current resourses  :  5.7  2.9  6.5  6.3  4.2  6.0  4.5
6. Total current resources  :  35.1  34.4  33.3  39.9  39.5  37.7  40.6
7. Government consumption expenditure  :  19.2  18.4  20.1  21.8  18.3  20.6  21.4
8. Of which compensation of employees  :  13.0  13.9  14.4  15.2  14.9  14.8  14.5
9. Collective consumption  :  8.9  10.1  9.3  10.2  10.0  9.9  10.0
10. Social benefits in kind  :  10.3  8.3  10.9  11.6  8.3  10.7  11.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind  :  11.9  10.3  12.6  12.9  12.9  12.5  13.3
12. Interest payments  :  3.6  3.2  3.2  3.7  3.4  3.5  3.8
13. Subsidies  :  1.4  1.1  2.2  2.2  0.7  1.6  2.1
14. Other current expenditure  :  1.3  2.4  0.6  1.5  3.8  1.6  1.9
15. Total current expenditure  :  37.5  35.3  38.7  42.1  39.1  39.8  42.7
16. Gross savings  :  -2.4  -0.9  -5.4  -2.2  0.4  -2.1  -2.2
17. Capital transfers received  :  1.1  0.0  0.9  0.6  1.0  0.3  4.2
18. Total resources  :  35.0  36.1  33.2  39.2  42.3  36.8  42.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation  :  4.2  3.0  4.9  5.2  3.2  3.7  4.6
20. Other capital expenditure  :  0.8  0.6  0.5  3.4  0.7  0.8  0.5
21. Total expenditure  :  41.2  40.6  43.1  49.4  44.7  43.2  45.3
22. Tax burden  :  29.4  31.4  26.8  33.6  35.3  31.7  36.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  :  -6.2  -4.5  -9.9  -10.2  -2.4  -6.4  -2.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
 Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
 Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
 Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
 Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
 Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
 Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
 Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source:  Commission services.403
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.21
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Poland 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  14.2  12.6  13.2  13.2  12.8  13.9  14.3  14.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  11.7  7.2  6.9  6.6  6.4  7.1  7.1 7.0
3. Social contributions  11.3  14.4  14.5  14.0  13.4  13.8  14.2  13.6
4. Of which actual social contributions  11.3  14.4  14.5  14.0  13.4  13.8  14.2  13.6
5. Other current resourses  5.7  4.9  5.7  5.5  5.6  5.7  5.2 4.6
6. Total current resources  42.9  39.0  40.3  39.3  38.3  40.5  40.8  40.1
7. Government consumption expenditure  18.7  17.5  18.0  18.3  17.9  18.7  17.5  17.2
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.7  10.1  10.8  10.7  10.2  10.1  10.1 9.8
9. Collective consumption  9.2  7.5  8.0  8.0  8.2  8.7  8.0 7.9
10. Social benefits in kind  9.5  10.0  10.0  10.2  9.7  10.0  9.5 9.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind  17.0  16.0  17.0  17.0  16.1  15.9  16.3  15.8
12. Interest payments  5.7  3.0  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.4  2.5 2.6
13. Subsidies  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.0 0.9
14. Other current expenditure  1.1  0.5  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.8  2.2 2.2
15. Total current expenditure  43.3  37.8  39.3  39.5  38.1  39.1  39.5  38.7
16. Gross savings  -0.4  1.5  1.0  -0.2  0.2  1.3  1.4 1.4
17. Capital transfers received  0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.5 0.3
18. Total resources  43.3  39.6  41.0  39.9  38.6  40.8  41.6  40.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.3  2.4  3.4  3.3  3.4  3.1  4.0 4.1
20. Other capital expenditure  0.8  0.5  0.5  1.1  0.5  0.7  0.8 0.7
21. Total expenditure  47.7  41.0  44.2  44.6  42.5  43.3  44.6  43.7
22. Tax burden  37.2  34.2  34.6  33.8  32.7  34.8  35.6  35.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -2.2  -1.5  -3.2  -4.7  -3.9  -2.5  -3.0  -3.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.404
A
N
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EXTable A.1.22
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Slovenia
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  :  16.3  16.4  16.6  16.2  16.2  16.1  16.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  :  7.5  7.9  8.2  8.4  8.6  8.8 9.0
3. Social contributions  :  15.0  15.1  15.0  15.0  15.2  15.0  14.8
4. Of which actual social contributions  :  14.7  14.8  14.7  14.7  14.9  14.8  14.5
5. Other current resourses  :  3.7  3.9  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.0 4.0
6. Total current resources  :  42.5  43.3  43.4  43.7  44.0  44.0  43.8
7. Government consumption expenditure  :  19.3  19.7  19.6  19.5  19.6  19.4  19.1
8. Of which compensation of employees  :  11.6  12.0  12.1  12.0  12.1  11.9  11.7
9. Collective consumption  :  7.9  7.9  7.8  7.7  7.8  7.6 7.5
10. Social benefits in kind  :  11.4  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.9  11.7  11.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  :  17.0  17.1  17.0  16.9  16.9  16.8  16.9
12. Interest payments  :  2.5  2.4  2.1  1.9  1.6  1.5 1.4
13. Subsidies  :  1.5  1.3  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6 1.6
14. Other current expenditure  :  1.3  1.5  1.2  1.8  1.9  2.3 2.5
15. Total current expenditure  :  42.1  42.0  41.6  41.6  41.7  41.6  41.5
16. Gross savings  :  0.9  1.4  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.4 2.3
17. Capital transfers received  :  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2
18. Total resources  :  44.3  45.4  45.2  45.3  45.5  45.5  45.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation  :  3.1  3.0  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.4 3.3
20. Other capital expenditure  :  1.8  1.2  1.4  1.2  0.9  1.0 0.8
21. Total expenditure  :  48.1  48.0  48.1  47.6  47.3  47.3  47.0
22. Tax burden  :  38.8  39.4  39.7  39.9  40.0  40.0  39.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  :  -3.9  -2.7  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -1.9  -1.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
 Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
 Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
 Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
 Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
 Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
 Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
 Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.405
A
N
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EXTable A.1.23
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Sweden
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  15.4  16.3  16.8  17.0  16.9  17.0  17.0  16.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  19.9  22.2  17.8  18.6  19.4  19.9  19.3  19.2
3. Social contributions  13.6  15.0  15.3  15.0  14.6  14.7  14.5  14.4
4. Of which actual social contributions  13.0  14.4  14.6  14.2  13.9  13.9  13.8  13.7
5. Other current resources  8.1  5.8  4.9  4.9  4.7  4.9  4.8 4.7
6. Total current resources  57.0  59.3  54.9  55.4  55.6  56.5  55.6  55.2
7. Government consumption expenditure  27.0  26.4  27.8  28.1  27.4  27.3  27.3  27.1
8. Of which compensation of employees  16.6  15.6  16.1  16.5  16.3  16.1  15.9  15.8
9. Collective consumption  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.0  8.0  8.0 7.9
10. Social benefits in kind  18.7  18.0  19.5  19.8  19.3  19.3  19.3  19.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind  20.4  17.3  17.3  18.1  17.8  17.4  17.2  16.9
12. Interest payments  6.7  4.0  2.9  2.0  1.6  1.6  1.8 1.8
13. Subsidies  3.7  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.6 1.5
14. Other current expenditure  2.0  2.3  2.3  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.9 2.8
15. Total current expenditure  59.7  51.5  51.9  52.3  50.9  50.6  50.6  50.2
16. Gross savings  -2.6  7.7  2.7  2.9  4.5  5.7  4.8 4.9
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 0.1
18. Total resources  60.2  61.8  57.5  58.0  58.3  59.1  58.2  57.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  3.9  2.9  3.2  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0 3.0
20. Other capital expenditure  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  -0.1  -0.1
21. Total expenditure  67.1  56.8  57.9  58.2  56.7  56.4  56.1  55.6
22. Tax burden  49.5  54.0  50.3  50.9  51.2  51.9  51.1  50.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -7.0  5.0  -0.2  0.1  1.8  2.9  2.2 2.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.406
A
N
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EXTable A.1.24
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 Slovakia 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.6 13.0 11.8 12.0 11.5 11.8 11.8 11.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.6 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 5.7 5.6 5.4
3. Social contributions 14.4 13.8 13.7 13.6 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.0
4. Of which actual social contributions 14.3 13.7 13.7 13.5 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.0
5. Other current resourses 13.8 15.1 14.3 13.8 6.0 4.8 5.7 5.5
6. Total current resources 55.4 49.5 47.2 46.9 37.2 34.7 35.6 34.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 20.5 19.8 20.1 20.1 19.9 19.4 19.4 19.2
8. Of which compensation of employees 9.5 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.5 8.2
9. Collective consumption 16.2 10.9 11.3 11.3 11.0 10.8 10.8 10.7
10. Social benefits in kind 4.4 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.2 12.3 12.0 11.8 11.4 9.7 9.4 9.1
12. Interest payments 2.3 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.2
13. Subsidies 4.8 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
14. Other current expenditure 8.0 10.1 9.0 10.6 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.7
15. Total current expenditure 47.9 48.9 47.3 47.6 37.8 35.2 35.9 34.9
16. Gross savings 7.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5
17. Capital transfers received 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.4
18. Total resources 53.3 47.6 45.5 45.2 35.4 35.1 36.1 34.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4
20. Other capital expenditure 6.9 10.5 3.1 2.2 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.5
21. Total expenditure 54.1 59.9 51.5 50.9 39.2 38.5 39.9 38.8
22. Tax burden 41.6 34.3 32.9 33.1 31.2  :  :  : 
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -0.9 -12.3 -6.0 -5.7 -3.7 -3.3 -3.8 -4.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.407
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.25
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
 United Kingdom 
ESA 95 definitions (1)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  12.9  13.3  13.0  13.0  13.1  12.9  12.8  13.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  14.7  16.4  15.4  14.9  15.2  16.1  17.0  17.3
3. Social contributions  7.4  7.6  7.4  8.0  8.2  8.5  8.5 8.6
4. Of which actual social contributions  6.7  6.8  6.6  7.4  7.6  7.9  8.0 8.0
5. Other current resources  2.9  2.4  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0  2.2 2.3
6. Total current resources  37.8  39.7  38.0  38.0  38.5  39.5  40.5  41.1
7. Government consumption expenditure  19.2  18.5  19.8  20.7  20.9  21.4  22.0  22.1
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.6  9.9  10.1  10.2  10.7  11.0  11.3  11.4
9. Collective consumption  8.2  7.5  7.8  8.2  8.1  8.3  8.5 8.5
10. Social benefits in kind  11.0  10.9  12.0  12.5  12.8  13.1  13.5  13.6
11. Social transfers other than in kind  15.1  13.0  13.0  13.1  13.1  13.2  13.0  12.8
12. Interest payments  3.6  2.8  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.0 2.1
13. Subsidies  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5 0.5
14. Other current expenditure  1.7  2.2  2.6  2.9  3.1  3.4  3.2 3.4
15. Total current expenditure  40.5  36.9  37.9  39.2  39.6  40.7  40.8  40.8
16. Gross savings  -2.7  2.8  0.1  -1.2  -1.1  -1.2  -0.2 0.2
17. Capital transfers received  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.4 0.4
18. Total resources  38.5  40.6  39.3  39.3  39.9  41.3  42.2  42.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.2  1.2  1.5  1.6  1.8  2.0  2.2 2.4
20. Other capital expenditure  1.2  -1.9  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  1.0 1.0
21. Total expenditure  44.3  36.8  40.9  42.5  43.2  44.8  45.2  45.5
22. Tax burden  35.9  37.9  36.2  36.2  36.7  37.8  38.6  39.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-)  -5.8  3.7  -1.6  -3.3  -3.3  -3.5  -3.0  -2.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.408
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.26
Resources and expenditure of general government (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
Euro area (1)
ESA 95 definitions (2)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Taxes on production and imports  12.2  13.3  13.1  13.1  13.3  13.4  13.5  13.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth  11.1  12.7  11.8  11.5  11.4  11.6  11.6  11.4
3. Social contributions  17.1  15.9  15.7  15.8  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.3
4. Of which actual social contributions  15.7  14.8  14.6  14.7  14.5  14.5  14.4  14.2
5. Other current resources  4.0  3.4  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4 3.4
6. Total current resources (1 + 2 + 3 + 5)  44.3  45.2  44.2  43.8  43.6  44.1  44.1  43.9
7. Government consumption expenditure (9 + 10)  20.2  19.6  20.2  20.5  20.3  20.4  20.4  20.3
8. Of which compensation of employees  10.9  10.4  10.4  10.5  10.4  10.4  10.3  10.2
9. Collective consumption  8.5  8.0  :  :  :  :  :  : 
10. Social benefits in kind  11.7  11.6  :  :  :  :  :  : 
11. Social transfers other than in kind  16.9  16.2  16.5  16.7  16.6  16.7  16.7  16.5
12. Interest  5.4  3.9  3.5  3.3  3.1  3.0  2.9 3.0
13. Subsidies  1.7  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure  1.5  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 2.1
15. Total current expenditure (9 to 14)  45.6  43.0  43.5  43.8  43.3  43.3  43.3  43.0
16. Gross savings (6 - 15)  -1.3  2.2  0.7  -0.1  0.3  0.7  0.7 0.9
17. Capital transfers received  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6 0.5
18. Total resources (6 + 17)  45.5  46.3  45.1  45.1  44.7  45.2  45.0  44.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.5 2.5
20. Other capital expenditure  1.7  0.2  1.3  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.2 1.2
21. Total Expenditure (15 + 19 + 20)  50.5  46.3  47.7  48.2  47.5  47.6  47.4  47.2
22. Tax burden  41.2  42.5  41.0  40.8  40.5  41.0  40.9  40.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (18 - 21)  -5.0  0.0  -2.5  -3.0  -2.8  -2.4  -2.4  -2.3
(1) Due to problem with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
(2) The table is based on ESA 95 deﬁnitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
 Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
 Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
 Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
 Line 16 = line 6 - line 15
 Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
 Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
 Line 23 = line 18 - line 21.
Source: Commission services.409
A
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EXTable A.2.1
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Belgium 
1. Net borrowing (1)  4.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4 1.0
2. Interest payments  8.9  6.6  5.8  5.4  4.9  4.5  4.3 4.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  7.0  6.1  5.6  5.3  5.1  4.8  4.6 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  3.6  5.7  3.4  2.6  4.9  3.5  4.3 4.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  4.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4 1.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -4.6  -6.1  -3.5  -2.6  -4.6  -3.2  -3.8 -3.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -1.5  0.3  0.4  -2.0  0.8  1.9  0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -4.5  -6.7  -5.7  -5.4  -4.8  -4.5  -3.8 -3.1
9. Snow-ball effect  4.3  0.5  2.3  2.7  0.2  1.2  0.3 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -1.5  0.3  0.4  -2.0  0.8  1.9  0.0 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -1.8  -5.9  -3.1  -4.7  -3.8  -1.4  -3.5 -2.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  129.7  107.7  103.2  98.5  94.7  93.3  89.8 87.0
 Germany
1. Net borrowing (1)  3.2  -1.3  3.7  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.1 2.5
2. Interest payments  3.5  3.2  2.9  3.0  2.8  2.8  2.8 2.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  7.6  5.4  5.1  5.0  4.6  4.4  4.2 4.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  3.8  2.5  1.5  0.9  2.4  1.3  2.1 2.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  3.2  -1.3  3.7  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.1 2.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -1.8  -1.5  -0.9  -0.5  -1.5  -0.9  -1.4 -1.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  6.1  1.9  -1.3  0.1  -0.5  -0.2  -0.6 -0.6
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -0.3  -4.5  0.8  1.0  0.8  0.5  0.3 -0.3
9. Snow-ball effect  1.7  1.7  2.1  2.5  1.3  1.9  1.4 1.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  6.1  1.9  -1.3  0.1  -0.5  -0.2  -0.6 -0.6
11. Change in gross debt (5)  7.5  -0.9  1.5  3.6  1.7  2.2  1.1 0.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  55.5  59.2  60.3  63.8  65.5  67.7  68.9 69.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.410
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EXTable A.2.2
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Greece 
1. Net borrowing (1)  10.2  4.1  5.0  5.8  6.8  4.4  2.9 3.5
2. Interest payments  12.7  8.1  6.1  5.5  5.3  4.8  4.8 4.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  13.2  7.9  5.7  5.3  5.5  5.0  4.9 5.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  12.1  10.4  7.8  8.4  8.3  7.5  6.6 6.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  10.2  4.1  5.0  5.8  6.8  4.4  2.9 3.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -11.6  -10.6  -8.2  -8.6  -8.2  -7.6  -6.7 -6.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.2  5.8  0.8  -0.1  2.0  2.1  1.2 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -2.6  -4.0  -1.1  0.3  1.5  -0.5  -1.9 -1.4
9. Snow-ball effect  1.1  -2.5  -2.2  -3.1  -2.8  -2.6  -1.8 -1.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.2  5.8  0.8  -0.1  2.0  2.1  1.2 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)  0.8  -0.8  -2.5  -2.9  0.7  -1.0  -2.5 -2.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  108.7  111.6  110.7  107.8  108.5  107.5  105.0 102.1
 Spain 
1. Net borrowing (1)  6.5  0.9  0.3  0.0  0.2  -1.1  -0.9 -0.4
2. Interest payments  5.1  3.2  2.7  2.4  2.1  1.8  1.7 1.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  9.2  5.7  5.2  4.8  4.5  4.2  4.1 4.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  7.8  8.7  7.2  7.1  7.3  8.0  7.5 6.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  6.5  0.9  0.3  0.0  0.2  -1.1  -0.9 -0.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -4.3  -4.9  -3.8  -3.5  -3.3  -3.4  -3.0 -2.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.5  1.7  0.4  -0.2  0.7  1.3  0.8 0.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  1.4  -2.4  -2.4  -2.3  -1.9  -2.9  -2.6 -1.9
9. Snow-ball effect  0.8  -1.7  -1.1  -1.1  -1.3  -1.7  -1.3 -0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.5  1.7  0.4  -0.2  0.7  1.3  0.8 0.7
11. Change in gross debt (5)  2.7  -2.4  -3.1  -3.7  -2.5  -3.2  -3.1 -2.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  62.5  59.2  52.5  48.9  46.4  43.2  40.0 37.9
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.411
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EXTable A.2.3
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 France 
1. Net borrowing (1)  5.5  1.5  3.2  4.2  3.7  2.9  3.0 3.1
2. Interest payments  3.5  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.7 2.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  7.4  5.2  5.3  4.9  4.4  4.2  4.0 4.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  3.4  5.5  3.4  2.4  4.0  2.8  3.4 3.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  5.5  1.5  3.2  4.2  3.7  2.9  3.0 3.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -1.6  -3.0  -1.9  -1.7  -2.4  -1.7  -2.2 -2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.3  0.0  0.8  1.6  0.8  1.2  -0.7 -0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  2.0  -1.4  0.3  1.4  1.0  0.2  0.4 0.4
9. Snow-ball effect  1.9  -0.2  1.0  1.1  0.3  0.9  0.4 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.3  0.0  0.8  1.6  0.8  1.2  -0.7 -0.4
11. Change in gross debt (5)  6.2  -1.6  2.1  4.1  2.1  2.3  0.1 0.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  55.1  56.7  58.2  62.4  64.4  66.8  66.9 67.0
 Ireland 
1. Net borrowing (1)  2.1  -4.4  0.4  -0.2  -1.6  -1.0  -0.1 0.4
2. Interest payments  5.3  1.9  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 1.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  6.7  4.7  4.2  4.0  4.1  4.3  4.6 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  13.0  15.2  11.4  6.6  6.8  7.9  7.8 8.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  2.1  -4.4  0.4  -0.2  -1.6  -1.0  -0.1 0.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -10.2  -6.3  -3.6  -2.0  -2.0  -2.2  -2.0 -2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.6  0.5  0.0  1.2  1.9  1.3  1.7 1.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -3.2  -6.3  -0.9  -1.4  -2.7  -2.2  -1.3 -0.8
9. Snow-ball effect  -4.9  -4.4  -2.3  -0.8  -0.8  -1.0  -0.8 -0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.6  0.5  0.0  1.2  1.9  1.3  1.7 1.4
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -7.6  -10.2  -3.2  -1.0  -1.6  -1.9  -0.4 -0.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  81.0  37.8  32.1  31.1  29.4  27.6  27.2 27.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.412
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EXTable A.2.4
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Italy 
1. Net borrowing (1)  7.4  0.8  3.0  3.5  3.5  4.3  4.1 4.5
2. Interest payments  11.2  6.4  5.7  5.2  4.8  4.7  4.5 4.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  10.0  5.9  5.3  5.0  4.7  4.5  4.4 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  7.9  5.7  3.7  3.1  4.0  2.0  3.4 3.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  7.4  0.8  3.0  3.5  3.5  4.3  4.1 4.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -8.9  -6.1  -3.9  -3.2  -4.0  -2.1  -3.5 -3.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.2  0.8  -2.1  -1.6  0.2  0.5  0.5 -0.8
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -3.8  -5.6  -2.7  -1.7  -1.3  -0.4  -0.5 -0.2
9. Snow-ball effect  2.3  0.2  1.6  2.0  0.7  2.5  1.0 1.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.2  0.8  -2.1  -1.6  0.2  0.5  0.5 -0.8
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -0.3  -4.6  -3.2  -1.3  -0.4  2.6  1.1 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  121.2  109.2  105.5  104.2  103.8  106.4  107.4 107.7
 Luxembourg
1. Net borrowing (1)  -2.3  -5.9  -2.0  -0.2  1.1  1.9  1.8 1.5
2. Interest payments  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 0.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  8.1  6.8  4.8  3.4  2.9  2.3  2.3 1.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  3.8  10.6  6.4  6.9  5.3  5.6  7.6 7.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  -2.3  -5.9  -2.0  -0.2  1.1  1.9  1.8 1.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -0.2  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4 -0.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.8  6.1  2.4  0.4  -0.6  -2.0  0.3 -0.6
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -2.7  -6.2  -2.3  -0.4  1.0  1.8  1.7 1.4
9. Snow-ball effect  0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 -0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  2.8  6.1  2.4  0.4  -0.6  -2.0  0.3 -0.6
11. Change in gross debt (5)  0.3  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.3  -0.4  1.7 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  5.8  5.3  6.5  6.3  6.6  6.2  7.9 8.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.413
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EXTable A.2.5
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 The Netherlands
1. Net borrowing (1)  4.0  -2.1  2.0  3.2  2.1  0.3  1.2 0.7
2. Interest payments  5.6  3.7  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.4  2.4 2.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  8.1  6.5  5.9  5.5  5.2  4.9  4.6 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  5.1  7.5  3.9  2.4  2.6  2.7  3.9 4.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  4.0  -2.1  2.0  3.2  2.1  0.3  1.2 0.7
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -3.6  -4.2  -1.9  -1.2  -1.3  -1.4  -2.0 -2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.6  0.1  1.5  -0.9 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -1.7  -5.8  -0.8  0.5  -0.5  -2.2  -1.2 -1.6
9. Snow-ball effect  2.1  -0.6  1.0  1.5  1.3  1.1  0.3 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.6  0.1  1.5  -0.9 0.4
11. Change in gross debt (5)  0.8  -6.9  -0.2  1.4  0.7  0.4  -1.7 -0.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  74.0  53.6  50.5  51.9  52.6  52.9  51.2 50.3
 Austria 
1. Net borrowing (1)  5.7  1.6  0.7  1.7  1.2  1.6  2.0 1.5
2. Interest payments  3.9  3.7  3.3  3.1  2.9  2.9  2.8 2.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  6.3  5.5  4.8  4.5  4.6  4.5  4.4 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  3.9  5.2  2.2  2.8  4.4  4.0  4.4 4.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  5.7  1.6  0.7  1.7  1.2  1.6  2.0 1.5
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -2.4  -3.3  -1.4  -1.8  -2.7  -2.4  -2.6 -2.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.3  1.1  0.8  -1.3  0.8  0.3  0.2 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  1.8  -2.0  -2.6  -1.4  -1.7  -1.2  -0.8 -1.3
9. Snow-ball effect  1.4  0.2  1.7  1.1  0.1  0.3  0.0 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.3  1.1  0.8  -1.3  0.8  0.3  0.2 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (5)  4.6  -0.7  -0.2  -1.6  -0.8  -0.6  -0.5 -0.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  67.9  65.8  66.0  64.4  63.6  62.9  62.4 61.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.414
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EXTable A.2.6
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Portugal
1. Net borrowing (1)  5.2  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.2  6.0  5.0 4.9
2. Interest payments  5.9  3.1  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.9 3.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  10.9  6.2  5.6  5.0  4.8  4.8  4.7 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  7.9  7.1  4.7  1.5  3.9  3.1  2.7 3.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  5.2  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.2  6.0  5.0 4.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -4.3  -3.4  -2.4  -0.8  -2.1  -1.8  -1.7 -2.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.2  -0.5  2.1  -0.6  0.5  1.0  1.1 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -0.7  -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.5  3.3  2.1 1.8
9. Snow-ball effect  1.6  -0.4  0.5  1.9  0.5  1.0  1.3 0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  1.2  -0.5  2.1  -0.6  0.5  1.0  1.1 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)  2.1  -1.0  2.6  1.5  1.6  5.2  4.5 2.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  61.0  50.4  55.5  57.0  58.7  63.9  68.4 70.6
 Finland
1. Net borrowing (1)  6.2  -7.0  -4.1  -2.3  -2.1  -2.4  -2.6 -2.4
2. Interest payments  3.9  2.8  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.5 1.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  7.5  6.6  5.1  4.3  3.6  3.4  3.5 3.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  8.4  8.2  3.2  2.1  4.1  3.7  4.4 3.7
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  6.2  -7.0  -4.1  -2.3  -2.1  -2.4  -2.6 -2.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -4.4  -3.5  -2.3  -0.6  -1.8  -1.0  -1.7 -1.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.6  8.2  4.3  6.1  4.0  0.4  3.0 2.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  2.2  -9.8  -6.2  -4.2  -3.8  -4.1  -4.1 -3.9
9. Snow-ball effect  -0.5  -0.7  -0.1  1.2  -0.2  0.5  -0.3 -0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.6  8.2  4.3  6.1  4.0  0.4  3.0 2.7
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -0.9  -2.3  -2.1  3.1  -0.1  -3.2  -1.4 -1.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  56.5  44.3  41.3  44.3  44.3  41.1  39.7 38.3
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.415
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EXTable A.2.7
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Czech Republic
1. Net borrowing (1)  13.2  3.6  6.8  6.6  2.8  2.6  3.1 3.4
2. Interest payments  1.1  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.3 1.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  5.7  5.2  4.2  4.3  4.0  4.9 4.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  16.8  5.3  4.3  5.8  8.3  5.9  6.6 6.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  13.2  3.6  6.8  6.6  2.8  2.6  3.1 3.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -0.8  -1.0  -1.5  -2.2  -1.7  -1.7 -2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  0.5  -2.3  -3.8  0.0  -1.0  -0.6 -0.5
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  12.1  2.8  5.6  5.5  1.7  1.4  1.8 2.0
9. Snow-ball effect  :  0.1  0.2  -0.4  -1.1  -0.5  -0.2 -0.6
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  0.5  -2.3  -3.8  0.0  -1.0  -0.6 -0.5
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  3.3  3.5  1.3  0.6  -0.2  1.0 0.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  19.1  28.8  30.0  30.6  30.5  31.5 32.4
 Denmark 
1. Net borrowing (1)  2.0  -3.2  -1.0  -0.8  -2.5  -4.7  -3.8 -3.9
2. Interest payments  5.9  3.7  3.0  2.7  2.4  2.1  1.9 1.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  8.1  6.6  6.3  5.6  5.2  4.8  5.2 5.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  4.4  6.6  2.8  2.7  4.1  5.7  6.5 4.7
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  2.0  -3.2  -1.0  -0.8  -2.5  -4.7  -3.8 -3.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -3.2  -3.6  -1.3  -1.2  -1.8  -2.4  -2.1 -1.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.9  1.2  1.9  -0.2  2.7  0.5  0.3 1.9
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -3.9  -6.8  -4.1  -3.6  -5.0  -6.8  -5.7 -5.5
9. Snow-ball effect  2.7  0.0  1.6  1.3  0.5  -0.5  -0.4 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.9  1.2  1.9  -0.2  2.7  0.5  0.3 1.9
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -4.0  -5.7  -0.6  -2.5  -1.8  -6.8  -5.8 -3.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  72.5  51.7  46.8  44.4  42.6  35.8  30.0 26.5
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.416
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EXTable A.2.8
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Estonia 
1. Net borrowing (1)  -0.4  0.4  -1.0  -2.4  -1.5  -1.6  -1.4 -0.8
2. Interest payments  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 0.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  4.2  4.7  4.6  4.6  4.1  4.0 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  37.4  13.6  11.9  8.9  11.1  16.6  12.9 11.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  -0.4  0.4  -1.0  -2.4  -1.5  -1.6  -1.4 -0.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  -0.8  -0.5 -0.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -0.8  2.4  3.3  1.5  1.8  0.8 0.6
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -0.6  0.2  -1.2  -2.6  -1.8  -1.8  -1.6 -1.0
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.4 -0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -0.8  2.4  3.3  1.5  1.8  0.8 0.6
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  -1.2  0.9  0.4  -0.6  -0.6  -1.2 -0.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  5.1  5.5  6.0  5.4  4.8  3.6 3.0
 Cyprus
1. Net borrowing (1)  :  2.4  4.5  6.3  4.1  2.4  2.1 2.0
2. Interest payments  :  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.1 3.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  6.2  5.3  5.7  4.9  5.1  4.7 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  9.4  8.9  4.4  7.0  6.5  6.7  6.2 6.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  :  2.4  4.5  6.3  4.1  2.4  2.1 2.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -4.9  -2.6  -4.3  -4.2  -4.5  -4.1 -4.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  2.8  1.5  2.5  2.0  0.8  0.8 0.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  :  -1.1  1.3  2.8  0.9  -1.0  -1.0 -1.0
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -1.5  0.6  -0.8  -1.0  -1.1  -1.0 -1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  2.8  1.5  2.5  2.0  0.8  0.8 0.7
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  0.2  3.3  4.5  1.9  -1.3  -1.2 -1.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  59.9  65.2  69.7  71.7  70.3  69.1 67.8
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.417
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EXTable A.2.9
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Latvia
1. Net borrowing (1)  2.0  2.8  2.3  1.2  0.9  -0.2  1.0 1.0
2. Interest payments  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 0.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  8.7  5.8  5.7  5.7  5.1  5.5 5.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  14.0  10.9  10.3  11.0  16.0  20.1  16.4 14.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  2.0  2.8  2.3  1.2  0.9  -0.2  1.0 1.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -1.2  -1.3  -1.3  -2.0  -2.4  -1.7 -1.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -1.7  -1.5  1.1  1.2  0.0  0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  0.8  1.8  1.5  0.5  0.2  -0.8  0.5 0.4
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -0.2  -0.6  -0.6  -1.3  -1.8  -1.1 -0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -1.7  -1.5  1.1  1.2  0.0  0.0 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  -0.1  -0.5  1.0  0.1  -2.6  -0.6 -0.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  12.3  13.5  14.4  14.6  11.9  11.3 10.9
 Lithuania 
1. Net borrowing (1)  1.9  3.6  1.4  1.2  1.5  0.5  0.6 0.9
2. Interest payments  0.4  1.7  1.3  1.2  0.9  0.8  0.7 0.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  8.0  6.1  6.1  4.9  4.8  4.4 3.9
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  51.3  5.7  7.0  9.3  10.0  13.8  11.4 9.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  1.9  3.6  1.4  1.2  1.5  0.5  0.6 0.9
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -1.2  -1.5  -1.9  -1.9  -2.4  -1.9 -1.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -1.6  -0.4  -0.4  -1.3  1.1  1.5 1.5
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  1.5  1.8  0.1  0.0  0.5  -0.3  -0.1 0.2
9. Snow-ball effect  :  0.5  -0.2  -0.7  -1.0  -1.6  -1.2 -0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -1.6  -0.4  -0.4  -1.3  1.1  1.5 1.5
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  0.7  -0.5  -1.1  -1.7  -0.8  0.2 0.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  23.6  22.3  21.2  19.5  18.7  18.9 19.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.418
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EXTable A.2.10
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Hungary
1. Net borrowing (1)  :  3.0  8.4  6.4  5.4  6.2  6.7 7.0
2. Interest payments  :  5.5  3.9  3.9  4.2  3.9  3.7 3.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  10.4  8.6  7.8  8.1  7.2  6.8 6.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  28.6  15.6  12.8  10.3  9.5  6.7  7.0 7.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  :  3.0  8.4  6.4  5.4  6.2  6.7 7.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -8.1  -5.9  -5.1  -4.9  -3.6  -3.8 -4.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.0  -1.3  -1.4 -0.9
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  :  -2.4  4.4  2.5  1.2  2.3  3.0 3.3
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -2.7  -1.9  -1.2  -0.7  0.2  -0.1 -0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.0  -1.3  -1.4 -0.9
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  -5.7  3.3  1.7  0.5  1.2  1.5 2.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  54.3  55.0  56.7  57.1  58.4  59.9 62.0
 Malta
1. Net borrowing (1)  :  6.2  5.6  10.2  5.1  3.3  3.0 3.4
2. Interest payments  :  3.6  3.7  3.7  4.1  4.0  3.9 3.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  7.0  6.3  6.1  5.7  5.5  5.4 5.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  11.4  8.2  3.4  1.8  0.1  5.3  5.3 4.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  :  6.2  5.6  10.2  5.1  3.3  3.0 3.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -4.3  -2.0  -1.1  -0.1  -3.8  -3.7 -3.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -2.4  -4.0  1.0  -0.2  -1.0  0.1 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  :  2.6  1.8  6.5  1.1  -0.7  -0.9 -0.5
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -0.6  1.7  2.6  4.0  0.1  0.1 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -2.4  -4.0  1.0  -0.2  -1.0  0.1 0.2
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  -0.4  -0.5  10.1  4.9  -1.5  -0.7 -0.1
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  56.0  61.2  71.3  76.2  74.7  74.0 74.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.419
A
N
N
EXTable A.2.11
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Poland
1. Net borrowing (1)  4.4  1.5  3.2  4.7  3.9  2.5  3.0 3.0
2. Interest payments  5.7  3.0  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.4  2.5 2.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  8.4  7.9  7.3  6.4  6.0  6.1 6.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  36.9  11.8  3.7  4.2  9.5  4.9  4.9 6.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  4.4  1.5  3.2  4.7  3.9  2.5  3.0 3.0
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -4.1  -1.3  -1.6  -3.8  -2.0  -2.0 -2.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -0.8  2.0  1.0  -2.1  0.1  2.0 0.8
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -1.3  -1.5  0.4  1.9  1.3  0.1  0.5 0.4
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -1.2  1.5  1.2  -1.3  0.4  0.5 0.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -0.8  2.0  1.0  -2.1  0.1  2.0 0.8
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  -3.5  3.9  4.1  -2.0  0.6  3.0 1.2
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  35.9  39.8  43.9  41.9  42.5  45.5 46.7
 Slovenia
1. Net borrowing (1)  :  3.9  2.7  2.8  2.3  1.8  1.9 1.6
2. Interest payments  :  2.5  2.4  2.1  1.9  1.6  1.5 1.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  11.1  9.3  7.7  6.9  5.9  5.5 5.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  28.0  9.7  11.6  8.6  7.5  4.9  6.5 6.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  :  3.9  2.7  2.8  2.3  1.8  1.9 1.6
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -2.2  -2.9  -2.3  -2.0  -1.4  -1.8 -1.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  1.3  1.7  -1.1  0.1  -0.8  0.8 -0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  :  1.4  0.3  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.4 0.2
9. Snow-ball effect  :  0.3  -0.6  -0.2  -0.2  0.3  -0.3 -0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  1.3  1.7  -1.1  0.1  -0.8  0.8 -0.1
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  3.0  1.4  -0.6  0.4  -0.4  0.9 -0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  27.6  29.7  29.1  29.5  29.1  29.9 29.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.420
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EXTable A.2.12
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Slovakia
1. Net borrowing (1)  0.8  12.2  7.7  3.7  3.0  2.9  2.7 2.1
2. Interest payments  2.3  4.0  3.5  2.5  2.2  1.7  1.8 1.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  :  9.4  7.9  6.4  5.7  4.6  5.6 5.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  16.3  10.7  8.8  9.3  10.3  8.6  10.3 9.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  0.8  12.2  7.7  3.7  3.0  2.9  2.7 2.1
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  :  -4.6  -3.9  -3.6  -4.5  -3.3  -3.2 -3.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -5.0  -9.2  -0.7  0.4  -6.7  0.4 1.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  -1.5  8.1  4.1  1.2  0.8  1.1  0.9 0.4
9. Snow-ball effect  :  -0.5  -0.4  -1.1  -2.3  -1.5  -1.4 -1.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  :  -5.0  -9.2  -0.7  0.4  -6.7  0.4 1.3
11. Change in gross debt (5)  :  2.6  -5.5  -0.6  -1.1  -7.2  -0.2 0.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  :  50.0  43.3  42.7  41.6  34.5  34.3 34.7
 Sweden 
1. Net borrowing (1)  6.9  -5.0  0.5  0.2  -1.6  -2.7  -2.1 -2.2
2. Interest payments  6.5  4.0  3.2  2.4  1.9  1.9  1.9 1.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  9.8  6.8  5.5  4.0  3.2  3.3  3.7 4.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  7.6  5.8  3.6  3.7  4.6  3.9  5.0 5.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  6.9  -5.0  0.5  0.2  -1.6  -2.7  -2.1 -2.2
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -5.2  -3.4  -1.9  -1.9  -2.3  -1.9  -2.4 -2.3
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.0  -1.4  -0.2  1.7  2.8  4.6  1.9 1.8
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  0.3  -9.0  -2.8  -2.2  -3.5  -4.6  -4.0 -4.1
9. Snow-ball effect  1.5  0.6  1.0  0.2  -0.7  -0.3  -0.7 -0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -2.0  -1.4  -0.2  1.7  2.8  4.6  1.9 1.8
11. Change in gross debt (5)  -0.2  -9.8  -1.9  -0.2  -1.3  -0.2  -2.7 -2.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  73.0  52.3  52.0  51.8  50.5  50.3  47.6 44.8
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.421
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Table A.2.13
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 United Kingdom
1. Net borrowing (1)  5.8  -3.7  1.6  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.0 2.8
2. Interest payments  3.6  2.7  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1 2.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2)  8.0  6.6  5.5  5.6  5.4  5.5  5.0 4.9
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  5.6  5.3  5.2  5.5  5.3  3.8  4.6 5.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1)  5.8  -3.7  1.6  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.0 2.8
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -2.5  -2.2  -1.9  -2.0  -2.0  -1.5  -1.9 -2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -0.1  3.0  -0.2  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.1 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4)  2.1  -6.5  -0.4  1.3  1.3  1.3  0.9 0.7
9. Snow-ball effect  1.1  0.6  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.2 -0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3)  -0.1  3.0  -0.2  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.1 0.0
11. Change in gross debt (5)  3.2  -2.9  -0.5  1.5  1.8  2.0  1.3 0.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  51.0  41.2  37.6  39.0  40.8  42.8  44.1 44.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(3) Line 7 = line 10 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.
Table A.2.14
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio (% of GDP)
(% of GDP)
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EUR-12 (1) 
1. Net borrowing (2)  5.0  0.0  2.6  3.1  2.8  2.4  2.4 2.4
2. Interest payments  5.4  3.9  3.5  3.3  3.1  3.0  3.0 3.0
3. Implicit interest rate (3)  8.3  5.7  5.3  5.0  4.7  4.4  4.3 4.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%)  4.7  5.2  3.5  2.7  4.0  3.1  3.8 3.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (2)  5.0  0.0  2.6  3.1  2.8  2.4  2.4 2.4
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth  -3.0  -3.6  -2.3  -1.9  -2.7  -2.1  -2.6 -2.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (4)  2.7  1.1  -0.4  0.0  0.4  0.7  0.0 -0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (5)  -0.4  -3.9  -0.9  -0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.6 -0.6
9. Snow-ball effect  2.4  0.3  1.1  1.4  0.4  0.9  0.4 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (4)  2.7  1.1  -0.4  0.0  0.4  0.7  0.0 -0.2
11. Change in gross debt (6)  4.6  -2.5  -0.2  1.2  0.5  1.0  -0.2 -0.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year)  72.4  69.4  68.3  69.5  70.0  71.0  70.7 70.3
(1) Due to problems with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included
(2) Line 1 = line 5, a minus sign means a surplus
(3) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t-1
(4) Line 7 = line 10 
(5) Net borrowing excluding interest payments, line 8 = line 1 - line 2. A minus sign means a primary surplus
(6) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10
Source: Commission services.422
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EXTable A.3.1
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Belgium
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  47.6  49.1  49.8  51.2  49.4  50.1  49.3 48.5
2. Cyclical component  -0.2  0.9  0.2  -0.3  0.0  -0.3  -0.2 -0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  47.8  48.2  49.5  51.4  49.4  50.4  49.5 48.6
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  51.9  49.1  49.8  51.1  49.5  50.1  49.7 49.5
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  51.9  49.2  49.8  51.1  49.4  50.0  49.6 49.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -4.4  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4 -1.0
8. Cyclical component  -0.2  1.1  0.3  -0.3  0.0  -0.4  -0.2 -0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -4.1  -1.0  -0.3  0.4  0.0  0.4  -0.1 -0.7
— as % of potential GDP  -3.9  -0.9  -0.2  0.4  0.0  0.6  0.1 -0.3
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.4  3.9  1.5  0.9  2.6  1.2  2.3 2.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.1  2.2  2.0  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.2 2.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.8  1.9  0.3  -0.7  0.0  -0.9  -0.9 -1.0
 Germany 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  45.1  46.4  44.3  44.4  43.2  43.4  43.1 43.0
2. Cyclical component  0.1  0.7  0.1  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2 -0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data  45.0  45.7  44.2  44.8  43.4  43.8  43.2 43.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  48.3  45.1  48.1  48.4  46.8  46.7  46.1 45.5
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data  48.3  47.8  48.1  48.3  46.8  46.6  46.1 45.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -3.2  1.3  -3.7  -4.0  -3.7  -3.3  -3.1 -2.5
8. Cyclical component  0.2  0.9  0.2  -0.5  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2 -0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -3.4  -2.0  -3.9  -3.5  -3.4  -2.9  -2.9 -2.1
— as % of potential GDP  -3.0  -1.7  -3.7  -3.3  -3.4  -3.0  -3.0 -2.3
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  1.9  3.2  0.1  -0.2  1.6  0.9  1.7 1.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.2  1.5  1.1  1.0  0.8  1.1  1.2 1.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.4  1.0  -0.1  -1.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.1 -0.3
Source: Commission services.423
A
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N
EXTable A.3.2
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Greece
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  40.9  47.0  43.9  43.2  42.0  41.8  41.9 41.3
2. Cyclical component  -0.7  -0.2  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.4 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data  41.6  47.2  43.8  42.7  41.3  41.2  41.5 41.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  51.0  51.1  49.0  49.0  48.8  46.2  44.8 44.9
5. Cyclical component  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  51.0  51.0  48.9  48.9  48.9  46.4  44.9 44.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -10.2  -4.1  -5.0  -5.8  -6.8  -4.4  -2.9 -3.5
8. Cyclical component  -0.7  -0.2  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.4 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -9.4  -3.8  -5.1  -6.3  -7.7  -5.1  -3.4 -3.8
— as % of potential GDP  -8.9  -3.4  -5.0  -6.3  -7.9  -5.4  -3.8 -4.5
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.1  4.5  3.8  4.8  4.7  3.7  3.5 3.4
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.2  3.8  3.7  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.5 3.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -2.6  -1.3  0.2  1.0  1.9  1.9  1.9 1.9
 Spain 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  37.6  38.1  38.4  38.3  38.7  39.3  39.3 38.8
2. Cyclical component  -0.8  0.7  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.1  -0.1 -0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  38.3  37.4  38.0  38.0  38.6  39.2  39.3 39.2
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  44.1  39.0  38.7  38.3  38.8  38.2  38.3 38.5
5. Cyclical component  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  43.9  39.2  38.7  38.3  38.8  38.2  38.3 38.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -6.5  -0.9  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  1.1  0.9 0.4
8. Cyclical component  -0.9  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1  -0.1 -0.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -5.6  -1.7  -0.8  -0.3  -0.3  1.0  1.0 0.8
— as % of potential GDP  -5.0  -2.0  -0.8  -0.2  0.0  1.3  1.3 1.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.8  5.0  2.7  3.0  3.1  3.4  3.1 2.8
11. Trend GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.6  3.4  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.6 3.3
12. Gap between actual and trend GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -3.2  2.3  1.3  0.4  -0.2  -0.5  -1.0 -1.5
Source: Commission services.424
A
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EXTable A.3.3
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 France
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  49.0  50.2  49.5  49.2  49.6  51.0  51.0 50.7
2. Cyclical component  -0.5  0.9  0.5  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  49.5  49.2  49.0  49.2  49.5  51.1  51.1 50.8
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  54.5  51.6  52.6  53.4  53.2  53.9  54.1 53.8
5. Cyclical component  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  54.4  51.7  52.7  53.3  53.2  53.9  54.0 53.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -5.5  -1.5  -3.2  -4.2  -3.7  -2.9  -3.0 -3.1
8. Cyclical component  -0.6  1.0  0.5  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -4.9  -2.5  -3.7  -4.1  -3.7  -2.7  -2.9 -3.0
— as % of potential GDP  -4.7  -2.7  -3.8  -4.1  -3.6  -2.5  -2.5 -2.4
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.4  4.1  1.2  0.8  2.3  1.4  1.9 2.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.0  2.5  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.1  2.2 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -1.4  2.4  1.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.7  -1.0 -1.3
 Ireland 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  39.0  35.9  33.0  33.6  35.2  35.5  35.1 34.7
2. Cyclical component  3.3  6.1  5.1  4.7  4.4  4.2  4.1 4.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data  35.8  29.9  27.9  28.9  30.8  31.3  30.9 30.6
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  41.1  31.5  33.4  33.4  33.7  34.5  34.9 35.1
5. Cyclical component  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  -0.6  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5 -0.5
6. Cyclically adjusted data  41.5  32.2  34.2  34.0  34.2  35.0  35.4 35.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -2.1  4.4  -0.4  0.2  1.6  1.0  0.1 -0.4
8. Cyclical component  3.7  6.7  5.7  5.3  5.0  4.8  4.6 4.7
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -5.7  -2.3  -6.3  -5.1  -3.4  -3.7  -4.5 -5.1
— as % of potential GDP  -0.8  2.6  -1.9  -0.5  1.4  1.5  1.1 0.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  9.8  9.2  6.1  4.4  4.5  4.7  4.9 5.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 7.1  7.9  6.7  6.0  5.9  6.4  6.1 5.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -2.6  4.9  3.3  1.7  0.3  -1.3  -2.4 -2.9
Source: Commission services.425
A
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EXTable A.3.4
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Italy 
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  44.6  45.3  44.4  44.8  44.3  44.0  44.0 43.8
2. Cyclical component  -0.1  0.8  0.6  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.3 -0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data  44.7  44.5  43.8  44.7  44.2  44.4  44.3 44.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  52.0  46.0  47.4  48.3  47.8  48.2  48.1 48.4
5. Cyclical component  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  52.0  47.2  47.3  48.2  47.7  48.1  48.1 48.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -7.4  -0.8  -3.0  -3.5  -3.5  -4.3  -4.1 -4.5
8. Cyclical component  -0.1  0.8  0.6  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.3 -0.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -7.3  -2.7  -3.5  -3.5  -3.5  -3.6  -3.8 -4.4
— as % of potential GDP  -7.3  -2.9  -3.4  -3.4  -3.3  -3.3  -3.4 -3.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.8  3.6  0.3  0.0  1.1  0.0  1.3 1.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 1.4  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 1.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.3  1.8  1.1  0.0  -0.2  -1.4  -1.3 -1.4
 Luxembourg 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  42.1  43.5  43.4  42.2  42.1  42.4  42.2 42.3
2. Cyclical component  -0.8  1.7  0.6  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  0.0 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data  42.9  41.8  42.8  42.5  42.3  42.6  42.2 42.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  39.8  37.7  41.4  42.1  43.2  44.3  44.0 43.8
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  39.7  37.7  41.4  42.1  43.2  44.3  44.0 43.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  2.3  5.9  2.0  0.2  -1.1  -1.9  -1.8 -1.5
8. Cyclical component  -0.9  1.8  0.6  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  0.0 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  3.1  4.1  1.4  0.5  -0.9  -1.7  -1.8 -1.8
— as % of potential GDP  3.0  4.3  1.7  0.9  -0.5  -1.2  -1.2 -1.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  1.4  8.4  3.6  2.0  4.2  4.2  4.4 4.5
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 4.6  5.0  4.5  4.4  4.1  4.2  4.1 4.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -1.9  4.2  0.7  -1.6  -1.5  -1.5  -1.2 -1.0
Source: Commission services.426
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EXTable A.3.5
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 The Netherlands
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  45.3  45.6  44.2  43.9  44.5  45.4  46.5 46.4
2. Cyclical component  1.5  3.4  2.3  1.5  1.4  1.1  1.2 1.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  43.9  42.1  42.0  42.4  43.1  44.4  45.3 45.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  49.3  43.4  46.2  47.1  46.6  45.7  47.7 47.1
5. Cyclical component  -0.6  -1.3  -1.0  -0.6  -0.6  -0.4  -0.5 -0.6
6. Cyclically adjusted data  49.9  45.4  47.1  47.7  47.0  46.1  48.2 47.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -4.0  2.1  -2.0  -3.2  -2.1  -0.3  -1.2 -0.7
8. Cyclical component  2.1  4.7  3.2  2.1  2.0  1.5  1.8 2.0
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -6.1  -3.3  -5.2  -5.2  -3.9  -1.8  -2.9 -2.7
— as % of potential GDP  -3.3  -0.3  -1.9  -2.0  -0.9  1.0  -0.2 -0.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  3.0  3.5  0.1  -0.1  1.7  1.1  2.6 2.6
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.6  2.8  2.1  1.7  1.6  1.7  1.9 2.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -1.1  3.3  -0.1  -1.9  -1.8  -2.3  -1.6 -1.0
 Austria 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  50.3  49.8  50.0  49.2  48.8  48.0  46.6 46.8
2. Cyclical component  -0.3  0.9  -0.1  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.0 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  50.6  48.9  50.2  49.6  49.0  48.2  46.7 46.7
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  56.0  51.4  50.7  50.9  50.0  49.6  48.7 48.3
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  55.9  51.7  50.5  50.7  49.9  49.5  48.6 48.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -5.7  -1.6  -0.7  -1.7  -1.2  -1.6  -2.0 -1.5
8. Cyclical component  -0.3  1.0  -0.1  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  0.0 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -5.3  -2.8  -0.4  -1.1  -0.9  -1.3  -1.9 -1.4
— as % of potential GDP  -5.2  -2.9  -0.3  -1.0  -0.8  -1.0  -1.7 -1.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  1.9  3.4  1.0  1.4  2.4  1.9  2.5 2.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.2  2.4  2.1  2.2  2.0  2.2  1.9 2.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.9  2.2  -0.4  -1.2  -0.7  -1.0  -0.4 -0.3
Source: Commission services.427
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EXTable A.3.6
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Portugal
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  37.6  40.2  41.4  42.9  43.2  41.8  43.0 43.1
2. Cyclical component  -1.1  1.3  0.9  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.1 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  38.7  38.9  40.4  42.9  43.2  42.0  43.1 43.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  42.8  43.1  44.3  45.9  46.4  47.8  48.0 48.0
5. Cyclical component  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  42.7  43.5  44.3  45.8  46.4  47.8  47.9 48.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -5.2  -3.0  -2.9  -3.0  -3.2  -6.0  -5.0 -4.9
8. Cyclical component  -1.2  1.4  1.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.1 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -4.0  -4.6  -3.9  -2.9  -3.2  -5.8  -4.9 -5.0
— as % of potential GDP  -4.1  -4.6  -3.6  -2.5  -2.6  -5.0  -3.9 -3.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  4.3  3.9  0.8  -1.1  1.1  0.3  0.9 1.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.7  2.7  2.0  1.4  1.3  1.1  1.1 1.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -2.6  3.2  1.6  -0.9  -1.2  -1.9  -2.2 -2.3
 Finland 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  55.3  55.8  52.9  52.4  52.4  53.1  52.7 52.1
2. Cyclical component  -2.0  1.6  0.3  0.0  0.2  -0.1  0.1 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  57.3  54.3  52.6  52.4  52.2  53.3  52.6 52.0
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  61.4  48.8  48.8  50.0  50.3  50.7  50.1 49.8
5. Cyclical component  0.5  -0.3  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  60.9  49.2  48.8  49.9  50.2  50.5  49.9 49.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -6.2  7.0  4.1  2.3  2.1  2.4  2.6 2.4
8. Cyclical component  -2.5  1.9  0.3  0.0  0.3  -0.2  0.2 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -3.6  5.1  3.8  2.5  2.0  2.8  2.7 2.4
— as % of potential GDP  -4.2  5.5  4.4  3.0  2.5  3.2  3.0 2.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  3.4  5.0  2.2  2.4  3.6  2.1  3.6 2.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 1.8  3.7  3.3  3.0  2.9  2.9  2.8 2.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -3.4  3.3  -0.4  -1.0  -0.3  -1.1  -0.4 -0.4
Source: Commission services.428
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EXTable A.3.7
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Czech Republic
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  40.5  38.0  39.9  40.7  41.4  41.1  40.8 40.4
2. Cyclical component  0.8  -0.4  -1.0  -1.1  -0.7  0.0  0.4 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data  39.8  38.4  40.9  41.7  42.1  41.1  40.5 39.9
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  53.8  41.6  46.7  47.2  44.2  43.7  44.0 43.8
5. Cyclical component  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  53.8  41.6  46.7  47.2  44.2  43.7  44.1 43.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -13.2  -3.6  -6.8  -6.6  -2.8  -2.6  -3.1 -3.4
8. Cyclical component  0.8  -0.4  -1.0  -1.1  -0.8  0.0  0.4 0.5
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -14.0  -3.2  -5.8  -5.5  -2.1  -2.6  -3.6 -4.0
— as % of potential GDP  :  -2.9  -5.7  -5.3  -2.0  -2.5  -3.6 -4.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  5.9  3.9  1.5  3.2  4.7  6.0  5.3 4.7
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  1.8  2.9  3.6  3.8  3.7  4.0 4.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 :  -1.9  -2.8  -3.2  -2.3  -0.2  1.0 1.4
 Denmark 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  57.2  56.8  55.7  55.6  57.2  57.4  54.7 53.8
2. Cyclical component  0.1  1.4  -0.2  -0.8  -1.0  -0.5  0.0 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  57.1  55.4  55.9  56.4  58.1  57.9  54.7 53.8
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  59.2  53.6  54.7  54.8  54.6  52.7  50.9 50.0
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.4  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  59.2  53.8  54.5  54.3  54.2  52.4  50.8 49.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -2.0  3.2  1.0  0.8  2.5  4.7  3.8 3.9
8. Cyclical component  0.1  1.7  -0.2  -1.1  -1.2  -0.6  0.0 0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -2.1  1.6  1.4  2.1  3.9  5.5  3.9 4.0
— as % of potential GDP  -2.0  1.7  1.4  2.0  3.8  5.4  3.9 4.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  3.1  3.5  0.5  0.7  1.9  3.1  3.2 2.3
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.3  2.3  2.0  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.3 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.1  2.5  -0.4  -1.6  -1.7  -0.8  0.0 0.1
Source: Commission services.429
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EXTable A.3.8
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Estonia
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  44.0  37.9  37.8  39.1  37.9  37.5  37.3 36.8
2. Cyclical component  0.5  -0.6  -0.6  -0.7  -0.6  0.0  0.3 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  43.5  38.4  38.4  39.8  38.5  37.5  36.9 36.4
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  43.6  38.3  36.8  36.7  36.4  35.9  35.8 35.9
5. Cyclical component  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  43.6  38.2  36.8  36.8  36.4  35.9  35.9 35.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  0.4  -0.4  1.0  2.4  1.5  1.6  1.4 0.8
8. Cyclical component  0.5  -0.6  -0.6  -0.7  -0.6  0.0  0.4 0.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -0.1  0.2  1.6  2.9  2.1  1.6  1.1 0.4
— as % of potential GDP  2.7  0.1  1.2  2.5  1.8  1.5  1.1 0.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  4.5  7.9  7.2  6.7  7.8  9.8  8.9 7.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  5.1  6.8  7.3  7.6  8.4  8.1 8.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -6.7  -1.5  -0.5  -1.1  -0.9  0.4  1.1 1.0
 Cyprus 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  :  35.3  36.1  39.1  39.7  42.3  41.8 41.8
2. Cyclical component  :  0.5  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  0.0 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data  :  34.8  35.9  39.5  40.0  42.4  41.7 41.6
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  :  37.7  40.6  45.3  43.8  44.7  43.9 43.8
5. Cyclical component  :  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  :  37.7  40.6  45.4  44.1  44.7  43.9 43.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  :  -2.4  -4.5  -6.3  -4.1  -2.4  -2.1 -2.0
8. Cyclical component  :  0.5  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  0.0 0.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  :  -2.9  -4.6  -5.9  -4.1  -2.3  -2.1 -2.2
— as % of potential GDP  :  -3.0  -5.0  -6.0  -3.9  -2.1  -1.9 -2.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  9.9  5.0  2.1  1.9  3.9  3.8  3.8 3.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  3.5  3.5  3.8  4.4  3.6  3.3 3.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 1.1  1.8  1.2  -0.6  -1.1  -0.9  -0.5 0.0
Source: Commission services.430
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EXTable A.3.9
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Latvia
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  36.8  34.7  33.4  33.5  34.9  36.4  36.1 36.1
2. Cyclical component  0.8  -0.7  -0.6  -0.6  -0.3  0.3  0.6 0.6
3. Cyclically adjusted data  36.0  35.4  33.9  34.0  35.2  36.0  35.5 35.5
Total uses (% of GDP
4. Actual data  38.8  37.5  35.6  34.6  35.9  36.2  37.1 37.1
5. Cyclical component  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  38.9  37.4  35.6  34.6  35.9  36.3  37.1 37.1
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -2.0  -2.8  -2.3  -1.2  -0.9  0.2  -1.0 -1.0
8. Cyclical component  0.8  -0.7  -0.6  -0.6  -0.3  0.3  0.6 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -2.8  -2.0  -1.7  -0.6  -0.6  -0.3  -1.6 -1.6
— as % of potential GDP  -1.0  -2.2  -2.1  -1.0  -0.9  -0.2  -1.2 -0.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  -0.9  6.9  6.5  7.2  8.5  10.2  8.5 7.6
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  6.1  6.9  7.3  8.2  8.6  9.1 8.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -3.1  -1.8  -0.5  -0.7  -0.4  1.0  0.5 -0.7
 Lithuania 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  34.2  35.8  32.9  31.9  31.9  33.1  32.0 30.7
2. Cyclical component  -11.4  -14.5  -13.3  -11.7  -11.6  -11.4  -11.2 -11.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data  45.6  50.3  46.2  43.6  43.6  44.6  43.3 41.8
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  36.1  39.3  34.3  33.2  33.4  33.7  32.6 31.7
5. Cyclical component  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 0.4
6. Cyclically adjusted data  35.7  38.8  33.8  32.8  33.0  33.3  32.3 31.3
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -1.9  -3.6  -1.4  -1.2  -1.5  -0.5  -0.6 -0.9
8. Cyclical component  -11.8  -15.1  -13.7  -12.1  -12.0  -11.8  -11.6 -11.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  9.9  11.5  12.3  10.8  10.5  11.3  11.0 10.5
— as % of potential GDP  :  -2.2  -0.9  -1.8  -2.0  -1.2  -1.1 -1.0
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  3.3  3.9  6.8  10.5  7.0  7.5  6.5 6.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  3.5  5.7  6.6  7.2  6.8  7.4 7.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 :  -4.3  -1.5  2.0  1.8  2.4  1.6 0.4
Source: Commission services.431
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EXTable A.3.10
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Hungary
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  :  44.3  43.7  43.4  44.1  44.5  43.1 42.2
2. Cyclical component  0.6  0.2  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  :  44.2  43.6  43.6  44.1  44.5  42.9 41.9
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  :  47.4  52.0  49.8  49.5  50.7  49.8 49.2
5. Cyclical component  :  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  :  46.7  52.0  49.8  49.7  50.6  49.8 49.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  :  -3.0  -8.4  -6.4  -5.4  -6.2  -6.7 -7.0
8. Cyclical component  :  0.2  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3 0.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  :  -2.5  -8.4  -6.2  -5.6  -6.2  -6.9 -7.4
— as % of potential GDP  :  -2.3  -8.0  -5.7  -5.2  -5.8  -6.6 -7.1
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  1.5  5.2  3.8  3.4  4.6  4.1  4.6 4.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  4.3  4.4  4.1  4.1  4.0  3.9 3.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 2.5  -0.2  -0.7  -1.4  -0.9  -0.7  -0.1 0.3
 Malta 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  :  35.0  38.7  39.2  43.4  44.2  42.4 40.2
2. Cyclical component  :  1.6  1.3  -0.1  -1.2  -0.7  -0.4 -0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  :  33.4  37.5  39.3  44.5  44.9  42.8 40.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  :  41.2  44.3  49.4  48.5  47.5  45.4 43.6
5. Cyclical component  :  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  :  41.3  44.3  49.4  48.5  47.5  45.3 43.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  :  -6.2  -5.6  -10.2  -5.1  -3.3  -3.0 -3.4
8. Cyclical component  :  1.7  1.3  -0.1  -1.2  -0.7  -0.4 -0.1
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  :  -7.9  -6.9  -10.1  -3.9  -2.6  -2.5 -3.1
— as % of potential GDP  :  -8.1  -7.0  -10.0  -3.8  -2.4  -2.1 -2.6
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  6.2  6.4  1.5  -2.5  -1.5  2.5  1.7 1.9
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  3.3  0.8  1.3  1.3  1.7  1.5 1.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -3.5  5.0  3.5  -0.4  -3.1  -2.3  -2.1 -1.6
Source: Commission services.432
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EXTable A.3.11
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Poland
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  43.3  39.6  41.0  39.9  38.6  40.8  41.6 40.7
2. Cyclical component  -1.1  0.8  -0.7  -0.6  -0.1  -0.2  0.1 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data  44.4  38.8  41.7  40.5  38.8  41.0  41.5 40.2
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  47.7  41.0  44.2  44.6  42.5  43.3  44.6 43.7
5. Cyclical component  0.2  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data  47.5  42.2  44.1  44.4  42.5  43.3  44.6 43.8
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -4.4  -1.5  -3.2  -4.7  -3.9  -2.5  -3.0 -3.0
8. Cyclical component  -1.4  1.0  -0.8  -0.7  -0.1  -0.2  0.1 0.6
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -0.9  -3.5  -2.3  -4.0  -3.8  -2.3  -3.1 -3.6
— as % of potential GDP  -0.2  -2.7  -2.2  -4.1  -4.2  -2.7  -3.3 -3.5
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  7.0  4.2  1.4  3.8  5.3  3.2  4.5 4.6
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  3.2  2.9  2.9  3.2  3.6  4.1 4.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -4.8  0.6  -2.2  -1.3  0.7  0.4  0.8 1.1
 Slovenia 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  :  44.3  45.4  45.2  45.3  45.5  45.5 45.3
2. Cyclical component  :  0.5  0.0  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.1 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data  :  43.7  45.4  45.6  45.5  45.7  45.4 45.1
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  :  48.1  48.0  48.1  47.6  47.3  47.3 47.0
5. Cyclical component  :  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  :  48.2  48.0  48.0  47.6  47.3  47.4 47.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  :  -3.9  -2.7  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -1.9 -1.6
8. Cyclical component  :  0.6  0.0  -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  0.1 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  :  -4.5  -2.7  -2.4  -2.1  -1.6  -2.0 -1.9
— as % of potential GDP  :  -4.3  -2.4  -2.1  -1.8  -1.4  -1.8 -1.7
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  4.1  4.1  3.5  2.7  4.2  3.9  4.3 4.1
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  4.3  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.6 3.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 :  1.0  -0.5  -1.6  -1.1  -0.9  -0.3 0.1
Source: Commission services.433
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EXTable A.3.12
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 Slovakia
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  52.6  47.1  35.7  35.6  35.9  33.9  33.0 32.5
2. Cyclical component  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data  52.8  47.6  36.3  36.3  36.4  34.2  33.1 32.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  53.5  59.3  43.3  39.4  38.9  36.8  35.7 34.6
5. Cyclical component  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  53.5  59.2  43.6  39.3  38.9  36.8  35.7 34.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -0.8  -12.2  -7.7  -3.7  -3.0  -2.9  -2.7 -2.1
8. Cyclical component  -0.2  -0.6  -0.6  -0.7  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1 0.2
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -0.7  -11.6  -7.3  -3.1  -2.5  -2.6  -2.6 -2.2
— as % of potential GDP  :  -11.8  -7.7  -3.0  -2.3  -2.4  -2.5 -2.2
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  5.8  2.0  4.6  4.5  5.5  6.0  6.1 6.5
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  2.5  4.7  6.0  5.4  5.2  5.3 5.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 :  -1.1  -1.0  -2.4  -2.4  -1.6  -0.8 0.2
 Sweden 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  60.2  61.8  57.5  58.0  58.3  59.1  58.2 57.7
2. Cyclical component  -0.5  1.3  0.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.2 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data  60.7  60.5  57.4  58.4  58.3  59.1  58.0 57.4
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  67.1  56.8  57.9  58.2  56.7  56.4  56.1 55.6
5. Cyclical component  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data  67.1  57.0  57.7  57.8  56.5  56.2  56.0 55.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -6.9  5.0  -0.5  -0.2  1.6  2.7  2.1 2.2
8. Cyclical component  -0.6  1.6  0.1  -0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.3 0.4
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -6.4  3.4  -0.3  0.6  1.8  3.0  2.0 1.9
— as % of potential GDP  -5.8  3.9  0.0  0.8  1.9  3.0  2.1 2.1
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  3.9  4.3  2.0  1.7  3.7  2.7  3.4 3.0
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.2  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.7  3.0 2.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -1.8  2.0  -0.3  -1.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.3 0.4
Source: Commission services.434
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EXTable A.3.13
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
 United Kingdom
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  38.5  40.6  39.3  39.3  39.9  41.3  42.2 42.7
2. Cyclical component  1.7  2.7  2.1  2.1  2.3  2.1  2.2 2.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  36.8  37.9  37.2  37.2  37.6  39.2  40.0 40.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  44.3  36.8  40.9  42.5  43.2  44.8  45.2 45.5
5. Cyclical component  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data  44.4  39.3  41.0  42.6  43.3  44.9  45.3 45.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -5.8  3.7  -1.6  -3.3  -3.3  -3.5  -3.0 -2.8
8. Cyclical component  1.8  2.8  2.2  2.2  2.4  2.2  2.3 2.5
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -7.6  -1.4  -3.8  -5.5  -5.7  -5.7  -5.3 -5.3
— as % of potential GDP  -5.5  0.8  -1.7  -3.4  -3.6  -3.3  -2.7 -2.5
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.9  4.0  2.0  2.5  3.1  1.8  2.4 2.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.4  3.0  2.7  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.8 2.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -0.7  1.5  0.2  0.1  0.5  -0.4  -0.7 -0.7
Source: Commission services.435
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EXTable A.3.14
Cyclical adjustment of general government receipts, expenditures and budget balances
EUR-12 (1)
ESA 95 definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  45.5  46.3  45.1  45.1  44.7  45.2  45.0 44.8
2. Cyclical component  -0.1  1.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.0 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data  45.6  45.3  44.6  45.0  44.6  45.2  45.0 44.8
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  50.5  46.3  47.7  48.2  47.5  47.6  47.4 47.2
5. Cyclical component  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  50.5  47.5  47.8  48.2  47.5  47.5  47.4 47.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  -5.0  0.0  -2.6  -3.1  -2.8  -2.4  -2.4 -2.4
8. Cyclical component  -0.1  1.3  0.7  0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.1 0.0
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  -4.9  -2.2  -3.2  -3.1  -2.9  -2.3  -2.4 -2.4
— as % of potential GDP  -4.4  -2.0  -2.9  -2.8  -2.6  -1.9  -2.0 -1.9
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.5  3.8  0.9  0.7  2.0  1.3  2.0 1.8
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 2.1  2.2  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9 2.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 -1.1  1.9  0.6  -0.5  -0.3  -0.9  -0.8 -0.9
EU-25 (1) 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total resources (% of GDP)
1. Actual data  :  45.7  44.4  44.5  44.3  44.9  44.9 44.7
2. Cyclical component  :  1.3  0.7  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.4 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data  :  44.4  43.7  44.2  43.8  44.6  44.5 44.3
Total uses (% of GDP)
4. Actual data  :  44.9  46.8  47.5  47.0  47.2  47.2 46.9
5. Cyclical component  :  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data  :  46.3  46.9  47.5  47.0  47.2  47.2 47.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)
7. Actual balance  :  0.8  -2.4  -3.0  -2.7  -2.3  -2.3 -2.2
8. Cyclical component  :  1.5  0.8  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.4 0.5
9. Cyclically adjusted balance  :  -1.9  -3.2  -3.3  -3.1  -2.6  -2.7 -2.7
— as % of potential GDP  :  -1.3  -2.5  -2.7  -2.5  -1.9  -1.9 -1.8
10. GDP at 1995 market prices (annual % change)  2.7  3.9  1.2  1.2  2.4  1.6  2.3 2.2
11. Potential GDP at 1995 market prices 
(annual % change)
 :  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
 :  1.7  0.4  -0.5  -0.2  -0.7  -0.7 -0.8
(1) Due to problem with availability of the data, Luxembourg data are not included.
Source: Commission services.436
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EXTable A.4.1
Current tax burden; total economy — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 45.5 46.9 47.0 46.6 46.7 47.3 47.0 46.4
DE 41.2 43.2 40.8 40.9 39.8 39.8 39.6 39.6
EL 34.4 39.7 39.3 38.5 37.4 37.2 37.4 37.4
ES 33.3 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.4 36.4 36.5 36.3
FR 44.4 45.7 44.7 44.3 44.5 45.5 45.6 45.4
IE 34.7 32.7 29.6 30.3 31.6 32.1 31.9 31.9
IT 41.3 42.1 41.0 40.3 40.4 40.7 40.8 40.8
LU 38.1 39.8 39.7 38.9 38.7 39.3 39.2 39.4
NL 39.8 40.5 38.4 38.1 38.5 39.1 39.4 39.2
AT 43.5 44.7 45.5 44.7 44.2 43.4 42.1 42.4
PT 32.7 35.1 35.5 36.1 35.6 36.6 37.4 37.6
FI 46.0 47.6 44.4 43.9 43.5 44.3 43.8 43.5
EUR-12 41.2 42.5 41.0 40.8 40.5 41.0 40.9 40.8
CZ 35.8 34.1 35.1 35.7 36.7 37.0 37.1 36.9
DK 50.6 51.0 49.7 49.6 50.7 51.6 49.6 49.0
EE 37.9 32.6 32.5 33.0 32.6 32.7 31.6 31.1
CY : 30.5 31.4 33.2 33.4 35.3 34.9 34.9
LV 33.2 29.7 28.4 28.7 28.8 29.4 29.0 28.8
LT 28.6 30.3 28.6 28.3 28.7 29.1 28.7 28.1
HU 42.5 39.3 39.1 39.0 39.0 38.9 37.6 36.5
MT : 29.4 33.6 33.6 35.9 36.7 36.3 36.2
PL 37.2 34.2 34.6 33.8 32.7 34.8 35.6 35.5
SI : 38.8 39.4 39.7 39.9 40.0 40.0 39.8
SK 41.1 33.9 32.5 31.5 30.5 29.7 29.1 28.9
SE 49.5 54.0 50.3 50.9 51.2 51.9 51.1 50.8
UK 35.9 37.9 36.2 36.2 36.7 37.8 38.6 39.1
EU-25 : 41.8 40.3 40.2 40.1 40.7 40.7 40.6
Source: Commission services.437
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.2
Social contributions received; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 16.4 16.0 16.6 16.6 16.3 16.2 16.0 15.7
DE 18.3 18.3 18.1 18.2 17.8 17.7 17.4 16.6
EL 12.6 13.7 14.9 15.3 14.6 14.3 14.8 14.8
ES 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8
FR 20.3 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.3 18.4 18.5
IE 6.7 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3
IT 14.4 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.9 12.7 12.7
LU 10.9 10.9 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.8
NL 16.5 16.4 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.3 15.7 15.4
AT 17.1 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.9
PT 10.4 11.2 11.7 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.3
FI 14.7 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.8 12.2 12.4 12.3
EUR-12 17.0 15.9 15.7 15.8 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.3
CZ 14.2 14.3 15.0 15.1 15.0 15.2 15.2 15.1
DK 2.9 3.6 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8
EE 13.1 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.2 11.0 10.6 10.4
CY : 6.7 6.8 7.1 7.8 8.4 8.1 8.1
LV 12.0 10.1 9.5 9.1 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.5
LT 7.6 9.4 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.2
HU 15.5 13.2 13.7 13.6 13.6 14.1 13.8 13.1
MT : 7.6 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.9 8.7 8.6
PL 11.3 14.4 14.5 14.0 13.4 13.8 14.2 13.6
SI : 15.0 15.1 15.0 15.0 15.2 15.0 14.8
SK 14.2 13.6 13.5 13.0 12.1 11.1 11.0 10.7
SE 13.6 15.0 15.3 15.0 14.6 14.7 14.5 14.4
UK 7.4 7.6 7.4 8.0 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.6
EU-25 : 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.0 14.0 14.0 13.8
Source: Commission services.438
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.3
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 16.3 17.1 17.1 16.7 16.8 17.1 16.9 16.6
DE 10.8 12.3 10.6 10.4 10.0 10.1 10.0 9.9
EL 7.4 10.6 9.3 8.7 8.7 9.1 9.1 9.1
ES 9.9 10.2 10.4 10.1 10.2 11.0 11.0 10.9
FR 8.1 12.0 11.3 10.9 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.0
IE 13.5 13.3 11.5 11.8 12.3 12.2 12.0 12.0
IT 14.5 14.4 13.9 13.4 13.3 13.3 13.6 13.5
LU 15.3 14.9 15.2 14.7 13.2 13.7 14.0 14.4
NL 11.9 11.6 11.4 10.7 10.5 11.7 11.0 11.1
AT 11.6 13.1 14.0 13.5 13.4 12.8 11.5 12.0
PT 8.4 9.8 9.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.9 9.1
FI 17.2 21.3 18.8 17.7 17.6 17.8 17.2 17.0
EUR-12 11.1 12.7 11.9 11.5 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.4
CZ 9.5 8.3 9.2 9.6 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.5
DK 30.7 30.3 29.1 29.1 30.0 30.9 29.4 29.0
EE 10.9 8.1 7.9 8.6 8.5 7.4 7.2 7.1
CY : 11.1 11.2 9.7 8.2 9.4 9.5 9.5
LV 7.1 7.3 7.7 7.5 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.1
LT 8.8 8.4 7.5 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.0 8.7
HU 9.3 9.8 10.3 9.7 9.2 9.2 9.1 9.0
MT : 9.2 11.5 12.1 12.2 11.9 11.9 11.9
PL 11.7 7.2 6.9 6.6 6.4 7.1 7.1 7.0
SI : 7.5 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9.0
SK 11.4 7.5 7.1 7.1 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.5
SE 19.9 22.2 17.8 18.6 19.4 19.9 19.3 19.2
UK 14.7 16.4 15.4 14.9 15.2 16.1 17.0 17.3
EU-25 : 13.7 12.8 12.4 12.4 12.8 12.8 12.8
Source: Commission services.439
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.4
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 11.9 12.9 12.7 12.7 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.3
DE 11.1 11.9 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.9
EL 13.5 14.9 14.1 13.6 12.9 12.6 13.3 13.4
ES 9.9 11.4 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.2
FR 15.2 15.2 14.9 15.0 15.3 15.6 15.6 15.6
IE 13.4 13.1 12.0 12.3 13.0 13.4 13.4 13.4
IT 11.8 14.7 14.3 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.2 14.2
LU 11.0 13.5 12.5 12.3 13.6 13.6 13.3 13.0
NL 10.3 11.6 12.1 12.2 12.5 12.7 12.7 12.5
AT 13.9 14.4 14.7 14.5 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.3
PT 12.9 13.5 14.2 14.8 14.3 15.3 16.0 16.1
FI 13.5 13.6 13.4 13.9 13.8 14.0 14.0 14.0
EUR-12 12.2 13.3 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.8
CZ 12.1 11.4 10.9 11.1 11.7 12.0 11.9 11.8
DK 16.8 17.0 17.4 17.1 17.4 17.6 17.2 16.9
EE 13.9 12.9 13.1 13.0 12.8 14.0 13.7 13.3
CY : 12.7 13.4 16.5 17.4 17.5 17.4 17.3
LV 14.1 12.3 11.2 12.1 11.8 12.6 12.4 12.4
LT 12.3 12.6 12.4 11.8 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.0
HU 17.7 16.3 15.1 15.8 16.2 15.6 14.8 14.4
MT : 12.6 13.9 13.3 15.3 15.6 15.5 15.4
PL 14.2 12.6 13.2 13.2 12.8 13.9 14.3 14.9
SI : 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.2 16.2 16.1 16.0
SK 15.5 12.9 12.0 11.4 12.3 12.7 12.3 12.3
SE 15.4 16.3 16.8 17.0 16.9 17.0 17.0 16.9
UK 12.9 13.3 13.0 13.0 13.1 12.9 12.8 13.0
EU-25 : 13.5 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.8
Source: Commission services.440
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.5
Other current revenue; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.6
DE 3.6 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7
EL 4.5 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.1
ES 4.0 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0
FR 4.4 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0
IE 2.8 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9
IT 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5
LU 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.9
NL 5.7 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.4
AT 4.9 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
PT 3.9 3.3 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7
FI 7.2 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.1 5.9
EUR-12 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
CZ 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.9 6.1 6.0
DK 5.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.6
EE 8.9 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.3 3.5 3.1 2.9
CY : 3.2 2.9 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.7 4.7
LV 6.3 7.4 6.6 6.0 5.7 4.9 4.6 4.4
LT 6.3 5.8 3.9 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9
HU : 6.0 5.7 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.8
MT : 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.6 5.2 4.5 3.5
PL 5.7 4.9 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.2 4.6
SI : 3.7 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
SK 13.6 15.0 5.2 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.0
SE 8.1 5.8 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.7
UK 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3
EU-25 : 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3
Source: Commission services. 441
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.6
Total current revenue; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 47.8 49.0 49.4 48.9 48.6 49.3 48.8 48.1
DE 43.9 45.6 43.5 43.5 42.3 42.4 42.1 42.1
EL 38.1 42.7 41.3 40.0 38.4 38.3 39.9 39.3
ES 36.6 37.8 38.0 38.0 38.3 39.2 39.2 38.9
FR 48.0 48.9 48.2 47.7 48.1 49.1 49.4 49.2
IE 36.4 34.1 31.2 31.8 33.3 33.9 33.6 33.6
IT 43.7 44.6 44.1 43.4 43.7 44.0 44.1 44.0
LU 42.0 43.6 43.4 42.2 42.0 42.2 42.0 42.1
NL 44.4 44.2 42.7 42.4 42.9 43.8 44.7 44.6
AT 47.5 47.2 48.8 48.0 47.5 46.7 45.4 45.6
PT 35.7 37.8 38.8 39.3 39.1 39.9 41.0 41.3
FI 52.5 53.2 50.1 49.4 49.1 49.9 49.7 49.1
EUR-12 44.3 45.2 44.2 43.8 43.6 44.1 44.1 43.9
CZ 42.7 40.7 41.4 42.0 42.7 42.5 42.8 42.4
DK 55.6 55.0 53.7 53.6 54.9 55.5 53.2 52.3
EE 46.8 36.7 36.9 37.2 36.7 35.9 34.6 33.7
CY : 33.7 34.4 37.2 37.1 39.5 39.6 39.6
LV 39.5 37.1 35.0 34.7 34.3 34.4 33.7 33.3
LT 34.9 36.1 32.6 31.5 31.5 32.0 31.6 30.8
HU : 45.3 44.8 44.6 45.1 45.2 43.7 42.3
MT : 35.1 39.5 39.9 42.5 41.6 40.6 39.5
PL 42.9 39.0 40.3 39.3 38.3 40.5 40.8 40.1
SI : 42.5 43.3 43.4 43.7 44.0 44.0 43.8
SK 54.8 48.9 37.8 37.5 37.1 35.7 34.9 34.5
SE 57.0 59.3 54.9 55.4 55.6 56.5 55.6 55.2
UK 37.8 39.7 38.0 38.0 38.5 39.5 40.5 41.1
EU-25 : 44.7 43.4 43.2 43.1 43.7 43.8 43.7
Source: Commission services.442
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.7
Interest; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 8.9 6.6 5.8 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.3 4.0
DE 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
EL 12.7 8.1 6.1 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.9
ES 5.1 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5
FR 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
IE 5.3 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
IT 11.2 6.4 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.8
LU 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
NL 5.6 3.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3
AT 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7
PT 5.9 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.1
FI 3.9 2.8 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5
EUR-12 5.4 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
CZ 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
DK 5.9 3.7 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.6
EE 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
CY : 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.0
LV 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
LT 0.4 1.7 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
HU : 5.5 3.9 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.7
MT : 3.6 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9
PL 5.7 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.6
SI : 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4
SK 2.3 4.0 3.5 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.7
SE 6.5 4.0 3.2 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
UK 3.6 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
EU-25 : 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
Source: Commission services.443
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.8
Final consumption expenditure of general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 21.5 21.3 22.5 23.0 22.9 23.1 23.1 23.1
DE 19.6 19.0 19.2 19.2 18.6 18.6 18.4 18.2
EL 15.3 17.4 17.8 16.7 16.6 16.4 15.9 15.9
ES 17.7 17.2 17.2 17.4 17.8 17.8 17.9 18.0
FR 23.6 22.9 23.4 23.7 23.7 23.8 23.8 23.6
IE 16.3 13.8 15.0 15.3 15.6 15.9 16.2 16.3
IT 17.4 17.9 19.2 19.7 19.8 20.3 20.2 20.1
LU 15.9 15.1 16.3 16.5 16.9 17.5 17.4 17.3
NL 23.0 21.8 23.7 24.4 24.3 24.0 25.5 25.3
AT 20.1 18.4 18.2 18.2 18.0 18.0 17.9 17.8
PT 17.7 19.3 20.0 20.4 20.6 21.1 20.9 20.8
FI 22.7 20.5 21.0 21.7 21.9 22.5 22.5 22.5
EUR-12 20.2 19.6 20.2 20.4 20.3 20.4 20.4 20.3
CZ 21.5 21.8 22.5 23.4 22.4 22.4 21.7 20.8
DK 25.2 25.1 26.2 26.3 26.5 25.8 25.3 25.0
EE 27.4 20.2 19.2 19.4 19.0 18.2 17.7 17.5
CY : 16.4 18.4 19.9 18.2 18.3 18.0 18.0
LV 24.1 20.8 21.0 21.4 19.6 17.8 17.9 17.6
LT 21.9 21.7 19.4 18.4 18.0 16.8 16.3 16.0
HU 23.4 21.4 23.4 24.6 23.8 23.7 23.6 23.3
MT : 19.2 21.0 21.8 22.7 22.1 21.4 21.1
PL 18.7 17.5 18.0 18.3 17.9 18.7 17.5 17.2
SI : 19.3 19.7 19.6 19.5 19.6 19.4 19.1
SK 20.3 19.6 20.3 20.5 20.0 18.7 18.1 17.4
SE 27.0 26.4 27.8 28.1 27.4 27.3 27.3 27.1
UK 19.2 18.5 19.8 20.7 20.9 21.4 22.0 22.1
EU-25 : 19.7 20.4 20.8 20.7 20.9 20.9 20.8
Source: Commission services.444
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.9
Compensation of employees; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 11.9 11.5 12.2 12.3 12.0 12.2 12.1 12.0
DE 8.7 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.2 7.0
EL 11.3 11.5 12.0 11.7 12.4 12.6 12.3 12.3
ES 11.0 10.3 10.0 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.7
FR 13.6 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.0
IE 10.1 8.0 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.9 10.1 10.1
IT 10.9 10.4 10.6 10.8 10.8 11.0 11.0 10.9
LU 8.5 7.5 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.0
NL 10.3 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.5
AT 12.5 10.9 9.6 9.6 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.0
PT 12.9 14.2 14.7 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.2 14.0
FI 15.1 13.1 13.2 13.6 13.6 13.8 13.8 13.7
EUR-12 10.9 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.2
CZ 7.3 7.1 7.8 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.0 7.9
DK 17.2 17.1 17.8 17.9 17.8 17.3 17.0 16.8
EE 11.7 11.0 10.1 10.5 10.3 9.8 9.5 9.2
CY : 13.8 13.9 15.7 15.1 14.9 14.5 14.4
LV 11.2 10.8 10.5 10.7 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.9
LT 10.1 12.7 11.4 10.8 10.8 10.4 10.1 10.0
HU 12.1 10.7 12.4 13.3 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.5
MT : 13.0 14.8 15.2 15.4 14.8 14.5 14.3
PL 10.7 10.1 10.8 10.7 10.2 10.1 10.1 9.8
SI : 11.6 12.0 12.1 12.0 12.1 11.9 11.7
SK 9.4 8.7 9.0 8.9 8.5 7.4 7.1 6.8
SE 16.6 15.6 16.1 16.5 16.3 16.1 15.9 15.8
UK 10.6 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.7 11.0 11.3 11.4
EU-25 : 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.6
Source: Commission services.445
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.10
Total current expenditure; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 49.8 46.3 47.4 48.1 47.3 47.5 47.3 47.2
DE 44.0 44.0 44.4 44.8 43.6 43.4 43.0 42.4
EL 44.9 42.9 42.0 41.2 40.7 39.5 40.1 40.1
ES 38.4 34.8 34.1 34.0 34.1 33.8 33.9 34.0
FR 48.9 46.7 47.9 48.5 48.3 48.8 48.9 48.6
IE 36.4 26.4 27.9 28.1 28.7 30.0 30.1 30.1
IT 47.4 43.2 43.9 44.3 44.2 44.6 44.6 44.7
LU 34.7 33.0 35.5 36.3 37.3 37.9 37.6 37.4
NL 45.5 39.8 40.9 41.7 41.6 40.9 42.5 41.9
AT 48.5 45.6 46.2 46.4 45.4 44.9 44.1 43.8
PT 37.6 37.2 39.1 40.7 41.4 42.7 43.1 43.3
FI 53.3 43.7 43.3 44.3 44.2 45.0 44.5 44.4
EUR-12 45.6 43.0 43.5 43.8 43.3 43.4 43.3 43.0
CZ 37.0 38.5 39.4 40.6 38.6 38.5 38.9 39.1
DK 55.7 50.2 50.9 51.1 50.8 49.1 47.9 47.0
EE 39.7 32.1 30.2 30.7 32.0 30.9 29.3 29.1
CY : 32.6 35.3 39.5 37.8 39.1 38.0 37.9
LV 39.3 36.8 34.0 33.1 31.5 30.2 30.3 29.7
LT 32.0 35.1 30.9 29.8 29.6 29.6 29.3 28.8
HU : 42.8 44.6 45.9 46.0 47.0 47.5 46.9
MT : 37.5 40.7 42.1 44.4 43.3 42.7 42.4
PL 43.3 37.5 39.3 39.5 38.1 39.1 39.5 38.7
SI : 41.6 42.0 41.6 41.6 41.7 41.6 41.5
SK 47.4 48.3 38.6 37.8 36.7 34.3 33.6 32.8
SE 59.6 51.5 52.2 52.5 51.1 50.8 50.8 50.3
UK 40.5 36.8 37.9 39.2 39.6 40.7 40.7 40.8
EU-25 : 42.1 42.7 43.3 42.9 43.0 43.0 42.7
Source: Commission services.446
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.11
Gross saving; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE -1.9 2.6 1.9 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.0
DE -0.1 1.6 -0.9 -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.4
EL -6.8 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -2.4 -1.2 -0.2 -0.8
ES -1.8 3.0 3.9 3.9 4.2 5.3 5.3 4.9
FR -0.8 2.2 0.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6
IE 0.0 7.7 3.4 3.7 4.6 3.9 3.5 3.5
IT -3.7 1.4 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8
LU 7.3 10.5 7.9 5.9 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.7
NL -1.1 4.4 1.8 0.7 1.3 2.9 2.1 2.6
AT -1.0 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.8
PT -2.0 0.6 -0.3 -1.4 -2.2 -2.8 -2.1 -2.0
FI -0.7 9.5 6.8 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 4.8
EUR-12 -1.3 2.3 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9
CZ 5.7 2.2 2.0 1.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.3
DK -0.1 4.8 2.8 2.5 4.1 6.4 5.3 5.3
EE 7.1 4.6 6.7 6.5 4.8 5.0 5.2 4.6
CY : 1.1 -0.9 -2.3 -0.6 0.4 1.6 1.7
LV 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.6 2.8 4.2 3.5 3.6
LT 2.9 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.0
HU : 2.5 0.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.8 -3.8 -4.6
MT : -2.4 -1.2 -2.2 -1.9 -1.7 -2.2 -3.0
PL -0.4 1.5 1.0 -0.2 0.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
SI : 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3
SK 7.4 0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 1.4 1.3 1.7
SE -2.6 7.7 2.7 2.9 4.5 5.7 4.8 4.9
UK -2.7 2.8 0.1 -1.2 -1.1 -1.2 -0.2 0.2
EU-25 : 2.5 0.7 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.0
Source: Commission services.447
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.12
Gross fixed capital formation; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7
DE 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
EL 3.2 4.0 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.5 3.1 3.1
ES 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.7
FR 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.4
IE 2.3 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.7 4.0
IT 2.1 2.3 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
LU 3.8 3.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.8
NL 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
AT 3.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
PT 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.8
FI 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
EUR-12 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
CZ 5.0 2.9 3.9 4.5 4.9 4.5 6.5 6.8
DK 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6
EE 5.0 3.9 4.7 4.3 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.1
CY : 3.0 3.0 3.4 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.4
LV 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.7 3.2
LT 3.4 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5
HU : 3.3 5.0 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.6
MT : 4.2 4.5 5.2 4.5 5.5 4.6 4.1
PL 3.3 2.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.1 4.0 4.1
SI : 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3
SK 2.3 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.5
SE 3.9 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
UK 2.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
EU-25 : 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6
Source: Commission services.448
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.13
Total expenditure; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 51.9 49.1 49.8 51.1 49.5 50.1 49.7 49.5
DE 48.3 45.1 48.1 48.4 46.8 46.7 46.1 45.5
EL 51.0 51.1 49.0 49.0 48.8 46.2 44.8 44.9
ES 44.1 39.0 38.7 38.3 38.8 38.2 38.3 38.5
FR 54.5 51.6 52.6 53.4 53.2 53.9 54.1 53.8
IE 41.1 31.5 33.4 33.4 33.7 34.5 34.9 35.1
IT 52.0 46.0 47.4 48.3 47.8 48.2 48.1 48.4
LU 39.8 37.7 41.4 42.1 43.2 44.3 44.0 43.8
NL 49.3 43.4 46.2 47.1 46.6 45.7 47.7 47.1
AT 56.0 51.4 50.7 50.9 50.0 49.6 48.7 48.3
PT 42.8 43.1 44.3 45.9 46.4 47.8 48.0 48.0
FI 61.4 48.8 48.8 50.0 50.3 50.7 50.1 49.8
EUR-12 50.4 46.3 47.7 48.2 47.5 47.5 47.4 47.1
CZ 53.8 41.6 46.7 47.2 44.2 43.7 44.0 43.8
DK 59.2 53.6 54.7 54.8 54.6 52.7 50.9 50.0
EE 43.6 38.3 36.8 36.7 36.4 35.9 35.8 35.9
CY : 37.7 40.6 45.3 43.8 44.7 43.9 43.8
LV 38.8 37.5 35.6 34.6 35.9 36.2 37.1 37.1
LT 36.1 39.3 34.3 33.2 33.4 33.7 32.6 31.7
HU : 47.4 52.0 49.8 49.5 50.7 49.8 49.2
MT : 41.2 44.3 49.4 48.5 47.5 45.4 43.6
PL 47.7 41.0 44.2 44.6 42.5 43.3 44.6 43.7
SI : 48.1 48.0 48.1 47.6 47.3 47.3 47.0
SK 53.5 59.3 43.3 39.4 38.9 36.8 35.7 34.6
SE 67.1 56.8 57.9 58.2 56.7 56.4 56.1 55.6
UK 44.3 36.8 40.9 42.5 43.2 44.8 45.2 45.5
EU-25 : 44.9 46.8 47.5 47.0 47.2 47.2 46.9
Source: Commission services.449
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.14
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-); general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE -4.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -1.0
DE -3.2 1.3 -3.7 -4.0 -3.7 -3.3 -3.1 -2.5
EL -10.2 -4.1 -5.0 -5.8 -6.8 -4.4 -2.9 -3.5
ES -6.5 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 1.1 0.9 0.4
FR -5.5 -1.5 -3.2 -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -3.0 -3.1
IE -2.1 4.4 -0.4 0.2 1.6 1.0 0.1 -0.4
IT -7.4 -0.8 -3.0 -3.5 -3.5 -4.3 -4.1 -4.5
LU 2.3 5.9 2.0 0.2 -1.1 -1.9 -1.8 -1.5
NL -4.0 2.1 -2.0 -3.2 -2.1 -0.3 -1.2 -0.7
AT -5.7 -1.6 -0.7 -1.7 -1.2 -1.6 -2.0 -1.5
PT -5.2 -3.0 -2.9 -3.0 -3.2 -6.0 -5.0 -4.9
FI -6.2 7.0 4.1 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.4
EUR-12 -5.0 0.0 -2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
CZ -13.2 -3.6 -6.8 -6.6 -2.8 -2.6 -3.1 -3.4
DK -2.0 3.2 1.0 0.8 2.5 4.7 3.8 3.9
EE 0.4 -0.4 1.0 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.8
CY : -2.4 -4.5 -6.3 -4.1 -2.4 -2.1 -2.0
LV -2.0 -2.8 -2.3 -1.2 -0.9 0.2 -1.0 -1.0
LT -1.9 -3.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9
HU : -3.0 -8.4 -6.4 -5.4 -6.2 -6.7 -7.0
MT : -6.2 -5.6 -10.2 -5.1 -3.3 -3.0 -3.4
PL -4.4 -1.5 -3.2 -4.7 -3.9 -2.5 -3.0 -3.0
SI : -3.9 -2.7 -2.8 -2.3 -1.8 -1.9 -1.6
SK -0.8 -12.2 -7.7 -3.7 -3.0 -2.9 -2.7 -2.1
SE -6.9 5.0 -0.5 -0.2 1.6 2.7 2.1 2.2
UK -5.8 3.7 -1.6 -3.3 -3.3 -3.5 -3.0 -2.8
EU-25 : 0.8 -2.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -2.3 -2.2
Source: Commission services.450
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.15
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest; general government — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 4.5 6.7 5.7 5.4 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.1
DE 0.3 4.5 -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.3
EL 2.6 4.0 1.1 -0.3 -1.5 0.5 1.9 1.4
ES -1.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.6 1.9
FR -2.0 1.4 -0.3 -1.4 -1.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
IE 3.2 6.3 0.9 1.4 2.7 2.2 1.3 0.8
IT 3.8 5.6 2.7 1.7 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.2
LU 2.7 6.2 2.3 0.4 -1.0 -1.8 -1.7 -1.4
NL 1.7 5.8 0.8 -0.5 0.5 2.2 1.2 1.6
AT -1.8 2.0 2.6 1.4 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.3
PT 0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -3.3 -2.1 -1.8
FI -2.2 9.8 6.2 4.2 3.8 4.1 4.1 3.9
EUR-12 0.4 3.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
CZ -12.1 -2.8 -5.6 -5.5 -1.7 -1.4 -1.8 -2.0
DK 3.9 6.8 4.1 3.6 5.0 6.8 5.7 5.5
EE 0.6 -0.2 1.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.0
CY : 1.1 -1.3 -2.8 -0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
LV -0.8 -1.8 -1.5 -0.5 -0.2 0.8 -0.5 -0.4
LT -1.5 -1.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.2
HU : 2.4 -4.4 -2.5 -1.2 -2.3 -3.0 -3.3
MT : -2.6 -1.8 -6.5 -1.1 0.7 0.9 0.5
PL 1.3 1.5 -0.4 -1.9 -1.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4
SI : -1.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2
SK 1.5 -8.1 -4.1 -1.2 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.4
SE -0.3 9.0 2.8 2.2 3.5 4.6 4.0 4.1
UK -2.1 6.5 0.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.9 -0.7
EU-25 : 4.4 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5
Source: Commission services.451
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.16
General government consolidated gross debt — Excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995)
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 129.7 107.7 103.2 98.5 94.7 93.3 89.8 87.0
DE 55.5 59.2 60.3 63.8 65.5 67.7 68.9 69.2
EL 108.7 111.6 110.7 107.8 108.5 107.5 105.0 102.1
ES 62.5 59.2 52.5 48.9 46.4 43.2 40.0 37.9
FR 55.1 56.7 58.2 62.4 64.4 66.8 66.9 67.0
IE 81.0 37.8 32.1 31.1 29.4 27.6 27.2 27.0
IT 121.2 109.2 105.5 104.2 103.8 106.4 107.4 107.7
LU 5.8 5.3 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.2 7.9 8.2
NL 74.0 53.6 50.5 51.9 52.6 52.9 51.2 50.3
AT 67.9 65.8 66.0 64.4 63.6 62.9 62.4 61.6
PT 61.0 50.4 55.5 57.0 58.7 63.9 68.4 70.6
FI 56.5 44.3 41.3 44.3 44.3 41.1 39.7 38.3
EUR-12 72.2 69.2 68.1 69.3 69.8 70.8 70.5 70.1
CZ : 19.1 28.8 30.0 30.6 30.5 31.5 32.4
DK 72.5 51.7 46.8 44.4 42.6 35.8 30.0 26.5
EE : 5.1 5.5 6.0 5.4 4.8 3.6 3.0
CY : 59.9 65.2 69.7 71.7 70.3 69.1 67.8
LV : 12.3 13.5 14.4 14.6 11.9 11.3 10.9
LT : 23.6 22.3 21.2 19.5 18.7 18.9 19.7
HU : 54.3 55.0 56.7 57.1 58.4 59.9 62.0
MT : 56.0 61.2 71.3 76.2 74.7 74.0 74.0
PL : 35.9 39.8 43.9 41.9 42.5 45.5 46.7
SI : 27.6 29.7 29.1 29.5 29.1 29.9 29.7
SK : 50.0 43.3 42.7 41.6 34.5 34.3 34.7
SE 73.0 52.3 52.0 51.8 50.5 50.3 47.6 44.8
UK 51.0 41.2 37.6 39.0 40.8 42.8 44.1 44.7
EU-25 : 61.9 60.5 62.0 62.4 63.4 63.2 62.9
Source: Commission services.452
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.17
Cyclically adjusted total revenue of general government — Adjustment based on potential GDP — ESA 1995
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 47.9 48.2 49.6 51.5 49.4 50.5 49.7 49.0
DE 45.3 46.0 44.4 44.9 43.4 43.7 43.1 43.1
EL 41.8 47.5 43.9 42.7 41.2 41.0 41.1 40.6
ES 38.8 37.3 38.0 38.1 38.8 39.5 39.6 39.4
FR 49.6 49.1 49.0 49.2 49.6 51.3 51.5 51.3
IE 40.1 34.2 31.9 33.0 35.1 36.0 35.9 35.8
IT 44.8 44.4 43.8 44.8 44.4 44.7 44.6 44.5
LU 42.8 41.9 43.0 43.0 42.7 43.0 42.8 42.8
NL 45.8 44.3 44.2 44.7 45.2 46.3 47.2 46.8
AT 50.7 48.9 50.2 49.7 49.1 48.4 46.8 46.9
PT 38.5 39.0 40.7 43.3 43.7 42.6 43.9 44.1
FI 56.7 54.4 53.0 52.8 52.6 53.6 52.9 52.3
EUR-12 45.9 45.5 44.8 45.3 44.9 45.5 45.4 45.2
CZ : 38.7 40.9 41.8 42.2 41.2 40.5 39.9
DK 57.2 55.5 55.9 56.4 58.0 57.8 54.7 53.8
EE 46.4 38.3 38.0 39.4 38.2 37.4 37.0 36.5
CY : 34.7 35.7 39.3 40.1 42.7 41.9 41.8
LV 37.7 35.2 33.5 33.6 35.0 36.1 35.9 36.2
LT : 37.0 33.3 31.4 31.5 32.5 31.6 30.6
HU : 44.4 44.0 44.0 44.5 44.8 43.2 42.1
MT : 33.6 37.5 39.4 44.5 45.0 43.1 40.8
PL 45.0 39.4 41.8 40.3 38.4 40.7 41.4 40.3
SI : 43.9 45.6 45.9 45.7 45.9 45.6 45.3
SK : 47.4 35.9 36.3 36.5 34.4 33.2 32.4
SE 61.1 60.8 57.6 58.6 58.3 59.1 58.1 57.5
UK 38.8 40.0 39.2 39.2 39.7 41.5 42.5 43.0
EU-25 : 44.9 44.2 44.7 44.4 45.2 45.2 45.0
Source: Commission services.453
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.18
Cyclically adjusted total expenditure of general government — Adjustment based on potential GDP - Excessive 
deficit procedure
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 51.9 49.2 49.8 51.0 49.4 49.9 49.6 49.3
DE 48.3 47.7 48.0 48.2 46.8 46.6 46.1 45.4
EL 51.0 51.0 48.9 48.9 48.9 46.4 44.9 44.9
ES 43.9 39.2 38.8 38.3 38.8 38.2 38.3 38.4
FR 54.4 51.7 52.7 53.3 53.2 53.8 54.0 53.7
IE 41.0 31.7 33.7 33.5 33.7 34.5 34.8 35.0
IT 52.0 47.2 47.3 48.2 47.7 48.1 48.1 48.4
LU 39.7 37.7 41.4 42.0 43.2 44.3 44.0 43.8
NL 49.1 44.6 46.2 46.7 46.1 45.3 47.4 47.0
AT 55.9 51.7 50.5 50.7 49.9 49.4 48.5 48.2
PT 42.7 43.5 44.3 45.8 46.3 47.8 47.9 47.9
FI 61.0 49.1 48.7 49.8 50.1 50.4 49.9 49.5
EUR-12 50.4 47.4 47.7 48.1 47.4 47.4 47.3 47.1
CZ : 41.6 46.7 47.2 44.2 43.7 44.1 43.9
DK 59.2 53.8 54.5 54.3 54.2 52.4 50.8 49.8
EE 43.5 38.2 36.8 36.9 36.4 35.9 35.9 35.9
CY : 37.7 40.6 45.4 44.1 44.7 43.9 43.8
LV 38.7 37.5 35.6 34.6 35.9 36.3 37.1 37.0
LT : 39.3 34.3 33.2 33.4 33.7 32.7 31.7
HU : 46.7 52.0 49.8 49.7 50.6 49.8 49.2
MT : 41.3 44.3 49.4 48.5 47.5 45.3 43.4
PL 47.4 42.1 44.1 44.5 42.6 43.3 44.6 43.8
SI : 48.2 48.0 48.0 47.6 47.3 47.4 47.0
SK : 59.2 43.6 39.3 38.8 36.8 35.7 34.6
SE 67.0 57.0 57.7 57.8 56.4 56.2 56.0 55.5
UK 44.3 39.2 40.9 42.5 43.2 44.8 45.2 45.5
EU-25 : 46.2 46.8 47.4 46.9 47.1 47.1 46.9
Source: Commission services.454
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.19
Cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general government — Adjustment based on potential 
GDP — Excessive deficit procedure
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
ESA 95 
definitions
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE -3.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.3
DE -3.0 -1.7 -3.7 -3.4 -3.4 -3.0 -3.0 -2.3
EL -9.2 -3.5 -5.0 -6.2 -7.7 -5.3 -3.8 -4.4
ES -5.1 -1.9 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.0
FR -4.8 -2.6 -3.8 -4.1 -3.6 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5
IE -0.8 2.4 -1.8 -0.5 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.8
IT -7.3 -2.8 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -3.8
LU 3.1 4.1 1.7 0.9 -0.5 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0
NL -3.3 -0.3 -1.9 -2.1 -0.9 1.0 -0.3 -0.2
AT -5.2 -2.8 -0.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 -1.7 -1.2
PT -4.2 -4.5 -3.5 -2.5 -2.7 -5.1 -4.0 -3.8
FI -4.3 5.3 4.3 3.0 2.5 3.2 3.0 2.7
EUR-12 -4.5 -1.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.6 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9
CZ : -2.9 -5.8 -5.4 -2.0 -2.5 -3.6 -4.0
DK -2.0 1.7 1.4 2.1 3.8 5.4 3.9 4.0
EE 2.9 0.1 1.2 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.5
CY : -3.0 -4.9 -6.1 -3.9 -2.1 -1.9 -2.0
LV -1.0 -2.3 -2.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.2 -1.2 -0.8
LT : -2.3 -1.0 -1.7 -1.9 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0
HU : -2.3 -8.0 -5.8 -5.2 -5.8 -6.6 -7.1
MT : -7.7 -6.8 -10.0 -3.9 -2.4 -2.2 -2.6
PL -0.2 -2.7 -2.3 -4.2 -4.2 -2.6 -3.3 -3.5
SI : -4.3 -2.4 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -1.8 -1.7
SK : -11.8 -7.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.1
SE -5.9 3.8 0.0 0.8 1.9 3.0 2.1 2.1
UK -5.5 0.8 -1.7 -3.3 -3.5 -3.3 -2.7 -2.5
EU-25 : -1.3 -2.5 -2.7 -2.5 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8
Source: Commission services.455
A
N
N
EXTable A.5.1
Gross domestic product at current market prices
(Billion EUR)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 217.4 251.7 267.6 274.6 288.1 298.2 310.9 324.0
DE 1 929.4 2 062.5 2 145.0 2 163.4 2 215.7 2 245.5 2 292.6 2 341.3
EL 89.9 125.9 143.5 155.5 168.4 181.1 193.1 205.6
ES 456.5 630.3 729.0 780.6 837.3 904.3 971.7 1 034.1
FR 1 201.1 1 441.4 1 548.6 1 585.2 1 648.4 1 694.1 1 752.4 1 821.6
IE 51.3 104.4 130.5 139.1 148.6 160.3 172.9 186.9
IT 861.1 1 191.1 1 295.2 1 335.4 1 388.9 1 417.2 1 465.6 1 514.1
LU 15.8 22.0 24.0 25.7 27.1 28.6 30.7 33.1
NL 330.9 419.5 465.2 476.3 488.6 501.9 521.7 542.6
AT 183.2 210.4 220.7 227.0 237.0 246.5 257.3 267.7
PT 87.0 122.3 135.4 137.5 142.8 147.2 151.2 157.1
FI 100.1 130.9 140.9 143.8 149.7 155.3 162.1 168.2
EUR-12 5 523.9 6 712.3 7 245.6 7 444.0 7 740.6 7 980.3 8 282.1 8 596.2
CZ 42.3 60.4 78.4 80.3 86.8 98.4 109.6 118.0
DK 139.1 173.6 184.7 189.6 197.2 208.2 221.5 232.0
EE 2.9 5.9 7.5 8.1 9.0 10.5 11.9 13.2
CY 7.0 9.9 11.1 11.7 12.5 13.4 14.0 14.9
LV 3.8 8.5 9.9 10.0 11.1 12.8 14.7 16.8
LT 4.9 12.4 15.0 16.4 18.1 20.6 22.9 25.0
HU 34.4 51.0 69.6 73.5 81.1 87.8 88.5 93.5
MT 2.7 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 5.0
PL 106.4 185.8 209.4 191.4 203.7 240.5 259.4 274.5
SI 15.5 20.8 23.7 24.9 26.1 27.4 29.2 31.1
SK 14.8 21.9 25.7 29.0 33.1 37.3 41.6 45.2
SE 191.6 262.6 258.9 269.5 282.0 288.0 300.2 315.8
UK 866.8 1 564.6 1 667.3 1 598.2 1 715.9 1 768.5 1 822.9 1 899.9
EU-25 6 956.1 9 093.9 9 811.3 9 950.9 10 421.6 10 798.3 11 223.4 11 681.2
Source: Commission services.456
A
N
N
EXTable A.5.2
Gross domestic product at 2000 market prices
(Annual percentage change)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 2.4 3.9 1.5 0.9 2.6 1.2 2.3 2.1
DE 1.9 3.2 0.1 -0.2 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.0
EL 2.1 4.5 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.4
ES 2.8 5.0 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.8
FR 2.4 4.1 1.2 0.8 2.3 1.4 1.9 2.0
IE 9.8 9.2 6.1 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.1
IT 2.8 3.6 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.3 1.2
LU 1.4 8.4 3.6 2.0 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.5
NL 3.0 3.5 0.1 -0.1 1.7 1.1 2.6 2.6
AT 1.9 3.4 1.0 1.4 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.2
PT 4.3 3.9 0.8 -1.1 1.1 0.3 0.9 1.1
FI 3.4 5.0 2.2 2.4 3.6 2.1 3.6 2.9
EUR-12 2.4 3.8 0.9 0.7 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.8
CZ 5.9 3.9 1.5 3.2 4.7 6.0 5.3 4.7
DK 3.1 3.5 0.5 0.7 1.9 3.1 3.2 2.3
EE 4.5 7.9 7.2 6.7 7.8 9.8 8.9 7.9
CY 9.9 5.0 2.1 1.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8
LV -0.9 6.9 6.5 7.2 8.5 10.2 8.5 7.6
LT 3.3 3.9 6.8 10.5 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.2
HU 1.5 5.2 3.8 3.4 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.2
MT 6.2 6.4 1.5 -2.5 -1.5 2.5 1.7 1.9
PL 7.0 4.2 1.4 3.8 5.3 3.2 4.5 4.6
SI 4.1 4.1 3.5 2.7 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.1
SK 5.8 2.0 4.6 4.5 5.5 6.0 6.1 6.5
SE 3.9 4.3 2.0 1.7 3.7 2.7 3.4 3.0
UK 2.9 4.0 2.0 2.5 3.1 1.8 2.4 2.8
EU-25 2.6 3.9 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.6 2.3 2.2
Source: Commission services.457
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EXTable A.5.3
Potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices
(Annual percentage change)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2
DE 2.2 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2
EL 2.2 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4
ES 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.3
FR 2.0 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3
IE 7.1 7.9 6.7 6.0 5.9 6.4 6.1 5.6
IT 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4
LU 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2
NL 2.6 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0
AT 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.1
PT 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2
FI 1.8 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
EUR-12 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0
CZ : 1.8 2.9 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.2
DK 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3
EE : 5.1 6.8 7.3 7.6 8.4 8.1 8.1
CY : 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.4 3.6 3.3 3.3
LV : 6.1 6.9 7.3 8.2 8.6 9.1 8.9
LT : 3.5 5.7 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.4 7.4
HU : 4.3 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8
MT : 3.3 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.4
PL : 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.3
SI : 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7
SK : 2.5 4.7 6.0 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.4
SE 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.9
UK 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7
EU-25 : 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3
Source: Commission services.458
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EXTable A.5.4
Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices
(Annual percentage change)
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BE -0.8 1.9 0.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
DE -0.4 1.0 -0.1 -1.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3
EL -2.6 -1.3 0.2 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
ES -3.2 2.3 1.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5
FR -1.4 2.4 1.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 -1.3
IE -2.6 4.9 3.3 1.7 0.3 -1.3 -2.4 -2.9
IT -0.3 1.8 1.1 0.0 -0.2 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4
LU -1.9 4.2 0.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2 -1.0
NL -1.1 3.3 -0.1 -1.9 -1.8 -2.3 -1.6 -1.0
AT -0.9 2.2 -0.4 -1.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3
PT -2.6 3.2 1.6 -0.9 -1.2 -1.9 -2.2 -2.3
FI -3.4 3.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.3 -1.1 -0.4 -0.4
EUR-12 -1.1 1.9 0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9
CZ : -1.9 -2.8 -3.2 -2.3 -0.2 1.0 1.4
DK -0.1 2.5 -0.4 -1.6 -1.7 -0.8 0.0 0.1
EE -6.7 -1.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.9 0.4 1.1 1.0
CY 1.1 1.8 1.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.0
LV -3.1 -1.8 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 1.0 0.5 -0.7
LT : -4.3 -1.5 2.0 1.8 2.4 1.6 0.4
HU 2.5 -0.2 -0.7 -1.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.1 0.3
MT -3.5 5.0 3.5 -0.4 -3.1 -2.3 -2.1 -1.6
PL -4.8 0.6 -2.2 -1.3 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.1
SI : 1.0 -0.5 -1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.1
SK : -1.1 -1.0 -2.4 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.2
SE -1.8 2.0 -0.3 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4
UK -0.7 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7
EU-25 : 1.7 0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Source: Commission services.459
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